Ordonez-Cardona v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledOctober 29, 2026
Docket25-1900
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 29 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BERTA ALICIA ORDONEZ-CARDONA; No. 25-1900
LLEFRY BALERIANO GREGORIO- Agency Nos.
ORDONEZ, A216-179-991
A216-179-992
Petitioners,
v. MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 27, 2026**
Seattle, Washington
Before: M. SMITH, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Berta Alicia Ordonez-Cardona and her minor son, both natives and citizens
of Guatemala, petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying their
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we
deny the petition.
Where, as here, the Board affirms the immigration judge’s decision without
opinion, we review the immigration judge’s decision as the final agency action.
Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). We review
legal questions, including claims of due process violations, de novo. Mohammed v.
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s factual
findings for substantial evidence. Id. at 791. Under the substantial-evidence
standard, the agency’s findings of fact are “conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).
1. Ordonez-Cardona argues that the Board violated her due process rights by
affirming the immigration judge’s decision without opinion. Our precedent
forecloses that argument. See Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 851 (9th
Cir. 2003).
1
Although Ordonez-Cardona and her minor son both petition for review, Ordonez-
Cardona appears to argue only on her own behalf. Ordonez-Cardona’s son is a
derivative beneficiary of her asylum application, but he also filed separate
applications for withholding and CAT relief.
2 25-1900
2. Both asylum and withholding of removal require an applicant to show that
her past or feared persecution bears a nexus to a protected ground. Garcia v.
Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2021). For asylum, a protected
ground must be “one central reason,” and for withholding of removal, “a reason,”
for the persecution. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 2017)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(C)) (emphasis omitted).
Ordonez-Cardona claims to fear persecution on account of her Mayan Mam
ethnicity. She testified that she feared returning to Guatemala because of
confrontations with her former neighbors, a man and a woman who were upset
about animals that Ordonez-Cardona kept on her property. The immigration judge
determined that this claim was insufficient to establish persecution on account of a
protected ground.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion. Ordonez-Cardona
testified that her neighbors, like her, were indigenous Mayan Mam and that they
confronted her because of the animals on her property. The evidence therefore
would not compel a reasonable adjudicator to conclude that Ordonez-Cardona
suffered past harm or faces future harm because of her membership in a particular
social group, rather than because of a purely private dispute about the animals. See
Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 357.
3 25-1900
3. Substantial evidence supports the denial of CAT relief. To obtain CAT
relief, a petitioner must establish that “it is more likely than not that he or
she would be tortured if removed,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2), and that the torture
would be “inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence
of, a public official” or other person acting in an official capacity, id.
§ 1208.18(a)(1). No evidence in the record shows that Ordonez-Cardona’s dispute
with her neighbors had any connection to government officials in Guatemala or
that such officials would acquiesce in the torture she fears. Ordonez-Cardona
testified that she was not afraid of police in Guatemala, and that she had no
knowledge of any collusion between the police and her neighbors. The evidence
would not compel a conclusion contrary to that of the agency.
PETITION DENIED.
4 25-1900