Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 2 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SAUL CANO SANCHEZ, No. 16-71520 Petitioner, Agency No. A208-599-076 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 29, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: PAEZ, OWENS, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. Saul Cano Sanchez (“Cano Sanchez”), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision. The agency denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) and rejected his due process right to counsel claim. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We grant the petition in part and deny in part. “Where the BIA writes its own decision, as it did here, we review the BIA’s decision, except to the extent it expressly adopts the IJ’s decision.” Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2020). We examine the BIA’s “legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence.” Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “Under the substantial evidence standard, administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Ani v. Bondi, 155 F.4th 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). We review due process challenges de novo. Olea-Serefina v. Garland, 34 F.4th 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2022). 1. To qualify for asylum, Cano Sanchez must show that past harm “(1) rises to the level of persecution; (2) the persecution was on account of one or more protected grounds; and (3) the persecution was committed by the government, or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control.” Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). Substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s determinations that Cano Sanchez’s past harm 2 did not rise to the level of persecution and that he was not persecuted “on account of” his membership in a particular social group. The record compels the conclusion that Cano Sanchez suffered past persecution when he was kidnapped and beaten by the Knights Templar cartel. See Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 909 (9th Cir. 2018) (“It is, of course, ‘well established that physical violence is persecution . . . .’” (citation omitted)). The record also compels that conclusion that the persecution was on account of his family membership. See id. at 910 (noting that family membership is categorically a “particular social group” for asylum and withholding of removal relief). Cano Sanchez was captured and beaten, his daughter’s godfather was murdered, his nephew and brother were kidnapped, his family’s money was taken, and he and his family members received multiple death threats. See Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1145 (holding that “murder, specific death threats, forcible taking of property, attempted conscription, and retaliation for failed conscription” constituted persecution based on family membership); Parada, 902 F.3d at 910 (noting that sibling’s assassination, neighbor’s murder, family death threats, being captured and beaten, and home invasions constituted persecution based on family membership). Because the BIA did not address whether the persecution was committed by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control, the agency should 3 consider this element of Cano Sanchez’s asylum claim on remand. Past persecution “triggers a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.” Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, if Cano Sanchez has demonstrated that the government was unable or unwilling to control the Knights Templar, the BIA must determine whether the government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Cano Sanchez no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution or that he can reasonably relocate to a safe area within Mexico. See Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 934 (9th Cir. 2010). 2. The BIA committed legal error when it failed to apply the differing nexus standards for withholding of removal and asylum claims. “A person seeking asylum has the burden of proving that their persecution was ‘on account of’ a protected ground, while a withholding of removal applicant must prove that her life or freedom would be threatened ‘because of’ a protected characteristic.” Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1146 (citations omitted). The BIA here failed to appreciate the difference between these standards when it only acknowledged that “the overall standard of proof is more difficult to meet in withholding cases.” See Corpeno-Romero v. Garland, 120 F.4th 570, 580 (2024) (explaining that asylum’s “one central reason” standard is “more demanding”); Manzano v. Garland, 104 F.4th 1202, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 2024) 4 (defining “one central reason” as “a reason of primary importance to the persecutors, one that is essential to their decision to act”); Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A person may have ‘a reason’ to do something that is not his ‘central’ reason or even ‘one central reason.’”). Here, the BIA did not state or apply any nexus standard. We remand to the BIA to apply the distinct nexus standards for asylum and withholding of removal, and to consider whether Cano Sanchez’s family membership was “a reason” or “one central reason” for his past persecution. 3. For the CAT claim, substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s determination that Cano Sanchez failed to establish that he would more likely than not be tortured by or with the acquiescence of a public official if removed to Mexico. See Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1147. The record compels the conclusion that Cano Sanchez experienced past torture. The violent beating of Cano Sanchez, as well as threats to, and actual killing of, his family members rises to level of “[t]he intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering” and “[t]he threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering . . . . ” under CAT’s implementing regulations and this circuit’s cases. 8 U.S.C. § 1208.18(a)(4)(i), (iv); see Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2020) (being “beaten severely and threatened with death at gunpoint” by members of an organized criminal group constituted torture). 5 The record also compels the conclusion that a public official acquiesced to Cano Sanchez’s past torture when the town leader responded to Cano Sanchez’s plea for help with an apology and a “letter” to help him seek refuge in another country, stating that he could not “promise” Cano Sanchez “wellness []or security.” See Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 509 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that acquiescence “does not require that the public official approve of the torture, even implicitly” and that “[i]t is sufficient that the public official be aware that torture . . . occurs and remain willfully blind to it”). Thus, we remand to the BIA to consider whether it is more likely than not that Cano Sanchez will be tortured if removed to Mexico. See Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1147. 4. Finally, the IJ did not violate Cano Sanchez’s right to due process by failing to provide him with proper right to counsel advisals or allow a reasonable time period to obtain counsel. Due process in the immigration context is violated if “(1) the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the [noncitizen] was prevented from reasonably presenting his case, and (2) the [noncitizen] demonstrates prejudice, which means that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Arizmendi-Medina v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The IJ repeatedly provided Cano Sanchez with the proper right to counsel 6 advisals, which Cano Sanchez repeatedly waived. Furthermore, Cano Sanchez’s argument that he was not given enough time to find counsel is unpersuasive, as he did not request counsel at any point during the proceedings. Thus, we deny the petition for review as to the due process claim. PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 7