Pablo Pablo v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-7609
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELIDIA FLORINDA PABLO PABLO; No. 25-7609
E. E. P. P., Agency Nos.
A245-030-682
Petitioners, A245-030-687
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 19, 2026**
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, KOH, and TUNG, Circuit Judges;
Concurrence by Judge TUNG.
Elidia Florinda Pablo Pablo (“Pablo”) and her minor son, E.E.P.P.
(collectively, “Petitioners”), petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) decision dismissing Petitioners’ appeal of a decision of an Immigration
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel has granted Respondent’s opposed motion to submit the
case, Dkt. No. 33, and unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Judge (“IJ”) denying Pablo’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the petition.
Where, as here, “the BIA expressed agreement with the reasoning of the IJ,
this court reviews both the IJ and the BIA’s decisions.” Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d
993, 998 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir.
2005)). “In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied
upon by that agency.” Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted). “We review factual findings, including adverse credibility
determinations, for substantial evidence.” Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th
Cir. 2014).
1. The BIA found that Pablo’s testimony was not credible based on three
inconsistencies. The BIA legally erred in relying on two of the inconsistencies to
affirm the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.2
1
E.E.P.P filed his own application for “asylum and related protection,” but is also
a derivative beneficiary on Pablo’s asylum application. E.E.P.P. appeals the BIA’s
decision only as a derivative beneficiary. Under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), spouses and children as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(A)-(E) may
assert derivative asylum claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3). The INA does not
provide for derivative withholding claims, nor do the CAT implementing
regulations provide for derivative CAT claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c).
2
Petitioners have exhausted their challenges to the three inconsistencies on which
the BIA relied in its decision. “It is well-established that we may review any issue
2 25-7609
First, the agency erroneously relied on an inconsistency between Pablo’s
declaration and hearing testimony regarding the harm Pablo suffered after
Guatemalan police officers stopped the car that she, her husband Mario Abel Pablo
Lorenzo (“Lorenzo”), and E.E.P.P. were in on September 15, 2021 (the
“September 2021 incident”). “[T]he IJ must give the petitioner the opportunity to
provide an explanation of an apparent inconsistency” and, if the petitioner gives a
reasonable explanation, “the IJ must provide a specific and cogent reason for
rejecting [the explanation].” Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011),
overruled in part on other grounds by Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1135-37
(9th Cir. 2021) (en banc). The IJ never asked Pablo why she failed to state during
her hearing that she was physically harmed when she asserted in her declaration
that she was “attacked” and “severely harmed.” As such, the agency cannot rely on
this inconsistency. See id. (“[A]n IJ cannot base an adverse credibility
determination on a contradiction that the alien could reconcile if given a chance to
do so.”).
Second, the agency erroneously relied on an inconsistency between
Lorenzo’s declaration and hearing testimony regarding whether he was attacked
during the September 2021 incident. The agency failed to explain why an internal
addressed on the merits by the BIA, regardless of whether the petitioner raised it
before the agency.” Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 914 (9th Cir. 2018).
3 25-7609
inconsistency in Lorenzo’s testimony had a bearing on Petitioner’s veracity. See
Bandari v. INS, 227 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e will not uphold an
adverse credibility finding unless the IJ or BIA specifically explains the
significance of the discrepancy.” (citation omitted)).
On the other hand, substantial evidence supports the agency’s reliance on
Pablo’s conflicting testimony regarding the degree of harm inflicted on E.E.P.P.
during the September 2021 incident. Although Pablo asserted in her declaration
that one of the police officers “began beating [E.E.P.P.] relentlessly,” Pablo stated
during her hearing that the police officer “slapped” her son. After the IJ asked
Pablo to clarify this inconsistency, Pablo stated that the police officer “slap[ped]
[E.E.P.P.] on his head” and “hit [him] about three times.” A reasonable factfinder
could conclude that a relentless beating would entail a degree of harm greater than
three slaps.3 See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the substantial evidence standard is satisfied unless “no reasonable factfinder
could find that [the petitioner] was not credible” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). Further, the opportunity to explain requirement was fully satisfied
when the IJ asked Pablo to explain the “perceived inconsistencies” in her
3
Because the BIA’s finding was based solely on the inconsistency between Pablo’s
declaration and Pablo’s testimony on cross-examination, we need not consider
whether the IJ erred in finding that Pablo said in her direct testimony that E.E.P.P.
experienced a “one-time slap.”
