A. M. A. S. v. Mullin
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-6950
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
A. M. A. S., No. 26-6950
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:26-cv-06601-JCH
District of Arizona,
v.
Phoenix
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, ORDER
Department of Homeland Security, in
official capacity; et al.,
Defendants - Appellants.
Before: GRABER, BENNETT, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dissent by Judge GRABER
Defendants-Appellants (collectively, the “government”) move for an
emergency stay pending appeal pursuant to Circuit Rule 27-3 (Dkt. No. 9). As the
party requesting a stay, the government “bears the burden of showing that the
circumstances justify” a stay pending appeal. Doe #1 v. Trump, 957 F.3d 1050,
1058 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). In
determining whether to exercise our discretion to grant a stay, we must consider
the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Nken: “(1) whether the Government
has made a strong showing of the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether
the appellants will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether a stay will
substantially injure other parties; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Doe #1,
957 F.3d at 1058. Having considered the Nken factors, we find that they support
the issuance of a stay. The government’s motion for a stay pending appeal is
therefore GRANTED.
2 26-6950
FILED
NOV 20 2026
A.M.A.S. v. Mullin, No. 26-6950 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
GRABER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in large part from the order granting a stay
Plaintiff A.M.A.S. is from Egypt and was held to be removable from the
United States to Egypt. But because he likely would face torture in Egypt, he
received deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. He was then
removed not to Egypt but, instead, to Equatorial Guinea, which the government has
paid to take deportees like him. Plaintiff had no opportunity to challenge the
choice to send him to that country. Since his arrival in Equatorial Guinea, he has
been arrested, held incommunicado, repeatedly beaten by guards, deprived of food
and water, and threatened with death at gunpoint. He does not contest his
removability. Rather, he objects to the lack of due process afforded him with
respect to the place of removal. The district court found a constitutional violation
and ordered that Plaintiff be returned to the United States so that he can dispute the
destination to which he is removed—a remedy that the Supreme Court expressly
approved in Noem v. Abrego Garcia, 145 S. Ct. 1017 (2025). Without
explanation, the per curiam order grants the government’s motion to stay the
district court’s order. Because the government has failed to meet the standards that
we must apply to a motion for a stay pending appeal, I dissent. I would grant a
stay only to the extent that the district court’s orders exceed the remedy described
in Abrego Garcia. I otherwise would deny the stay and allow the district court to
order the government to facilitate Plaintiff’s return to this country pending the
outcome of this appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff was admitted to the United States in 1998 and became a lawful
permanent resident in 2021. A.M.A.S. v. Mullin, No. 26-06601-PHX-JCH, 2026
WL 3026123, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2026). In January 2024, following a
conviction for aggravated assault and possession of a synthetic narcotic, the
government sought to remove him to Egypt. Id. In 2025, an immigration judge
ordered him removed to Egypt but, upon determining that he faced a clear
probability of torture in Egypt, the immigration judge granted deferral of removal
under the Convention Against Torture. Id. The government did not appeal that
decision but continued to detain Plaintiff. Id.
On April 28, 2026, the government removed Plaintiff to Equatorial Guinea.
Id. The government notified Plaintiff that he was being removed to Equatorial
Guinea shortly before the flight and, when he asked for a reasonable-fear
interview, he was told it was too late, and he was carried onto the plane. Id.
Equatorial Guinean officials held Plaintiff with other deportees under armed
guard at a decommissioned hotel. Id. at *2. While imprisoned at the hotel from
April to September 2026, Plaintiff and the other deportees frequently were subject
to verbal abuse, beatings, and death threats. Id. Equatorial Guinean officials also
2
threatened to return deportees involuntarily to the countries from which they had
been granted protection from removal; they followed through on those threats by
refouling1 a group of Ethiopian citizens to their home country. Id.
In August 2026, Plaintiff reported to his lawyer that he and other detainees
were dragged, handcuffed, and assaulted at gunpoint for speaking to the press
about their detention. Id. Equatorial Guinean officials warned that the country did
not want the deportees and that, if they did not return to their home countries, it
would be “easy” to “kill [them] and bury [them] in a field.” On September 5,
Plaintiff’s lawyer received a video and text message from Plaintiff and another
detainee. The video showed officers aiming guns at Plaintiff and another detainee
who was trying to shield Plaintiff, while another officer commanded them to shoot.
Id. After the press reported about the incident and published the video, Equatorial
Guinean officials confiscated the detainees’ phones. Id. On September 11,
Plaintiff’s lawyer was informed that Plaintiff and another detainee had been
arrested and were being held incommunicado at an unknown location, reportedly
without food or water. Witnesses later reported that Plaintiff and the other
detainee had been bound with rope, hooded, and beaten. Id. As of September 15,
Plaintiff’s lawyer did not know her client’s whereabouts or condition.
