Jaime Chavez v. Todd Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket17-72957
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 19 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAIME HECTOR CHAVEZ, Nos. 17-72957 & 24-3798
Agency No.
Petitioner, A073-810-721
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 17, 2026**
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER, OWENS, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Jaime Hector Chavez, a native and citizen of Peru, petitions for review of
(1) a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
and (2) a decision of the Board denying his motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petitions.
We review de novo questions of law, including whether a particular
conviction constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Cervantes
v. Holder, 772 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2014).
1. The Board correctly determined that Chavez’s conviction under
California Penal Code § 273.5(a) was a CIMT that rendered him statutorily
ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. At the time of
Chavez’s conviction, an individual could be convicted under section 273.5(a) if he
“willfully inflict[ed] upon a person who is his or her spouse, former spouse,
cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of his or her child, corporal
injury resulting in a traumatic condition.” Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a) (West 2000).
We have held that a conviction under section 273.5(a) is not categorically a CIMT
because the statute is overbroad as to the victim-offender relationship. Morales-
Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058, 1064–66 (9th Cir. 2009). The government argues
that later developments in California law have abrogated that holding. We need not
resolve that argument because section 273.5(a) is a divisible statute such that
“cohabitants” or “former cohabitants” do not possess the requisite special
relationship of trust for a moral turpitude finding, whereas the remaining spousal-
2 17-72957 & 24-3798
like relationships listed in the statute do. Cervantes, 772 F.3d at 588; Morales-
Garcia, 567 F.3d at 1065–67.
An applicant for discretionary relief from a removal order bears the burden
of establishing “all aspects of . . . eligibility,” including proving that he “do[es] not
stand convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense.” Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592
U.S. 224, 227 (2021). If the applicant has been convicted under a divisible statute,
developing such proof requires applying the “modified categorical approach,” id.
at 238, which allows a court to consider whether the “judicially noticeable facts in
the record indicate that [the alien] was convicted of the elements of the generically
defined crime,” Huerta-Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2003).
Nothing in the record identifies Chavez’s relationship to the victim of his offense,
and Chavez concedes that the record is inconclusive. Because the record is
inconclusive, Chavez has not “prove[d] that his actual, historical offense of
conviction” is not a CIMT, so he has not met his burden. Pereida, 592 U.S. at 236.
2. Because Chavez’s motion to reopen was both time- and number-barred,
he sought sua sponte reopening. Denials of motions to reopen sua sponte are
generally not reviewable, but we have limited jurisdiction to review “the reasoning
behind the decisions for legal or constitutional error.” Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d
575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).
3 17-72957 & 24-3798
Chavez argues that the Board applied an improper standard of review when
it found that he failed to demonstrate “exceptional circumstances,” rather than
“extraordinary circumstances,” to justify sua sponte reopening. Although the Board
has characterized the remedy of sua sponte reopening as “extraordinary,” see, e.g.,
Matter of G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1134 (B.I.A. 1999), the Board has also
interchangeably used the phrase “exceptional circumstances” in describing the
applicable standard, see id., and so have we, see, e.g., Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225,
1233 (9th Cir. 2020); Menendez-Gonzalez v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir.
2019). The Board’s use of “exceptional” did not amount to legal error.
Chavez also argues that Board did not adequately consider his motion
because the Board’s decision did not note that the motion was unopposed by the
Department of Homeland Security. The Board need not expressly acknowledge
DHS’s non-response. See Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1200–01 (9th Cir.
2012).
Finally, Chavez asserts that the Board misapplied our decision in Bent v.
Garland, 115 F.4th 934 (9th Cir. 2024), in assessing the effect of the vacatur of his
state conviction. But the alleged misapplication did not occur in the order under
review; it occurred in a different order denying an earlier motion to reopen. Chavez
withdrew his petition for review of the Board’s order denying that earlier motion,
so any challenge to that order is not before us.
4 17-72957 & 24-3798
PETITIONS DENIED.
5 17-72957 & 24-3798