Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ROSA MAGALI RUBIO ZAMORA; No. 25-1213 A. G. R., Agency Nos. A215-647-057 Petitioners, A215-647-058 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 23, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: CALLAHAN, LEE, and KOH, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Rosa Magali Rubio Zamora (“Rubio Zamora”) and her minor child (collectively, “Petitioners”)1, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 Rubio Zamora’s child asserts his claim as a derivative beneficiary of Rubio Zamora’s application for asylum. review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum.2 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition. Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions. Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2013). We review the agency’s denial of asylum for substantial evidence. Ani v. Bondi, 155 F.4th 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2025). Under that standard, we must uphold the agency’s findings “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the harm Petitioners suffered lacks the requisite nexus to a protected ground. See Santos- Ponce v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “whether the ‘nexus’ requirement has been satisfied . . . is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard”). Rubio Zamora testified that in 2018 unknown burglars broke into her house and stole valuables while she and her family were out. Following the burglary, unknown men tried to extort money from her but left when she refused to pay them. After her refusal, Rubio Zamora and her son were tailed by unknown men, who made no contact with and did not speak to Petitioners. A 2 Petitioners do not challenge the agency’s denial of withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. These claims are accordingly waived. 2 25-1213 petitioner’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1075 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that relief is precluded when persecution is “solely on account of an economic motive”). Petitioners argue that the agency could have inferred a non-economic motive for the 2018 burglary, extortion, and tailings based on a 2014 incident, in which a drug cartel leader threatened Rubio Zamora and her colleagues at a teacher’s meeting. However, substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that the 2014 incident had no nexus to the 2018 events, given that the cartel leader who made the threats was arrested in 2015, and four years passed without incident between the 2014 threats and the 2018 burglary, extortion, and tailings. 2. The IJ and BIA did not err in considering Petitioners’ proposed particular social group (“PSG”) of “former Mexican government employees in favor of the government.” To the extent Petitioners did not raise before the BIA the new PSG Petitioners now assert, “former Mexican government teachers in favor of the government,” the issue is not exhausted and relief must be denied. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies); Umana- Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). Even if exhaustion were satisfied such that we could consider Petitioners’ argument, Petitioners bore the 3 25-1213 burden below to clearly delineate the PSG. See Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 2020). The IJ correctly ruled based on the PSG that Petitioners proposed and argued before the IJ. To the extent that Petitioners raised a new PSG on BIA appeal, the BIA correctly declined to consider Petitioners’ new PSG on appeal. Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 192 (BIA 2018) (BIA did not err in declining to consider PSG newly raised on appeal to the BIA)). PETITION DENIED.3 3 Petitioners’ opposed motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 4) is denied. The temporary stay of removal entered pursuant to General Order 6.4(c) (Dkt. No. 4) is lifted, effective immediately. 4 25-1213