Quiroz v. Mullin

Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of PUBLISH Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 30, 2026 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Christopher M. Wolpert _________________________________ Clerk of Court RIGOBERTO SANTILLAN QUIROZ, Petitioner - Appellant, v. No. 26-6019 MARKWAYNE MULLIN; TODD BLANCHE; JOSHUA JOHNSON; SCARLET GRANT, Respondents - Appellees. ----------------------------- IMMIGRATION LAW SCHOLARS; ROCKY MOUNTAIN IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY NETWORK; THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF ARIZONA; STATE OF COLORADO; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF DELAWARE; STATE OF HAWAI‘I; STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF MARYLAND; STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF MICHIGAN; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF VIRGINIA; STATE OF  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 2 WASHINGTON; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Amici Curiae. _________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 5:25-CV-01349-PRW) _________________________________ My Khanh Ngo of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, San Francisco, California (Michael K.T. Tan and Oscar Sarabia Roman of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, San Francisco, California; Judy Rabinovitz and Natalie Behr of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, New York; Timothy R. Macdonald and Scott C. Medlock of the American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado Foundation, Denver, Colorado; Megan Lambert and Travis D. Handler of the American Civil Liberties Union of Oklahoma Foundation, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Kelli Stump of Kelli J. Stump, PLLC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with her on the briefs), for Petitioner-Appellant. Drew C. Ensign, Deputy Assistant Attorney General (Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General; Keith I. McManus, Assistant Director; Anthony J. Nardi, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Department of Justice, on the brief), Washington, D.C., for Respondents- Appellees. Amit Jain of the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, Washington, D.C., filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Petitioner-Appellant, for Immigration Law Scholars. Rebecca Cassler of the American Immigration Council, Washington, D.C., filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Petitioner-Appellant, for the Rocky Mountain Immigrant Advocacy Network and the American Immigration Lawyers Association. Letitia James, Attorney General, and Gillian Barna, Assistant Solicitor General, State of New York, New York, New York, filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Petitioner-Appellant, for the State of New York, State of California, State of Arizona, State of Colorado, State of Connecticut, State of 2  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 3 Delaware, State of Hawai‘i, State of Illinois, State of Maine, State of Maryland, State of Massachusetts, State of Michigan, State of Minnesota, State of Nevada, State of New Jersey, State of Oregon, State of Rhode Island, State of Vermont, State of Virginia, State of Washington, and District of Columbia. _________________________________ Before BACHARACH, EBEL, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ FEDERICO, Circuit Judge. _________________________________ Petitioner Rigoberto Santillan Quiroz has been detained for more than eight consecutive months and counting. He is not charged with a crime. Nor does anyone suggest that he is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Rather, he is in pre-adjudicative detention 1 awaiting the outcome of his pending immigration removal proceedings. And because the Government recently interpreted immigration law to mandate his detention, Santillan Quiroz has not had the chance to argue for release at a bond hearing. 1 The term “pre-adjudicative detention” is not often used to label the circumstances of immigration detainees pending removal proceedings even though it is perhaps most descriptively accurate. See, e.g., Lindsay Nash, Resurrecting Immigration Releases, 135 Yale L.J. 1533, 1547 (2026) (discussing author’s preference for “pre-adjudication detention”); Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 533 (9th Cir. 2002) (also using “pre-adjudication civil detention”), rev’d sub-nom., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). For simplicity, we will refer to Santillan Quiroz’s status and circumstances as detention. 3  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 4 His case is before this court on appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention. Santillan Quiroz asks us to order the Government to release him or, alternatively, to provide him with a bond hearing to determine his suitability for release. The Government contests his petition, arguing that he is subject to mandatory detention and thus not entitled to release or a bond hearing. The question before us is whether Santillan Quiroz is eligible for bond and therefore entitled to meaningfully challenge his detention at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. Answering this question will require the court to navigate several statutory provisions found in our Nation’s immigration laws. We are not the first circuit court of appeals this year to wrestle with this issue. That is because the Government did not take the position – that petitioners like Santillan Quiroz are ineligible for release and thus not entitled to a bond hearing – until July 2025, so its position stems from a new and novel reading of old statutes. The Government’s new position has resulted in a large increase in the number of immigration detainees and a flood of habeas petitions challenging those detentions. The circuits have split on the best reading of the applicable statutes, and we are the latest court of appeals to weigh in on this question of national importance. Although the petition at issue presents a question of statutory 4  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 5 interpretation with nationwide implications, a habeas corpus petition is inherently personal. It is a challenge by one man, Santillan Quiroz, who remains detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The district court determined that Santillan Quiroz is not eligible for release or entitled to a bond hearing. We disagree and reverse. I Two decades ago, in 2006, Santillan Quiroz entered the United States. He has lived here ever since. In that time, Santillan Quiroz started a family. He married a lawful permanent resident and became a father to a U.S.