Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FERNANDO GONZALEZ-ALFARO, No. 24-1896 Agency No. Petitioner, A079-613-951 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted October 23, 2026 San Francisco, California Before: FORREST and TUNG, Circuit Judges, and BASTIAN, District Judge.** Petitioner Fernando Gonzalez-Alfaro, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision ordering his removal to Mexico and denying his motion to remand based on new evidence. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Stanley Allen Bastian, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation. § 1252, and we deny the petition. 1. We review the denial of a motion to remand for abuse of discretion. Alcarez-Rodriguez v. Garland, 89 F.4th 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2023). The BIA abuses its discretion when it acts “arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.” Id. (citation omitted). A motion to remand “is akin to a motion to reopen and is evaluated by the same standards.” Coria v. Garland, 114 F.4th 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2024). The BIA can deny a motion to remand or reopen “on any one of at least three independent grounds—failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought, failure to introduce previously unavailable, material evidence, and a determination that even if these requirements were satisfied, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief which he sought.” Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotations omitted). If the BIA bases its decision on the third ground (its discretionary judgment), we lack jurisdiction to review its decision. Lemus-Escobar v. Bondi, 158 F.4th 944, 965 (9th Cir. 2025) (explaining that “[w]e lack jurisdiction . . . over the BIA’s purely discretionary judgment” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). Here, the BIA denied Gonzalez-Alfaro’s motion to remand “in the exercise of discretion because [he] had not established that the evidence . . . would likely change the result of his case.” This is the legal standard that governs the BIA’s discretionary 2 24-1896 judgment on whether to grant a remand. Fonseca-Fonseca, 76 F.4th at 1180. Therefore, we have no basis to question its judgment nor any need to analyze whether Gonzalez-Alfaro’s additional evidence was in fact new. Lemus-Escobar, 158 F.4th at 965; Fonseca-Fonseca, 76 F.4th at 1180.1 2. We have jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that Gonzalez- Alfaro failed to show the necessary exceptional hardship for cancellation of removal. Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 222 (2024). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision because the hardship faced by Gonzalez-Alfaro’s U.S.-citizen children would not be “substantially beyond” that which would be expected upon the removal of a close relative. Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2025) (explaining that “the hardship must be out of the ordinary and exceedingly uncommon”). The agency determined that Gonzalez-Alfaro’s U.S.- citizen children would continue to receive support from his ex-wife; they had numerous aunts and uncles who could help care for them emotionally and financially, they could live in the house that Gonzalez-Alfaro purchased, or they could live with their mother. Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s 1 Gonzalez-Alfaro also alleges the BIA erred by not adequately explaining its discretionary decision. But the overall decision makes it clear that the BIA considered the evidence concerning his son’s mental health and concluded that the hardship he would face would not rise to the requisite standard for granting cancellation. Thus, read in context, we are able “to perceive that [the BIA] has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Najmabadi, F.3d 983 at 990 (quoting Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 807 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004)). 3 24-1896 determination that Gonzalez-Alfaro failed to establish hardship, he is ineligible for cancellation of removal. The petition for review is DENIED. 4 24-1896