Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RICHARD CASTILLO HURTADO; No. 24-3734 DANIELA CRUZ; RICHARD CASTILLO Agency Nos. CRUZ; ANGHELINA CASTILLO CRUZ, A241-704-240; A241-704-241; Petitioners, A241-704-242; A241-704-243; v. A241-704-244 TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 23, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: FORREST and TUNG, Circuit Judges, and BASTIAN, District Judge.*** Petitioners Richard George Castillo Hurtado, his wife, and their three minor children (collectively, “Petitioners”), seek review of the Board of Immigration * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Stanley Allen Bastian, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation. Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of their appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision to deny their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection for substantial evidence. Duran- Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). 1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Petitioners’ applications for asylum and withholding of removal based on the finding that Petitioners were targeted exclusively for financial gain and not based on a protected ground. See Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding an applicant for asylum and withholding of removal “must show he was individually targeted on account of a protected ground rather than simply the victim of generalized violence”). To establish eligibility for asylum, the applicant must demonstrate that a statutorily protected ground is “at least one central reason” for the past or feared future persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, the applicant must establish that a protected ground was or is “a reason” for the inflicted or feared persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017). Before the IJ, Petitioners asserted two protected grounds: political opinion and 2 24-3734 the particular social group (PSG) of “Peruvian citizens persecuted by private actors the government is unable to control.” The IJ denied relief in part because Petitioners failed to establish a nexus between these asserted grounds that the harm they suffered, and the BIA affirmed, explaining Petitioners “did not establish a motive for the incidents described beyond financial gain by the perpetrators.” The BIA declined to reach the IJ’s other grounds for denying Petitioners relief. The BIA’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Indeed, lead Petitioner testified that the criminal groups targeted him and his family for “[t]he money.” As the agency’s nexus finding was dispositive to the entire analysis, we have no basis to disturb its denial of asylum and withholding of removal. 2. The BIA did not err by declining to consider Petitioners’ newly proffered PSGs, pattern or practice, or disfavored group claims raised for the first time on appeal. See Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A). 3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioners failed to establish a clear probability of torture with government acquiescence. To qualify for protection under the CAT, an applicant bears the burden of proving a clear probability that he “would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(1)–(2), 1208.18(a). Torture is defined as “any act by which severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by, or 3 24-3734 at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); see also Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005). While willful blindness to torture could be considered acquiescence, see Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003), a government “does not acquiesce in the torture of its citizens merely because it is aware of torture but powerless to stop it.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The agency denied Petitioners’ applications for CAT protection because they failed to show they were subjected to treatment rising to the level of torture. Substantial evidence supports this finding. Further, the record indicates that while the Peruvian government’s investigations may ultimately have been fruitless, law enforcement took Petitioners’ reports seriously and conducted investigations. See B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 844 (9th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Petitioners were not entitled to CAT protection. 4. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Petitioners’ ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim as they failed to comply with the Lozada requirements and were unable to show that prior counsel’s ineffectiveness caused them prejudice. See Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing Lozada requirements). A petitioner can be excused of complying with the Lozada 4 24-3734 requirements when ineffectiveness of counsel is “plain on the face of the administrative record.” Id. (citation omitted). To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show that prior counsel’s performance was deficient and caused them prejudice. Guan v. Barr, 925 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 2019). Here, regardless of whether prior counsel’s ineffectiveness is apparent on the face of the record, Petitioners cannot show that prior counsel’s actions or lack thereof caused them prejudice. Even if prior counsel presented a cognizable protected ground, the IJ’s denial of relief would have remained the same, as substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Petitioners were targeted for purely financial reasons, and were thus ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal. See Gutierrez v. Garland, 106 F.4th 866, 881 (9th Cir. 2024) (finding that to establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate, at a minimum, that the asserted ground for relief is at least plausible.). PETITION DENIED.1 1 Petitioners’ unopposed motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 2) is denied, and the temporary stay of removal entered pursuant to General Order 6.4(c) is lifted effective immediately. 5 24-3734