Alzokari v. Mullin
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket24-3196
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
24-3196-cv
Alzokari v. Mullin
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
AUGUST TERM 2025
(ARGUED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2025 DECIDED: NOVEMBER 20, 2026)
Docket No. 24-3196-cv
ETAB SHARAF MOHAMED ALZOKARI, KAID NAGIP ZOKARI, AMAL
ALZEWKERI REDHEWAN, FAYIZ NAGIP ZOKARI,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
- against -
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in His Official Capacity as Secretary for the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES; JOSEPH B. EDLOW, in His Official Capacity as
Director of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; ROSEMARY
LANGLEY MELVILLE, in Her Official Capacity as Director of the USCIS
California Service Center; JOHN M. ALLEN, in His Official Capacity as
Director of the USCIS Texas Service Center; UNITED STATES
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, LONG ISLAND FIELD OFFICE;
ELIZABETH MILLER, in Her Official Capacity as Field Office Director of
the USCIS Long Island Field Office; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
STATE; NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION;
NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECORDS CENTER,
Defendants-Appellees. *
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
*Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Substitution of
Parties, the Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as reflected
above.
24-3196-cv
Before:
WALKER, CARNEY, AND SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a November 26, 2024 final judgment of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Block, J.), dismissing on the pleadings all claims either for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), respectively. These claims
arose from two brothers’ efforts over time to challenge, on the basis
that they were U.S. citizens, the government’s authority to remove
them to Yemen. The district court determined that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the brothers’ claims under (1) Section 1503 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1503,
because the INA forecloses the institution of an action to declare
citizenship when citizenship is “in issue” in a removal proceeding;
and also under (2) the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5
U.S.C. § 701 et seq., due to the presence of an adequate alternative
remedy and preclusion by the INA. The district court also dismissed
the brothers’ constitutional claims under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process clause, the First Amendment right to petition the
government, and the Constitution’s separation of powers principles
for failure to state a claim. The brothers appeal from each of these
holdings.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
Judge Sullivan concurs in part and dissents in part in a
separate opinion.
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JULIE A. GOLDBERG, Goldberg & Associates, P.C.,
Melvindale, MI, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
LAYALIZA SOLOVEICHIK (Varuni Nelson, on the
brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, Of
Counsel, for John J. Durham, United States
Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York, Brooklyn, NY, for Defendants-
Appellees.
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from a November 26, 2024 final judgment of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Block, J.), dismissing on the pleadings all claims either for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), respectively. These claims
arose from two brothers’ efforts over time to challenge, on the basis
that they are United States citizens, the government’s authority to
remove them to Yemen. The district court determined that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the brothers’ claims under (1) Section
1503 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1503,
because the INA forecloses the institution of an action to declare
citizenship where citizenship is “in issue” in a removal proceeding;
and also under (2) the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5
U.S.C. § 701 et seq., due to the presence of an adequate alternative
remedy and preclusion by the INA. The district court also dismissed
the brothers’ constitutional claims under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process clause, the First Amendment right to petition the
government, and the Constitution’s separation of powers principles
for failure to state a claim. The brothers appeal from each of these
holdings.
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For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of the Zokari brothers’ claims, except for its dismissal of
their APA claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in part,
vacate it in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.
Judge Sullivan concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate
opinion.
BACKGROUND
Kaid (“Kaid”) and Fayiz (“Fayiz”) Zokari are brothers who
were born in Yemen and assert that they acquired United States
citizenship through their now-deceased father, Nagip Zokari, who
they allege had resided in the United States for more than ten years
during the 1970s and 80s and was naturalized as a U.S. citizen on July
4, 1979, before either was born. We refer to Kaid and Fayiz, together,
as the “brothers” or the “Zokari brothers.”
I. Administrative History
The Zokari brothers allege that, in 2011, each mistakenly filed
an Application for Naturalization, also known as Form N-400, with
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). They claim
that, at the time of filing, they had “not realiz[ed] they had acquired
citizenship at birth[.]” Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief at 4.
