M. C. C.-G. v. Todd W. Blanche

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 E.E.V. and M.C.C.-G., Petitioners, v. TODD W. BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. ____________________ On Petitions for Review of Orders of the Department of Homeland Security. Nos. A000-000-000 & A000-000-000. ____________________ ARGUED APRIL 15, 2026 — DECIDED JULY 6, 2026 ____________________ Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and KOLAR, Circuit Judges. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Federal law prohibits removal of a noncitizen from the United States to a country where he or she will be persecuted because of a protected ground or sub- jected to torture. In most circumstances, agency denials of such relief are subject to judicial review. 2 Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 We consider here the federal government’s motions to dis- miss petitions for review brought by noncitizens who seek withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioners E.E.V. and M.C.C.-G. are two of a larger group of noncitizens who seek judicial review of removal orders because they fear persecution and torture if they are removed. Before the Supreme Court decided Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025), binding circuit precedent required petitioners like E.E.V. and M.C.C.-B. to wait to file their peti- tions for judicial review until all their administrative proceed- ings had concluded. E.g., F.J.A.P. v. Garland, 94 F.4th 620, 628– 29 (7th Cir. 2024); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (so-called “zipper clause” consolidating review of all questions of law and fact arising from removal proceedings). The Court held in Riley that the statutory thirty-day deadline to seek judicial review in such cases runs from the date of a final administrative re- moval order even though a noncitizen’s requests for with- holding of removal and CAT relief may still be pending. Un- less the Riley treatment of that deadline is subject to equitable tolling, these petitions for review were filed too late. The government has moved to dismiss these petitions as untimely. It has also raised new jurisdictional arguments that seek more broadly to block judicial review of many nonciti- zens’ requests for withholding of removal or CAT relief. We reject the government’s attempts to limit such judicial review, both as applied to these petitioners and more broadly. We in- stead follow the path mapped out in Riley itself and find these petitioners are entitled to equitable tolling of the thirty-day deadline. We deny these motions to dismiss. Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 3 I. Factual and Procedural Background A. Withholding-Only Relief The government may not remove involuntarily a nonciti- zen from the United States to a country: (1) where her “life or freedom” would be threatened due to her race, religion, na- tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; or (2) where it is more likely than not that she would be subjected to torture. The first is a statutory prohibition known as “withholding of removal” or sometimes “statutory withholding of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); see 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1(a)(1), 208.16(a) (terminology). The second is an inter- national treaty obligation under the Convention Against Tor- ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, often referred to as “CAT relief.” Dec. 10, 1984, Senate Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; see also Au- guste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 130–34 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing ratification and congressional reservations); 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (implementing regulations). With five narrow exceptions, nearly all noncitizens present in the United States are eligible to seek these forms of relief. Foreign Affairs Reform and Re- structuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), § 2242(c), Pub. L. No. 105- 277, 112 Stat. 2681–822, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Because “removal from the United States is not at issue” in such pro- ceedings—only the country where a noncitizen may be sent is at issue—these limits are forms of “withholding-onlyʺ relief. Riley, 606 U.S. at 263.1 A noncitizen may seek withholding-only relief during re- moval proceedings before an immigration judge and the 1 Asylum is not a form of withholding-only relief. Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 536–37 (2021). 4 Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 Board of Immigration Appeals. However, not all noncitizens go through such plenary removal proceedings. Three alterna- tive removal processes are implicated in these petitions for ju- dicial review. First, the Department of Homeland Security may issue an “expedited removal order” to a noncitizen who lacks valid entry documents and cannot demonstrate contin- uous physical presence in the United States for the past two years. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(7) (terminol- ogy). Second, the agency may issue a “final administrative re- moval order” (sometimes known as a “FARO”) to a nonciti- zen convicted of an “aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b); 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2)(i) (terminology). Third, the agency may “reinstate” a prior order of removal against a noncitizen who was previously removed and who then illegally reenters the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). Expedited removal orders, final administrative removal orders, and reinstatement orders may not be reviewed by an immigration judge or appealed to the Board. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(C), 1231(a)(5); 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(3) (challenge to a FARO goes straight to court of ap- peals without review by immigration judge or Board).2 Nonetheless, noncitizens subject to these orders are still entitled to seek withholding-only relief. A noncitizen subject to a final administrative removal order or reinstatement order who expresses fear of returning to the country of removal will 2 There is one limited exception: when a person subject to expedited removal claims to have status as a lawful permanent resident, refugee, or asylee, or claims to be a United States citizen, and the immigration officer cannot verify that claim, the officer will issue the expedited removal order and refer the person to an immigration judge for review of that claim (and not any other issues). If the person proves his or her claim, the expedited removal order is vacated. The immigration judge’s decision cannot be ap- pealed to the Board. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5). Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 5 be interviewed by an asylum officer to determine if the noncit- izen has a “reasonable fear” of persecution or torture, mean- ing a reasonable possibility exists that he will be persecuted on the basis of a protected ground or tortured in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b)–(c). If the asylum officer makes a positive determination, the noncitizen is referred to an immigration judge for withhold- ing-only proceedings. § 208.31(e). If the officer makes a nega- tive determination, the noncitizen may have that determina- tion reviewed by an immigration judge based on the record before the asylum officer. § 208.31(g); § 1208.31(g) (2020). If the immigration judge upholds the negative determination, that decision may not be appealed to the Board. The immigra- tion judge may also vacate the negative determination and place the noncitizen in withholding-only proceedings in which the final decision may be appealed to the Board. § 1208.31(g)(1)–(2) (2020).3 For an expedited removal order, the process is slightly dif- ferent. A noncitizen who asserts a fear of persecution or tor- ture in the country of removal will be interviewed by an asy- lum officer to determine if the noncitizen has a “credible fear” of persecution or torture, meaning there is a “significant pos- sibility” the noncitizen is eligible for withholding of removal or CAT protection. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(b), (e)(2)–(3). If the officer makes a positive determination, the noncitizen will be re- ferred to an immigration judge for withholding-only proceed- ings (or for plenary removal proceedings), and again the final 3 See Pangea Legal Services v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 512 F. Supp. 3d 966 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (enjoining amendment to rule). 6 Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 decision may be appealed to the Board. § 208.30(f); Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 887–88 (D.C. Cir. 2020).4 A negative determination must be reviewed by a supervi- sory asylum officer, and if the supervisor concurs with the of- ficer, the noncitizen may have the determination reviewed by an immigration judge, who must provide the noncitizen with an opportunity to be heard and questioned. § 208.30(g)(1). If the immigration judge concludes that the noncitizen lacks a credible fear of persecution or torture, the noncitizen cannot appeal to the Board. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A). Critical to this case, any “final order of removal” other than an expedited removal order is subject to judicial review in the court of appeals through a petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)–(2). The term “final order of removal” is not de- fined in the United States Code, although the Illegal Immigra- tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) provides that “any reference in law to an order of removal shall be deemed to include a reference to an order of exclusion and deportation or an order of deportation.” § 309(d)(2), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–627. An “order of deportation” means an order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A). The “zipper clause” consolidates judicial re- view of all questions of law and fact arising out of removal proceedings into a single judicial proceeding through a peti- tion for review of a final order of removal. § 1252(b)(9) (“Judi- 4 A noncitizen subject to an expedited removal order may apply for asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), unlike someone subject to a final ad- ministrative removal order or reinstatement order, §§ 1228(b)(5), 1231(a)(5). Upon a positive credible-fear determination, the asylum officer may retain jurisdiction over the asylum claim. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f). Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 7 cial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpre- tation and application of constitutional and statutory provi- sions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.”). The motions to dismiss we consider here are based on the statutory deadline for filing a petition for review: “The peti- tion for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Until recently, every court of appeals, including this court, held that the clock for that deadline started upon the conclusion of withholding-only proceedings. F.J.A.P. v. Garland, 94 F.4th 620, 628–29 (7th Cir. 2024) (collecting cases and noting Second and Fourth Circuits had recently departed from this view), ab- rogated by Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259. The Supreme Court held last year in Riley v. Bondi, how- ever, that because a final administrative removal order may not be appealed within the agency—which is also true of a reinstatement order—it becomes final and starts the clock for the thirty-day deadline upon issuance even if withholding proceedings remain pending. 