Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ELIDIA FLORINDA PABLO PABLO; No. 25-7609 E. E. P. P., Agency Nos. A245-030-682 Petitioners, A245-030-687 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 19, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: S.R. THOMAS, KOH, and TUNG, Circuit Judges; Concurrence by Judge TUNG. Elidia Florinda Pablo Pablo (“Pablo”) and her minor son, E.E.P.P. (collectively, “Petitioners”), petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing Petitioners’ appeal of a decision of an Immigration * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel has granted Respondent’s opposed motion to submit the case, Dkt. No. 33, and unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Judge (“IJ”) denying Pablo’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the petition. Where, as here, “the BIA expressed agreement with the reasoning of the IJ, this court reviews both the IJ and the BIA’s decisions.” Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2005)). “In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.” Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence.” Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014). 1. The BIA found that Pablo’s testimony was not credible based on three inconsistencies. The BIA legally erred in relying on two of the inconsistencies to affirm the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.2 1 E.E.P.P filed his own application for “asylum and related protection,” but is also a derivative beneficiary on Pablo’s asylum application. E.E.P.P. appeals the BIA’s decision only as a derivative beneficiary. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), spouses and children as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(A)-(E) may assert derivative asylum claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3). The INA does not provide for derivative withholding claims, nor do the CAT implementing regulations provide for derivative CAT claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). 2 Petitioners have exhausted their challenges to the three inconsistencies on which the BIA relied in its decision. “It is well-established that we may review any issue 2 25-7609 First, the agency erroneously relied on an inconsistency between Pablo’s declaration and hearing testimony regarding the harm Pablo suffered after Guatemalan police officers stopped the car that she, her husband Mario Abel Pablo Lorenzo (“Lorenzo”), and E.E.P.P. were in on September 15, 2021 (the “September 2021 incident”). “[T]he IJ must give the petitioner the opportunity to provide an explanation of an apparent inconsistency” and, if the petitioner gives a reasonable explanation, “the IJ must provide a specific and cogent reason for rejecting [the explanation].” Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled in part on other grounds by Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc). The IJ never asked Pablo why she failed to state during her hearing that she was physically harmed when she asserted in her declaration that she was “attacked” and “severely harmed.” As such, the agency cannot rely on this inconsistency. See id. (“[A]n IJ cannot base an adverse credibility determination on a contradiction that the alien could reconcile if given a chance to do so.”). Second, the agency erroneously relied on an inconsistency between Lorenzo’s declaration and hearing testimony regarding whether he was attacked during the September 2021 incident. The agency failed to explain why an internal addressed on the merits by the BIA, regardless of whether the petitioner raised it before the agency.” Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 914 (9th Cir. 2018). 3 25-7609 inconsistency in Lorenzo’s testimony had a bearing on Petitioner’s veracity. See Bandari v. INS, 227 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e will not uphold an adverse credibility finding unless the IJ or BIA specifically explains the significance of the discrepancy.” (citation omitted)). On the other hand, substantial evidence supports the agency’s reliance on Pablo’s conflicting testimony regarding the degree of harm inflicted on E.E.P.P. during the September 2021 incident. Although Pablo asserted in her declaration that one of the police officers “began beating [E.E.P.P.] relentlessly,” Pablo stated during her hearing that the police officer “slapped” her son. After the IJ asked Pablo to clarify this inconsistency, Pablo stated that the police officer “slap[ped] [E.E.P.P.] on his head” and “hit [him] about three times.” A reasonable factfinder could conclude that a relentless beating would entail a degree of harm greater than three slaps.3 See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the substantial evidence standard is satisfied unless “no reasonable factfinder could find that [the petitioner] was not credible” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, the opportunity to explain requirement was fully satisfied when the IJ asked Pablo to explain the “perceived inconsistencies” in her 3 Because the BIA’s finding was based solely on the inconsistency between Pablo’s declaration and Pablo’s testimony on cross-examination, we need not consider whether the IJ erred in finding that Pablo said in her direct testimony that E.E.P.P. experienced a “one-time slap.” 4 