1
“Refoulement” refers to forcing refugees back to a place where they face
persecution. “Refoulement,” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, (last visited
Nov. 20, 2026), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/refoulement
[https://perma.cc/6VA3-5G36].
3
On September 15, Plaintiff filed this action against the government, alleging
that his removal to Equatorial Guinea violated his right to procedural due process
under the Fifth Amendment and constituted an unlawful agency action under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). He sought a judicial declaration that his
removal to Equatorial Guinea was unlawful; mandamus relief requiring the
government to facilitate his return to the United States; and further equitable relief.
On October 6, the district court entered an order fully resolving the case.
The district court expressly declined to reach Plaintiff’s APA claim and, instead,
ruled solely on the constitutional claim. Id. at *7. The district court held that
Plaintiff’s removal to Equatorial Guinea without notice of the country of removal
and a meaningful opportunity to raise a country-specific fear-based claim violated
Plaintiff’s right to procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at *6–
*7. The district court issued declaratory and equitable relief, ordering the
government to “facilitate” Plaintiff’s return to the United States. Id. at *11. In the
weeks that followed, the court issued increasingly specific orders mandating that
the government take particular actions.
The government timely appeals. A motions panel of this court granted an
administrative stay that remains in effect, and the motions panel referred the
government’s motion for a stay pending appeal to the merits panel.
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DISCUSSION
In Abrego Garcia, the Supreme Court approved an order that required the
government to “facilitate” the return of a person who had been removed to El
Salvador unlawfully and imprisoned there. 145 S. Ct. at 1018. The Court also
noted that “the Government should be prepared to share what it can concerning the
steps it has taken and the prospect of further steps.” Id. But the Court required the
district court, on remand, to clarify its directive that the government “effectuate”
the plaintiff’s return. Id. The Court directed the district court to give appropriate
deference to the executive branch in the area of foreign affairs. Id.
The district court’s original order appears to have applied Abrego Garcia
faithfully, requiring the government to “facilitate” Plaintiff’s return and requiring
periodic status reports. But the government is likely correct that the court’s later
orders overstepped, micromanaging the government’s efforts and impinging on the
government’s authority to conduct foreign affairs. For that reason, I would grant a
stay of any order that exceeds the remedy authorized in Abrego Garcia. But the
government’s request for a stay is not nuanced. The government seeks a full stay
of all aspects of all orders issued by the district court, even those orders that are
fully consistent with Abrego Garcia. I confine my analysis below to that issue.
A stay pending appeal is an “extraordinary remedy.” United States v.
Mitchell, 971 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). In determining whether
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to grant a stay to the government, we must consider four factors: “(1) whether [the
government] has made a strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) whether [the government] will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,
426 (2009). In my view, none of the factors supports a stay.
A. Irreparable Harm
I begin the analysis with the second factor, both because it is dispositive and
because it is clearly not met. “Nken instructed ‘that if the petition has not made a
certain threshold showing regarding irreparable harm then a stay may not issue,
regardless of the [movant’s] proof regarding the other stay factors.’” Doe #1 v.
Trump, 957 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2020) (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Leiva-
Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)).
The government’s assertions of irreparable harm are wholly unpersuasive.
The district court’s order requires the government to facilitate the return of a single
individual from a single country. The Supreme Court in Abrego Garcia blessed
precisely this remedy in precisely this context. There is no possible irreparable
harm here from permitting Plaintiff’s return to safety while his legal challenges are
resolved.
6
The government does not offer any arguments particularized to Plaintiff or
to this case. Instead, the government points to the Supreme Court’s issuance of a
stay in a related case, Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426,
2026 WL 2917860 (U.S. Sep. 29, 2026). The government argues that the issuance
of the stay in D.V.D. “squarely controls” our assessment of the Nken factors here.
The government reasons that, because the Court found irreparable harm in D.V.D.,
irreparable harm necessarily will result here. I strenuously disagree. Particularly
when assessing irreparable harm to the government, the government’s equivalence
of this case and D.V.D. strains credulity.
In D.V.D., several named plaintiffs brought a class action seeking to prevent
the government from following formal “Guidance” issued by the Department of
Homeland Security. D.V.D. v. U.S. DHS, 821 F. Supp. 3d 102, 119–20 (D. Mass.
2026). That Guidance authorizes third-country removal for a person, like Plaintiff
here, who cannot be removed to the person’s country of origin. Id. Ruling solely
on the plaintiffs’ APA claims, the district court in D.V.D. held that the challenged
Guidance was unlawful, and the court set aside the Guidance pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2). Id. at 165, 167–68. In essence, the district court’s order ended the third-
country removal program and required the government to unwind thousands of
removals.
