Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 6 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JULIO CARDENAS CHOQUE; SARA No. 25-3961 CRUZ VIDAURRE; A. C. C.; C. C. C.; C. Agency Nos. C. C., A246-558-236 A246-558-237 Petitioners, A246-558-238 A246-558-239 v. A246-558-240 TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 30, 2026** Seattle, Washington Before: CHRISTEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and SYKES, District Judge.*** Petitioners Julio Cardenas Choque, his wife (Sara Cruz Vidaurre), and their three daughters (A.C.C., C.C.C., and C.C.C.), natives and citizens of Peru, petition * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sunshine Suzanne Sykes, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition. Where the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions. Hernandez v. Garland, 38 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022). We review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal questions de novo, Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020), and we may not reverse factual findings unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion, Singh v. Bondi, 130 F.4th 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2025). 1. Petitioners did not challenge the IJ’s findings that they failed to establish past persecution on account of a protected ground; failed to demonstrate the cognizability of the proposed particular social groups (PSGs) of “Peruvian women who refuse to be victims of sexual predation,” “Peruvians for whom local law enforcement is unable and willing to protect,” and “Peruvians who have reported gang crimes to local authorities”; failed to show women are a disfavored group in Peru; and failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of A.C.C.’s feminist political opinion. Because these arguments were unexhausted before the agency, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), we decline to consider them, Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). 2 25-3961 2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Cardenas Choque’s proposed PSG of “Peruvian small business owners who have refused extortion demands levied by Venezuelan gangs” is not cognizable because it is not immutable and lacks particularity. A PSG is cognizable if, among other things, the group is “composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic” and “defined with particularity.” Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 833 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016)). An immutable characteristic is one “that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.” Id. (quoting Matter of W-G-R, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 212 (BIA 2014)). Business ownership alone is not an immutable characteristic, see Macedo Templos v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 877, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2021) (concluding that petitioner’s PSG as a “wealthy business owner” is not an immutable characteristic). Cardenas Choque ceased being a small business owner in 2022, and there is no evidence he possessed specialized knowledge that would render the characteristic unchangeable, see Plancarte Sauceda, 23 F.4th at 834. Cardenas Choque forfeited any challenge to the particularity finding by failing to develop any argument in his opening brief. Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022); Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (9th Cir. 1996). Because the lack of a cognizable PSG is dispositive of his asylum 3 25-3961 and withholding of removal claims, we do not reach his remaining arguments. See Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 2020). 3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that there is no nexus between Cruz Vidaurre’s and her daughters’ fear of persecution and their immediate-family PSGs. Both asylum and withholding of removal require an applicant to show that her past or feared persecution bears a nexus to a protected ground. Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2021). For asylum, a protected ground must be “one central reason,” and for withholding of removal, “a reason,” for the persecution. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(C)) (emphasis omitted). The record reflects that Tren de Aragua threatened the family to extort money from Cardenas Choque, indirectly referencing Cruz Vidaurre and the daughters, but they were neither harmed nor directly threatened. Petitioners cite no other evidence suggesting that the gang was or will be motivated by family membership, and the record does not contain any evidence that shows the gang was motivated by anything other than financial gain. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”). Because the lack of nexus is dispositive, we do not address whether any feared future persecution on account of family membership is 4 25-3961 objectively reasonable. See Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016). 4. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Cruz Vidaurre and her daughters did not establish an objectively reasonable well-founded fear based on a pattern or practice of persecution against “Peruvian women.” The agency considered the Peru 2022 Human Rights Report and news articles describing gender-based violence but concluded that the materials did not define the term “gender-based violence,” that they likely encompassed lesser harms not rising to persecution, and that the cited statistics did not show systematic violence in light of Peru’s overall population. Even if another view were possible, the record does not compel a contrary conclusion. Singh, 130 F.4th at 1148. To the extent that evidence relating to A.C.C. suggests nexus based on nationality and gender, A.C.C. forfeited any challenge by failing to develop any argument in the opening brief. See Hernandez, 47 F.4th at 916; Martinez-Serrano, 94 F.3d at 1259–60. 5. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief. There is no basis to conclude the agency failed to consider letters from Cruz Vidaurre’s mother and goddaughter. The immigration judge stated she considered all evidence, and Petitioners do not make the required clear and affirmative showing that the agency ignored or misstated highly probative material. See Cruz v. Bondi, 5 25-3961 146 F.4th 730, 739 (9th Cir. 2025). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief because the evidence does not compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not that Petitioners will be tortured with government acquiescence if returned to Peru. While Tren de Aragua threatened and once beat Cardenas Choque, Petitioners do not point to evidence of a likelihood of future harm, and Petitioners fail to show that they cannot safely relocate outside Lima. See Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 705 (9th Cir. 2022); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii). The motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 3) is denied. PETITION DENIED. 6 25-3961