-citizen stepdaughter. He provided for them financially and stayed by his wife’s side to offer care and support as she underwent treatment for a heart condition. Apart from one DUI for which he completed community service, he has no criminal history. By all accounts, Santillan Quiroz has become a valued and contributing member of his community. On November 2, 2025, ICE agents whisked Santillan Quiroz away from his family. After detaining Santillan Quiroz at a traffic stop, the agents initiated removal proceedings against him on the basis that he entered the country without admission or parole. But they did not release Santillan Quiroz after the traffic stop concluded. Instead, they held him for several more days before eventually sending him to a detention center, 5  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 6 where he remains in custody to this day. According to the Government, Santillan Quiroz must remain in mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Pointing to the same provision, the Government also claims that Santillan Quiroz is not entitled to a bond hearing and, as such, has not provided him with the opportunity to argue for release. Santillan Quiroz filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He asserted in his petition that the Government wrongly invoked § 1225(b)(2)(A) to detain him. Rather, Santillan Quiroz argued, his detention can only be authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and he is eligible for a bond hearing under that provision. A magistrate judge recommended granting Santillan Quiroz’s petition. However, the district court rejected that recommendation and denied the petition. Santillan Quiroz timely appeals that denial. II The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is “[t]he foundation of our laws on immigration and naturalization.” Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191, 195 (2020). Thirty years ago, Congress amended the INA when it enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. IIRIRA reformed the immigration removal system. Pre-IIRIRA, removal turned on physical entry. Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 481 6  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 7 n.2 (2012). Noncitizens 2 who had been stopped at the border or ports of entry (border, for short) were placed in exclusion proceedings and removable on grounds of excludability. Id. Noncitizens who had entered the country, whether lawfully or not, were placed in deportation proceedings and removable on grounds of deportability. Id. Post-IIRIRA, distinctions based on lawful entry replaced those based on physical entry. Specifically, IIRIRA introduced the term “admission,” which it defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Noncitizens who had entered the country unlawfully and therefore had not been admitted were subject to removal on grounds of inadmissibility. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 46 (2011) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)). Noncitizens who had entered lawfully and had been admitted remained subject to removal on grounds of deportability. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). Finally, IIRIRA merged exclusion proceedings and deportation proceedings into a single set of removal proceedings. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 481 n.2. 2 The INA uses the word “alien,” defined as “any person not a citizen or a national of the United States,” instead of “noncitizen.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). This opinion uses the term “noncitizen” to describe Santillan Quiroz and as an equivalent to “alien,” unless “alien” appears within a quotation or is used as part of a statutory term of art. 7  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 8 In conjunction with these reforms, IIRIRA consolidated the Government’s authority to detain noncitizens with pending removal proceedings into two provisions: § 1225 and § 1226. Of these two, § 1225 makes no mention of bond and instead mandates that noncitizens subject to its authority “shall be detained.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), (b)(2)(A). Meanwhile, § 1226 permits immigration officials to “release the alien on . . . bond” subject to some exceptions. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A). Soon after IIRIRA became law, the Government promulgated a regulation interpreting the relationship between § 1225 and § 1226. The regulation explained that “arriving aliens” (i.e., those at the border) are subject to § 1225 and do not “have available to them bond redetermination hearings.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). By contrast, “aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled [i.e., those already inside the United States] will be eligible for bond” under § 1226. Id. In simpler terms, the regulation said that § 1225 generally applies at the border while § 1226 applies in the country’s interior. Over the course of the next five Presidential administrations, that understanding held. But in July 2025, the Government reversed course. For the first time in IIRIRA’s nearly thirty-year history, the Government took the position that § 1225, specifically subsection (b)(2)(A), applied to 8  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 9 noncitizens who had already entered the country without admission. Memorandum from Rodney S. Scott, Commissioner, U.S. Customs & Border Protection (July 10, 2025), https://perma.cc/C6SM-MXGS. Two months later, the Board of Immigration Appeals followed suit and agreed with the Government’s new reading of the statute. