Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT OKUNLOLA OLUWASEUN No. 21-415 KOLAWOLE, Agency No. A206-914-990 Petitioner, MEMORANDUM* v. TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted October 6, 2026 San Francisco, California Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge MILLER. Okunlola Kolawole (“Kolawole” or “Petitioner”), a citizen of Nigeria, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We “may look to the IJ’s decision when the BIA incorporates parts of the IJ’s reasoning as its own.” Szonyi v. Barr, 942 F.3d 874, 897 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). The court reviews questions of law de novo. Chavez-Garcia v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2017). We review the agency’s factual findings and adverse credibility decisions for substantial evidence. Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014). While the court shows “a healthy measure of deference,” the agency “must still provide specific and cogent reasons” for an adverse credibility determination. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041-43 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). In assessing an adverse credibility finding under the REAL ID Act, the court “must look to the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors.” Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (citation modified). We grant the petition for review in part and deny it in part. 1. Voluntary Departure After the BIA dismissed Kolawole’s appeal, we clarified in Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2021), that service of a defective Notice to Appear (“NTA”) does not stop a noncitizen from accumulating the continuous physical presence required for voluntary departure. Kolawole’s removal proceeding began when DHS issued a defective NTA one month after he arrived in 2 21-415 the United States. Under Posos-Sanchez, Kolawole now meets the one-year presence requirement for voluntary departure. The futility exception excuses Kolawole’s failure to administratively exhaust this claim because he was ineligible to apply for voluntary departure during his removal proceeding. Gonzalez-Lara v. Garland, 104 F.4th 1109, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2024). Accordingly, we remand for Kolawole to apply for voluntary departure due to the intervening Posos-Sanchez decision establishing his statutory eligibility. 2. Frivolous Asylum Application The agency erred in applying the frivolousness bar based on a minor, explained inconsistency regarding the exact date of the attack. Whether Boko Haram attacked Kolawole’s village in April 2014 or July 2014 makes no difference to his persecution claim. The IJ offered no explanation as to why the exact date might be significant other than the fact of its inconsistency. The government does not dispute that the frivolousness finding was not adequately supported under this court’s case law. Khadka v. Holder, 618 F.3d 996, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2010). Because the IJ’s frivolousness finding was not supported by substantial evidence, we remand to the BIA with directions to vacate that finding. 3. Adverse Credibility Determination The BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, which relied on Kolawole’s inconsistent statements on three topics: the date his 3 21-415 village was attacked, whether he knew that his father survived the attack, and the income he reported to USCIS in a separate immigration matter. Substantial evidence does not support the finding that the date of the attack was a valid basis for an adverse credibility determination. There is no indication in the record that Kolawole would have any reason to lie about the date of the attack or that it would enhance his persecution claim if the attack occurred in April versus July. Discrepancies that cannot be viewed as attempts to enhance claims of persecution generally have no bearing on credibility. Singh v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004); Mbueno-Vita v. Blanche, 190 F.4th 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2026). Because of the insignificance of the exact date to Kolawole’s claim and the IJ’s unsupported speculation about what a trauma survivor would necessarily recall, substantial evidence does not support this credibility finding. See Singh, 362 F.3d at 1171; Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). On remand, the agency may not rely on the date of the attack as a basis for discrediting Kolawole. The IJ’s findings regarding the death of Kolawole’s father are only partially supported by the record. The IJ found two discrepancies regarding Kolawole’s description of his father’s death. First, the IJ took issue with Kolawole’s 2014 statement that his father was killed in the attack and his 2021 statement that his father died from natural causes. There is no inconsistency. Following the attack, 4 21-415 Kolawole operated under the assumption that his father had been killed. Kolawole believed his father was dead based on circumstantial evidence: he knew that his mother and brother were killed in the Boko Haram attack, his house was burned down, and he had neither seen nor heard from his father since that day despite efforts to find him. Kolawole later learned that his father died from natural causes in 2018, but his assumption in 2014 is not inconsistent with his 2021 statement describing his knowledge of a later event. Second, the IJ found Kolawole’s 2021 testimony about the cause of his father’s death was inconsistent with his November 2020 testimony that he was not certain about his father’s whereabouts or wellbeing. Substantial evidence in the record supports the IJ’s finding. The record is not clear whether the agency relied on the perceived 2014– 2021 inconsistency, the 2020–2021 inconsistency, or both in its adverse credibility finding. “The BIA must be clear enough that we need not speculate based on an incomplete analysis. . . . Without knowing the basis of the Board’s decision, we cannot conduct a meaningful review.” Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1107– 08 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation modified). We remand to the BIA to clarify its decision on the issue. See id. Kolawole’s inconsistent statements regarding the income reported on his previous USCIS application were supported by substantial evidence and may be 5 21-415 relied upon by the agency on remand. A credibility finding must be based on the totality of the circumstances; no single factor is determinative. Alam, 11 F.4th at 1137. Because some of the grounds on which the IJ and BIA relied are not supported by the record and the basis for some of the agency’s findings is not clear, we remand for a new credibility determination. 