Kolawole v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket21-415
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 19 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OKUNLOLA OLUWASEUN No. 21-415
KOLAWOLE, Agency No.
A206-914-990
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted October 6, 2026
San Francisco, California
Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge MILLER.
Okunlola Kolawole (“Kolawole” or “Petitioner”), a citizen of Nigeria,
petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
dismissing an appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”).
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We “may look to the IJ’s
decision when the BIA incorporates parts of the IJ’s reasoning as its own.” Szonyi
v. Barr, 942 F.3d 874, 897 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). The court reviews
questions of law de novo. Chavez-Garcia v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir.
2017).
We review the agency’s factual findings and adverse credibility decisions
for substantial evidence. Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014).
While the court shows “a healthy measure of deference,” the agency “must still
provide specific and cogent reasons” for an adverse credibility determination.
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041-43 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). In
assessing an adverse credibility finding under the REAL ID Act, the court “must
look to the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors.” Alam v. Garland,
11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (citation modified).
We grant the petition for review in part and deny it in part.
1. Voluntary Departure
After the BIA dismissed Kolawole’s appeal, we clarified in Posos-Sanchez
v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2021), that service of a defective Notice to
Appear (“NTA”) does not stop a noncitizen from accumulating the continuous
physical presence required for voluntary departure. Kolawole’s removal
proceeding began when DHS issued a defective NTA one month after he arrived in
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the United States. Under Posos-Sanchez, Kolawole now meets the one-year
presence requirement for voluntary departure. The futility exception excuses
Kolawole’s failure to administratively exhaust this claim because he was ineligible
to apply for voluntary departure during his removal proceeding. Gonzalez-Lara v.
Garland, 104 F.4th 1109, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2024). Accordingly, we remand for
Kolawole to apply for voluntary departure due to the intervening Posos-Sanchez
decision establishing his statutory eligibility.
2. Frivolous Asylum Application
The agency erred in applying the frivolousness bar based on a minor,
explained inconsistency regarding the exact date of the attack. Whether Boko
Haram attacked Kolawole’s village in April 2014 or July 2014 makes no difference
to his persecution claim. The IJ offered no explanation as to why the exact date
might be significant other than the fact of its inconsistency. The government does
not dispute that the frivolousness finding was not adequately supported under this
court’s case law. Khadka v. Holder, 618 F.3d 996, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2010).
Because the IJ’s frivolousness finding was not supported by substantial evidence,
we remand to the BIA with directions to vacate that finding.
3. Adverse Credibility Determination
The BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s adverse credibility determination,
which relied on Kolawole’s inconsistent statements on three topics: the date his
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village was attacked, whether he knew that his father survived the attack, and the
income he reported to USCIS in a separate immigration matter.
Substantial evidence does not support the finding that the date of the attack
was a valid basis for an adverse credibility determination. There is no indication in
the record that Kolawole would have any reason to lie about the date of the attack
or that it would enhance his persecution claim if the attack occurred in April versus
July. Discrepancies that cannot be viewed as attempts to enhance claims of
persecution generally have no bearing on credibility. Singh v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d
1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004); Mbueno-Vita v. Blanche, 190 F.4th 1034, 1042 (9th
Cir. 2026). Because of the insignificance of the exact date to Kolawole’s claim
and the IJ’s unsupported speculation about what a trauma survivor would
necessarily recall, substantial evidence does not support this credibility finding.
See Singh, 362 F.3d at 1171; Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1091–92 (9th Cir.
2005). On remand, the agency may not rely on the date of the attack as a basis for
discrediting Kolawole.
The IJ’s findings regarding the death of Kolawole’s father are only partially
supported by the record. The IJ found two discrepancies regarding Kolawole’s
description of his father’s death. First, the IJ took issue with Kolawole’s 2014
statement that his father was killed in the attack and his 2021 statement that his
father died from natural causes. There is no inconsistency. Following the attack,
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Kolawole operated under the assumption that his father had been killed. Kolawole
believed his father was dead based on circumstantial evidence: he knew that his
mother and brother were killed in the Boko Haram attack, his house was burned
down, and he had neither seen nor heard from his father since that day despite
efforts to find him. Kolawole later learned that his father died from natural causes
in 2018, but his assumption in 2014 is not inconsistent with his 2021 statement
describing his knowledge of a later event.
Second, the IJ found Kolawole’s 2021 testimony about the cause of his
father’s death was inconsistent with his November 2020 testimony that he was not
certain about his father’s whereabouts or wellbeing. Substantial evidence in the
record supports the IJ’s finding.
The record is not clear whether the agency relied on the perceived 2014–
2021 inconsistency, the 2020–2021 inconsistency, or both in its adverse credibility
finding. “The BIA must be clear enough that we need not speculate based on an
incomplete analysis. . . . Without knowing the basis of the Board’s decision, we
cannot conduct a meaningful review.” Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1107–
08 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation modified). We remand to the BIA to clarify
its decision on the issue. See id.
Kolawole’s inconsistent statements regarding the income reported on his
previous USCIS application were supported by substantial evidence and may be
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relied upon by the agency on remand.
A credibility finding must be based on the totality of the circumstances; no
single factor is determinative. Alam, 11 F.4th at 1137. Because some of the
grounds on which the IJ and BIA relied are not supported by the record and the
basis for some of the agency’s findings is not clear, we remand for a new
credibility determination.
