Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RAMON RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ, No. 25-6842 on behalf of himself as an individual D.C. No. and on behalf of others similarly 3:25-cv-05240- situated, TMC Plaintiff - Appellee, OPINION v. DREW BOSTOCK, Seattle Field Office Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); BRUCE SCOTT, Warden, Northwest ICE Processing Center; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, (EOIR); SIRCE OWEN, Acting Director, EOIR; TACOMA IMMIGRATION COURT, Defendants - Appellants. 2 RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Tiffany M. Cartwright, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 4, 2026 Seattle, Washington Filed July 30, 2026 Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Carlos T. Bea, and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Bress; Dissent by Judge Bea SUMMARY* Immigration Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a class of detained aliens in Western Washington, the panel held that aliens present without admission who are apprehended in the interior of the United States are not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The panel explained that, historically, the law regarded unadmitted aliens present in the interior of the United States as subject to release on bond during their removal * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK 3 proceedings. That understanding persisted after the amendments Congress made to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Following those amendments, the government treated unadmitted aliens present in the interior as detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for release on bond. Section 1225(b)(2)(A), requiring mandatory detention, was understood to apply only to aliens seeking to enter the United States at the border. In July 2025, the government issued guidance providing that unadmitted aliens present in the interior of the country were subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The change resulted in thousands of aliens filing habeas petitions seeking bond hearings and possible release. The panel observed that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have sided with the government (each over a dissent), while the Second, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have sided with the habeas petitioners (the Sixth and Eleventh with dissents), and the Seventh Circuit has issued a decision that failed to command a majority. Subject to carveouts not applicable here, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained” during immigration proceedings. Section 1225(a)(1), also added by IIRIRA, provides that an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted . . . shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 4 RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK The panel concluded that § 1225(b)(2)(A), based on its text and context, is best construed as applying to aliens entering at the border. The word “admission” under the INA is specifically defined as “the lawful entry . . . into the United States after inspection and authorization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Combined with the word “seeking,” § 1225(b)(2)(A) has been treated as requiring that an alien be engaged in the affirmative process of attempting to gain “entry” “into” the country, which an alien does at the border (or a port of entry). The panel wrote that this interpretation avoids surplusage, accords with the ordinary understanding of “seeking,” coheres with the statute’s reference to an “examining immigration officer,” and is consistent with the Supreme Court’s description of the detention regime in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). The government’s interpretation is that all aliens present in the United States without admission are subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A) because, in its view, an “applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking admission.” The panel explained that this reading results in surplusage, is inconsistent with ordinary language usage, and is in significant tension, if not outright conflict, with Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). The other provisions in § 1225 likewise did not advance the government’s position. The panel also observed that, if the statute is meant to require the mass detention of unadmitted aliens present in the United States and mark a sharp break from the past, Congress would not have introduced such a major change through a cross-referenced deeming provision, in the way the government asserts. The oblique and elliptical language of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not approach the requisite clarity expected if Congress wished to alter the fundamental details  RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK 5 of the mandatory detention scheme. Section 1226 also continues to confirm that the government is seeking to invoke a significant power on an uncertain statutory basis. Moreover, the panel concluded that the government’s reliance on the posited statutory purpose of IIRIRA— equalizing the treatment of aliens who enter the country illegally and those who present themselves for lawful inspection at the border—was not conclusive enough to overcome the textual difficulties associated with the government’s new interpretation. Finally, the panel concluded that the post-enactment practice and understanding surrounding IIRIRA’s detention authorities detracted from the government’s new interpretation. That no Administration has ever found a duty mandatorily to detain unadmitted aliens present in the interior of the country is strong evidence that it does not exist. Dissenting, Judge Bea would hold that the government was correct that all those deemed to be “applicants for admission,” are necessarily “seeking admission,” and thus are subject to subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Judge Bea arrived at this conclusion by accepting that Congress deemed an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted, an “applicant for admission,” § 1225(a)(1); applying a non-specialized, ordinary meaning to the undefined terms, “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission;” and asking whether an applicant for admission is someone who is seeking admission. Judge Bea wrote that the other provisions of § 1225 provide yet further proof that an “applicant for admission” is “seeking