606 U.S. 259, 266–67, 272 (2025) (“withholding-only proceedings do not disturb the finality of an otherwise final order of removal”). The Court recognized the “legitimate practical concerns” posed by needing to file a petition for review before withholding-only proceedings con- clude. Id. at 272. The solution to that problem, the Court wrote, is for the government to “alert the court of appeals to the pendency of a withholding-only proceeding so that re- view there can wait until that issue is decided.” Id. 8 Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 The Riley Court also held that the thirty-day deadline is not a jurisdictional bar. Id. at 277. That conclusion is important because “[a] litigant’s failure to comply with a jurisdictional bar deprives a court of all authority to hear a case, regardless of waiver or equitable considerations.” Id. at 273, quoting 33 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 8316, p. 50 (2018). The Court concluded: “In sum, we hold that § 1252’s 30-day filing rule is not jurisdictional, but because the Gov- ernment does not wish to press that ground for dismissal, it does not preclude this case from proceeding on remand.” Ri- ley, 606 U.S. at 277. An opinion dissenting in part noted that in such cases, equitable tolling is “likely available now that the Court has recognized that § 1252(b)(1)’s appeal deadline is not jurisdictional.” Id. at 302–03 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part). B. These Petitions for Review Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Riley on June 26, 2025, this court received over a dozen petitions for review from noncitizens whose orders of removal had been final for more than thirty days when Riley was decided, but whose withholding-only proceedings were still pending or whose negative credible-fear determinations were pending before immigration judges. Unlike in Riley itself, however, the gov- ernment has moved to dismiss or deny each of these petitions as untimely. Because the government and each petitioner raised substantially similar arguments in each motion, we di- rected the parties to identify suitable lead cases for briefing and argument on the common issues presented in these mo- tions. After receiving their selections, we consolidated these Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 9 two petitions for briefing and argument on the motions to dis- miss.5 E.E.V. is a citizen of El Salvador. She entered the United States unlawfully and was removed to El Salvador under an expedited removal order issued in March 2007 and executed two months later. Years later, in August 2015, Border Patrol agents apprehended her after she reentered the United States near Rio Grande City, Texas. The agency issued a reinstate- ment order the next day in McAllen, Texas. At some later time, E.E.V. expressed fear of returning to El Salvador. An asylum officer conducted a reasonable-fear interview in February 2017. The officer determined that E.E.V. showed a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in El Salvador and referred her to an immigration judge for withholding-only proceedings. Her proceedings began in Chicago and were later reassigned to another immigration judge in Indianapolis, where they re- main pending as of this decision. E.E.V. filed her petition for review on July 24, 2025, less than thirty days after the Su- preme Court issued its decision in Riley. M.C.C.-G. is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States on an unknown date. In November 2018, she was con- victed of theft in a municipal court in Goshen, Indiana, and given a suspended sentence of 365 days in custody. She was later detained by immigration officials after a traffic stop. The agency notified her of its intent to issue a final administrative 5 The other petitions for review presenting common issues identified at the time were Nos. 25-2226, 25-2227, 25-2238, 25-2239, 25-2257, 25-2258, 25-2265, 25-2266, 25-2267, 25-2273, 25-2274, 25-2281, and 25-2282. This court later granted the petitioner’s unopposed motion for voluntary dis- missal in No. 25-2266. See Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). At this time, we are also aware that similar issues may be presented in Nos. 25-2301 and 25-2453. 10 Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 removal order on May 11, 2025, and issued it the next day. She expressed fear of returning to Mexico, but an asylum officer found that she did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. She requested review of that determination by an immigration judge. That request was still pending when she filed her petition for review on July 26, 2025, also within thirty days after Riley was issued. On August 7, 2025, the immigra- tion judge vacated the negative reasonable-fear determination and placed her in withholding-only proceedings. Those pro- ceedings were before an immigration judge during the brief- ing of these motions, but the judge later denied relief on De- cember 8, 2025. She appealed to the Board, where her pro- ceedings remain pending as of this decision. II. Jurisdictional Challenges Before we turn to the equitable tolling issues at the center of these cases, we must address two new arguments challeng- ing this court’s jurisdiction. The first challenge—raised for the first time in the government’s reply brief—is that a reinstate- ment order is not subject to judicial review because it is not a final order of removal. That argument asks us to overrule binding precedents in this circuit and is contrary to prece- dents in all other circuits as well. If we were to adopt the gov- ernment’s position, we would foreclose judicial review of questions of law and fact arising from reinstatement orders, including entitlement to CAT protection and even claims of mistaken identity and United States citizenship. The second challenge, that these petitions were filed too early, is irrecon- cilable with the government’s primary position—that they were filed too late—and runs counter to the course charted in Riley itself for placeholder petitions for review like these. We reject both jurisdictional challenges. Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 11 A. Reviewability of Reinstatement Orders This court has consistently concluded that a reinstatement order is a final order of removal subject to judicial review un- der 8 U.S.C. § 1252. E.g., Velazquez-Olais v. Blanche, 172 F.4th 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2026); F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 633; Villa v. Barr, 924 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 2019); Torres-Tristan v. Holder, 656 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2011); Lemos v. Holder, 636 F.3d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 2011). Though the dissenting opinion calls these con- clusions “‘drive-by’ jurisdictional statements,” neither that opinion nor the government has identified any precedential decision from any circuit holding otherwise. See post at 53. And while Riley abrogated some of the analysis in F.J.A.P., the Court said nothing about reinstatement orders. That’s not surprising because Riley did not involve a reinstatement order in the first place. Judicial review of a reinstatement order is limited to the reinstatement order itself. Villa, 924 F.3d at 372–73. To issue a reinstatement order, an immigration official must make three determinations: (1) the identity of the noncitizen; (2) that the noncitizen was removed or departed voluntarily under a prior order of removal; and (3) that the noncitizen unlawfully reentered the United States. Id. at 373, citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a). Those three determinations, not the validity of the original order of removal that is “reinstated,” are what may be reviewed. See id. Although judicial review of a reinstatement order is nar- row, the zipper clause both allows and requires a petition for judicial review of a final order of removal to raise a peti- tioner’s challenges to the denial of withholding-only relief. See F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 635 (“Section 1252(b)(9)’s zipper clause consolidates our review of withholding proceedings with our 12 Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 review of final orders of removal; it does not limit that re- view.”); see also id. at 641 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (“With a final order of removal, we can review all questions of law and fact … arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove [the] alien from the United States.”) (internal quo- tation marks omitted and alterations in original).6 The government argues now that a reinstatement order is not a final order of removal. If that position were accepted, courts of appeals would lack jurisdiction to consider through a petition for review any questions of law and fact arising from a reinstatement order. There would be no judicial review of whether the government has the right person, whether the person is likely to be subjected to torture, whether the person reentered the country illegally, and even whether the person subject to the order is or is not actually a United States citizen with a constitutional right to remain in the United States. We do not overrule circuit precedent without a “compel- ling reason,” such as statutory changes or intervening Su- preme Court decisions that have undermined our prior case law. United States v. Betts, 99 F.4th 1048, 1055–56 (7th Cir. 2024), quoting Wilson v. Cook County, 937 F.3d 1028, 1035 (7th 6 Although prior precedents of this court characterized § 1252(b)(9) as a limit and not a grant of jurisdiction, they did so in the context of peti- tioners arguing that the zipper clause overrides other unambiguous juris- dictional limits in § 1252. See Leyva v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 2004). This court has since emphasized the “strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 633, quoting Salinas v. United States Railroad Retirement Bd., 592 U.S. 188, 197 (2021). Ac- cordingly, “[t]o the extent there is ambiguity in the meaning of” the phrase “shall be available only in judicial review of a final order” in § 1252(b)(9), “it must be resolved in [petitioners’] favor.” See Salinas, 592 U.S. at 197. Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 13 Cir. 2019) (per curiam). Three cases warrant discussion here: Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020), Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021), and Riley. None provides a sound reason, let alone a compelling one, to overrule circuit prece- dent and restrict judicial review in such cases. Nasrallah did not undermine this court’s precedents. The “narrow” question presented in Nasrallah was whether the so- called “criminal alien bar” stripping the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to review factual challenges, but not legal or con- stitutional challenges, to a final order of removal for a noncit- izen convicted of certain criminal offenses extends to the de- nial of CAT relief. The Court’s answer hinged on analysis that is not relevant here. 590 U.S. at 576; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 627 (terminology). The Court concluded that it does not, for two reasons. “A CAT or- der is not itself a final order of removal because it is not an order ‘concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering de- portation.’” 