Mejia Diaz v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-2547
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
25-2547
Mejia Diaz v. Blanche
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 16th day of November, two thousand twenty-six.
PRESENT:
REENA RAGGI,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
MERARY YAMILETH MEJIA DIAZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 25-2547
TODD BLANCHE, United States Attorney
General,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
For Petitioner: H. RAYMOND FASANO, Youman, Madeo &
Fasano, LLP, New York, New York
For Respondent: JENNIFER P. WILLIAMS (Brett A. Shumate,
Assistant Attorney General; Song Park,
Assistant Director, on the brief), Office of
Immigration Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
Petitioner Merary Yamileth Mejia Diaz, a native and citizen of El Salvador,
petitions for review of a decision of the BIA affirming the Immigration Judge’s
(“IJ”) decision to deny her application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien who is not a lawful
permanent resident (“LPR”) and is removable may apply for cancellation of
removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). To be eligible for non-LPR cancellation of
removal, an alien must show, among other things, that her “removal would result
in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [her] spouse, parent, or child,
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who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.” Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). “To satisfy the exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship requirement, ‘a noncitizen must demonstrate that a qualifying
relative would suffer hardship that is substantially different from or beyond that
which would ordinarily be expected to result from [her] removal.’” Toalombo Yanez
v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 35, 39 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209,
215 (2024)).
In determining whether a qualifying relative will suffer exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship, the agency considers “all hardship factors . . . in the
aggregate,” including “the ages, health, and circumstances of qualifying . . .
relatives.” In Re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63–64 (B.I.A. 2001). A
“strong applicant might have a qualifying child with very serious health issues, or
compelling special needs in school,” but “[a] lower standard of living or adverse
country conditions in the country of return . . . generally will be insufficient in
themselves to support a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”
Id. Where, as here, an alien’s application for cancellation of removal is “based on
the health of a qualifying relative, [the] applicant needs to establish that the
[qualifying] relative has a serious medical condition and, if he or she is
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accompanying the applicant to the country of removal, that adequate medical care
for the claimed condition is not reasonably available in that country.” Matter of
J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 808, 811 (B.I.A. 2020) (footnote omitted).
We review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA and, in this case, address
only the dispositive hardship determination. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of
Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We have jurisdiction to review whether the
facts found by the agency satisfy the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
standard for an alien’s qualifying relative, but we lack jurisdiction to review the
agency’s underlying findings of historical fact, including “an IJ’s factfinding on . . .
the seriousness of a family member’s medical condition.” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at
212, 225; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D). We review the agency’s hardship
determination for clear error. See Toalombo Yanez, 140 F.4th at 40–45; Diaz v.
Blanche, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 3341223, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 5, 2026).
We lack jurisdiction to review Mejia Diaz’s challenges to the IJ’s factual
findings. Specifically, Mejia Diaz argues that the agency failed to support its
finding that her children’s medical conditions are “not serious.” Mejia Diaz Br. at
16–17. But the agency acknowledged the children’s documented medical
conditions – which included asthma, anxiety, a heart murmur, and a growth on
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one child’s back – before concluding that they were not serious. S. App’x at 3–4.
That conclusion as to the conditions’ seriousness is a core factual finding that the
Supreme Court has explicitly stated we may not review. See Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at
225.
To be sure, we have treated some factual mistakes as legal errors where the
agency “totally overlooked” or “seriously mischaracterized” facts material to the
hardship analysis. Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 2009). Mejia Diaz
insists that the agency did just that when it determined that her younger son’s
heart condition did not require “medical intervention,” even though he had an
electronic “holter” to monitor his heart. Mejia Diaz Br. at 17; see S. App’x at 4. But
the agency expressly reviewed the relevant medical records, along with two letters
from a cardiologist who stated that Mejia Diaz’s son’s heart condition was
“common,” that his “prognosis is good,” and that his condition required “[n]o
intervention.” J. App’x at 269, 273; S. App’x at 8. On this record, we cannot say
that the agency’s conclusion was a mischaracterization.
Mejia Diaz also contends, with respect to her older son, that the agency
ignored a 2018 letter from a social worker indicating that professional assistance
would be crucial to his behavioral health. Mejia Diaz Br. at 16–17. But the agency
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acknowledged the letter, see S. App’x at 8, which said nothing about the availability
of such care in El Salvador, J. App’x at 430. Therefore, the agency did not clearly
err in concluding that the record was insufficient to establish that medical care for
her child’s behavioral health condition would be unavailable in El Salvador. S.
App’x at 4, 9–10.
Finally, Mejia Diaz argues that the agency did not give adequate weight to
a World Health Organization (“WHO”) report about the purported inadequacy of
healthcare in El Salvador and to her testimony regarding the same. Mejia Diaz Br.
at 18. But the WHO report is a general overview of El Salvador’s healthcare system
and does not address the specific ailments from which Mejia Diaz’s children suffer.
Moreover, the record reflects that El Salvador has a universal health care system,
even if the country is not always “able to meet population needs.” J. App’x at 285,
318. Such evidence of a generally lower standard of medical care than available in
the United States, absent a showing that treatment for the specific ailment is not
reasonably available, is not legally sufficient to establish unusual hardship. See
Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 812–13 (conducting ailment specific inquiry);
Toalombo Yanez, 140 F.4th at 45–46 (same). Especially given the agency’s
undisturbed findings regarding the non-serious nature of the medical conditions
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at issue in this application, we cannot say that it clearly erred in its assessment of
El Salvador’s healthcare system as it pertains to her children’s medical needs. Nor
does the fact that the BIA and IJ did not explicitly mention the WHO report in their
decisions mean that the agency committed legal error. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t
of Just., 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (presuming that the agency “has taken
into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests
otherwise”); Mendez, 566 F.3d at 323 (“[T]he agency does not commit an error of
law every time an item of evidence is not explicitly considered.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Because we are not left with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed,” Toalombo Yanez, 140 F.4th at 44 (internal quotation marks
omitted); Diaz, 2026 WL 3341223, at *1, we may not disturb the agency’s finding
that Mejia Diaz failed to establish that her removal would cause exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to her children.
* * *
We have considered Mejia Diaz’s other arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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