25-7609 testimony, Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1999), and the IJ was not required to ask further questions regarding whether Pablo’s background might have affected how she perceived the degree of harm suffered by E.E.P.P., see Rizk, 629 F.3d at 1088. Because we conclude that the BIA erroneously relied on two of three inconsistencies when affirming the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this disposition. See Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2021) (remanding when the only inconsistency remaining relevant to the adverse credibility determination was not a “clear falsehood[] [or] fabrication[]”). We need not reach whether the agency erred in denying Pablo asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. “Because the BIA has not evaluated [Petitioners’] eligibility for [relief] independently from its adverse credibility finding, we also remand to give the agency an opportunity to make those determinations in the first instance.” Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 2. We do not consider Pablo’s claim that the IJ violated her right to a full and fair hearing under the Due Process Clause. Although 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement does not generally apply to constitutional claims, the requirement does apply to due process claims “based on correctable procedural errors.” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002). Pablo’s claim that she 5 25-7609 was denied a full and fair hearing is a correctable procedural error subject to the exhaustion requirement “because the BIA could have provided a remedy if [Pablo’s] complaints were found to be valid by ordering a rehearing to allow for additional evidence.” Tall v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2008). Although Pablo included her due process claim in her notice of appeal to the BIA, she did not include the claim in her brief before the BIA. When a petitioner files a brief before the BIA, the petitioner must raise a claim in the brief, and not just the notice of appeal, for that claim to be exhausted. Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam). Thus, Pablo has not exhausted her due process claim. PETITION GRANTED.4 4 Petitioners’ motion to stay removal and supplemental motion to stay removal, Dkt. Nos. 4 and 11, are granted. 6 25-7609 FILED Pablo Pablo v. Blanche, Case No. 25-7609 NOV 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK TUNG, Circuit Judge, concurring: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS The immigration judge denied asylum to an applicant because the judge disbelieved the applicant’s testimony, which was marked by several inconsistencies. In any other area of law, a reviewing court like ours would be obligated to defer to that credibility determination. But not so when it comes to immigration. This circuit has adopted a unique rule, with no statutory or constitutional basis, that a petition for review must be granted if the asylum applicant was not given a chance to explain inconsistencies in her testimony if the factfinder identified those inconsistencies in his decision denying relief. That extra procedural step is not required by law; indeed, Congress prohibited it by stating that adverse credibility findings “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 16 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Needless to say, we should follow that instruction, not add procedural hurdles of our own creation—hurdles that stack the deck in favor of petitioners. Our circuit’s precedent (good or bad) binds me, and so I vote to grant the petition here. But I write separately to explain in more detail why that precedent, custom-made for immigration, is clearly erroneous and inconsistent with the standard of review applied by every other circuit. * * * 1 We review credibility determinations made by immigration judges for substantial evidence. 16 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). This review is deferential. Urias- Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 544–45 (2026). We have disregarded this standard in the past: by “appl[ying] a special rule in immigration disputes”—that “in the absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination by an immigration judge[,] . . . a reviewing court must treat a petitioning alien’s testimony as credible and true”—we embellished the simple substantial evidence standard with our own judge- made procedural rule. Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 359–60 (2021). The Supreme Court has chastised us for doing so. In reversing our judgment, the Supreme Court reminded us that Congress “carefully circumscribed judicial review of [the Board of Immigration Appeal’s] decisions.” Id. at 365. “The only question for judges reviewing [the agency’s] factual determinations is whether any reasonable adjudicator could have found as the agency did.” Id. at 368. We should take heed. Applying that “highly deferential” standard should have resulted in the denial of the petition here. Id. at 365. A reasonable adjudicator could conclude that Pablo’s changing descriptions of the September 15 incident undermined her credibility. And paired with a similar inconsistency in her husband’s testimony, a reasonable immigration judge could certainly find that Pablo’s testimony is unreliable. Our review should have been deferential without requiring the agency to clear an added procedural hurdle that appears nowhere in the statute. 