Both N-400 applications were denied by USCIS. In response to
the applications, however, USCIS noted that the brothers “may have
acquired citizenship at the[ir] time[s] of birth” through their father,
and requested from them documents, such as tax returns, W-2 forms,
medical records, and bank statements, that would show that their
father had resided in the United States for ten years prior to the
brothers’ births, potentially rendering them eligible for derivative
U.S. citizenship. Supp. App’x at 31 ¶ 82. The brothers do not appear
to have taken any steps to determine their citizenship, however, until
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after they were each arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) in 2016.
In December 2016, ICE commenced removal proceedings
against both brothers based on their convictions for conspiracy to
commit food stamp fraud. In February 2017, the brothers each
appeared before an immigration judge and subsequently moved to
terminate their respective removal proceedings on the basis that they
were U.S. citizens through their father. Subsequently, each filed with
USCIS an Application for Certificate of Citizenship Form N-600 (“N-
600 application”) to obtain from the government a certificate of their
U.S. citizenship.
In 2018, despite their pending N-600 applications, an
immigration judge denied the brothers’ motions to terminate removal
proceedings against them, finding that the United States had not
recognized them as citizens at that point. The Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) declined to consider the brothers’ interlocutory
appeals and returned their cases to the immigration court with no
further action, while observing that each could challenge its ruling in
an appeal from a final order of removal, if one were entered.
In 2019, after the brothers requested but did not receive from
the government additional evidence of their father’s past presence in
the United States, USCIS denied the brothers’ N-600 applications for
certificates of citizenship, having deemed the applications
“abandoned.” Supp. App’x at 35–36 ¶¶ 113–19. USCIS subsequently
denied the brothers’ motions to reopen and reconsider the denials of
their N-600 applications. In 2021, USCIS’s Administrative Appeals
Office dismissed Fayiz’s appeal. (The record contains no evidence of
any such appeal by Kaid.)
In 2020, after the denial of the brothers’ N-600 applications and
while removal proceedings against them were still pending, the
brothers’ respective wives, Plaintiffs-Appellants Etab Sharaf
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Mohamed Alzokari (wife of Kaid) and Amal Alzewkeri Redhewan
(wife of Fayiz), each filed a Petition for Alien Relative Form I-130 in
pursuit of permanent resident cards (“green card”) for their
husbands. In 2022, both petitions were granted, permitting the
brothers to apply for green cards while pursuing their citizenship
claims.
In 2021, in response to the denials of their N-600 applications,
the brothers again sought additional information about their father’s
presence in the United States by filing a Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”) request with the Department of State to secure their father’s
passport records. In January 2022, the government’s response to the
brothers’ FOIA request included their father’s passport applications
and their naturalization applications. Armed with these documents,
the brothers again moved to terminate their removal proceedings on
the basis that they were United States citizens. An immigration judge
denied these motions in November 2022.
The brothers finally achieved some success, however, when, in
February 2024, an immigration judge granted their motions to
terminate their removal proceedings on the basis that they had
established a prima facie case for derivative U.S. citizenship.
Then, in February 2025, the Zokari brothers each received
United States passports from the Department of State. They
nonetheless pursued their applications for certificates of citizenship
through the action filed in 2022 and now before us on appeal.
II. Procedural History
The Zokari brothers and their wives (the four together, the
“Zokaris”) filed this action in 2022 and the amended complaint, which
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is the operative filing, in 2023. The amended complaint includes the
five claims rejected by the district court in the ruling appealed here. 1
On March 27, 2024, the four Zokaris submitted a letter to the
district court, informing it that the Zokari brothers’ removal
proceedings had been terminated because the brothers had
established a prima facie case for derivative U.S. citizenship and thus
were not removable under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA. See 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In response to the Zokaris’ letter,
Defendants-Appellees (the “Government”) argued that,
notwithstanding the termination of removal proceedings, the
applicable statutes required that the federal court action be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) or for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The district court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss
in November 2024. The district court concluded that it was without
subject matter jurisdiction to review the APA and INA claims and that
the Zokari brothers’ constitutional claims failed to state claims upon
which relief could be granted. See Alzokari v. Mayorkas, 758 F. Supp.