7
The First Circuit granted a stay pending appeal but, after affirming on the
merits, the First Circuit abruptly dissolved the stay, thus reinstating the district
court’s order. D.V.D. v. U.S. DHS, 192 F.4th 74 (1st Cir. 2026). The government
then sought emergency relief before the Supreme Court, which the Court granted
without explanation. DHS v. D.V.D., 2026 WL 2917860. The Court also treated
the application as a petition for writ of certiorari; granted certiorari; and ordered
the parties to file supplemental briefs. Id. at *1.
Although the Court did not explain its stay order in D.V.D., it is easy to see
why the Court saw irreparable harm. The district court’s order effectively ended
the entire third-country removal program and required the government to unwind
actions affecting thousands of persons and many different countries. Crediting the
government’s application in that case, the failure to issue a stay would: affect
“thousands” of persons removed to third countries; “upend international
agreements”; disturb the government’s ability to carry out third-country removals
of “all aliens, anywhere in the country—indefinitely”; create an “unworkable
morass”; “impos[e] massive operational burdens” on the immigration agencies;
“impose[] massive costs on the government”; and “require[] new rounds of
diplomatic engagement” with many other countries. U.S. DHS v. D.V.D.,
Application for a Stay, No. 26A406, 2026 WL 2884581, at *38–40 (U.S. Sept.
2026). The government pointed out, as the “tip of the iceberg,” the disruptions
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caused in just the few short days during which the district court’s order in D.V.D.
had been reinstated: cancellation of “a flight to three countries with 70 criminal
aliens,” “pull[ing] nearly 150 aliens from removal flights to at least four different
countries,” and the likely cancellation of an upcoming “flight to four countries
carrying 58 aliens.” Id. at *40.
Nothing of the sort is true here. The district court required the government
to facilitate the return of a single individual. Whatever harm could result from
arranging a flight for one passenger, none of the harms described in D.V.D. is
present. Denying a stay here would not affect thousands of persons; upend
international agreements; indefinitely disturb all third-country removals; create an
unworkable morass; impose massive operational burdens; impose massive costs on
the government; require new rounds of diplomatic engagement; or affect any
current or future flight involving other deportees. Instead, a stay would require
merely the facilitation of the return of a single person from a single country. As
noted, the Supreme Court in Abrego Garcia blessed precisely this remedy in
precisely this context. There is no possible irreparable harm here. In my view, it is
not even a close call.
In sum, the government has not shown irreparable harm. The motion for a
stay should be denied for this reason alone. Doe #1, 957 F.3d at 1058. But the
other factors, too, fail to support the government’s position.
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B. Likelihood of Success
The first Nken factor—likelihood of success—has five separate components
here.
1. The government argues that Rule 23 bars this action. I see little chance
of success on that issue. The district court reasoned correctly that we have held
that, in situations like this one, a district court has discretion to choose, or to
choose not, to exercise jurisdiction. A.M.A.S., 2026 WL 3026123, at *4; see Pride
v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013); Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890,
892–93 (9th Cir. 1979). This case is analogous to the situation in Pride, where the
district court considered an individual prisoner’s medical claim even though there
was a pending class action against the whole prisoner medical system. 719 F.3d at
1137–38. The government is unlikely to show an abuse of discretion when the
underlying facts here (unrebutted evidence of abuse and torture) are so different
from the facts in D.V.D. (assurances of no plausible chance of harm). The
situation here is akin to the situation in Pride: specific medical needs vs.
generalized challenge to the system. But even if this case is dissimilar to Pride in
some ways, the district court still retained discretion to hear the case under our
binding precedents. There is little or no chance of showing an abuse of discretion.
2. The government also argues that res judicata (claim preclusion) bars this
action. But this argument fails for several reasons, including that there is no final
10
judgment (or even an existing order) in D.V.D.. A final judgment on the merits is
one requirement for res judicata to apply. W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123
F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997).
3. Next, the government argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction.
But the government then immediately admits that we rejected exactly the same
arguments in Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989 (9th Cir. 2025). The
government points out that the Supreme Court may decide that issue differently in
D.V.D.. But until then, we are bound by Ibarra-Perez. The Supreme Court might
agree with the government, but it might not, or it might not reach the issue at all for
some other reason, such as a lack of authority to bring an APA claim or a class
action. The government has not made a strong showing of a likelihood of success
simply on the hope that our binding precedent will be overturned on this precise
issue.
4. The government argues, without much elaboration, that it will prevail on
the merits because it may remove a person, without any notice or opportunity for a
reasonable-fear interview, to any country at all. The district court’s opinion in this
case is persuasive on this point. A.M.A.S., 2026 WL 3026123, at *6–7; see also
D.V.D., 821 F. Supp. 3d at 148–65 (discussing due process in the context of the
APA claim). At a minimum, there is no strong showing of a likelihood of success.