2 But our precedent says otherwise. We have replaced the “clear standard” of substantial-evidence review with procedural obstacles that “flummox immigration judges, who must contort what should be a simple factual finding to satisfy our often irreconcilable precedents.” Jibril v. Gonzalez, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, it is the requirement that if an immigration judge “relies upon purported inconsistences to make an adverse credibility determination,” he must offer the alien “an opportunity to explain each inconsistency.” Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2022). This rule cannot be squared with the substantial- evidence review that Congress has mandated we undertake. Just like our previous rule deeming a petitioner’s testimony true absent an explicit adverse credibility finding (see Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 359–60), a rule affording a petitioner the opportunity to explain an inconsistency lacks any statutory basis. You might wonder where such a rule comes from. It arose in fits and starts from a series of largely unrelated precedents. Start with Osorio v. INS, 99 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1996). There we reasoned that an adverse credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence because the agency failed to recognize that these inconsistencies could “have been simply the product of a language barrier or of a misreading of a largely unintelligible document.” Id. at 932. We then adduced a more categorical rule: the agency “must address in a reasoned manner the explanations that [the alien] offers for these perceived inconsistencies.” Id. 3 In a later decision, purportedly interpreting the Due Process Clause, we cited the Osorio rule as necessary “to ensure a fair hearing.” Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1999). And we stated that the “logical corollary” to Osorio was that the Board “must provide a petitioner with a reasonable opportunity to offer an explanation of any perceived inconsistencies that form the basis of a denial of asylum.” Id. Campos-Sanchez’s due-process context proved beside the point: we would later quote its “logical corollary” formulation as stating a substantial-evidence rule. See Zi Lin Chen v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 2004) (because the alien “was denied a reasonable opportunity to explain” an inconsistency, the adverse credibility finding “cannot serve as a basis for the denial of asylum”); see also Soto- Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (absence of an opportunity to explain inconsistencies meant that the “adverse credibility finding . . . was not supported by substantial evidence”). But how exactly does such an absence prove a lack of substantial evidence? We never quite explained. That absence would not vitiate an adverse credibility finding in any other context. For example, in the criminal context, we uphold a jury verdict, for instance, if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Applying Jackson, we have inferred that a jury may decline to believe a witness 4 based on inconsistencies in her testimony—no opportunity to explain necessary. See United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 2010). And in the civil (non-immigration) context, the same is true. See Tan Lam v. City of Los Banos, 976 F.3d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 2020) (a defendant “gave inconsistent accounts” of an event, “and the jury was entitled to take those inconsistencies into consideration”). Only in the immigration context does this procedural hurdle emerge. Such a move lacks any statutory warrant, as discussed. Nor can due process justify it (contrary to Campos-Sanchez): if due process required that rule, we would see it applied in criminal and civil contexts. But we do not. Nothing about administrative factfinding in immigration cases requires us to afford more procedural safeguards for petitioning aliens than for criminal or civil parties. But in this circuit, we do. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we are the only circuit to impose such a categorical rule requiring an opportunity to explain inconsistencies. The only other circuit that comes close—the Second—requires only that “an [immigration judge] may not rest an adverse credibility finding on non-dramatic putative contradictions or incongruities in an alien’s narrative without first giving the applicant a chance to reconcile the testimony.” Min Shi Xue v. Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, 439 F.3d 111, 125 (2d Cir. 2006). But even in so holding, it expressly held that a petitioner need not have an opportunity to explain an “obvious and substantial” contradiction in his 5 testimony. Id. at 120. The Seventh Circuit has expressly declined to adopt even that narrower rule. See Sankoh v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2008). We are thus the outlier, and we are in the wrong. While I am bound by precedent to grant the petition, I hope that we will soon correct our “sly insubordination” against Congress’s scheme, Jibril, 423 F.3d at 1138, and review for substantial evidence instead. 6