1
Although named as Plaintiffs in the amended complaint, Etab and Amal,
wives of Kaid and Fayiz, respectively, each filed only an I-130 petition on
behalf of their husbands, and those applications were apparently granted.
See Supp. App’x at 38 ¶¶ 136–37. The claims asserted in the amended
complaint, however, involve only USCIS’s denial of the brothers’ N-600
applications. Thus, it appears that Etab and Amal may not have standing
to pursue the relief sought in the complaint, for they have failed to show
that they have suffered any injury redressable by that relief. See Knight v.
City of New York, 164 F.4th 173, 178 (2d Cir. 2026) (explaining that “a plaintiff
must demonstrate standing for each claim that he presses and for each form
of relief that he seeks” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)).
On remand, the district court should consider whether Etab and Amal each
have a sufficient basis to remain as plaintiffs in the case.
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3d 39, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2024). The district court dismissed the complaint
and entered judgment the same day.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the Zokaris argue that the district court erred in
holding that: (1) it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over each of the
brothers’ INA claim because the INA did not provide jurisdiction
over the claim; (2) it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
brothers’ APA claims because the claims were precluded by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1503(a) and because the brothers had access to alternative remedies
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b); and (3) the brothers failed to state claims for
constitutional violations under the Fifth Amendment, First
Amendment, and separation of powers principles.
After considering these arguments, we find that the district
court did not err in its rulings on the INA and constitutional claims.
We conclude, however, that the district court was mistaken when it
dismissed the Zokari brothers’ APA claims in reliance on the theories
that another remedy was adequate and available under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 and that Section 1503(a) of the INA precluded judicial review
of the challenged agency action. We hold that no other remedy was
both adequate and available to the Zokari brothers because their
removal proceedings had been terminated in their favor and without
a final order of removal. This disposition of their removal
proceedings made the proposed alternative remedy of review under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) unavailable. We further hold that Section 1503(a)
of the INA does not preclude APA review of the agency action.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of the Zokari
brothers’ APA claims, remand the APA claims for further
proceedings, and affirm the district court’s dismissal of the brothers’
remaining INA and constitutional claims.
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I. INA Claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1503 and APA Claims under 5
U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A) and (D)
It is well settled that “where a district court grants a defendant's
Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, an appellate court will review the
district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions
de novo.” Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43 F.4th 112, 120 (2d Cir. 2022)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff asserting subject
matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that it exists.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110,
113 (2d Cir. 2000). “In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a district court . . . may refer
to evidence outside the pleadings.” Id.
A. INA Claim
We agree with the district court that the Zokari brothers’ claim
under Section 1503(a) of the INA fails for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Section 1503(a) is entitled “Proceedings for declaration of
United States nationality.” It provides a cause of action to “any
person who is within the United States [and] claims a right or
privilege as a national of the United States and is denied such right or
privilege by any department or independent agency . . . upon the
ground that he is not a national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1503(a). It further provides, however, that “no such action may be
instituted” where “the issue of such person’s status as a national of
the United States (1) arose by reason of, or in connection with any
removal proceeding . . . or (2) is in issue in any such removal
proceeding.” Id. § 1503(a)(1), (2).
Here, the removal proceedings against the Zokari brothers
began in December 2016. They filed their N-600 applications in March
2017 and sought to terminate their removal proceedings that same
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month on the ground that they were U.S. citizens. The brothers then
filed their federal court complaint in January 2022 and their amended
complaint in May 2023. Their removal proceedings were terminated
eight months later, in February 2024. Accordingly, when the brothers
“instituted” their federal court action under Section 1503(a) in
January 2022 (or even in May 2023), the “status [of each of them] as a
national” was “in issue in a[] . . . removal proceeding.” Id.
