Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LILIANA DOS SANTOS; M.L.D.S., No. 25-7027 Agency Nos. Petitioners, A240-422-840 A240-422-841 v. TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 18, 2026** Seattle, Washington Before: McKEOWN, W. FLETCHER, and DESAI, Circuit Judges. Liliana Dos Santos and her minor child M.L.D.S. (“petitioners”) seek review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. We review the IJ’s decision because the BIA affirmed it without opinion. See Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2009). The IJ found that Dos Santos “testified credibly,” and thus we accept Dos Santos’s testimony as true. See Corpeno-Romero v. Garland, 120 F.4th 570, 575 (9th Cir. 2024). We review the IJ’s factual findings “under the deferential substantial evidence standard.” Ai Jun Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014). 1. Substantial evidence does not compel a finding that petitioners suffered past persecution. See Corpeno-Romero, 120 F.4th at 570, 577. Persecution is an “extreme concept,” and not every instance of mistreatment qualifies. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021). Here, Dos Santos testified that a member of her church in Angola confronted her and threatened to kill her because her father is Congolese. Credible death threats alone can constitute persecution, but they do so “only when [they] are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). Even if a reasonable factfinder could determine that the isolated threat made against Dos Santos constituted persecution, the record evidence does not compel that finding. See, e.g., Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1063–64 (upholding the BIA’s finding of no past persecution where petitioner was physically abused and threatened during an eighteen-to-nineteen-hour detention). 2 2. Substantial evidence also does not compel a finding that petitioners’ fear of future persecution is objectively reasonable. See Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1991). Dos Santos testified that the “only reason” why she fears returning to Angola is that “the church is still active.” And the IJ noted that the lone death threat made against Dos Santos was approximately twelve years old, that there was no evidence that the church member who made the threat “ha[d] any continuing interest in” Dos Santos, and that many members of Dos Santos’s family—her father, three siblings, and five children—remain in Angola and have not reported any harm or persecution since 2012. The IJ therefore deemed petitioners’ evidence too speculative to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. See Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Petitioners argue that the IJ improperly considered the passage of time and the status of petitioners’ family members, and that the IJ failed to consider all protected grounds on which petitioners sought asylum. But the question here is whether petitioners’ evidence is “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of [future] persecution.” Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 545 (2026) (citation modified). Petitioners do not make this showing. Lastly, petitioners argue that the IJ failed to develop the record, which is required when an individual proceeds pro se. See Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “it is the IJ’s duty to fully develop the record” 3 (citation modified)). But the IJ did so here by eliciting substantial testimony from Dos Santos, which the IJ subsequently deemed credible. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2010). And notably, petitioners point to no country conditions evidence, nor do they explain how such evidence would change the IJ’s analysis. See id. (discussing a petitioner’s burden). 3. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s denial of petitioners’ CAT claim. To receive CAT protection, a petitioner must show that she would more likely than not face torture by or with the acquiescence of the government if she were removed to the proposed country of removal. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). Dos Santos testified that she “had no problem[s] with the police in Angola” or with the Angolan government. She likewise testified that M.L.D.S. had no “problems in Brazil.” Accordingly, the IJ found that petitioners were not tortured and that there was no evidence that the Angolan or Brazilian government would instigate or consent or acquiesce to petitioners’ torture. See Sinha, 564 F.3d at 1026. The petition is DENIED.1 1 Petitioners’ motion to stay removal, Dkt. No. 3, is denied, and the temporary stay of removal is lifted. 4