admission.” Judge Bea also concluded that this straightforward textual interpretation meshes with the purpose of IIRIRA, 6 RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK while the majority’s interpretation undermines that purpose. Judge Bea also rejected the majority’s reliance on other considerations, including its pervasive, underlying demand for an untold level of congressional clarity. COUNSEL Matt Adams (argued), Aaron Korthuis, Amanda Ng, Leila Kang, and Glenda M.A. Madrid, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Seattle, Washington; My Khanh Ngo, Oscar S. Roman, and Michael K.T. Tan, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, San Francisco, California; Judy Rabinovitz and Natalie Behr, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, New York; for Plaintiff- Appellee. Benjamin T. Hayes (argued), Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General; Ian S. Lam, Michael D. Ross, and Jaime Durr, Trial Attorneys, Office of Immigration Litigation; Samuel P. Go and Victor M. Mercado-Santana, Senior Litigation Counsel; Elizabeth Hedges, Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General; Drew C. Ensign, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Yaakov M. Roth, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General; Civil Division; United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants- Appellants. Amit Jain and Kathleen Pleiss, Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Immigration Law Scholars.  RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK 7 Suchita Mathur, Rebecca M. Cassler, and Emma C. Winger, American Immigration Council, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae American Immigration Council and American Immigration Lawyers Association. Julie Dona, Special Counsel; Gillian Barna, Assistant Solicitor General; Philip J. Levitz, Senior Assistant Solicitor General; Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General; Letitia James, New York Attorney General; Office of the New York Attorney General, New York, New York; Robin Goldfaden, Deputy Solicitor General; Marissa Malouff, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Rob Bonta, California Attorney General; Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, California; Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Office of the Arizona Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona; Kwame Raoul, Illinois Attorney General, Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, Illinois; Philip J. Weiser, Colorado Attorney General, Office of the Colorado Attorney General, Denver, Colorado; Aaron M. Frey, Maine Attorney General, Office of the Maine Attorney General, Augusta, Maine; William Tong, Connecticut Attorney General, Office of the Connecticut Attorney General, Hartford, Connecticut; Anthony G. Brown, Maryland Attorney General, Office of the Maryland Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland; Kathleen Jennings, Delaware Attorney General, Office of the Delaware Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware; Andrea J. Campbell, Massachusetts Attorney General, Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General, Boston, Massachusetts; Brian L. Schwalb, District of Columbia Attorney General, Office of the District of Columbia Attorney General, Washington, D.C.; Dana Nessel, Michigan Attorney General, Office of the Michigan Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan; Anne E. Lopez, Hawai’i Attorney General, Office of the Hawai’i Attorney 8 RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK General, Honolulu, Hawai’i; Keith Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General, Office of the Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; Aaron D. Ford, Nevada Attorney General, Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Carson City, Nevada; Peter F. Neronha, Rhode Island Attorney General, Office of the Rhode Island Attorney General, Providence, Rhode Island; Jennifer Davenport, New Jersey Acting Attorney General, Office of the New Jersey Attorney General, Trenton, New Jersey; Charity R. Clark, Vermont Attorney General, Office of the Vermont Attorney General, Montpelier, Vermont; Dan Rayfield, Oregon Attorney General, Office of the Oregon Attorney General, Salem, Oregon; Nicholas W. Brown, Washington Attorney General, Office of the Washington Attorney General, Olympia, Washington; for Amici Curiae New York, California, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawai‘i, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. David H. Fry, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, San Francisco, California; Nicole R. Allicock, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Washington, D.C.; Liam McGivern and Regan Bailey, Justice in Aging, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae Justice in Aging, Northwest Health Law Advocates, and National Immigration Law Center. Jordan Wells, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, San Francisco, California, for Amicus Curiae Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area.  RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK 9 OPINION BRESS, Circuit Judge: Historically, the law regarded unadmitted aliens present in the interior of the United States as subject to release on bond during the pendency of their removal proceedings. That understanding persisted after the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Following those amendments, and over the course of many Presidential administrations, the government treated these unadmitted aliens present in the interior of the United States as detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which allows for release on bond. A different provision requiring mandatory detention, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), was understood to apply only to aliens who were seeking to enter the United States at the border. The government recently changed its longstanding approach. It now contends that unadmitted aliens present in the interior of the country are subject to mandatory detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A), based on revisions to the statute that Congress made in 1996. The government’s change in policy has resulted in detained aliens filing thousands of habeas petitions in federal courts across the country, seeking bond hearings and possible release from detention. Some of these detained aliens have resided in the United States for lengthy periods. The