Rodriguez Jimenez v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 2, 2026
Docket26-931
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 2 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ASTRI YENIFER RODRIGUEZ No. 26-931
JIMENEZ; M. Y. R. R., Agency Nos.
A241-389-425
Petitioners, A241-389-426
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 26, 2026**
Pasadena, California
Before: PAEZ, OWENS, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Astri Yenifer Rodriguez Jimenez (“Rodriguez Jimenez”) and her derivative
minor child, natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing their appeal from an
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). “Where, as here, the
BIA cites [Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994),] and also provides
its own review of the evidence and law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s
decisions.” Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011). “We review the
denial of asylum, withholding of removal and CAT claims for substantial
evidence.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).
“Under this standard, we must uphold the agency determination unless the
evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Id. As the parties are familiar with the
facts, we do not recount them here. We deny in part and grant in part the petition
for review.
1. “To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to demonstrate the
likelihood of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.’” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8
U.S.C § 1101(a)(42)(A)). “An applicant alleging past persecution has the burden
of establishing that (1) [her] treatment rises to the level of persecution; (2) the
persecution was on account of one or more protected grounds; and (3) the
persecution was committed by the government, or by forces that the government
2 26-931
was unable or unwilling to control.” Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th
Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that the past harm
suffered by Rodriguez Jimenez did not rise to the level of persecution. Rodriguez
Jimenez relies on several extortion phone calls she received from unknown
individuals. Rodriguez Jimenez testified that these individuals threatened her life
and her daughter’s life if she did not pay them. They also told her not to leave her
house. However, these extortionists never confronted, harmed, or performed any
other act of mistreatment against her, her daughter, or other family members.
Because these phone calls were anonymous threats without confrontation or other
mistreatment, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that they did not
rise to the level of persecution. See Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028
(explaining that “cases with threats alone, particularly anonymous or vague ones,
rarely constitute persecution” unless they are “repeated, specific and ‘combined
with confrontation or other mistreatment’” (citation omitted)).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s finding that Rodriguez
Jimenez did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. In the absence
of past persecution, Rodriguez Jimenez is not entitled to a presumption of a well-
founded fear of future persecution. Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1060. As noted above, the
past threatening phone calls she received do not rise to the level of persecution, and
3 26-931
she did not contend that she feared or was likely to face a different form of future
persecution in Guatemala. Moreover, her brother continues to reside safely in
Guatemala. See id. at 1066 (“The ongoing safety of family members in the
petitioner’s native country undermines a reasonable fear of future persecution.”).
2. Because substantial evidence supports the denial of asylum, Rodriguez
Jimenez necessarily failed to meet the higher showing required for withholding of
removal. See id.
3. The BIA erred by finding that Rodriguez Jimenez waived the IJ’s denial
of her CAT claim by failing to “meaningfully challenge[]” that issue. A petitioner
must simply put “‘the BIA on notice’ of a challenge such that the BIA ‘had an
opportunity to pass’ on it.” Martinez v. Barr, 941 F.3d 907, 922 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citation omitted).
Here, Rodriguez Jimenez sufficiently put the BIA on notice of her challenge
to the IJ’s denial of her CAT claim. In her brief to the BIA, she did not merely
mention CAT protection in passing. Cf. Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061, 1068-69
& n.8 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that BIA did not err in concluding that the petitioner
waived the CAT claim where the petitioner’s brief to the BIA merely “mentioned”
CAT twice and made “no argument for relief under the CAT”). Instead, Rodriguez
Jimenez included a separate two-page section in her brief titled “CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE” where she set forth the CAT standard, pointed to
4 26-931
supporting evidence, and made arguments challenging the IJ’s sole reason for
denying CAT protection. This was sufficient notice of her challenge to the IJ’s
denial of the CAT claim, so the BIA erred by deeming it waived.
Because the CAT claim was not reviewed on the merits by the BIA, we do
not address it. See Montes-Lopez v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 1163, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“[W]e usually decline to hear the claim unless the BIA does so in the first
instance.”); see also I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per
curiam) (“[A] court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a
matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.”). The BIA’s adoption of the
IJ’s decision under Burbano is insufficient because where the BIA explicitly
declines to reach an unexhausted issue, we interpret the BIA’s citation to Burbano
to incorporate only the portions of the IJ’s decision that the BIA decided on the
merits. See Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1040-41 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
Therefore, the CAT claim is remanded.
PETITION DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART.1
1
The motion to stay removal, Dkt. No. 2, is granted.
5 26-931