Villegas Bonilla v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 2, 2026
Docket25-4228
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 2 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KENIA VILLEGAS BONILLA, No. 25-4228
Agency No.
Petitioner, A200-975-728
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 28, 2026**
Pasadena, California
Before: OWENS, SANCHEZ, and TUNG, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Kenia Villegas Bonilla (“Villegas Bonilla”) seeks review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of her second untimely motion to
reopen removal proceedings. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not
recount them here. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
discretion and its underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. Reyes-
Corado v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1256, 1259–60 (9th Cir. 2023); Najmabadi v. Holder,
597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition.
1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Villegas Bonilla
failed to establish materially changed country conditions in Mexico sufficient to
excuse the time and numerical limitations on her motion to reopen. To establish
changed country conditions, a petitioner must present evidence that is
“qualitatively different” from the evidence of conditions given at the prior merits
hearing. Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted). Villegas Bonilla’s evidence at the prior merits hearing documented
widespread gender-based and domestic violence in Mexico, underreporting of such
violence, and inadequate government responses. Yet the newly presented evidence
before the BIA merely showed a continuation of longstanding conditions, not a
material change, since her 2018 merits hearing. See id. (holding that evidence
recounting previously raised conditions is not enough to show a change in country
conditions).
2. The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Villegas
Bonilla failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum or withholding of
removal. Failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying relief sought is
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an independent basis for denying a motion to reopen. I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94,
104 (1988); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986. Although Villegas Bonilla’s application
asserted political opinion and membership in a particular social group as protected
grounds, she did not identify in her application, motion to reopen, or declaration
the political opinion or particular social group underlying her alleged suffering or
fear of persecution. Thus, the BIA reasonably concluded that Villegas Bonilla had
not made the required prima facie showing.
While Villegas Bonilla contends that the BIA could not assess prima facie
eligibility because she had not previously applied for asylum or withholding of
removal, she provides no authority or reasoning for this proposition, and we have
reviewed such determinations where a motion to reopen sought to present a
previously unadjudicated asylum claim. See, e.g., Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600
F.3d 1148, 1150–52 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
3. Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Villegas
Bonilla failed to establish prima facie eligibility for protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). CAT protection requires a particularized
showing that the applicant is more likely than not to be tortured by, or with the
acquiescence of, a public official. Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir.
2019); Lalayan v. Garland, 4 F.4th 822, 840 (9th Cir. 2021); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2). Generalized evidence of violence against women in Mexico is
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not enough to establish this showing. See Dawson v. Garland, 998 F.3d 876, 885
(9th Cir. 2021). And although Villegas Bonilla alleges that she suffered serious
abuse from her former partner, she has had no contact with him since leaving
Mexico decades ago, and the record does not establish that he has a continuing
interest in harming her sufficient to compel the conclusion that she faces a
particularized likelihood of future torture. See id. at 882–83.
PETITION DENIED.1
1
The Stay of Removal is terminated.
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