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025). These twin decisions – made within the executive branch – led to a wave of habeas petitions challenging the mandatory detention of unadmitted noncitizens based on the Government’s newly minted interpretation. In the past few months, those petitions have begun to work their way into the circuit courts. So far, the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have each held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to unadmitted noncitizens who, like Santillan Quiroz, are found in the country’s interior. Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Mia., 175 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2026). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have agreed with the Government that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). Every other numbered circuit has heard argument on the question. Guerrero Orrellana v. Moniz, Nos. 25-2152, 26-1094 (1st Cir.) (argued 9  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 10 May 4, 2026); Buele Morocho v. Warden Phila. FDC, Nos. 26-1150, 26-1454 (3d Cir.) (argued May 11, 2026); Lopez Garcia v. Guadian, Nos. 25-7044, 25-7050 (4th Cir.) (argued May 5, 2026); Cirrus Rojas v. Olson, No. 25-3127 (7th Cir.) (argued June 15, 2026); 3 Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, No. 25-6842 (9th Cir.) (argued March 4, 2026). This court now adds its voice to the conversation on this important question of statutory interpretation. III We have jurisdiction over Santillan Quiroz’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because he appeals from the denial of a § 2241 habeas petition, “we review legal questions de novo and factual findings for clear error.” Standifer v. Ledezma, 653 F.3d 1276, 1278 (10th Cir. 2011). The sole issue we address in this appeal is whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) applies to Santillan Quiroz – a purely legal question of statutory interpretation – so our review is de novo. Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1156 (10th Cir. 2025). A The court’s task when interpreting a statute is to “give effect to the clear meaning of [that] statute[] as written.” Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity 3 A prior Seventh Circuit panel previously deadlocked on this issue in the context of an appeal from the refusal to dissolve an immigration consent decree. Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 175 F.4th 828 (7th Cir. 2026). 10  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 11 Brands, Inc., 580 U.S. 405, 414 (2017) (quoting Est. of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992)). Courts do so “by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). Often, this requires courts to dive into textual minutiae, parsing verb tense and the choice of one synonym over another. We will soon be doing just that. But before we get there, we first step back to appreciate the “broader context of the statute” and the baseline upon which we perform our statutory analysis. A statute’s broader context includes “the longstanding practice of the government.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the Government’s interpretation of nearly thirty years – that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies at the border while § 1226(a) applies in the interior – qualifies as such a longstanding practice. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323. “[T]he fact that no President has ever found” § 1225(b)(2)(A) to mandate detention in the interior until now is “strong evidence that [such mandate] does not exist.” 4 4 Citing 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii), the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Government had previously extended § 1225(b)(2)(A) beyond the border. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 507; accord Hernandez Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1307 (Lagoa, J., dissenting). Not quite. Although this regulation references § 1225(b)(2)(A), it implements expedited removal under a 11  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 12 Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. 229, 250 (2026). Indeed, the Supreme Court has previously invoked this principle in the immigration context, rejecting an interpretation of a statutory subsection at odds with one that “every Presidential administration” had adopted in the then-26 years “[s]ince IIRIRA’s enactment.” Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 805 (2022). Resisting this idea, the Government suggested at oral argument that this history is merely unreasoned practice (as opposed to reasoned executive analysis) that grew out of “bureaucratic inertia.” Oral Arg. at 39:00–39:45. Maybe so. But that characterization gives the Government no aid because it is precisely “Presidential practice” that matters. Learning Res., 607 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added). So long as the executive branch issued an “interpretation . . . roughly contemporaneously with enactment of the statute” (check), and that interpretation “remained consistent over time” (check), we give the Government’s longstanding interpretation weight in the analysis. Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 386. The fact that this interpretation came in the form of an affirmative regulatory action, 62 Fed. Reg. at 10323, also refutes the Government’s related argument that we are dealing with a different subsection, § 1225(b)(1). So far as it extended detention into the interior, it did so only for noncitizens who satisfied the criteria in § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II), a subsection that does not apply to § 1225(b)(2)(A). 12  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 13 mere “lack of administrative exercise.” See Resp. Br. at 52–53 (citing Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 131 (1983)). What’s more, the Supreme Court has endorsed this (until recently) unbroken interpretation and practice. In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court explained that, for purposes of our immigration laws, § 1225 governs the processing of noncitizens at “the Nation’s borders and ports of entry.” 