Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 10 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ESMERALDA VANESSA GOMEZ No. 25-6321 GOMEZ; N. R. M. G., Agency Nos. A245-385-152 Petitioners, A245-385-155 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 22, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: FORREST and TUNG, Circuit Judges, and COLLINS, District Judge.*** Petitioners Esmeralda Vanessa Gomez Gomez and her minor daughter, N.R.M.G., citizens of El Salvador, seek review of the Board of Immigration * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. Appeals’ (BIA) decision dismissing their appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision and adds its own reasoning, we review “both the BIA’s decision and the portions of the IJ’s decision adopted by the BIA.” Diaz v. Bondi, 129 F.4th 546, 552 (9th Cir. 2025). We review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal questions de novo. Id. Factual findings “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 1. Asylum & Withholding of Removal. The BIA did not err in finding Petitioners failed to establish a nexus between the harm Gomez suffered from her half-brother Handy Medina-Gomez and her membership in the particular social group (PSG) of Salvadoran women. For asylum, Gomez had to establish that her PSG was a “central reason” why Medina-Gomez persecuted her. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009). And 1 Gomez listed N.R.M.G. as a derivative in her application, and N.R.M.G. filed independent application for relief. The IJ denied N.R.M.G.’s applications for the same reasons that it denied Gomez’s. Although the BIA erred in stating that N.R.M.G. did not file her own applications, this error was harmless because the facts related to both Petitioners’ applications are the same. See Blanco v. Holder, 572 F.3d 780, 781 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that any error by the BIA was harmless because petitioner’s claim failed on other grounds). 2 25-6321 for withholding of removal, she had to show her PSG was “a reason” for Medina- Gomez’s persecution. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Medina-Gomez abused Gomez for “disrespecting” and failing to “obey” their mother and for refusing to testify in court on behalf of Medina-Gomez’s son, not because she is a Salvadoran woman. Nor did the agency err by not considering Gomez’s asserted protected ground of “feminist political opinion.” Beyond listing this as a protected ground in her pre- hearing statement, the record is devoid of any discussion about Gomez’s feminist political opinion. Furthermore, any error would have been harmless because the record would not support past persecution based on Gomez’s feminist political opinion any more than it supports past persecution based on her status as a Salvadoran woman. See Blanco, 572 F.3d at 781 n.1. Finally, the BIA did not err in finding that Petitioners failed to establish that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to protect Gomez from her ex- partner, Wilber Manzano-Vargas.2 Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 2 Petitioners’ briefing does not make clear whether they also challenge the IJ’s finding that they failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Regardless, such a challenge would fail because Manzano-Vargas no longer lives in El Salvador; thus, as the IJ found, any fear of future persecution in El Salvador would not be “objectively reasonable.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(B); Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 909 (9th Cir. 2018). 3 25-6321 1062 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 936 (9th Cir. 2010). Petitioners argue that Manzano-Vargas’s “three-day detention” after his arrest for abusing her is not meaningful recourse and point to El Salvador’s six-percent conviction rate in domestic violence cases. While country-conditions evidence is relevant in determining whether the government is unable or unwilling to protect against a specified harm, see Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1069, the record does not compel the conclusion that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to protect Gomez from her former partner or from domestic violence generally. See Avetova-Elisseva v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] petitioner contending that the [agency’s] findings are erroneous must establish that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it.” (citation omitted)). 2. CAT Protection. A petitioner seeking CAT protection must establish that “it is more likely than not that . . . she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). “[T]orture is more severe than persecution and the standard of proof for the CAT claim is higher than the standard of proof for an asylum claim.” Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005). Although Gomez suffered “severe” harm from her half-brother, the agency reasonably concluded that it did not rise to the level of torture. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 769 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that “even instances of 4 25-6321 significant physical abuse d[o] not constitute torture”).3 3. Due Process. Petitioners argue that the IJ failed to act as an independent arbiter because he stated during their hearing that the evidence “supports withholding of removal,” but then denied all relief in his written decision because he was influenced by the Government’s reservation of the right to appeal. “To prevail on a due process challenge to [removal] proceedings, [a petitioner] must show error and substantial prejudice.” Grigoryan v. Barr, 959 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Petitioners’ assertion that the IJ was influenced by the Government’s reservation of appeal rights is speculative. As the BIA found, they point to no evidence supporting this fact other than the IJ’s apparent changed thinking between the hearing and issuing his written decision. This is insufficient where there are other reasonable explanations for why the IJ may have changed his mind. PETITION DENIED. 3 Any error in the agency’s consideration of the record evidence relevant to the government’s acquiescence in Gomez-Medina’s abuse was harmless because the finding that his abuse did not rise to the level of torture is dispositive. 5 25-6321