Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ROCAEL CAMARGO-GOMEZ, No. 23-1728 Agency No. Petitioner, A071-607-068 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 19, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: S.R. THOMAS, KOH, and TUNG, Circuit Judges. Rocael Camargo-Gomez petitions this court for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision on his motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. 1. Camargo-Gomez challenges the BIA’s decision not to reopen his removal * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). proceedings after the government reinstated his removal order. When the BIA adopts and supplements the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) views of the law and evidence, we review both decisions. See Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016); Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011). We review denials of motions to reopen for abuse of discretion. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). Congress empowered the government to reinstate removal orders. If the government wishes to reinstate an order, the law “only requires proof that (1) petitioner is an alien, (2) who was subject to a prior removal order, and (3) who illegally reentered the United States.” Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 495 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). So long as the government makes that showing, “the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). Camargo-Gomez admits that he is an alien who reentered the United States illegally after he was subject to a prior removal order. And the government reinstated his removal order. Accordingly, section 1231(a)(5) “unambiguously” bars courts and agencies from reopening his proceedings. Cuenca v. Barr, 956 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 2020), abrogated on other grounds by Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 632 (9th Cir. 2024). Camargo-Gomez argues that we should review his claim anyway. The 2 23-1728 government first removed Camargo-Gomez in 1992 because of his state felony conviction. But twenty-six years after he reentered the United States, a California court vacated his conviction. According to Camargo-Gomez, reinstating the removal order would cause a “gross miscarriage of justice” that merits reopening. However, section 1231(a)(5) is a mandatory claim-processing rule. See Suate-Orellana, 101 F.4th at 630–32 (describing section 1231(a)(5) as a claim- processing rule); Cuenca, 956 F.3d at 1084 (construing section 1231(a)(5)’s language as mandatory); Rios-Arevalo v. Bondi, No. 17-72582, 2026 WL 710561, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 13, 2026). And the government invoked that rule at every stage of Camargo-Gomez’s proceedings. See Suate-Orellana, 101 F.4th at 629. Under these circumstances, section 1231(a)(5) bars Camargo-Gomez’s claim. 2. As an alternative, Camargo-Gomez asks us not to apply section 1231(a)(5) because it infringes on his “vested right” to have his case considered under pre- IIRIRA law. This is not the first time Camargo-Gomez has raised this issue. He made the same argument when he petitioned us for review in 2023. See Camargo- Gomez v. Garland, No. 21-1022, 2023 WL 3019062, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2023). We squarely rejected his claim. See id. That holding is law of the case. Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012). PETITION DENIED.1 1 Petitioner’s motion to stay removal (23-1728, Dkt. 14.1) is DENIED. 3 23-1728