Dos Santos v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-7027
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LILIANA DOS SANTOS; M.L.D.S., No. 25-7027
Agency Nos.
Petitioners, A240-422-840
A240-422-841
v.
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 18, 2026**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, W. FLETCHER, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.
Liliana Dos Santos and her minor child M.L.D.S. (“petitioners”) seek review
of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the immigration
judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
We review the IJ’s decision because the BIA affirmed it without opinion. See
Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2009). The IJ found that Dos
Santos “testified credibly,” and thus we accept Dos Santos’s testimony as true. See
Corpeno-Romero v. Garland, 120 F.4th 570, 575 (9th Cir. 2024). We review the IJ’s
factual findings “under the deferential substantial evidence standard.” Ai Jun Zhi v.
Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014).
1. Substantial evidence does not compel a finding that petitioners suffered
past persecution. See Corpeno-Romero, 120 F.4th at 570, 577. Persecution is an
“extreme concept,” and not every instance of mistreatment qualifies. Sharma v.
Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021). Here, Dos Santos testified that a
member of her church in Angola confronted her and threatened to kill her because
her father is Congolese. Credible death threats alone can constitute persecution, but
they do so “only when [they] are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering
or harm.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation
modified). Even if a reasonable factfinder could determine that the isolated threat
made against Dos Santos constituted persecution, the record evidence does not
compel that finding. See, e.g., Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1063–64 (upholding the BIA’s
finding of no past persecution where petitioner was physically abused and threatened
during an eighteen-to-nineteen-hour detention).
2
2. Substantial evidence also does not compel a finding that petitioners’
fear of future persecution is objectively reasonable. See Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS,
937 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1991). Dos Santos testified that the “only reason” why
she fears returning to Angola is that “the church is still active.” And the IJ noted that
the lone death threat made against Dos Santos was approximately twelve years old,
that there was no evidence that the church member who made the threat “ha[d] any
continuing interest in” Dos Santos, and that many members of Dos Santos’s
family—her father, three siblings, and five children—remain in Angola and have not
reported any harm or persecution since 2012. The IJ therefore deemed petitioners’
evidence too speculative to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future
persecution. See Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999).
Petitioners argue that the IJ improperly considered the passage of time and the
status of petitioners’ family members, and that the IJ failed to consider all protected
grounds on which petitioners sought asylum. But the question here is whether
petitioners’ evidence is “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to
find the requisite fear of [future] persecution.” Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S.
537, 545 (2026) (citation modified). Petitioners do not make this showing.
Lastly, petitioners argue that the IJ failed to develop the record, which is
required when an individual proceeds pro se. See Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871,
877 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “it is the IJ’s duty to fully develop the record”
3
(citation modified)). But the IJ did so here by eliciting substantial testimony from
Dos Santos, which the IJ subsequently deemed credible. See Zetino v. Holder, 622
F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2010). And notably, petitioners point to no country
conditions evidence, nor do they explain how such evidence would change the IJ’s
analysis. See id. (discussing a petitioner’s burden).
3. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s denial of petitioners’ CAT claim.
To receive CAT protection, a petitioner must show that she would more likely than
not face torture by or with the acquiescence of the government if she were removed
to the proposed country of removal. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1).
Dos Santos testified that she “had no problem[s] with the police in Angola” or with
the Angolan government. She likewise testified that M.L.D.S. had no “problems in
Brazil.” Accordingly, the IJ found that petitioners were not tortured and that there
was no evidence that the Angolan or Brazilian government would instigate or
consent or acquiesce to petitioners’ torture. See Sinha, 564 F.3d at 1026.
The petition is DENIED.1
1
Petitioners’ motion to stay removal, Dkt. No. 3, is denied, and the temporary
stay of removal is lifted.
4