Gonzalez-Alfaro v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket24-1896
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 19 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FERNANDO GONZALEZ-ALFARO, No. 24-1896
Agency No.
Petitioner,
A079-613-951
v. MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted October 23, 2026
San Francisco, California
Before: FORREST and TUNG, Circuit Judges, and BASTIAN, District Judge.**
Petitioner Fernando Gonzalez-Alfaro, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal from
an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision ordering his removal to Mexico and denying
his motion to remand based on new evidence. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Stanley Allen Bastian, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
§ 1252, and we deny the petition.
1. We review the denial of a motion to remand for abuse of discretion.
Alcarez-Rodriguez v. Garland, 89 F.4th 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2023). The BIA abuses
its discretion when it acts “arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.” Id. (citation
omitted). A motion to remand “is akin to a motion to reopen and is evaluated by the
same standards.” Coria v. Garland, 114 F.4th 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2024). The BIA
can deny a motion to remand or reopen “on any one of at least three independent
grounds—failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought, failure to
introduce previously unavailable, material evidence, and a determination that even
if these requirements were satisfied, the movant would not be entitled to the
discretionary grant of relief which he sought.” Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76
F.4th 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986
(9th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotations omitted). If the BIA bases its decision on the
third ground (its discretionary judgment), we lack jurisdiction to review its decision.
Lemus-Escobar v. Bondi, 158 F.4th 944, 965 (9th Cir. 2025) (explaining that “[w]e
lack jurisdiction . . . over the BIA’s purely discretionary judgment” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)).
Here, the BIA denied Gonzalez-Alfaro’s motion to remand “in the exercise of
discretion because [he] had not established that the evidence . . . would likely change
the result of his case.” This is the legal standard that governs the BIA’s discretionary
2 24-1896
judgment on whether to grant a remand. Fonseca-Fonseca, 76 F.4th at 1180.
Therefore, we have no basis to question its judgment nor any need to analyze
whether Gonzalez-Alfaro’s additional evidence was in fact new. Lemus-Escobar,
158 F.4th at 965; Fonseca-Fonseca, 76 F.4th at 1180.1
2. We have jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that Gonzalez-
Alfaro failed to show the necessary exceptional hardship for cancellation of removal.
Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 222 (2024). Substantial evidence supports the
agency’s decision because the hardship faced by Gonzalez-Alfaro’s U.S.-citizen
children would not be “substantially beyond” that which would be expected upon
the removal of a close relative. Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1006
(9th Cir. 2025) (explaining that “the hardship must be out of the ordinary and
exceedingly uncommon”). The agency determined that Gonzalez-Alfaro’s U.S.-
citizen children would continue to receive support from his ex-wife; they had
numerous aunts and uncles who could help care for them emotionally and
financially, they could live in the house that Gonzalez-Alfaro purchased, or they
could live with their mother. Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s
1
Gonzalez-Alfaro also alleges the BIA erred by not adequately explaining its
discretionary decision. But the overall decision makes it clear that the BIA
considered the evidence concerning his son’s mental health and concluded that the
hardship he would face would not rise to the requisite standard for granting
cancellation. Thus, read in context, we are able “to perceive that [the BIA] has heard
and thought and not merely reacted.” Najmabadi, F.3d 983 at 990 (quoting Lopez v.
Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 807 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004)).
3 24-1896
determination that Gonzalez-Alfaro failed to establish hardship, he is ineligible for
cancellation of removal.
The petition for review is DENIED.
4 24-1896