Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 5 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT HEIDI NOEMI CARDONA No. 24-1579 HERNANDEZ; A.A.C.H., Agency Nos. A220-569-682 Petitioners, A220-569-683 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. HEIDI NOEMI CARDONA No. 25-4466 HERNANDEZ; A.A.C.H., Agency Nos. A220-569-682 Petitioners, A220-569-683 v. TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted September 17, 2026 Pasadena, California Before: NGUYEN, R. NELSON, and DESAI, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Heidi Noemi Cardona Hernandez and her minor child A.A.C.H. (“petitioners”) seek review of two Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decisions. First, petitioners challenge the BIA’s decision to uphold the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of petitioners’ applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Second, petitioners challenge the BIA’s denial of petitioners’ motion to reopen the BIA’s prior decision. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny both petitions. 1. Petitioners challenge the denial of asylum and withholding of removal on the ground that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review to the IJ’s nexus determination. We review de novo whether the BIA has applied the correct standard of review. Soto-Soto v. Garland, 1 F.4th 655, 659 (9th Cir. 2021). The BIA “must review de novo whether a persecutor’s motives meet the nexus legal standards” for asylum and withholding of removal, but it must review for clear error the IJ’s “underlying factual findings.” Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 551–52 (9th Cir. 2023). When reviewing the IJ’s factual finding that “there was no evidence that anyone would want to harm [Cardona Hernandez] because of her family membership or because she was a witness to a crime,” the BIA correctly applied the clear error standard. See id. at 552–53. 2. We review denials of CAT protection for substantial evidence. Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022). To qualify for CAT protection, a petitioner must show it is more likely than not that she will face torture by the government, at its instigation, or with its consent or acquiescence. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1); Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, the record does not compel the conclusion that the Guatemalan government would acquiesce to petitioners’ torture. The police assisted Cardona Hernandez after she reported being threatened by gang members, including promising to patrol near where she lived. And the report on country conditions showing some police corruption is too general to establish acquiescence. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show acquiescence.”). Substantial evidence thus supports the BIA’s denial of CAT protection. 3. We review the BIA’s denial of petitioners’ motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2014). A motion to reopen must “state the new facts” that a petitioner will prove “at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted,” and “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). For a petitioner to prevail on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, new evidence—“when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing”—must “establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.” Ayanian v. Garland, 64 F.4th 1074, 1080 (9th 3 Cir. 2023) (citation modified). On such a motion, the BIA may not make credibility determinations, Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 986–87 (9th Cir. 2005), and “must accept as true the facts asserted by the petitioner, unless they are ‘inherently unbelievable.’” Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). Petitioners relied on Cardona Hernandez’s declaration and a police report describing an incident involving one of petitioners’ family members. The BIA observed that Cardona Hernandez’s declaration was inconsistent with the police report. The existence of the police report belied Cardona Hernandez’s statement that her family member could not report gang violence to the police, and the police report reflected that petitioners’ family member was subject to indiscriminate, not targeted, violence. See Agonafer, 859 F.3d at 1203 (noting that the BIA need not accept “inherently unbelievable” facts as true). Cardona Hernandez made vague statements in her declaration about a separate attack on a different family member, but she did not even say when this attack occurred. See He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2007). Even accepting such statements as true, the BIA determined that petitioners failed to show that country conditions had changed sufficiently. See Ayanian, 64 F.4th at 1080 (“The critical question is whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim now does.” (citation modified)). We 4 cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion in making this determination. See Go, 744 F.3d at 609 (“Under this standard, the [BIA’s] decision may only be reversed if it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” (citation modified)). PETITIONS DENIED.1 1 Petitioners’ motion to stay removal, Case No. 25-4466, Dkt. No. 2, is denied, and the temporary stay of removal is lifted. 5