4. CAT Claim
The BIA applied the correct legal standard in evaluating Kolawole’s CAT
claim. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Although it appears that the IJ erroneously
required Kolawole to show he could not relocate within Nigeria, he did not raise
that argument before this court. Thus, the issue is waived. See Alcaraz v. INS, 384
F.3d 1150, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, we deny the petition as to Petitioner’s CAT claim.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED AND REMANDED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART.
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FILED
NOV 19 2026
Kolawole v. Blanche, No. 21-415
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
MILLER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Okunlola Kolawole seeks to establish eligibility for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture based on his claim
to have suffered religious persecution in Nigeria when the Boko Haram terrorist
group attacked his village and took him captive. That claim rests on Kolawole’s
own testimony, but the immigration judge determined that Kolawole was not
credible, and the Board of Immigration Appeals agreed. We review the agency’s
factual findings—including credibility determinations—for substantial evidence,
which means that we must uphold the findings “unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see
Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 365 (2021).
The agency found that Kolawole was not credible based on inconsistences in
his testimony about (1) the date of the attack by Boko Haram, (2) the timing and
cause of his father’s death, and (3) his income. Any one of those inconsistencies
could be enough, under the totality of the circumstances, to uphold the agency’s
ultimate adverse credibility determination. Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137
(9th Cir. 2021) (en banc). All three are supported by substantial evidence.
First, Kolawole gave conflicting accounts of the date of the attack by Boko
Haram. In a credible-fear interview and in an interview with a border patrol officer,
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Kolawole stated that the attack occurred on April 29, 2014. In contrast, in his
declaration in support of his application for relief and in his immigration hearing,
Kolawole testified that the attack occurred months later, on July 15, 2014. When
asked about the inconsistency, Kolawole said that he mistakenly gave the July date
because his trauma affected his memory of the attack. But the immigration judge
“was not required to accept that proffered explanation.” Kalulu v. Bondi, 128 F.4th
1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2024). The immigration judge could reasonably decide not to
credit an explanation that was essentially circular: Kolawole’s trauma could not
explain the inconsistency in his testimony unless he actually suffered trauma, but
the only evidence of his trauma was his inconsistent testimony.
Nor does it matter that a misstatement about the date of the attack would not
enhance Kolawole’s persecution claim. To the extent that our decision in Singh v.
Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2004), suggests otherwise, that case reflected our
pre–REAL ID Act doctrine that an inconsistency had to relate to the “heart of [the]
claim” to count against an applicant’s credibility, id. at 1171; see Alam, 11 F.4th at
1135. Under the REAL ID Act, which expressly abrogated the “heart of the claim”
doctrine, “even minor inconsistencies may have a legitimate impact on a
petitioner’s credibility.” Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2021); see 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
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To be sure, “manifestly trivial” inconsistences “that no reasonable person
would understand as undermining an applicant’s veracity” are not a proper basis
for an adverse credibility finding. Mbueno-Vita v. Blanche, 190 F.4th 1034, 1041–
42 (9th Cir. 2026). And a date can sometimes be a matter of insignificance, such
that misremembering it would not cast doubt on a witness’s credibility. But not
always. If you met someone who claimed to have been affected by the terrorist
attacks of September 10, 2001, you would probably view his story with skepticism.
In this instance, the agency could reasonably conclude that Kolawole’s inconsistent
testimony about the “crucial date” of his attack similarly undermined his
credibility. Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 2007)).
Second, Kolawole was inconsistent as to whether his father died in the 2014
attack. In his 2014 credible fear interview, Kolawole stated that his father died in
the attack. Then, in his 2020 immigration court hearing, Kolawole testified that he
did not know whether his father was alive or dead. When asked to explain this
inconsistency, Kolawole said that he originally believed his father “could have
been” killed in the attack but then found out that he probably escaped. That is only
a partial explanation for the inconsistency because if Kolawole had simply
assumed that his father could have been killed, it is difficult to understand his
unqualified statement that “both of my parents were killed.” And when the hearing
3
continued in early 2021, Kolawole offered a third version: that his father died of a
stroke and heart attack in 2018. When asked about the inconsistency, Kolawole
stated that he had learned only recently that his father died of natural causes, but he
also admitted that he knew of his father’s death in 2018. Kolawole was unable to
explain why in 2020 he stated that he did not “know his [father’s] whereabouts,” if
he was aware his father was dead in 2018. In assessing Kolawole’s credibility, the
agency appropriately considered his inability to explain his varying statements
about his father’s death. Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2021).
Third, Kolawole made inconsistent claims about his income. In his
citizenship application and on a fee waiver, Kolawole stated that his annual income
was $200. But at his immigration hearing, Kolawole stated that he worked full time
earning at least $10 per hour. When asked about the inconsistency, Kolawole
explained that his adoptive American father had prepared the forms. As the court
today recognizes, the agency appropriately considered that inconsistency.
* * *
I agree with the court that the agency erred in applying the frivolousness bar
and that remand is warranted to consider voluntary departure in light of Posos-
Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176 (9th Cir. 2021). But because the agency’s adverse
credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence, I would deny the petition
for review in all other respects.
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