4 25-7609
testimony, Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1999), and the IJ
was not required to ask further questions regarding whether Pablo’s background
might have affected how she perceived the degree of harm suffered by E.E.P.P.,
see Rizk, 629 F.3d at 1088.
Because we conclude that the BIA erroneously relied on two of three
inconsistencies when affirming the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, we
remand for further proceedings consistent with this disposition. See Kumar v.
Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2021) (remanding when the only
inconsistency remaining relevant to the adverse credibility determination was not a
“clear falsehood[] [or] fabrication[]”). We need not reach whether the agency erred
in denying Pablo asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. “Because
the BIA has not evaluated [Petitioners’] eligibility for [relief] independently from
its adverse credibility finding, we also remand to give the agency an opportunity to
make those determinations in the first instance.” Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d
1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
2. We do not consider Pablo’s claim that the IJ violated her right to a full and
fair hearing under the Due Process Clause. Although 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)’s
exhaustion requirement does not generally apply to constitutional claims, the
requirement does apply to due process claims “based on correctable procedural
errors.” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002). Pablo’s claim that she
5 25-7609
was denied a full and fair hearing is a correctable procedural error subject to the
exhaustion requirement “because the BIA could have provided a remedy if
[Pablo’s] complaints were found to be valid by ordering a rehearing to allow for
additional evidence.” Tall v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2008).
Although Pablo included her due process claim in her notice of appeal to the BIA,
she did not include the claim in her brief before the BIA. When a petitioner files a
brief before the BIA, the petitioner must raise a claim in the brief, and not just the
notice of appeal, for that claim to be exhausted. Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203,
1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam). Thus, Pablo has not exhausted her due
process claim.
PETITION GRANTED.4
4
Petitioners’ motion to stay removal and supplemental motion to stay removal,
Dkt. Nos. 4 and 11, are granted.
6 25-7609
FILED
Pablo Pablo v. Blanche, Case No. 25-7609 NOV 17 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
TUNG, Circuit Judge, concurring: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
The immigration judge denied asylum to an applicant because the judge
disbelieved the applicant’s testimony, which was marked by several inconsistencies.
In any other area of law, a reviewing court like ours would be obligated to defer to
that credibility determination. But not so when it comes to immigration. This circuit
has adopted a unique rule, with no statutory or constitutional basis, that a petition
for review must be granted if the asylum applicant was not given a chance to explain
inconsistencies in her testimony if the factfinder identified those inconsistencies in
his decision denying relief. That extra procedural step is not required by law; indeed,
Congress prohibited it by stating that adverse credibility findings “are conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
16 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Needless to say, we should follow that instruction, not
add procedural hurdles of our own creation—hurdles that stack the deck in favor of
petitioners. Our circuit’s precedent (good or bad) binds me, and so I vote to grant
the petition here. But I write separately to explain in more detail why that precedent,
custom-made for immigration, is clearly erroneous and inconsistent with the
standard of review applied by every other circuit.
* * *
1
We review credibility determinations made by immigration judges for
substantial evidence. 16 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). This review is deferential. Urias-
Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 544–45 (2026). We have disregarded this standard
in the past: by “appl[ying] a special rule in immigration disputes”—that “in the
absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination by an immigration judge[,]
. . . a reviewing court must treat a petitioning alien’s testimony as credible and
true”—we embellished the simple substantial evidence standard with our own judge-
made procedural rule. Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 359–60 (2021). The
Supreme Court has chastised us for doing so. In reversing our judgment, the
Supreme Court reminded us that Congress “carefully circumscribed judicial review
of [the Board of Immigration Appeal’s] decisions.” Id. at 365. “The only question
for judges reviewing [the agency’s] factual determinations is whether any reasonable
adjudicator could have found as the agency did.” Id. at 368.
We should take heed. Applying that “highly deferential” standard should have
resulted in the denial of the petition here. Id. at 365. A reasonable adjudicator could
conclude that Pablo’s changing descriptions of the September 15 incident
undermined her credibility. And paired with a similar inconsistency in her husband’s
testimony, a reasonable immigration judge could certainly find that Pablo’s
testimony is unreliable. Our review should have been deferential without requiring
the agency to clear an added procedural hurdle that appears nowhere in the statute.
