Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SANDRA ELIZA SALAZAR-DE ARIAS; No. 26-51 C. S. A.-S.; D. I. A.-S.; E. D. A.-S., Agency Nos. A203-482-255 Petitioners, A203-482-256 A203-482-257 v. A203-482-258 TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 16, 2026 ** Pasadena, California Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and RODRIGUEZ, District Judge.*** Sandra Eliza Salazar-De Arias (Salazar-De Arias) and her three children (together, Petitioners) petition for review of an order from the Board of * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Xavier Rodriguez, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation. Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal of the denial by an Immigration Judge (IJ) of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. 1. Substantial evidence supports the denial of Petitioners’ applications for asylum and withholding of removal based on their failure to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. See Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 545 (2026) (stating that “[t]hough the courts of appeals apply varying standards to the agency’s persecution determination, we have already concluded that these determinations receive substantial-evidence review”). Petitioners contend that they suffered persecution based on their membership in the particular social group (PSG) of “single women in El Salvador and their children who cooperate with government officials against criminal activity.” A PSG is a cognizable basis for immigration relief only if it is “socially distinct within the society in question.” Guttierez-Alm v. Garland, 62 F.4th 1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2023) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA determined that the proposed PSG is not cognizable because “there is no evidence that Salvadoran society views individuals who cooperate in opposition to criminal activity as a distinct group.” The country conditions report submitted by 2 Petitioners describes generalized evidence that fails to demonstrate that their proposed PSG is socially distinct. See Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2021) (reasoning that “generalized statistics do not compel a finding that . . . proposed groups are socially distinct”) (citations omitted); cf. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (concluding that a PSG composed of people who testify against gang members “in open court” may satisfy the social distinction requirement). Here, Salazar-De Arias reported only one incident by unknown individuals to the police. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that the proposed PSG lacks social distinction. See Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1092; see also Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “the absence of society-specific evidence of social distinction” constituted substantial evidence that the proposed PSG was not socially distinct). 2. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of Petitioners’ applications for asylum and withholding of removal based on their failure to satisfy the nexus requirement.1 Before us, Petitioners argue that “[e]xtortion in any form is a form of persecution and [Salazar-De Arias] is valid to believe that she would be extorted in the future.” However, this contention lacks support in our precedent. See Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2017) (clarifying that economic 1 The BIA determined that Petitioners failed to meaningfully challenge the IJ’s findings on nexus. 3 extortion may constitute persecution, but only if motivated by a protected ground). Because Petitioners failed to demonstrate a nexus between a protected ground and fear of future persecution, substantial evidence supports the denial of asylum and withholding of removal on this basis. See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2023). 3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief. To receive relief under the CAT, a petitioner must demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 768–69 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). A petitioner must also establish “that [the] torture [would] be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Edgar G.C. v. Bondi, 136 F.4th 832, 845 (9th Cir. 2025), as amended (citation omitted). Petitioners assert that Salazar-De Arias “will be tortured or killed if removed to El Salvador.” Petitioners also maintain that “the police in El Salvador cannot be relied on for protection as many of them are corrupt and work with the organized criminal groups.” However, the BIA observed that the country conditions evidence reflects an ongoing effort by the Salvadoran government to combat corruption and gang violence, despite those efforts not being fully successful. Simply stating that the Salvadoran government has failed to take adequate 4 measures to combat gang violence does not establish that the government is acquiescing to private acts of torture. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended (reasoning that “a general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show acquiescence”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, their challenge to the agency’s denial of CAT relief fails. See Edgar G.C., 136 F.4th at 850. PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.2 2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for stay of removal (Dkt. # 3) is otherwise denied. 5