implication of the government’s position is that Congress in 1996 made a major change to the immigration laws by subjecting millions of unadmitted aliens present in the United States to mandatory detention, but that this change then went unnoticed and unheeded, with the Executive Branch for the next three decades violating Congress’s assertedly 10 RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK unambiguous mandatory detention directive by treating these aliens as subject to release on bond. We conclude that the text, context, and structure of the INA, considered as a whole, did not direct such a significant, yet overlooked, change in the law. Although no reading of the complicated and interrelated textual provisions at issue here is without some shortcomings, the historical understanding of the statute is the better one. The government’s new interpretation, by contrast, is less consistent with the statutory text and introduces a series of interpretative complications. We accordingly do not think that Congress in 1996 made such a large-scale change to our established system of immigration detention in the way that the government now contends. The aliens at issue here remain subject to mandatory detention if they commit qualifying criminal offenses, and they may be denied bond and held pending their removal proceedings if they pose flight risks or dangers to the community. Whether these aliens should be subject to a broader mandatory detention regime is a policy question that lies outside the role of the judiciary. The question here is not about policy or Executive Branch discretion, but congressional authorization. We do not decide whether Congress could enact the detention regime as the government would now have it, but rather whether Congress did so in 1996. The better view is that it did not. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that aliens present without admission who are apprehended in the interior of the United States are subject to the detention regime of § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2)(A). The judgment of the district court is affirmed.  RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK 11 I A Civil detention of aliens at the federal level began at the close of the nineteenth century, during a period when Congress was consolidating federal control over the nation’s immigration policies. See Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, 175 F.4th 1258, 1281 (11th Cir. 2026) (“[N]ear the close of the nineteenth century, Congress expanded border agents’ powers to specifically detain arriving aliens pending review.” (emphasis omitted)). It appears that the first congressional statute authorizing mandatory detention required that “every inspector of arriving alien immigrants . . . detain for a special inquiry” any alien not “clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission.” Immigration Act of 1893, ch. 206, § 5, 27 Stat. 569, 570 (1893); see Hernandez Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1281. Ten years later, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-162, § 24, 32 Stat. 1213, 1219–20 (1903), which similarly provided that “[e]very alien who may not appear to the examining immigrant inspector at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for examination in relation thereto by a board of special inquiry.” See Hernandez Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1281. Similar language was included in the INA in 1952. See Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 235(b), 66 Stat. 163, 199. In the meantime, Congress authorized, but did not mandate, the detention of certain aliens inside the country “upon [a] warrant,” pending the alien’s removal. See Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §§ 19–20, 39 Stat. 874, 889–91 (1917) (providing that such aliens “may be released under a bond”). When mandatory detention was provided for in the early laws, Congress limited that authority to ‘“arriving alien 12 RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK immigrants,’ aliens ‘at the port of arrival,’ and ‘aliens[s] seeking entry.’” Hernandez Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1281. This system—where arriving aliens suspected of inadmissibility were subject to mandatory detention at the ports of arrival, and aliens inside the country were subject only to discretionary detention with the possibility of bond— was carried over into the INA. See 66 Stat. at 199, 208–09. Initially under the INA, aliens detained at the border during entry into the United States were subject to “exclusion” proceedings, whereas aliens physically (though unlawfully) present in the United States were subject to “deportation” proceedings. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982); Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc); Hose v. I.N.S., 180 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Under this regime, the “distinction between those who had entered the United States and those who had not was important,” in that “‘non-citizens [aliens] who had entered without inspection could take advantage of the greater procedural and substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings, while non-citizens who presented themselves at a port of entry for inspection were subjected to more summary exclusion proceedings.’” Torres, 976 F.3d at 927– 28 (quoting Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 25–27 (summarizing the differences between deportation and exclusion proceedings). We have explained that these rights for aliens already present in the United States included the ability to seek adjustment of status, request suspension of deportation, voluntarily depart, and have the burden of proof placed on the government. See Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 280 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). Aliens in deportation proceedings could also receive release on  RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK 13 bond, whereas those subject to exclusion proceedings at the border were mandatorily detained. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)– (b) (1995), 1252(a) (1994); Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 223 (BIA 2025). Over time, Congress mandated the detention of limited categories of aliens inside the United States who had committed certain crimes. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7343(a)(4), 12 Stat. 4181, 4470 (1988). Congress next passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). Among other changes, IIRIRA eliminated the distinction between deportation and exclusion proceedings and replaced them with a general “removal” proceeding, to which all aliens would be subject. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223. Relying on legislative history, we have said that, through this change, Congress sought to correct the “anomaly” by which those aliens attempting to enter lawfully were subject to less favorable removal proceedings, thereby “ensur[ing] that all immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted, regardless of their physical presence in the country, are placed on equal footing in removal proceedings under the INA.” Torres, 976 F.3d at 928 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996)). One of the additional ways that Congress accomplished this is through IIRIRA’s “deeming” provision, which “deem[s]” as an “applicant for admission” any “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Because this provision deems unadmitted aliens who are already present here as “applicants for admission,” we have described the phrase “applicant for admission” in § 1225(a)(1) as a “term of art denoting a particular legal 14 RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK status,” which “places some physically-but-not-lawfully present noncitizens into a fictive legal status for purposes of removal proceedings.” Torres, 976 F.3d at 927–28. This statutory innovation has important consequences in removal proceedings. Per the above discussion, by deeming unadmitted aliens present inside the United States “applicants for admission,” § 1225(a)(1) brings those aliens within the INA’s inadmissibility framework and its associated procedural burdens. As compared to persons who are lawfully admitted yet removable, i.e., deportable, aliens who are “applicants for admission” (both present and arriving) are treated less favorably in removal proceedings. That is because inadmissibility grounds are distinct and often broader than those for deportability, and an alien charged with inadmissibility bears the burden of proof in removal proceedings. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 46 (2011); Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222, 243 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Ortega-Lopez v. Barr, 978 F.3d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Under [IIRIRA], a person who physically entered the United States but was not admitted is subject to grounds of inadmissibility, rather than deportability, and has to bear the corresponding burden of proving admissibility.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A). IIRIRA also amended the INA’s detention provisions. Section 1226 sets out a general detention scheme for aliens charged with removability. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226. It provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” Id. § 1226(a); see also 6 U.S.C. §§ 251, 557 & 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1) (transferring immigration enforcement from the Attorney General to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)). Section 1226 refers generally to “alien[s],”  RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK 15 without limitation. Because § 1226 is not limited to aliens deemed “applicants for admission,” the aliens subject to § 1226 include other aliens, such as admitted aliens “who overstay or violate the terms of their visas” or who “engage in conduct that renders them removable.” Buenrostro- Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2026). Like the previous detention authorities governing unadmitted aliens apprehended in the interior, detention under § 1226(a) is discretionary, allowing the release of aliens on bond pending their removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1; see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018) (“Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants for their arrest . . . . Section 1226(a) also permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.”). Although DHS makes the initial custody determination, aliens subject to § 1226(a) can seek bond hearings before an immigration judge (IJ) and further review in the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), (d), 1236.1(d)(1), (3), 1003.19. A § 1226(a) detainee will be released on bond if he demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not a flight risk or a danger to the community. See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006)). Section 1226(c) creates certain exceptions to the default availability of bond under § 1226(a). See Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 409 (2019) (observing that § 1226(c) is “a limit on the authority conferred by subsection (a)”). Building off and expanding the pre-IIRIRA statutory provisions, under § 1226(c), aliens who have committed certain crimes or who present national security concerns are 16 RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK subject to mandatory detention and cannot be released on bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(E), (4); see also Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1197. Given § 1226(c)’s expansion of mandatory detention, Congress in 1996 gave the Executive Branch the discretion to delay implementation of this provision to give the agency time to build detention capacity during the statutory transition. See IIRIRA § 303(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 3009–586. In addition, IIRIRA directed the Attorney General to increase the detention facilities of the INS to at least 9,000 beds before the end of 1997. Id. § 386, 110 Stat. at 3009–653. The INS promptly invoked its authority to delay implementation of mandatory detention under § 1226(c). See Letter from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, INS, to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 3, 1997); Hernandez Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1283; Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 89–90 (2d Cir. 2026). Congress amended § 1226(c) again in 2025 in the Laken Riley Act, expanding the range of circumstances and criminal violations that will render an alien subject to mandatory detention and ineligible for bond under § 1226(a). See Pub. L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3 (2025) (codified in relevant part at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)). Section 