Luis Sainz-Aragon v. Todd Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledOctober 29, 2026
Docket20-73508
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 29 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUIS ARMANDO SAINZ-ARAGON, No. 20-73508
Petitioner, Agency No. A208-055-658
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 27, 2026**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: GRABER, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Luis Armando Sainz-Aragon, a native and citizen of Mexico,
timely seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his
applications for cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we review for substantial evidence the BIA’s ruling that
Petitioner failed to establish eligibility for those forms of relief. See Gonzalez-
Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025) (the hardship standard for
cancellation of removal); Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir.
2019) (the standards for withholding of removal and CAT protection). The
agency’s determinations are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would
be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny
the petition.
1. The agency permissibly denied cancellation of removal on the ground
that Petitioner’s removal would not cause “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(D), to his children who were qualifying relatives.
Despite the financial and emotional effects of removal described in the record and
acknowledged by the BIA in its decision, we are not compelled to reach the
contrary conclusion. See Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1007 (“[T]he hardship
determination requires hardship that deviates, in the extreme, from the hardship
that ordinarily occurs in removal cases”).
Nor did the BIA legally err by disregarding evidence pertinent to the
hardship determination. The BIA specifically noted, for example, that Petitioner’s
youngest child “has asthma and uses an inhaler and a nebulizer as needed” and that
the older qualifying child has a history of medical issues and received special-
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education services. We reject, as unsupported by the record, Petitioner’s argument
that the BIA failed to account for that evidence when assessing hardship.
2. Next, the agency permissibly denied withholding of removal on the
ground that Petitioner failed to show a nexus between the harm that he fears and
the alleged protected ground, a particular social group described as his familial
relationship to his ex-girlfriend. See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012,
1018 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that an applicant must demonstrate a nexus between
past or feared harm and a protected ground). The agency permissibly concluded
that any past harm suffered by Petitioner, and his fear of future harm, were
“because of a personal dispute, unrelated to a protected ground.” See Pagayon v.
Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that a personal
dispute, standing alone, is not persecution on account of a protected ground). The
record does not compel a contrary conclusion.
3. Finally, the agency permissibly denied CAT protection on the ground that
Petitioner failed to show that he more likely than not would be tortured by, or with
the consent or acquiescence of, the Mexican government. See Xochihua-Jaimes v.
Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating that, to be eligible for CAT
relief, an applicant must show that torture would occur with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official). The record does not compel the conclusion that
Petitioner more likely than not will be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of
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governmental officials. Petitioner’s past attacker has died; when Petitioner was
brought before a judge after having been arrested and imprisoned, the judge
released him because he was not guilty of any crime; and the government has
prosecuted police officers for acts of torture, which are illegal in Mexico.
PETITION DENIED.
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