590 U.S. at 582, quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A). It also does not “merge into” a final order of removal since it does not “affect the validity” of the removal order, as the noncitizen still may be removed to a different country. Id. Nasrallah itself recognized the narrow scope of its “merge into” analysis when it wrote that “FARRA and § 1252(b)(9) simply establish that a CAT order may be re- viewed together with the final order of removal, not that a CAT order is the same as, or affects the validity of, a final or- der of removal.” Id. at 583. In other words, whether an order merges into a final order of removal for purposes of the crim- inal alien bar is a distinct question from whether it is subject to judicial review through a petition for review of a final order of removal. 14 Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 Guzman Chavez also did not undermine circuit precedent. There, the Court discussed two immigration detention provi- sions not relevant to these petitions. 594 U.S. at 526, 533, citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1231(a)(1)(A)–(B), (2). As both the majority and the separate opinion in F.J.A.P. recognized, the Court ex- pressly left open in a footnote whether a reinstatement order is a final order of removal and noted that § 1252 “uses differ- ent language than § 1231 and relates to judicial review of re- moval orders rather than detention.” Id. at 535 n.6, cited in F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 632 (majority), 643–44 (Brennan, J.). Further, in F.J.A.P., which was decided in 2024, after Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez, we reaffirmed that a reinstate- ment order is a final order of removal subject to (limited) ju- dicial review. 94 F.4th at 633. A separate opinion questioned that holding and drew particular attention to Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez, so we are confident the majority did not simply overlook this issue. See id. at 643–44 (Brennan, J.). The separate opinion noted that “caution counsels against” over- ruling precedent and wrote: “So, as does the majority opinion, I conclude that a reinstatement decision is a final order of re- moval subject to judicial review under § 1252(b)(9).” Id. at 644 (Brennan, J.). That leaves only Riley as a possible candidate for overrul- ing circuit precedent. But Riley clearly supports our prece- dents on the reviewability of reinstatement orders. In con- cluding that a denial of withholding-only relief is not a final order of removal, the Court wrote as follows on the definition of the term “order of removal”: While the Immigration and Nationality Act does not define the term “order of removal,” any statutory reference to “an order of removal” Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 15 is “deemed to include a reference to … an order of deportation.” Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 309(d)(2), 110 Stat. 3009–627. An “order of de- portation,” in turn, is defined as an order “con- cluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A). So an “order of removal” must have those same char- acteristics. We must therefore identify which order con- cluded that Riley is “deportable” and com- manded his deportation, and it is clear that the qualifying order is the FARO issued by DHS on January 26, 2021. That order held that Riley was deportable and directed that he be removed from the United States. Id. at 267. The Court had already used § 1101(a)(47)(A) to de- fine the term “order of removal” in Nasrallah. 590 U.S. at 579. Riley, if anything, expanded the definition of “order of re- moval” to encompass not only an “order of deportation” as defined in the statute but also an order with the “same char- acteristics.”7 Notably, Riley used the terms “removable” and “re- moved” interchangeably with “deportable” and “deported.” Compare id. at 264 (“If the immigration officer finds that the alien is removable … the officer issues a FARO specifying the country to which the alien must be deported.”) (emphasis 7 The withholding-only relief at issue in Riley was “deferral of re- moval,” which is temporary relief available to a noncitizen categorically ineligible for permanent CAT relief. 606 U.S. at 265; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a). 16 Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 added), with id. at 267 (“[The FARO] held that Riley was de- portable and directed that he be removed from the United States.”) (emphasis added). That choice is consistent with the “statute-wide change in terminology” made by IIRIRA. Cal- cano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 n.1 (2001); see also Per- alta-Cabrera v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 837, 839 n.1 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[O]ne of the many changes made was the substitution of the term ‘deportation’ with ‘removal.’”).8 On its face, E.E.V.’s reinstatement order fits that definition. It is an “order” that declares: “In accordance with [8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)], you are removable as an alien who has illegally reentered the United States after having been previously re- moved or departed voluntarily while under an order of exclu- sion, deportation or removal and are therefore subject to re- moval by reinstatement of the prior order.” (Emphasis added). The next sentence of the order informs E.E.V. how she can “contest this determination.” (Emphasis added). Her rein- statement order is therefore a “final order of removal” under the definition given in Riley. See Laureano v. Attorney General, 177 F.4th 453, 457 (3d Cir. 2026) (“[T]he reinstatement order … itself operates to remove [petitioner] from the United States, meeting the definition of a final order of removal.”), citing Riley, 606 U.S. at 267. After all, E.E.V. cannot again be removed under her original expedited removal order without that order being reinstated. “Once an order has been exe- cuted, it cannot be re-executed.” Velazquez-Olais, 172 F.4th at 538. 