§ 1503(a)(2). The action was therefore barred by Section 1503(a)(2).
That the removal proceedings were terminated before the
government moved to dismiss the brothers’ action in April 2024 or
before the district court ruled on that motion in November 2024 is of
no moment. The district court was not correct to say that “the
citizenship of [the brothers] [was] ‘in issue’ in an ongoing removal
proceeding” when it issued its decision in November 2024: the
removal proceedings had ended in February 2024, as just mentioned.
Alzokari, 758 F. Supp. 3d at 43. But, as we explain above, the statutory
text refers to the point at which an action is “instituted”—that is, when
the action is filed. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (emphasis added). When the
brothers “instituted” their federal court action here, their nationality
status was “in issue” in a removal proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)(2).
The cause of action created by Section 1503(a) was therefore not
available to them.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the
Zokari brothers’ INA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. APA Claims
In the district court, the Zokari brothers sought to challenge
USCIS’s denial of their N-600 applications through the APA, asserting
that the denial was arbitrary and capricious and “without observance
of procedure required by law,” in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and
(D). Supp. App’x at 46 ¶ 188 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D)). The
district court concluded that it had no authority to review the
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brothers’ claims under the APA on the ground that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
provides an adequate alternative remedy for them to obtain review of
USCIS’s determination regarding their nationality. See 5 U.S.C. § 704
(explaining agency actions are reviewable under the APA only if there
is no adequate alternative remedy). As an additional basis for
dismissal, the district court held that Section 1503(a) of the INA
expressly precludes review under the APA. See id. § 701(a)
(explaining that the APA does not permit review where a statute
precludes review). We disagree with the district court as to both of
these grounds for dismissal.
1. Whether Section 1252 Provides an Adequate Alternative Basis
for Judicial Review of the Agency Action
We may review agency actions under the APA only if “no other
adequate remedy in a court” is available to a plaintiff. 5 U.S.C. § 704;
see also Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 90 n.14 (2d Cir. 2008).
Here, the district court concluded that the brothers had
adequate remedy available to them other than through the APA: in
the district court’s view, they could appeal USCIS’s rejection of their
citizenship defense in their removal proceedings under Section
1252(b), which permits the courts of appeals to review final orders of
removal. See Alzokari, 758 F. Supp. 3d at 44; see also Reyes Mata v.
Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 147 (2015) (“The INA . . . gives the courts of
appeals jurisdiction to review ‘final order[s] of removal.’” (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1))).
In this, the district court erred. The brothers could not have
obtained review under Section 1252 because their removal
proceedings had been terminated in their favor, so no final order of
removal was ever entered for a court of appeals to review. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b). Section 1252, then, did not provide an
adequate remedy for the brothers. Since no party has proposed any
other adequate remedy, we must disagree with the district court that
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this was a sufficient basis on which to dismiss the brothers’ APA
claims.
We therefore turn to the district court’s other stated reason for
dismissing the Zokari brothers’ APA claims: that Section 1503(a) of
the INA “preclude[s] judicial review” of the claims, triggering the bar
erected by 5 U.S.C. § 701.
2. Whether Section 1503(a) of the INA Precludes Judicial Review
of the Agency Action
Courts may not set aside agency actions on review under the
APA where another “statute[] preclude[s] judicial review[.]”
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1); see also Singh v. United States Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs., 878 F.3d 441, 445 (2d Cir. 2017), as amended (Jan. 9, 2018).
When analyzing whether a statute precludes judicial review
under the APA, we consider whether the statutory scheme provides
an exclusive means of relief. See, e.g., Kapoor v. DeMarco, 132 F.4th 595,
608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 325 (2025). Statutory exceptions
that potentially preclude review under the APA “are construed
narrowly and apply only if there is clear and convincing evidence of
legislative intention to preclude review.” Nat. Res. Def. Council v.
