Full Opinion

25-2547 Mejia Diaz v. Blanche UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ MERARY YAMILETH MEJIA DIAZ, Petitioner, v. No. 25-2547 TODD BLANCHE, United States Attorney General, Respondent. _____________________________________ For Petitioner: H. RAYMOND FASANO, Youman, Madeo & Fasano, LLP, New York, New York For Respondent: JENNIFER P. WILLIAMS (Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General; Song Park, Assistant Director, on the brief), Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Merary Yamileth Mejia Diaz, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of a decision of the BIA affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision to deny her application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien who is not a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) and is removable may apply for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). To be eligible for non-LPR cancellation of removal, an alien must show, among other things, that her “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [her] spouse, parent, or child, 2 who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). “To satisfy the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship requirement, ‘a noncitizen must demonstrate that a qualifying relative would suffer hardship that is substantially different from or beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to result from [her] removal.’” Toalombo Yanez v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 35, 39 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 215 (2024)). In determining whether a qualifying relative will suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, the agency considers “all hardship factors . . . in the aggregate,” including “the ages, health, and circumstances of qualifying . . . relatives.” In Re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63–64 (B.I.A. 2001). A “strong applicant might have a qualifying child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in school,” but “[a] lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of return . . . generally will be insufficient in themselves to support a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Id. Where, as here, an alien’s application for cancellation of removal is “based on the health of a qualifying relative, [the] applicant needs to establish that the [qualifying] relative has a serious medical condition and, if he or she is 3 accompanying the applicant to the country of removal, that adequate medical care for the claimed condition is not reasonably available in that country.” Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 808, 811 (B.I.A. 2020) (footnote omitted). We review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA and, in this case, address only the dispositive hardship determination. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We have jurisdiction to review whether the facts found by the agency satisfy the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard for an alien’s qualifying relative, but we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s underlying findings of historical fact, including “an IJ’s factfinding on . . . the seriousness of a family member’s medical condition.” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 212, 225; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D). We review the agency’s hardship determination for clear error. See Toalombo Yanez, 140 F.4th at 40–45; Diaz v. Blanche, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 3341223, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 5, 2026). We lack jurisdiction to review Mejia Diaz’s challenges to the IJ’s factual findings. Specifically, Mejia Diaz argues that the agency failed to support its finding that her children’s medical conditions are “not serious.” Mejia Diaz Br. at 16–17. But the agency acknowledged the children’s documented medical conditions – which included asthma, anxiety, a heart murmur, and a growth on 4 one child’s back – before concluding that they were not serious. S. App’x at 3–4. That conclusion as to the conditions’ seriousness is a core factual finding that the Supreme Court has explicitly stated we may not review. See Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225. To be sure, we have treated some factual mistakes as legal errors where the agency “totally overlooked” or “seriously mischaracterized” facts material to the hardship analysis. Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 2009). Mejia Diaz insists that the agency did just that when it determined that her younger son’s heart condition did not require “medical intervention,” even though he had an electronic “holter” to monitor his heart. Mejia Diaz Br. at 17; see S. App’x at 4. But the agency expressly reviewed the relevant medical records, along with two letters from a cardiologist who stated that Mejia Diaz’s son’s heart condition was “common,” that his “prognosis is good,” and that his condition required “[n]o intervention.” J. App’x at 269, 273; S. App’x at 8. On this record, we cannot say that the agency’s conclusion was a mischaracterization. Mejia Diaz also contends, with respect to her older son, that the agency ignored a 2018 letter from a social worker indicating that professional assistance would be crucial to his behavioral health. Mejia Diaz Br. at 16–17. But the agency 5 acknowledged the letter, see S. App’x at 8, which said nothing about the availability of such care in El Salvador, J. App’x at 430. Therefore, the agency did not clearly err in concluding that the record was insufficient to establish that medical care for her child’s behavioral health condition would be unavailable in El Salvador. S. App’x at 4, 9–10. Finally, Mejia Diaz argues that the agency did not give adequate weight to a World Health Organization (“WHO”) report about the purported inadequacy of healthcare in El Salvador and to her testimony regarding the same. Mejia Diaz Br. at 18. But the WHO report is a general overview of El Salvador’s healthcare system and does not address the specific ailments from which Mejia Diaz’s children suffer. Moreover, the record reflects that El Salvador has a universal health care system, even if the country is not always “able to meet population needs.” J. App’x at 285, 318. Such evidence of a generally lower standard of medical care than available in the United States, absent a showing that treatment for the specific ailment is not reasonably available, is not legally sufficient to establish unusual hardship. See Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 812–13 (conducting ailment specific inquiry); Toalombo Yanez, 140 F.4th at 45–46 (same). Especially given the agency’s undisturbed findings regarding the non-serious nature of the medical conditions 6 at issue in this application, we cannot say that it clearly erred in its assessment of El Salvador’s healthcare system as it pertains to her children’s medical needs. Nor does the fact that the BIA and IJ did not explicitly mention the WHO report in their decisions mean that the agency committed legal error. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (presuming that the agency “has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”); Mendez, 566 F.3d at 323 (“[T]he agency does not commit an error of law every time an item of evidence is not explicitly considered.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because we are not left with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” Toalombo Yanez, 140 F.4th at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted); Diaz, 2026 WL 3341223, at *1, we may not disturb the agency’s finding that Mejia Diaz failed to establish that her removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her children. * * * We have considered Mejia Diaz’s other arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 7