4. CAT Claim The BIA applied the correct legal standard in evaluating Kolawole’s CAT claim. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Although it appears that the IJ erroneously required Kolawole to show he could not relocate within Nigeria, he did not raise that argument before this court. Thus, the issue is waived. See Alcaraz v. INS, 384 F.3d 1150, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we deny the petition as to Petitioner’s CAT claim. PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED AND REMANDED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 6 21-415 FILED NOV 19 2026 Kolawole v. Blanche, No. 21-415 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS MILLER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Okunlola Kolawole seeks to establish eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture based on his claim to have suffered religious persecution in Nigeria when the Boko Haram terrorist group attacked his village and took him captive. That claim rests on Kolawole’s own testimony, but the immigration judge determined that Kolawole was not credible, and the Board of Immigration Appeals agreed. We review the agency’s factual findings—including credibility determinations—for substantial evidence, which means that we must uphold the findings “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 365 (2021). The agency found that Kolawole was not credible based on inconsistences in his testimony about (1) the date of the attack by Boko Haram, (2) the timing and cause of his father’s death, and (3) his income. Any one of those inconsistencies could be enough, under the totality of the circumstances, to uphold the agency’s ultimate adverse credibility determination. Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc). All three are supported by substantial evidence. First, Kolawole gave conflicting accounts of the date of the attack by Boko Haram. In a credible-fear interview and in an interview with a border patrol officer, 1 Kolawole stated that the attack occurred on April 29, 2014. In contrast, in his declaration in support of his application for relief and in his immigration hearing, Kolawole testified that the attack occurred months later, on July 15, 2014. When asked about the inconsistency, Kolawole said that he mistakenly gave the July date because his trauma affected his memory of the attack. But the immigration judge “was not required to accept that proffered explanation.” Kalulu v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2024). The immigration judge could reasonably decide not to credit an explanation that was essentially circular: Kolawole’s trauma could not explain the inconsistency in his testimony unless he actually suffered trauma, but the only evidence of his trauma was his inconsistent testimony. Nor does it matter that a misstatement about the date of the attack would not enhance Kolawole’s persecution claim. To the extent that our decision in Singh v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2004), suggests otherwise, that case reflected our pre–REAL ID Act doctrine that an inconsistency had to relate to the “heart of [the] claim” to count against an applicant’s credibility, id. at 1171; see Alam, 11 F.4th at 1135. Under the REAL ID Act, which expressly abrogated the “heart of the claim” doctrine, “even minor inconsistencies may have a legitimate impact on a petitioner’s credibility.” Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2021); see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 2 To be sure, “manifestly trivial” inconsistences “that no reasonable person would understand as undermining an applicant’s veracity” are not a proper basis for an adverse credibility finding. Mbueno-Vita v. Blanche, 190 F.4th 1034, 1041– 42 (9th Cir. 2026). And a date can sometimes be a matter of insignificance, such that misremembering it would not cast doubt on a witness’s credibility. But not always. If you met someone who claimed to have been affected by the terrorist attacks of September 10, 2001, you would probably view his story with skepticism. In this instance, the agency could reasonably conclude that Kolawole’s inconsistent testimony about the “crucial date” of his attack similarly undermined his credibility. Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 2007)). Second, Kolawole was inconsistent as to whether his father died in the 2014 attack. In his 2014 credible fear interview, Kolawole stated that his father died in the attack. Then, in his 2020 immigration court hearing, Kolawole testified that he did not know whether his father was alive or dead. When asked to explain this inconsistency, Kolawole said that he originally believed his father “could have been” killed in the attack but then found out that he probably escaped. That is only a partial explanation for the inconsistency because if Kolawole had simply assumed that his father could have been killed, it is difficult to understand his unqualified statement that “both of my parents were killed.” And when the hearing 3 continued in early 2021, Kolawole offered a third version: that his father died of a stroke and heart attack in 2018. When asked about the inconsistency, Kolawole stated that he had learned only recently that his father died of natural causes, but he also admitted that he knew of his father’s death in 2018. Kolawole was unable to explain why in 2020 he stated that he did not “know his [father’s] whereabouts,” if he was aware his father was dead in 2018. In assessing Kolawole’s credibility, the agency appropriately considered his inability to explain his varying statements about his father’s death. Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2021). Third, Kolawole made inconsistent claims about his income. In his citizenship application and on a fee waiver, Kolawole stated that his annual income was $200. But at his immigration hearing, Kolawole stated that he worked full time earning at least $10 per hour. When asked about the inconsistency, Kolawole explained that his adoptive American father had prepared the forms. As the court today recognizes, the agency appropriately considered that inconsistency. * * * I agree with the court that the agency erred in applying the frivolousness bar and that remand is warranted to consider voluntary departure in light of Posos- Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176 (9th Cir. 2021). But because the agency’s adverse credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence, I would deny the petition for review in all other respects. 4