Johnson, 461 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see, e.g., Singh, 878 F.3d at 445 (finding that a statute
precluded judicial review under the APA when the statute specified
that “the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of
removal should be a petition for review filed with an appropriate
court of appeals” (citation modified)). “[W]here substantial doubt
about the congressional intent exists, the general presumption
favoring judicial review of administrative action is controlling.”
Johnson, 461 F.3d at 172 (citation modified). “Whether and to what
extent a particular statute precludes judicial review is determined not
only from its express language, but also from the structure of the
statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature
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of the administrative action involved.” Id. at 171 (quoting Block v.
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)).
Here, the district court ruled that it had no jurisdiction under
the APA to review the brothers’ claims because it read Section 1503(a)
as precluding judicial review for APA purposes. Respectfully, we are
not persuaded. To be sure, as we explain above, Section 1503(a) does
not expressly provide an avenue for judicial review of agency action
here because of the exception stated in Section 1503(a)(2). But the
presence of this exception does not mean that Section 1503(a) should
be understood for APA purposes as precluding judicial review of the
agency action. To the contrary, we find no “clear and convincing
evidence” that Section 1503(a) was intended to provide an exclusive
remedy to those who have been denied a right of citizenship. Johnson,
461 F.3d at 171.
To begin, Section 1503(a) states that a person who is residing
within the United States and who claims that a right of citizenship has
been denied to him “may institute an action” for declaratory judgment
of his citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (emphasis added).
“The word ‘may’ [in a statute] customarily connotes discretion.” Jama
v. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 543 U.S. 335, 346 (2005). Though “this
common-sense principle of statutory construction . . . can be defeated
by indications of legislative intent to the contrary or by obvious
inferences from the structure and purpose of the statute[,]” Yoo v.
United States, 43 F.4th 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation modified)
(quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983)), we find that
this is not the case for Section 1503(a) of the INA.
Within a statute, “[t]he use of the word ‘may’ – in contrast to
words like ‘shall’ or ‘must’ – authorizes, rather than commands.” Id.
at 72. Congress was “well aware of the different configurations of
language it could use in a given . . . provision[] to achieve different
outcomes,” id. at 76, and it chose to use the word “may” as a modifier
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in the instant case. That choice appears intentional because Congress
used “shall” in other places within Section 1503 of the INA. For
example, in Section 1503(a), Congress grants persons denied a right
of citizenship the ability to file an action but clarifies that action “shall
be filed in a district court[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). There, the use of
“shall” provides a mandatory directive, as opposed to the prior use
of “may” in Section 1503(a), which merely grants permission to a
person to file an action to declare their citizenship after being denied
a right of citizenship. Therefore, we find that the text and structure of
Section 1503(a) indicate that Congress intended for the term “may” to
authorize, not mandate, an action.
Our interpretation of Section 1503(a) is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962), abrogated
on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). There, the
Supreme Court held that Section 1503(b) and (c) of the INA, 2 which
permit judicial review of claims for wrongfully denied citizenship
rights of persons located outside of the United States, do not expressly
provide an exclusive remedy for applicants under that section. See id.
at 379. The Court observed that the use of “may” in Section 1503(b)
and (c) revealed “no intention to provide an exclusive remedy.” Id. at
375; see 8 U.S.C. § 1503(b) (dictating a person “may make
application”), § 1503(c) (dictating a person “may apply for
admission”). Of particular relevance here, the Court declined to hold
that “the broadly remedial provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act are unavailable to review administrative decisions
under the [INA] in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that
Congress so intended.” Cort, 369 U.S. at 379–80. Section 1503(b) and
(c), of course, are not at issue here. But the Supreme Court’s reasoning
2
Section 1503(b) and (c) were previously encoded in the 1952 INA as Section
360(b) and (c), which is the section that Cort reviewed. In both the 1952 and
current incarnations of the statute, Congress used the permissive language
of “may” to modify the verbs that followed.
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supports our view that Section 1503(a) was not intended to provide
an exclusive remedy for applicants within the United States who have
been denied a right of citizenship on the ground that they are not U.S.
citizens.