2
But our precedent says otherwise. We have replaced the “clear standard” of
substantial-evidence review with procedural obstacles that “flummox immigration
judges, who must contort what should be a simple factual finding to satisfy our often
irreconcilable precedents.” Jibril v. Gonzalez, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005).
Here, it is the requirement that if an immigration judge “relies upon purported
inconsistences to make an adverse credibility determination,” he must offer the alien
“an opportunity to explain each inconsistency.” Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th
1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2022). This rule cannot be squared with the substantial-
evidence review that Congress has mandated we undertake. Just like our previous
rule deeming a petitioner’s testimony true absent an explicit adverse credibility
finding (see Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 359–60), a rule affording a petitioner the
opportunity to explain an inconsistency lacks any statutory basis.
You might wonder where such a rule comes from. It arose in fits and starts
from a series of largely unrelated precedents. Start with Osorio v. INS, 99 F.3d 928,
932 (9th Cir. 1996). There we reasoned that an adverse credibility finding was not
supported by substantial evidence because the agency failed to recognize that these
inconsistencies could “have been simply the product of a language barrier or of a
misreading of a largely unintelligible document.” Id. at 932. We then adduced a
more categorical rule: the agency “must address in a reasoned manner the
explanations that [the alien] offers for these perceived inconsistencies.” Id.
3
In a later decision, purportedly interpreting the Due Process Clause, we cited
the Osorio rule as necessary “to ensure a fair hearing.” Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164
F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1999). And we stated that the “logical corollary” to Osorio
was that the Board “must provide a petitioner with a reasonable opportunity to offer
an explanation of any perceived inconsistencies that form the basis of a denial of
asylum.” Id. Campos-Sanchez’s due-process context proved beside the point: we
would later quote its “logical corollary” formulation as stating a substantial-evidence
rule. See Zi Lin Chen v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 2004) (because the
alien “was denied a reasonable opportunity to explain” an inconsistency, the adverse
credibility finding “cannot serve as a basis for the denial of asylum”); see also Soto-
Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (absence of an opportunity to
explain inconsistencies meant that the “adverse credibility finding . . . was not
supported by substantial evidence”).
But how exactly does such an absence prove a lack of substantial evidence?
We never quite explained. That absence would not vitiate an adverse credibility
finding in any other context. For example, in the criminal context, we uphold a jury
verdict, for instance, if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Applying Jackson, we have inferred that a jury may decline to believe a witness
4
based on inconsistencies in her testimony—no opportunity to explain necessary. See
United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 2010). And in the civil
(non-immigration) context, the same is true. See Tan Lam v. City of Los Banos, 976
F.3d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 2020) (a defendant “gave inconsistent accounts” of an event,
“and the jury was entitled to take those inconsistencies into consideration”). Only
in the immigration context does this procedural hurdle emerge. Such a move lacks
any statutory warrant, as discussed. Nor can due process justify it (contrary to
Campos-Sanchez): if due process required that rule, we would see it applied in
criminal and civil contexts. But we do not. Nothing about administrative factfinding
in immigration cases requires us to afford more procedural safeguards for petitioning
aliens than for criminal or civil parties. But in this circuit, we do.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we are the only circuit to impose such a categorical
rule requiring an opportunity to explain inconsistencies. The only other circuit that
comes close—the Second—requires only that “an [immigration judge] may not rest
an adverse credibility finding on non-dramatic putative contradictions or
incongruities in an alien’s narrative without first giving the applicant a chance to
reconcile the testimony.” Min Shi Xue v. Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, 439 F.3d 111, 125
(2d Cir. 2006). But even in so holding, it expressly held that a petitioner need not
have an opportunity to explain an “obvious and substantial” contradiction in his
5
testimony. Id. at 120. The Seventh Circuit has expressly declined to adopt even that
narrower rule. See Sankoh v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2008).
We are thus the outlier, and we are in the wrong. While I am bound by
precedent to grant the petition, I hope that we will soon correct our “sly
insubordination” against Congress’s scheme, Jibril, 423 F.3d at 1138, and review for
substantial evidence instead.
6