1226(c)(1)(E) now requires the mandatory detention of aliens inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A) (presence without admission), § 1182(a)(6)(C) (misrepresentation to procure admission into the United States), and § 1182(a)(7) (lack of documentation), who also commit various enumerated crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Accordingly, aliens who enter the United States illegally and then commit one of the crimes enumerated in § 1226(c)(1)(E) are subject to mandatory detention under that provision. This provision  RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK 17 applies to aliens who are present in the interior of the United States without admission. The other set of detention authorities at issue in this case are housed in 8 U.S.C. § 1225. That section is entitled “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” As discussed above, § 1225 begins with the provision “deem[ing]” as “applicant[s] for admission” both aliens present in the United States without admission and those arriving in the United States. Id. § 1225(a)(1). Section 1225 also includes the INA’s inspection mandate. Id. § 1225(a)(3) (“All aliens (including alien crewmen) who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States shall be inspected by immigration officers.”). Section 1225 then establishes two independent pathways for processing aliens suspected of inadmissibility and detaining them pending those proceedings: First, § 1225(b)(1) sets out IIRIRA’s new expedited removal regime. See DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 109 (2020) (discussing expedited removal). Under the expedited removal provisions, aliens arriving in the United States (and at the Attorney General’s discretion, aliens with fewer than two years of continuous presence in the United States) are subject to summary removal proceedings when they are inadmissible for lacking valid entry documents or engaging in various forms of immigration fraud. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (applying to aliens “arriving in the United States”); id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (applying to an alien “who has not affirmatively shown . . . that the alien has been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility”). Aliens subject to 18 RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK expedited removal shall be ordered removed without further hearing or review, unless they express a credible fear of persecution, in which case they are referred for further proceedings. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A), (B). Aliens in expedited removal proceedings are mandatorily detained pending their removal and credible fear proceedings. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii)(IV); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297 (noting that § 1225(b)(1) does not “say[] anything whatsoever about bond hearings”); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii). Second, § 1225(b)(2) requires the detention of certain “other aliens” pending removal proceedings. Section 1225(b)(2)(A), the key provision in this case, reads as follows: Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title. The carve-out for subparagraph (B) excepts from § 1225(b)(2)(A) aliens who are crewmen, stowaways, or who are subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1). Id. § 1225(b)(2)(B). The carve-out for subparagraph (C) allows the government to return arriving aliens to contiguous foreign territory before their removal proceedings. Id. § 1225(b)(2)(C). The final reference to “section 1229a of this title” is to the removal proceedings themselves. See id. § 1229a.  RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK 19 Unlike with detention under § 1226, detention under both § 1225(b)(1) and (2) is mandatory and affords no opportunity for release on bond. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 300 (explaining that these provisions “unequivocally mandate that aliens falling within their scope ‘shall’ be detained”); see also Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 499 (“Section 1225(b)(2) does not include any exception that permits the government to release detained aliens on bond.”). However, as noted above, for aliens subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A), and in the case of an alien “who is arriving on land (whether or not at a designated port of arrival) from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States, the Attorney General may return the alien to that territory” pending his removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C). The government may also grant temporary parole to aliens subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A), but “only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Id. § 1182(d)(5)(A). In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Supreme Court discussed §§ 1225 and 1226. Referencing § 1225, Jennings explained that the process of evaluating an alien’s right to enter and remain in the United States “generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible.” Id. at 287. The Court noted that “§ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States.” Id. at 297. The Court further stated that “§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.” Id. at 303. Discussing both §§ 1225 and 1226 together, the Court wrote that “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain 20 RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Id. at 289. This language in Jennings indicates that the Supreme Court was evidently operating on the same understanding of §§ 1225 and 1226 that has prevailed since 1996 (and earlier, under the predecessor provisions), namely, that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to unadmitted aliens seeking entry into the United States at the border, whereas § 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States. Until recently, the Executive Branch’s actions in the thirty years since were consistent with that same understanding. B The plaintiffs in this case are a class of unadmitted aliens apprehended in the interior of the United States who are not subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or mandatory detention as criminal aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The dispute in this case is whether these plaintiffs are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), or discretionary detention under § 1226(a) with a corresponding entitlement to a bond hearing. As we have noted, prior to its recent change in policy, the government treated aliens in the plaintiffs’ position as subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a). That includes the last thirty years, following Congress’s amendment of § 1225(b)(2)(A) to add the language that the government now claims requires mandatory detention. See Barbosa da Cunha, 175 F.4th at 91–92. The government’s new interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) seems to have originated from the practice of certain immigration judges in Tacoma, Washington, beginning in 2022, of denying bond to unadmitted aliens present inside the country, on the theory that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates  RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK 21 their detention. Those immigration judges were initially rebuffed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which in several unpublished decisions remanded cases to these immigration judges. In one of those decisions, the BIA stated it was “unaware of any precedent stating that an Immigration Judge lacks authority to redetermine the custody conditions of a respondent in removal proceedings under the circumstances here.” In July 2025, the government reversed course. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) issued guidance determining that, “[e]ffective immediately,” “[t]he only aliens eligible for a custody determination and release on . . . bond” under § 1226(a) are “aliens admitted to the United States” who have become deportable and who are not otherwise subject to § 1226(c). ICE’s guidance further provides that aliens who have entered without inspection are instead “subject to detention under [§ 1225(b)(2)(A)] and may not be released from ICE custody except by . . . parole.” In September 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals adopted this interpretation of the INA in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). After the government began to detain unadmitted aliens present in the United States under § 1225(b)(2)(A), thousands of aliens filed habeas petitions seeking release from custody and bond determinations. This is one such case. Plaintiff Ramon Rodriguez Vazquez illegally entered the United States in 2009, without admission or parole. In 2025, Rodriguez Vazquez was apprehended by immigration authorities pursuant to a warrant and placed in removal proceedings. An immigration judge in Tacoma, Washington then denied Rodriguez Vazquez bond under the challenged interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A). 22 RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK In response, Rodriguez Vazquez filed a habeas petition and class action complaint in federal district court. The district court certified a “Bond Denial Class” consisting of all individuals detained in the Northwest ICE Processing Center in Tacoma, Washington, and subject to mandatory detention under the government’s § 1225(b)(2)(A) detention policy. See, e.g., Al Otro Lado v. EOIR, 138 F.4th 1102, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2025) (explaining that under Ninth Circuit precedent, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) “does not ‘bar classwide declaratory relief’” (quoting Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010))), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, No. 25-5, 2026 WL 1825741 (U.S. June 25, 2026). The district court also granted the Bond Denial Class’s motion for partial summary judgment and entered final judgment, holding that the class was not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Rodriguez Vazquez received a bond hearing, but he was denied bond. He chose voluntarily to depart the United States instead of further challenging his detention and removal. Versions of this case have played out in federal courts across the country. The vast majority of the district courts to confront the issue have concluded that § 1225(b)(2)(A) is limited to the border and does not apply to unadmitted aliens apprehended inside the United States, meaning that those aliens are entitled to bond hearings under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations. See Barco Mercado v. Francis, 811 F. Supp. 3d 487, 494 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (collecting cases); see also Barbosa da Cunha, 175 F.4th at 71–72 (noting that “over ninety percent of district court judges have sided with Petitioner”). Some district courts, though, have ruled for the government. See, e.g., Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t & Removal Operations, 817 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1272 (M.D. Fla.  RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK 23 2026); Chen v. Almodovar, 2026 WL 100761, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2026); Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, 814 F. Supp. 3d 747, 758–59 (N.D. Tex. 2026); Hernandez Cruz v. Noem, 2025 WL 3482630, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025). The circuits are divided as well. In February of this year, the Fifth Circuit became the first court of appeals to address the question on the merits. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). In Buenrostro-Mendez, and over a dissent, the Fifth Circuit sided with the government, holding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to unadmitted aliens inside the country and requires their detention without the possibility of bond. Id. at 498. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit, also over a dissent. See Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1138 (8th Cir. 2026). The Second, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits (the Sixth and Eleventh with dissents) subsequently sided with the habeas petitioners, holding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to unadmitted aliens apprehended in the interior. See Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2026); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713, 732 (6th Cir. 2026); Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 2026 WL 1876709, at *5 (10th Cir. June 30, 2026); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, 175 F.4th 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2026). After earlier concluding at the stay motion stage that the government was unlikely to prevail on the merits of the § 1225(b)(2)(A) issue, see Castañon-Nava v.