8 We do not suggest that the different terminology may never be im- portant, just that it did not matter in Riley and does not matter here. Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 17 The dissenting opinion contends otherwise: “Reinstate- ment orders are not defibrillators. I am aware of no statute or case stating that original removal orders are defunct until given life by reinstatement orders.” See post at 55. That is es- sentially what happens, though. A noncitizen who is removed and reenters the country is not removable through reinstate- ment unless and until an immigration officer determines that she reentered illegally. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). If a nonciti- zen reenters the country legally—for example, with the con- sent of the Attorney General, see Mendoza v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 672, 679–80 (7th Cir. 2018) and §§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii), 1326(a)— then the prior order of removal remains defunct. There is nothing unusual about our exercising jurisdiction over reinstatement orders. Even the government acknowl- edges that “the courts of appeals have unanimously exercised jurisdiction over petitions for review of reinstatement or- ders.” Respondent’s Reply Br. at 3. Indeed. See Arevalo v. Ash- croft, 344 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003); Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2008); Laureano, 177 F.4th at 457; Tomas- Ramos v. Garland, 24 F.4th 973, 980 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2022) (treat- ing negative reasonable-fear determination as relevant re- moval order); Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 885, 890 (5th Cir. 2014); Moreno-Martinez v. Barr, 932 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 2019); Lara- Nieto v. Barr, 945 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2019); Ruiz v. Bondi, 172 F.4th 673, 676 (9th Cir. 2026); Arostegui-Maldonado v. Gar- land, 75 F.4th 1132, 1139–40 (10th Cir. 2023); Avila v. U.S. At- torney General, 560 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009).9 9 Some of these cases included explicit or implicit holdings on the tim- ing of judicial review that were abrogated by Riley. 18 Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 Against this weight of authority, the government and the dissenting opinion suggest there is a recent trend challenging that conclusion. Each one of the cited authorities either agreed with our holding, did not squarely decide the issue, was not a majority opinion, is no longer in force, or some combination of the four. See F.J.A.P., 94 F.4th at 644 (Brennan, J.); Martinez v. Garland, 86 F.4th 561, 568 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e leave that question for another day.”), vacated and remanded, 145 S. Ct. 2836 (2025) (in light of Riley); Ruiz-Perez v. Garland, 49 F.4th 972, 976 (5th Cir. 2022) (“But today is not the day.”); Bhak- tibhai-Patel v. Garland, 32 F.4th 180, 195 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[W]e recognize that an illegal reentrant may obtain judicial review of DHS’s decision to reinstate a prior order of removal ….”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Riley, 606 U.S. 259; Vega- Anguiano v. Barr, 982 F.3d 542, 559 (9th Cir. 2019), as amended (2020) (Bennett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“An alien subject to reinstatement may petition for ju- dicial review of the reinstatement order.”); Arostegui-Maldo- nado, 75 F.4th at 1149 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“[L]ike most circuits, we treat the reinstatement order as the func- tional equivalent of an order of removal and therefore retain jurisdiction to review it.”); Laureano, 177 F.4th at 472–73 (Matey, J., dissenting).10 Under the government’s and the dissenting opinion’s the- ory, a reinstatement order is not subject to any judicial review through a petition for review, including even a challenge based on citizenship. That jurisdictional prohibition would apply equally to a petition for review that is indisputably timely. If the government were correct on this point, then a 10 The Fifth Circuit is currently considering this question. See Martinez v. Blanche, No. 25-60400 (5th Cir. Mar. 2, 2026), Dkt. No. 70. Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 19 United States citizen wrongfully deported in the past and sub- sequently detained by immigration authorities might lack any way to vindicate in federal court his constitutional right to re- main in the United States. After all, immigration statutes limit the availability of the writ of habeas corpus, the historical mechanism for United States citizens to assert so-called “nationality claims,” in favor of consolidating such questions into a single petition for re- view in the court of appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2), (4)–(5), (b)(9); cf. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653, 696, 705 (1898) (affirming grant of habeas relief to birthright citizen wrongfully refused reentry to United States), citing Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417 (1891). Notably, for an expe- dited removal order, which is the only kind of removal order excluded from the petition for review procedure, judicial re- view of a nationality claim is available through habeas corpus. § 1252(e)(2). Not so for a reinstatement order, though. Nor may a person in removal proceedings or one ordered re- moved seek a declaratory judgment of citizenship in a district court. § 1503(a). Indeed, the statutory provision authorizing the court of appeals to decide a nationality claim on the plead- ings or to transfer it to a district court for factual development presupposes the existence of a “petitioner” who “may have such nationality claim decided only as provided in this para- graph,” meaning through a petition for review of a final order of removal. § 1252(b)(5). Wrongful deportation of United States citizens is not merely a “hypothetical” concern with “vanishingly small” odds, as the dissenting opinion asserts. See post at 56. Case reports show that the government has on several occasions sought to deport citizens through reinstatement and rejected 20 Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 their nationality claims at every stage until a court stepped in on a petition for review. See Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d 419, 421–22, 427 (5th Cir. 2013) (granting United States citizen’s pe- tition for review challenging reinstatement of a removal or- der); Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1072–74, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); Garza-Flores v. Mayorkas, 38 F.4th 440, 443, 446 (5th Cir. 2022) (ordering hearing on nationality claim on petition for review from reinstatement order); Batista v. Ash- croft, 270 F.3d 8, 10–12, 17 (1st Cir. 2001) (habeas corpus peti- tion challenging reinstatement order transferred from district court for treatment as petition for review; ordering hearing on nationality claim). In Gastelum Chavez v. Barr, the government pursued reinstatement against a person who had already been acquitted of illegal reentry after presenting a citizenship defense. 773 F. App’x 427, 427–28 (9th Cir. 2019) (non-prece- dential) (affirming district court’s citizenship finding). In other words, the government’s new jurisdictional argu- ment asserts a power for the executive branch to banish, with- out any access to judicial review, wrongfully deported United States citizens who return to this country. See Duarte-Ceri v. Holder, 630 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The most precious right of citizenship is at stake. The stakes are indeed high and mo- mentous, for deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.”) (cleaned up), quoting first Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963), then Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947), and then Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). In fact, if not even a person’s identity or the existence of the prior order of re- moval were subject to judicial review, then the government’s jurisdictional theory would allow the executive to banish an- yone. We are concerned not merely with clerical errors that the “safeguards” identified by the dissent might sometimes— Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 21 but not always—catch. See post at 56. Indeed, various govern- ments across the world have sought ways to select at will the “right” people to ship off to the “right” places.11 Such breath- taking power for the executive branch in the United States would fly in the face of both the constitutional allocation of authority between the branches of government and the mean- ing of United States citizenship. See Trump v. Barbara, 609 U.S. —, —, 146 S. Ct.—, —, No. 25-365, slip op. at 26 (U.S. June 30, 2026) (“Citizenship, then and now, was the right to have rights—to freely participate in our political community. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment extended that prom- ise to ‘every free-born person in this land.’ We keep that promise today.”) (citation omitted). We would not easily be persuaded that Congress has im- plicitly granted the government that power, if it even could grant such a power. Nothing in Riley or any other Supreme Court decision convinces us to overrule circuit precedent to do so. We conclude once again that a reinstatement order is a final order of removal. B. Ripeness The government’s next jurisdictional argument makes a U-turn, saying these petitions for review should be dismissed as not yet ripe. That argument asks us to reject the path charted in Riley itself for dealing with the new practical real- ity, after Riley, that a petition for review will almost always 11 See Dareh Gregorian et al., El Salvador’s President Says He Won’t Re- turn Mistakenly Deported Man to U.S., NBC News (Apr. 14, 2025), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/president-el- salvador-wont-return-deported-man-kilmar-abrego-garcia-rcna201136. 22 Nos. 25-2256 & 25-2268 need to be filed before withholding-only proceedings have finished: The Government’s final submission concerns the practical problems that it fears will arise if a removal order becomes final before the issue of withholding-only relief is decided. The Govern- ment worries that aliens like Riley who wish only to contest removal to their native country will not file a petition for review until their re- quest for withholding of removal to that desti- nation is denied. And if an alien files a petition for review before the question of withholding- only relief is settled, the Government fears that the proceeding in the court of appeals may be wrapped up before the BIA denies w