Rivas-Nunez v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledOctober 22, 2026
Docket25-6320
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 22 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUSAN KATANIA RIVAS-NUNEZ; S. L.- No. 25-6320
R.; D. M. T.-R., Agency Nos.
A246-826-536
Petitioners, A246-826-537
A246-826-538
v.
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 20, 2026**
Pasadena, California
Before: BUMATAY, VANDYKE, and MENDOZA, JR., Circuit Judges.
Petitioners Susan Katania Rivas-Nunez (“Lead Petitioner”) and her two minor
children, citizens of Colombia, challenge the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) summary affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying
their requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and removal protections under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252, and we deny the petition.
We review the agency’s factual findings in a final order of removal for
substantial evidence. Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir.
2022). Under that standard, the agency’s findings of fact are considered “conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
Id. (simplified).
1. Substantial evidence supports the denial of asylum and withholding of
removal. First, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the record compels a
conclusion that Lead Petitioner’s treatment by her former neighbor, Raul, and others
in Colombia “[rose] to the level of persecution.” Singh v. Blanche, 176 F.4th 1139,
1145 (9th Cir. 2026). This determination “is heavily fact-dependent and not
reducible to a set formula.” Id. at 1145 (simplified). While the incidents against
Petitioners were reprehensible, we cannot say that a reasonable jurist would be
compelled to find persecution here. Cf. id. at 1146–47 (holding that “troubling”
assaults on petitioner by “unknown” people were not sufficient to establish
persecution); Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “isolated
incident” of attempted sexual assault did not amount to persecution where petitioner
remained safely in the country for over a year afterward).
Second, Petitioners failed to establish a nexus to either their political opinion
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or their proposed social group, consisting of Lead Petitioner’s “relationship to her
partner,” who had run for local office. Cf. Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th
1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here, as here, the agency concludes that the
petitioner has not shown any nexus whatsoever, then the petitioner fails to establish
past persecution for both asylum and withholding [of removal].”). Petitioners argue
that they were targeted by a paramilitary group and that “paramilitary-linked groups
routinely use threats and extortion as mechanisms of political intimidation and social
control, particularly against politically visible families.” But substantial evidence
supports the agency’s determination that the unknown individuals who made
extortive threats against Petitioners were motivated by economic gain. “Where the
record indicates that the persecutor’s actual motivation for threatening a person is to
extort money from a third person, the record does not compel finding that the
persecutor threatened the target because of a protected characteristic such as family
relation.” Id. at 1019.
As for Raul’s attacks on the Lead Petitioner, the IJ determined that Raul was
motivated by “anger and jealousy over [Lead Petitioner’s] rejection of him.” These
attacks do not implicate any political opinion, nor does the record compel the
conclusion that Raul “specifically sought out” Petitioners’ proposed social group,
Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2018): Lead Petitioner indicated that
Raul went after her when she was young, when she was in a relationship with a
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previous partner, and when she was in a relationship with the political candidate.
The record thus supports the finding that Raul retaliated against her because he was
spurned.
Finally, Petitioners cannot establish an objectively reasonable threat of future
persecution. The record does not compel reversal of the IJ’s finding that the
Colombian government is not unwilling or unable to protect Petitioners. For
example, evidence shows that police provided some protection to her partner after
he filed a report in 2018 when unknown people came to their house and demanded
money. Cf. Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the government’s failure to solve complaints from petitioner who suffered from
anonymous threats and other harassment was insufficient to meet burden under
substantial evidence).
2. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT relief. The “torture”
that the CAT is aimed at is “more severe than persecution,” Guo v. Sessions, 897
F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2018) (simplified), and “must be inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity,” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th
Cir. 2014) (simplified). Looking at the evidence presented, the IJ found that
Petitioners had not and would not likely be subject to torture, and that the
government of Colombia did not inflict, consent, or acquiesce to any such torture.
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The record does not compel a finding to the contrary.
3. Petitioners’ due process challenge to the BIA’s summary affirmance of the
IJ’s decision also fails. It is not “a due process violation for the BIA to affirm the
IJ’s decision without issuing an opinion.” Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d
845, 851 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, “we review the IJ’s decision as the final agency
action.” Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2006). There is no
constitutional or administrative law problem with summary affirmance here.
PETITION DENIED.1
1
Petitioners’ Motion to Stay Removal is denied.
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