Soto Munoz v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket23-1404
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 19 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOEL SOTO MUNOZ, No. 23-1404
Petitioner, Agency No.
A206-463-861
v.
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 17, 2026**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: HAWKINS, WARDLAW, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Joel Soto Muñoz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the
dismissal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) of an order of an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the petition in part.
Where the Board adopts and affirms the IJ’s decision citing Matter of
Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), we review both decisions. See Cruz v.
Bondi, 146 F.4th 730, 737 (9th Cir. 2025). We review the denial of asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief for substantial evidence. See Duran-
Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). “Under this standard, we
must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary
conclusion.” Id. Where a purely legal question is presented, we review de novo.
See Nababan v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2021); Ayala v. Sessions,
855 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2017).
1. The Board erred in deeming Soto’s challenge to the IJ’s particular social
group determination waived. A petitioner must properly raise an issue before the
Board to receive appellate consideration of the issue. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1);
Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir. 2004). This process involves
raising an issue “sufficient to put the BIA on notice that [Petitioner] was
challenging the IJ’s . . . determination, and the agency had an opportunity to pass
on this issue.” Id.
On appeal to the Board, Soto’s opening brief noted that particular social
groups “must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective” and that a
proposed group must be “socially distinct in the relevant society.” He also
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specifically argued that “[t]he IJ erred in failing to recognize this as a family-based
particular social group.” While the brief did not explicitly say “the IJ erred in its
social distinction analysis,” it specifically articulated the legal standard involving
social distinction and took issue with the IJ’s cognizability determination. This
was sufficient to raise the social distinction issue before the Board. See Martinez
v. Barr, 941 F.3d 907, 922 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that the petitioner had properly
put the Board on notice by stating the legal standard for the issue she wished to
have reviewed). We REMAND to give the Board the opportunity to rule in the
first instance on the cognizability of Soto’s proposed social group.
2. Substantial evidence supports the Agency’s denial of CAT relief, and it
made no legal error in its determination. Soto argues that the Board improperly
required him to prove ongoing entitlement to CAT relief in light of the fact that
there have been no recent threats against him, and that the aggregate risk he faces
in Mexico from all potential sources of torture satisfies the standard for CAT
protection.
To qualify for CAT protection, Soto must “prove that it is more likely than
not that (1) [he], in particular, would be (2) subject to harm amounting to torture
(3) by or with the acquiescence of a public official, if removed.” Garcia v.
Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th Cir. 2021). Soto must show it is “more likely
than not” that he will face “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
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physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted” from all sources of potential torture.
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)).
The Agency did not apply an erroneous “continued interest” standard when
it determined Soto had not shown an ongoing risk that he will more likely than not
face torture if he returns to Mexico. Past torture “can be relevant in assessing an
applicant’s risk of future torture but does not alone establish or even give rise to a
presumption that the applicant will suffer future torture.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v.
Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 705 (9th Cir. 2022).
Even if Soto’s brothers’ deaths constituted past torture to which Soto might
also be susceptible, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Soto did
not adequately demonstrate any ongoing risk he faces. Soto was first threatened
after his brother was killed in 2013 and his father filed a report with the police,
prompting a threat from the officers that they would hurt Soto and his other brother
in the same way. Soto was last threatened in 2015, through two anonymous
Facebook messages sent to his common law wife. Before that, his family had
more generally been threatened in two anonymous Facebook messages sent to his
sister in 2013 and 2014. Since then, he has received no additional threats. His
other brother was violently murdered in 2020, but the record does not compel the
conclusion that the same people who killed the first brother also killed the second
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brother, and would similarly attack Soto. The remainder of his family remains in
Mexico and has not been harmed or threatened since the 2014 Facebook message.
Finally, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that, even taking
together all purported sources of torture, Soto is not more likely than not to face
torture if he returns to Mexico. Soto did not offer evidence that compels the
conclusion that he has ever faced threats from anyone other than the specific
officers who killed his first brother, nor has he offered sufficient evidence to show
that those officers are still targeting him. We thus DENY the petition for review
on this issue.
3. Soto has not shown that the IJ’s exclusion of his brother’s death
certificates and a summary translation caused him substantial prejudice. See Lata
v. I.N.S., 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000). Because the parties stipulated to the
cause of death for Soto’s second brother and his proposed summary translation
contains no other information relevant to his claim, the important information was
before the IJ regardless of the documents’ exclusion.
PETITION GRANTED IN PART; DENIED IN PART; AND
REMANDED.
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