Full Opinion

23-7615 Yanez-Tuabanda v. Blanche BIA Ling, IJ A220 193 456/455 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 3 rd day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, MICHAEL H. PARK, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ DEYCI VERONICA YANEZ- TUABANDA, N.Y.C.-Y.,* Petitioners, v. 23-7615 NAC * We have used only initials to refer to the minor petitioner in this publicly accessible order, consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(a)(3) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(5). TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONERS: Reuben S. Kerben, Kerben Law Firm, P.C., Kew Gardens, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Julie M. Iversen, Senior Litigation Counsel; Robert Michael Stalzer, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Deyci Veronica Yanez-Tuabanda and her minor child, both natives and citizens of Ecuador, seek review of an October 3, 2023, decision of the BIA affirming a March 23, 2023, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Deyci Veronica Yanez-Tuabanda, et al., Nos. A220 193 456/455 (B.I.A. Oct. 3, 2023), aff’g Nos. A220 193 456/455 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 23, 2023). 2 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA. See Chen v. Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, 435 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2006). Petitioners did not challenge the IJ’s rejection of their CAT claim before the BIA; it is therefore unexhausted, and we do not consider it. See Vera Punin v. Garland, 108 F.4th 114, 124 (2d Cir. 2024) (requiring exhaustion of issues before the BIA). We review “the entirety of the agency’s conclusions” – both findings of fact and the application of law to fact – for substantial evidence. Al Saidi v. Blanche, 185 F.4th 286, 297 (2d Cir. 2026) (citing Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 545 (2026). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). “We review constitutional claims and questions of law de novo.” Paucar v. Garland, 84 F.4th 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2023). To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must establish “past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). 3 “[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation modified). It “encompasses a variety of forms of adverse treatment, including non-life-threatening violence and physical abuse,” but it “does not encompass mere harassment.” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation modified). “Private acts can . . . constitute persecution if the government is unable or unwilling to control such actions.” Pan v. Holder, 777 F.3d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 2015). Yanez-Tuabanda’s stepfather’s injury and his brother’s tragic murder, which she did not claim to have witnessed and was not a means of targeting her, did not support her claim of past persecution because “applicants can become candidates for asylum relief only based on persecution that they themselves have suffered.” Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 494 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that reliance on harm to a family member may amount to past persecution if the applicant was in the “zone of risk” and suffered harm following the incident or where the harm was a means of targeting the applicant). Yanez-Tuabanda was harassed by classmates as a child and lived in a house that was robbed once when 4 she was an adult, but she did not allege that she suffered specific harm as a result. Thus, the agency reasonably concluded that she failed to establish harm rising to the level of persecution. See Mei Fun Wong, 633 F.3d at 72; Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d at 341. Because Yanez-Tuabanda did not demonstrate past persecution, she was not entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear or likelihood of persecution and thus had the burden to establish that she had such a fear on account of a protected ground. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). A well-founded fear of future persecution “requires that the alien . . . establish that h[er] fear is objectively reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). The agency did not err in finding Yanez-Tuabanda’s fear of persecution speculative because she did not allege that the men who attacked her stepfather in 2004 had contacted her or her family since, that there was a basis to conclude that the attackers were involved in the robbery of her house many years later, or that the attackers or anyone else had expressed an interest in harming her. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the record . . . [an applicant’s] fear is speculative at best”). Further, the harassment and general crime conditions she alleged are insufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. See 5 Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d at 341; see also Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313–14 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that “random violence” and “general crime conditions” are not grounds for asylum). Because Yanez-Tuabanda failed to establish a well- founded fear of persecution, the agency did not err in denying asylum and withholding of removal. See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that an applicant who “fails to demonstrate the . . . chance of persecution required for the grant of asylum, . . . necessarily fails to demonstrate the clear probability of future persecution required for withholding of removal” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). We need not reach the agency’s alternative bases for denying those forms of relief. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 6