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5. Finally, the government argues that the district court lacked authority for
the specific remedy it chose. But, with the caveat I noted at the outset, the
Supreme Court approved the same remedy in Abrego Garcia, 145 S. Ct. 1017. The
district court clearly had authority to require the government to “facilitate”
Plaintiff’s return and to file periodic progress reports. See id. at 1018 (authorizing
those remedies).
So why did the Supreme Court conclude that the government is likely to
succeed in D.V.D.? The district court, in essence, set side an entire removal
program, reached only the APA claims, and entered classwide relief. Those factors
appear to matter to the Court. The government’s motion emphasized the vast reach
of the district court’s order, and one of the issues specified by the Court for
supplemental briefing in D.V.D. is “[w]hether the district court had authority to
enter classwide declaratory relief and APA vacatur.” DHS v. D.V.D., 2026 WL
2917860, at *1.
This case differs from D.V.D. in those critical ways. Whereas the district
court in D.V.D. granted relief solely on the APA claims, the district court here
expressly declined to reach the APA claims and, instead, granted relief on
Plaintiff’s constitutional claim. Whatever issues related to the APA may concern
the Court, those concerns do not arise here.
12
Unlike the setting aside of the agency’s Guidance and removal program in
D.V.D., Plaintiff’s claim here does not challenge the Guidance. Indeed, Plaintiff’s
claim and the district court’s order remain the same whether the Guidance exists,
does not exist, remains the same, or is changed. Whatever legality, or illegality,
the Guidance may have in general, the district court here assessed only the process
that Plaintiff, in his particular circumstances, is due.
Finally, unlike the class action and classwide relief in D.V.D., the claims
here and the relief granted are individualized. Indeed, it is easy to imagine that the
Court in D.V.D. would hold that classwide relief is inappropriate, vacate the
district court’s order in full, and remand for reconsideration of any individual
claims. The Court only recently banned nationwide injunctions, Trump v. CASA,
Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025), and some members of the Court warned district courts
against using classwide relief as a workaround to the ruling, see id. at 866–68
(Alito, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.); id. at 869 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 849–50 (majority opinion) (noting the interplay
between nationwide injunctions and classwide relief). Notably, the Court recently
granted certiorari in a different case on the propriety of classwide relief in the
immigration context. See Mullin v. Refugee & Immigrant Ctr. for Educ. & Legal
Servs., No. 26-239, 2026 WL 3453847 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2026) (misc. order)
13
(granting certiorari on whether an immigration provision “bars the classwide relief
entered by the district court” and on another question).
For all of those reasons, the guidance that we can glean from the Court’s
stay in D.V.D. is vague at best. And it falls far short of demonstrating a strong
showing of a likelihood of success with respect to the specific, individualized
claims and relief at issue here. Because the government has not shown a likelihood
of success, this factor strongly disfavors issuing a stay.
C. Weighing of the Equities
We reach the final two factors, which require a weighing of the equities,
only if the government has shown a likelihood of success and irreparable harm. Al
Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999, 1007 (9th Cir. 2020). As described above, the
government has done neither. But even assuming that it has met the first two
factors, the equities here strongly disfavor a stay. Plaintiff’s continued sojourn in
Equatorial Guinea has caused, and likely will continue to cause, considerable
personal harm to him. Whatever equities support the government’s continued
execution of its third-country removal program in general, those equities are tiny
with respect to a single individual. And those equities pale in comparison to the
benefit of removing Plaintiff from a gravely dangerous and torturous situation.
The equities strongly disfavor a stay.
14
As with the first two factors, the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the
equities favored a stay in D.V.D. has little persuasive value here. The facts in
D.V.D. are not particularized to any person’s experiences, and the government
assured the Court that the vast majority of the plaintiffs faced no “realistic risk” of
harm in the foreign countries of removal. Application for a Stay, 2026 WL
2884581, at *42. By contrast, the individualized facts here are egregious: “It is
unrebutted that [Plaintiff has] been held under armed guard; threatened at
gunpoint; and arrested, beaten, and held incommunicado by Equatorial Guinean
authorities.” A.M.A.S., 2026 WL 3026123, at *1. The video eventually published
by the press is horrific: “police aimed rifles at Plaintiff while he knelt with his
hands raised, and a plainclothes officer shouted, ‘shoot him!’” Id. at *2. The
weighing of the equities plainly differs from the weighing of the equities in
D.V.D..
CONCLUSION
No irreparable harm results from the district court’s order, the government
has not made a strong showing of a likelihood of success on appeal, and the
equities strongly disfavor a stay. I would deny, in the main, the motion for a stay.
I would grant a stay only to the extent that the district court’s orders have exceeded
the remedy applied in Abrego Garcia. In all other respects, I dissent.
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