Moreover, as the Zokari brothers argue, the INA’s
administrative review scheme simply does not address the types of
claims that they seek to assert under the APA. The Supreme Court
has explained: “‘When Congress has dealt in particularity with a
claim and has intended a specified remedy’—including its
exceptions—to be exclusive, that is the end of the matter; the APA
does not undo that judgment.” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawami Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 216 (2012) (quoting Block v.
North Dakota ex rel Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286 n.22
(1983)). But it has also instructed that, “when a statute is not
addressed to the type of grievance which the plaintiff seeks to assert,
then the statute cannot prevent an APA suit.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The brothers’ APA claims here falls into the latter category. As
we explain above, when they filed their complaint, they could not
assert their nationality claims under Section 1503(a) because it was
barred by Section 1503(a)(2). We read Section 1503(a) as merely
declining to create any cause of action for such claims, however, not
as intending to bar all judicial review of the challenged agency action
under any existing statute. Indeed, “[t]he language of [Section
1503(a)] shows no intention to provide an exclusive remedy, or any
remedy,” to individuals whose nationality status was ”in issue in a[]
removal proceeding.” Cort, 369 U.S. at 375 (internal quotation marks
omitted); 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)(2). But “[n]either does the section indicate
that such persons are to be denied existing remedies” under the law.
Cort, 369 U.S. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the
INA “is not addressed to the type of grievance which the [Zokari
brothers] seek to assert” under the APA, and it does not bar APA
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review of the agency action challenged here. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-
Wish Band of Pottawami Indians, 567 U.S. at 216 (internal quotation
marks omitted). 3
In sum, we conclude that Section 1503(a) was not intended to
create an exclusive remedy and that it does not preclude the Zokari
brothers’ APA claims. Accordingly, we hold that the brothers were
entitled to bring suit under the APA to challenge the agency action.
The district court erred in ruling otherwise. 4
3
The Zokari brothers rely principally on Axon Enterprises, Inc. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 598 U.S. 175 (2023), to support their argument that the
INA was not intended to address their APA claims. Their reliance is
misplaced. In Axon, the Court held that the SEC’s and FTC’s statutory
review schemes do not displace a federal district court’s jurisdiction to
review constitutional challenges to the agencies’ structure or existence. Id.
at 180. That case involved constitutional claims under the district court’s
federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See id. at 182. The brothers
seek to assert claims under Section 702 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702. Whether
Congress intended to preclude APA review through the creation of a
statutory administrative review scheme is a question that Axon does not
address.
4 The Government raises two additional arguments against APA review of
the challenged agency action. We find neither persuasive. First, the
Government contends that Section 1503(a) impliedly forbids relief under
the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“[N]othing [in § 702] . . . confers authority to
grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or
impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” (emphasis added)). But Section
1503(a) reveals “no intention to provide an exclusive remedy,” as we
explained above, and therefore it does not impliedly forbid plaintiffs from
pursuing alternative remedies under the APA. Cort, 369 U.S. at 375.
Second, the Government argues that reviewing the Zokari brothers’ APA
claims would be futile because the certified administrative record from the
brothers’ N-600 applications would omit their father’s passport
applications. We disagree: the brothers’ APA claims do not depend on
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* * *
While we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Zokari
brothers’ INA claim under Section 1503(a) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, we find that the district court erred by dismissing the
brothers’ APA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We hold
that where, as here, a plaintiff raises the issue of his U.S. nationality
as a defense in removal proceedings against him, and the removal
proceedings are terminated in his favor, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 does not
provide an adequate alternative to APA review of an agency
determination with respect to the plaintiff’s nationality claim. We
further hold that 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) does not preclude an APA claim
challenging the agency’s determination in such circumstances
because Section 1503(a) was not intended to provide an exclusive
remedy. Therefore, we conclude that the district court has subject
matter jurisdiction to review the Zokari brothers’ APA claims. 5
II. Constitutional Claims
“We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting the complaint's factual allegations as
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.”
Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 2014). For the
reasons set forth below, we agree with the district court’s holding on
each of the Zokari brothers’ constitutional claims and accordingly
affirm its judgment with respect to those claims.
these records. See Supp. App’x at 47 ¶¶ 193–95.
5 The dissent asserts that the brothers’ APA claims are barred for yet another
reason: that Section 1503(a) itself “furnishes them with an alternate
‘adequate remedy in a court.’” Dissent at 1 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704). But
the Government did not develop that rationale in its briefing, and its core
arguments run counter to that position. Accordingly, we treat the
argument as unpreserved and do not address it further here.
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A. Fifth Amendment Due Process Claim
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause provides that no
person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Thus, “[t]he first inquiry in
every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been
deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’” Am. Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999). If a protected interest
is implicated, a plaintiff must show that he was denied the
opportunity to be heard “in a meaningful manner,” Burger v. Gonzales,
498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007), and that the “alleged shortcomings
have prejudiced the outcome of his case,” Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey,
531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008). Both citizens and noncitizens are
entitled to due process. See Burger, 498 F.3d at 134.
The Zokari brothers first argue that, because Section 1503(a) of
the INA does not allow for actions where the issue of nationality
“arose . . . in connection with” removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1503(a)(1), a plaintiff in the brothers’ position, whose removal
proceedings were terminated in his favor, has no means of obtaining
judicial review of his nationality claim and is therefore denied due
process. While their brief is less than clear, the brothers appear to
identify the determination of their citizenship status as their protected
liberty interest. But we need not decide whether a citizenship
determination is a protected liberty interest because we find that the
brothers received due process: They availed themselves of the N-600
application process and, as explained above, may bring an APA claim
challenging the denial of their application. That their applications
were denied does not mean that the Zokari brothers’ due process
rights were violated, nor does the fact that they could not avail
themselves of particular procedures set forth in Section 1503(a) of the
INA.
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The brothers next contend that they were denied due process
because they were detained “based on the government’s incorrect
assertion that they are not United States citizens.” Plaintiffs-
Appellants’ Brief at 13. But they do not explain what process was
lacking that led to their detention. Indeed, their complaint makes
clear that they were afforded a hearing before an immigration judge,
who denied their request for release from detention on bond, and that
there was a subsequent bond hearing. So, again, the brothers received
all the process that they were due.
Accordingly, the district court’s denial of the Zokari brothers’
due process claim was not erroneous.
B. First Amendment Right to Petition Claim
The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the
people . . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”
U.S. Const. amend. I. “A plaintiff’s constitutional right of access to
the courts is violated where government officials obstruct legitimate
efforts to seek judicial redress.” Friedman v. Bloomberg L.P., 884 F.3d
83, 90 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As the district court correctly held, the Zokari brothers fail to
plausibly allege a First Amendment violation. The brothers base their
First Amendment challenge on “the structure of the . . . review
mechanism in 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)[.]” Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief at 14.
But “[t]he right to petition exists in the presence of an underlying
cause of action and is not violated by a statute that . . . curtails a
category of causes of action.” City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
524 F.3d 384, 397 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S.
403, 415 (2002) (“[O]ur cases rest on the recognition that the right [of
access to the courts] is ancillary to the underlying claim, without
which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of
court.”). Thus, the Zokari brothers’ inability to bring a claim under
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Section 1503(a) does not state a claim for a violation of their right to
petition under the First Amendment.
C. Separation of Powers Claim
“The nondelegation doctrine bars Congress from transferring
its legislative power to another branch of Government.” Gundy v.
United States, 588 U.S. 128, 132 (2019).
Here, the brothers argue that the separation of powers was
violated by the jurisdictional bar contained in Section 1503(a)(1) and
(2). Specifically, the brothers contend that the jurisdictional bar
violates the nondelegation doctrine “[b]y stripping the judiciary of its
role to police executive action and to determine cases and
controversies,” including, as relevant here, determinations of
citizenship. Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief at 16. But, while “[t]he
nondelegat