Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT EMMA ESPARANZA HERNANDEZ- No. 25-6995 CAAL; SONIA FABIOLA VASQUEZ- Agency Nos. HERNANDEZ; E.I.G-E., A249-032-987 A249-032-986 Petitioners, A249-032-985 v. TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 29, 2026** Seattle, Washington Before: CHRISTEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and SYKES, District Judge.*** * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sunshine Suzanne Sykes, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. Emma Esparanza Hernandez-Caal, her daughter, Sonia Fabiola Vasquez-Hernandez, and her granddaughter, E.I.G-E. (collectively, Petitioners), all natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) order denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. Where the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions. Hernandez v. Garland, 38 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022). We review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal questions de novo. Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020). When reviewing factual findings, we may not reverse unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Singh v. Bondi, 130 F.4th 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2025). 1 The daughter and granddaughter also filed their own application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The BIA did not address the childrens’ applications separately, and no distinct arguments about their applications are raised by Hernandez-Caal. We therefore analyze only Hernandez-Caal’s petition. To the extent that the children seek review of their claims, they have forfeited those challenges by failing to develop independent arguments in their opening brief. See Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022) (arguments that are not meaningfully developed in a petitioner’s opening brief are forfeited). 2 25-6995 1. We limit our review to Hernandez-Caal’s proposed particular social group (PSG) of “Guatemalan women and girls.”2 Hernandez-Caal forfeited any challenge to the BIA’s determination that her proposed PSG of “Guatemalan woman and girls” is not cognizable. The BIA addressed cognizability as a separate, independent ground from its analysis on nexus. Here, Hernandez-Caal’s opening brief challenges nexus but does not contest that the PSG of “Guatemalan woman and girls” is not cognizable. Although she raises the challenge in her reply brief, we decline to consider that belated argument. See Hernandez, 47 F.4th at 916; Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020). 2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection to Hernandez-Caal. A CAT applicant must establish that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed” and that the torture would occur with the consent or acquiescence of a public official. Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)); Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003). The agency must consider all relevant evidence, including past torture, the possibility of relocation, and country conditions. See 2 Hernandez-Caal does not challenge the IJ’s determination that her PSGs of “Guatemalan single mothers” and “Guatemalan female domestic violence survivors” are not cognizable in this petition. Hernandez-Caal also does not challenge the IJ’s nexus determination with respect to her family-based PSG of “immediate family of Christian Joel Enriquez Hernandez.” 3 25-6995 Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). The BIA acknowledged Hernandez-Caal’s rape and the absence of subsequent harm during several years in Guatemala and affirmed the IJ’s aggregate-risk analysis. Even assuming Hernandez-Caal’s past harm constituted torture, there is no presumption of future torture under CAT. See Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 705 (9th Cir. 2022). The BIA found no clear probability of future torture based on (1) the absence of continued threats from Moises; (2) the lack of harm to family members who have remained in Guatemala; and (3) the IJ’s finding that Hernandez-Caal could relocate to avoid Moises and her uncle, Miguel. The BIA also noted that Hernandez-Caal remained in Guatemala for several years after her son’s murder and her rape without suffering additional harm from those sources. Although Hernandez-Caal argues that Moises’s affiliation with Barrio 18 undermines relocation given its national reach, the IJ considered and rejected that risk, observing that Hernandez-Caal went four or five months living in Guatemala without problems from Moises. The record does not show the agency overlooked material evidence. Because the record does not compel a contrary conclusion as to the likelihood of future torture, we need not reach the issue of public official consent or acquiescence. 4 25-6995 The motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 3) is denied. PETITION DENIED. 5 25-6995