Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT VANESSA VICTORIANO GILES; H. R. No. 25-7367 T.V.; O. J. T.V.; X. T.V., Agency Nos. A245-922-099 Petitioners, A245-922-101 A245-922-102 v. A245-922-103 TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 29, 2026** Seattle, Washington Before: CHRISTEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and SYKES, District Judge.*** Vanessa Victoriano Giles and her three minor children, all natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sunshine Suzanne Sykes, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. Appeals dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022). We review claims of due process violations de novo. Olea-Serefina v. Garland, 34 F.4th 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2022). 1. Victoriano Giles argues that her due process rights were violated because of poor translation in her proceedings before the immigration judge, which prevented the immigration judge from adequately developing the administrative record. “Due process requires that an applicant be given competent translation services.” He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2003). To prevail on a due process claim, a petitioner “must show error and substantial prejudice.” Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000). In the context of an alleged translation error, showing prejudice requires demonstrating that a “better translation would have made a difference in the outcome of the hearing.” Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 850 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1993)). This is an “onerous” standard, Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2000), and it requires a petitioner to show that there were at least “plausible 2 25-7367 grounds for relief.” United States v. Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003). Although Victoriano Giles points to passages in the record demonstrating issues with communication in the proceeding before the immigration judge, she has not shown that those issues resulted in prejudice. Victoriano Giles has not presented “plausible scenarios in which the outcome of the proceedings would have been different” without the communication issues. Tamayo-Tamayo v. Holder, 725 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 495 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). Victoriano Giles references the Department of States’s country conditions report, submitted by the Department of Homeland Security three days before the hearing, which the immigration judge excluded. But Victoriano Giles offers no meaningful explanation of how this report would have overcome the defects the agency identified in her claims. Victoriano Giles also underscores the importance of her testimony as a pro se litigant, but she does not explain how she was “prevented . . . from presenting relevant evidence.” Acewicz, 984 F.2d at 1063. Lastly, Victoriano Giles argues that her testimony related to past harm “was frequently marked as inaudible or untranslated.” But the record shows that the immigration judge followed up and obtained the information she claims went untranslated. Because Victoriano Giles failed to show that she had “plausible 3 25-7367 grounds for relief,” Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d at 1054, the Board correctly rejected her due process claims. 2. Both asylum and withholding of removal require an applicant to show that her past or feared persecution bears a nexus to a protected ground. Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2021). For asylum, a protected ground must be “one central reason,” and for withholding of removal, “a reason,” for the persecution. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(C)). Before the Board, Victoriano Giles did not challenge the immigration judge’s finding that she failed to establish a nexus to a protected ground. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), we may review only those claims that a petitioner has properly exhausted before the agency. See Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024). “A petitioner cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement by making a general challenge to the [immigration judge]’s decision, but, rather, must specify which issues form the basis of the appeal.” Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023). A petitioner exhausts an issue if her argument puts the Board “on notice” such that it has “an opportunity to pass on th[e] issue.” Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). 4 25-7367 In her briefing to the Board, Victoriano Giles focused on the alleged translation errors in the proceedings before the immigration judge. Because Victoriano Giles did not put the Board on notice that she was advancing an independent challenge to the immigration judge’s ruling on the nexus elements of her asylum and withholding claims, nexus is not properly before us. 3. Victoriano Giles forfeited her CAT claim because she did not “specifically and distinctly” present that claim in her opening brief. Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2020)). The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 3) is denied. PETITION DENIED. 5 25-7367