Castillo Hurtado v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket24-3734
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD CASTILLO HURTADO; No. 24-3734
DANIELA CRUZ; RICHARD CASTILLO Agency Nos.
CRUZ; ANGHELINA CASTILLO CRUZ, A241-704-240;
A241-704-241;
Petitioners,
A241-704-242;
A241-704-243;
v. A241-704-244
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 23, 2026**
San Francisco, California
Before: FORREST and TUNG, Circuit Judges, and BASTIAN, District Judge.***
Petitioners Richard George Castillo Hurtado, his wife, and their three minor
children (collectively, “Petitioners”), seek review of the Board of Immigration
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Stanley Allen Bastian, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of their appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
decision to deny their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision pursuant to the Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”). 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT protection for substantial evidence. Duran-
Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Petitioners’ applications
for asylum and withholding of removal based on the finding that Petitioners were
targeted exclusively for financial gain and not based on a protected ground. See
Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding an applicant for asylum
and withholding of removal “must show he was individually targeted on account of
a protected ground rather than simply the victim of generalized violence”).
To establish eligibility for asylum, the applicant must demonstrate that a
statutorily protected ground is “at least one central reason” for the past or feared
future persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). To establish eligibility for
withholding of removal, the applicant must establish that a protected ground was or
is “a reason” for the inflicted or feared persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);
Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017).
Before the IJ, Petitioners asserted two protected grounds: political opinion and
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the particular social group (PSG) of “Peruvian citizens persecuted by private actors
the government is unable to control.” The IJ denied relief in part because Petitioners
failed to establish a nexus between these asserted grounds that the harm they
suffered, and the BIA affirmed, explaining Petitioners “did not establish a motive
for the incidents described beyond financial gain by the perpetrators.” The BIA
declined to reach the IJ’s other grounds for denying Petitioners relief. The BIA’s
conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Indeed, lead Petitioner
testified that the criminal groups targeted him and his family for “[t]he money.”
As the agency’s nexus finding was dispositive to the entire analysis, we have
no basis to disturb its denial of asylum and withholding of removal.
2. The BIA did not err by declining to consider Petitioners’ newly proffered
PSGs, pattern or practice, or disfavored group claims raised for the first time on
appeal. See Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A).
3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioners failed to
establish a clear probability of torture with government acquiescence. To qualify for
protection under the CAT, an applicant bears the burden of proving a clear
probability that he “would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(1)–(2), 1208.18(a). Torture is defined as “any act
by which severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by, or
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at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official.” 8
C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); see also Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1224 (9th Cir.
2005). While willful blindness to torture could be considered acquiescence, see
Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003), a government “does not
acquiesce in the torture of its citizens merely because it is aware of torture but
powerless to stop it.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted).
The agency denied Petitioners’ applications for CAT protection because they
failed to show they were subjected to treatment rising to the level of torture.
Substantial evidence supports this finding. Further, the record indicates that while
the Peruvian government’s investigations may ultimately have been fruitless, law
enforcement took Petitioners’ reports seriously and conducted investigations. See
B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 844 (9th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, substantial
evidence supports the agency’s finding that Petitioners were not entitled to CAT
protection.
4. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Petitioners’ ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim as they failed to comply with the Lozada requirements
and were unable to show that prior counsel’s ineffectiveness caused them prejudice.
See Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing Lozada
requirements). A petitioner can be excused of complying with the Lozada
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requirements when ineffectiveness of counsel is “plain on the face of the
administrative record.” Id. (citation omitted). To prove ineffective assistance of
counsel, the petitioner must show that prior counsel’s performance was deficient and
caused them prejudice. Guan v. Barr, 925 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 2019).
Here, regardless of whether prior counsel’s ineffectiveness is apparent on the
face of the record, Petitioners cannot show that prior counsel’s actions or lack thereof
caused them prejudice. Even if prior counsel presented a cognizable protected
ground, the IJ’s denial of relief would have remained the same, as substantial
evidence supports the conclusion that Petitioners were targeted for purely financial
reasons, and were thus ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal. See
Gutierrez v. Garland, 106 F.4th 866, 881 (9th Cir. 2024) (finding that to establish
prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate, at a minimum, that the asserted ground for
relief is at least plausible.).
PETITION DENIED.1
1
Petitioners’ unopposed motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 2) is denied, and the
temporary stay of removal entered pursuant to General Order 6.4(c) is lifted
effective immediately.
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