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Once noncitizens are “inside the United States,” § 1226 “generally governs the process of arresting and detaining that group of aliens pending their removal.” Id. at 288. In short, Jennings explained that § 1225 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country” while § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country.” Id. at 289 (emphasis added). 5 We therefore approach the Government’s novel, contrary position with a healthy dose of skepticism. 5 Jennings’s description of the interplay between § 1225 and § 1226 is obiter dictum. Still, we are “bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when the dicta is recent and not enfeebled by later statements.” N. Mill St., LLC v. City of Aspen, 6 F.4th 1216, 1228 n.11 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007)). Jennings therefore counsels, if not requires, us to rule in Santillan Quiroz’s favor since immigration agents did not arrest Santillan Quiroz at the border. The Government objects that Jennings is ambiguous on whether § 1225 is restricted to the border. But we need not linger on the meaning of Jennings’s dicta. In light of the importance of the issues raised in this appeal, we conduct a full statutory 13  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 14 With that baseline established, we proceed with a statutory analysis. We first analyze the text of the specific provision invoked to detain Santillan Quiroz, § 1225(b)(2)(A), including how that provision fits into § 1225 as a whole. We then discuss how § 1225(b)(2)(A) interacts with § 1226(a) before considering and rejecting the Government’s statutory purpose arguments. Finally, we explain how and why constitutional avoidance applies here. We hold that noncitizens who entered the United States and were thereafter detained in the interior of the country are usually subject to § 1226(a) (and thus eligible for bond), not § 1225(b)(2)(A). 6 B “We begin, as always, with the language of the statute.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001). Here, that language reads in relevant part: [I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding[.] 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphases added). analysis as if Jennings’s dicta were nonbinding, and we ultimately reach the same result. 6 Some noncitizens who are arrested in the interior may be subject to § 1225(b)(1)(A). There is no argument here that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to Santillan Quiroz. 14  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 15 The outcome of this appeal turns on how § 1225(b)(2)(A) uses the terms “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission.” According to Santillan Quiroz, each of the two terms are independent restrictions on § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s scope. He concedes that he is an applicant for admission but contends that he is not seeking admission. So, from his perspective, § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him or noncitizens like him. On the other hand, the Government argues that “seeking admission” has no independent force separate from “applicant for admission.” From its vantage point, § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to all applicants for admission, including Santillan Quiroz and other unadmitted noncitizens arrested in the country’s interior. 1 Two mirror image principles guide our interpretation of “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission.” First, “[w]hen a term goes undefined in a statute, we give the term its ordinary meaning.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566 (2012). Second, “[w]hen ‘a statute includes an explicit definition’ of a term, ‘we must follow that definition[] even if it varies from a term’s ordinary meaning.’” Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374, 387 (2021) (quoting Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 47 (2020)); accord Feliciano v. Dep’t of Transp., 605 U.S. 38, 50 n.4 (2025). “Applicant for admission” is a defined term. Accordingly, we eschew its ordinary meaning in favor of its statutory definition: “An alien present 15  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 16 in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). By contrast, “seeking admission” is only partially defined. Congress defined “admission” to mean lawful entry following inspection, but it said nothing about what it means to be “seeking” something. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). This tells us “seeking admission” is equivalent to “seeking lawful entry” and leaves us to define “seeking” according to that word’s ordinary meaning. To determine the ordinary meaning of “seek,” we consult contemporary dictionaries. See M.S. v. Premera Blue Cross, 118 F.4th 1248, 1266 (10th Cir. 2024). Here, our sister circuits have already done the legwork by canvassing such dictionaries, and we agree with them that “seek” ordinarily means “request,” “ask for,” or something similar. Barbosa da Cunha, 175 F.4th at 74; accord Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 722–23; Avila, 170 F.4th at 1134; Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502. Of course, § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not use the verb “seek” but rather the present participle “seeking.” The choice of present participle adds another layer to our interpretation because it requires present and continuing action. See, e.g., D.L. Markham DDS, MSD, Inc. 401(K) Plan v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 88 F.4th 602, 610 (5th Cir. 2023); United States v. Stewart, 73 F.4th 423, 425 (6th Cir. 2023); Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 16  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 17 48 F.4th 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2022); Shell v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 941 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2019). Putting these pieces together, we conclude that a noncitizen is “seeking