Salazar-De Arias v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-51
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANDRA ELIZA SALAZAR-DE ARIAS; No. 26-51
C. S. A.-S.; D. I. A.-S.; E. D. A.-S., Agency Nos.
A203-482-255
Petitioners, A203-482-256
A203-482-257
v.
A203-482-258
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 16, 2026 **
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and RODRIGUEZ, District
Judge.***
Sandra Eliza Salazar-De Arias (Salazar-De Arias) and her three children
(together, Petitioners) petition for review of an order from the Board of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Xavier Rodriguez, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal of the denial by an
Immigration Judge (IJ) of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal,
and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the denial of Petitioners’ applications for
asylum and withholding of removal based on their failure to establish past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected
ground. See Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 545 (2026) (stating that
“[t]hough the courts of appeals apply varying standards to the agency’s persecution
determination, we have already concluded that these determinations receive
substantial-evidence review”). Petitioners contend that they suffered persecution
based on their membership in the particular social group (PSG) of “single women
in El Salvador and their children who cooperate with government officials against
criminal activity.”
A PSG is a cognizable basis for immigration relief only if it is “socially
distinct within the society in question.” Guttierez-Alm v. Garland, 62 F.4th 1186,
1199 (9th Cir. 2023) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA
determined that the proposed PSG is not cognizable because “there is no evidence
that Salvadoran society views individuals who cooperate in opposition to criminal
activity as a distinct group.” The country conditions report submitted by
2
Petitioners describes generalized evidence that fails to demonstrate that their
proposed PSG is socially distinct. See Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d
1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2021) (reasoning that “generalized statistics do not compel a
finding that . . . proposed groups are socially distinct”) (citations omitted); cf.
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(concluding that a PSG composed of people who testify against gang members “in
open court” may satisfy the social distinction requirement). Here, Salazar-De
Arias reported only one incident by unknown individuals to the police.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that the
proposed PSG lacks social distinction. See Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1092; see
also Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that
“the absence of society-specific evidence of social distinction” constituted
substantial evidence that the proposed PSG was not socially distinct).
2. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of Petitioners’ applications for
asylum and withholding of removal based on their failure to satisfy the nexus
requirement.1 Before us, Petitioners argue that “[e]xtortion in any form is a form
of persecution and [Salazar-De Arias] is valid to believe that she would be extorted
in the future.” However, this contention lacks support in our precedent. See Ayala
v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2017) (clarifying that economic
1
The BIA determined that Petitioners failed to meaningfully challenge the IJ’s
findings on nexus.
3
extortion may constitute persecution, but only if motivated by a protected ground).
Because Petitioners failed to demonstrate a nexus between a protected ground and
fear of future persecution, substantial evidence supports the denial of asylum and
withholding of removal on this basis. See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th
1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2023).
3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief. To receive
relief under the CAT, a petitioner must demonstrate that “it is more likely than not
that he or she would be tortured if removed.” Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757,
768–69 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). A petitioner must also establish “that
[the] torture [would] be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”
Edgar G.C. v. Bondi, 136 F.4th 832, 845 (9th Cir. 2025), as amended (citation
omitted).
Petitioners assert that Salazar-De Arias “will be tortured or killed if removed
to El Salvador.” Petitioners also maintain that “the police in El Salvador cannot be
relied on for protection as many of them are corrupt and work with the organized
criminal groups.” However, the BIA observed that the country conditions
evidence reflects an ongoing effort by the Salvadoran government to combat
corruption and gang violence, despite those efforts not being fully successful.
Simply stating that the Salvadoran government has failed to take adequate
4
measures to combat gang violence does not establish that the government is
acquiescing to private acts of torture. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829,
836 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended (reasoning that “a general ineffectiveness on the
government’s part to investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show
acquiescence”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, their challenge to the agency’s
denial of CAT relief fails. See Edgar G.C., 136 F.4th at 850.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.2
2
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The
motion for stay of removal (Dkt. # 3) is otherwise denied.
5