admission” when he takes some kind of ongoing action to request lawful entry into the United States. To be clear, we do not construe “seeking admission” as limited to the literal moments that a noncitizen is filling out a form or speaking with an immigration official to request admission. See Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502; Avila, 170 F.4th at 1134. It is enough that some pending request for admission remains open or ongoing because that indicates the process of securing admission is still active. See Khakhn v. Holder, 371 F. App’x 933, 937 (10th Cir. 2010) 7 (suggesting that under our immigration laws, a person is “‘applying’ for adjustment of status” until “his application [is] denied”). With these constructions of “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” in hand, it becomes apparent why § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to Santillan Quiroz. By statutory definition, Santillan Quiroz is an applicant for admission because he is present in the United States without 7 We cite unpublished decisions for their persuasive value only and do not treat them as binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 17  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 18 having been admitted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). However, he is not seeking admission since he has no present request for lawful entry pending. The fact that Santillan Quiroz is not seeking admission is more than mere happenstance. Noncitizens in Santillan Quiroz’s position – that is, those who entered the United States without admission and who have lived here since – are categorically unable to seek admission while they remain in the country. Part of the reason is a matter of logic and common sense. A person cannot make a present request for permission to enter the United States, lawfully or otherwise, once he or she has already entered. The other reason this is true relates to the structure of our immigration laws. A noncitizen can request legal status even after he has entered the United States unlawfully, but he cannot request admission after the fact. That is because “[l]awful status and admission . . . are distinct concepts in immigration law.” Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 593 U.S. 409, 415 (2021). Lawful status allows a noncitizen “to remain in the country.” Id. at 416. Admission, though, is defined in terms of “entry into the United States, denoting by its plain terms passage into the country from abroad.” Medina-Rosales v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original) (quoting Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2014)). The concept of admission “does not encompass a post-entry adjustment of status” because such adjustment does not involve “passage 18  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 19 into the country from abroad.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted); accord Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 544 (5th Cir. 2008). So, for instance, a noncitizen who entered the country unlawfully, but who later receives temporary protected status or asylum, does not become admitted even though he has lawful status. Sanchez, 593 U.S. at 415. The upshot is that once a noncitizen has entered unlawfully, no amount of legal maneuvering allows him to go back in time and make his initial entry lawful. The only time a noncitizen can be said to be seeking admission is when he is seeking to enter the United States at the border. 8 Since § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those seeking admission, § 1225(b)(2)(A) is likewise limited to the border. This border-oriented result tracks with the larger context of § 1225, starting with the section’s title: “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 Our dissenting colleague on the Sixth Circuit observes that “the law sometimes treats present immigrants as ‘seeking admission’ even after an illegal entry.” Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 752 (Murphy, J., dissenting). That’s true as far as it goes. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C), some lawful permanent residents are regarded as seeking admission even after entering the country. But § 1101(a)(13)(C) is a specific statutory carveout that applies only to lawful permanent residents. It does not apply to noncitizens like Santillan Quiroz who never had lawful permanent resident status and therefore does not displace the ordinary meaning of “seeking admission” as applied to Santillan Quiroz. 19  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 20 8 U.S.C. § 1225. While a title does not control over the text, it can helpfully “reinforce[] what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.” Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 120–21 (2023) (quoting Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 552 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)). Such is the case here. For starters, § 1225’s title refers to “[i]nspection by immigration officers.” When Congress enacted IIRIRA in 1996, immigration inspections took place at the border. See Barbosa da Cunha, 175 F.4th at 98 & n.12 (Cabranes, J., concurring) (collecting cases). Immigration officials were statutorily required to conduct inspections at ports of entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1995). And noncitizens were required to undergo inspection when making entry at the border or else face deportation or criminal charges. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B) (1995) (deportable offense); id. § 1325(a) (1995) (criminal offense). The title’s reference to inspections, then, hints that § 1225 focuses on the border. So too does the title’s reference to “arriving aliens”; a noncitizen arrives in the country when he or she crosses the border. Additional border-related language abounds in the body of § 1225. Subsections (a)(2), (b)(1)(A)(i) & (ii), (b)(1)(F), (b)(2)(C), (c)(1), and (d)(2)(A) all speak of noncitizens who are “arriving” or who “arrive[].” Further, subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) authorize immigration agents to search 20  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 21 vehicles that are “bringing” noncitizens, or in which noncitizens are “being brought,” into the country. Again, all that happens at the border. Only a single provision within § 1225, subsection (b)(1)(A)(iii)(II), mentions or refers to noncitizens in the country’s interior. Unlike that provision, § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not include language that references noncitizens who are present in the interior. “When Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, we generally take the choice to be deliberate.” Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1, 11 (2022) (citation modified). So, Congress’s omission of any reference to the interior in § 1225(b)(2)(A) is evidence that the subsection does not apply to the interior. That said, § 1225(b)(2)(A) also lacks the express reference to arriving noncitizens that limits many other provisions of § 1225 to the border. And one could argue that this omission implies § 1225(b)(2)(A) is not limited to the border. See Castañon-Nava, 175 F.4th at 875 (Kirsch, J., dissenting). What to do with these competing omissions? The answer is that “[t]he force of any negative implication [] depends on context.” Parrish v. United States, 605 U.S. 376, 389 (2025) (quoting NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. 288, 302 (2017)). Given that so many of § 1225’s provisions focus on arrival at the border while there is only a single outlier that applies to the interior, the best way to interpret subsection (b)(2)(A)’s dual omissions in context is to 21  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 22 treat subsection (b)(2)(A) like the majority of the other provisions in § 1225 by limiting it to the border. In the absence of express indication otherwise, we apply the rule and not the exception. Based on the statutory text and context, we conclude that § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s application is limited to the border. 2 Pushing back against this reasoning, the Government offers several textual arguments in an effort to persuade us that its reading and interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) must prevail. We are not convinced. The Government’s core position is that “applicant for admission,” but not “seeking admission,” limits § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s scope. Which is to say, the Government openly asks us to read the phrase “seeking admission” out of the statute. Since only “applicant for admission” has any force in the Government’s view, Congress could have more simply drafted § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [such] alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Government’s reading runs afoul of the so-called canon against surplusage, or the idea that courts should “‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute’” since it is “presum[ed] that each word 22  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 23 Congress uses is there for a reason.” Advoc. Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 581 U.S. 468, 477–78 (2017) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000)). It also runs afoul of the related canon that when Congress “uses certain language in one part of the statute [‘applicant for admission’] and different language in another [‘seeking admission’],” we presume “different meanings were intended.” DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 83 (2011) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004)). To be sure, these canons are not ironclad rules. Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 385 (2013). “Sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy.” Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334, 346 (2019). And interpreting different language “to mean roughly the same thing” is not categorically “forbid[den].” Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 540 (2013). However, these canons put a thumb on the scale in favor of giving “seeking admission” independent effect, and it is up to the Government to convince us that its redundant interpretation is the “more natural one.” Stanley v. City of Sanford, 606 U.S. 46, 56 (2025) (citation omitted). The crux of the Government’s argument is this: An applicant for admission is, by definition, someone who is applying for admission. Because applying for something is a form of seeking that thing, it follows that an 23  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 24 applicant for admission is seeking admission. To drive this point home, the Government borrows an analogy to college applications from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502; Avila, 170 F.4th at 1134. A college applicant, says the Government, must be applying to that college and therefore must also be seeking admission there. On the surface, this argument seems logical. But that surface appeal is the product of an interpretive sleight of hand. In drawing its analogy to the college admissions process, the Government relies on “[t]he everyday meaning” of “applicant for admission.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502; accord Avila, 170 F.4th at 1134 (using the “ordinary meaning” of the term). IIRIRA, however, statutorily defines the term “applicant for admission” as someone who is present in the United States without admission or who is arriving in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). This “statutory definition . . . excludes unstated meanings of that term.” Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484–85 (1987). We must therefore construe “applicant for admission” as “[IIRIRA] defines that phrase,” not according to the phrase’s ordinary meaning. Van Buren, 593 U.S. at 387–88 (emphasis in original). The Government does not do so. Instead, it conflates ordinary and statutory meaning. See Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 727–28; Hernandez Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1267; Barbosa da Cunha, 175 F.4th at 75–76. When 24  Appellate Case: 26-6019 Document: 91-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 25 determining whether Santillan Quiroz is an applicant for admission, the