Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOSE DAVID HERNANDEZ No. 24-3704 RODRIGUEZ; et al., Agency Nos. A220-554-403 Petitioners, A220-554-404 A220-554-405 v. A220-554-406 TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 18, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: S.R. THOMAS, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. Jose David Hernandez Rodriguez (“Hernandez”), Eva Sarai Galo Robles, K.N.H.G., and L.C.H.G. (collectively, “petitioners”), natives and citizens of Honduras, petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). dismissing their appeal of an immigration judge’s (IJ) order denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). “When, as here, the BIA conducts an independent review of the IJ’s findings, this court reviews the BIA’s decision and not that of the IJ.” Valadez-Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1307–08 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Poblete Mendoza v. Holder, 606 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010)). We review the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief for substantial evidence. Duran- Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). “Under this standard, we must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Id. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. 1. Petitioners claim that the agency’s failure to consider the individual applications of Robles, K.N.H.G., and L.C.H.G. violated their due process rights. However, petitioners never raised this alleged due process violation before the BIA. As a result, their claim is unexhausted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Because exhaustion is a claims-processing rule that must be enforced if the government properly raises it, we could not grant relief on this issue. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). Regardless, petitioners’ due process claim would fail. Robles, K.N.H.G., and L.C.H.G. raised no independent grounds 2 for relief and based their applications on the facts and claims asserted by Hernandez.1 2. Substantial evidence supports the denial of asylum and withholding of removal. To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner “has the burden to demonstrate a likelihood of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, Hernandez must “prove that it is more likely than not” that he will be persecuted in Honduras “because of” membership in a particular social group or another protected ground. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357, 360 (9th Cir. 2017); see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). “One way to satisfy this burden is by showing past persecution, which gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution.” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1060. “Proving past persecution requires the petitioner to show, among other elements, that ‘his treatment rises to the level of persecution.’” Id. (quoting Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 645 (9th Cir. 2021)). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Hernandez’s past harm did not rise to the level of persecution. “Persecution . . . is an extreme concept that means something considerably more than discrimination or harassment.” Id. (quoting Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1 For this reason, we will generally refer to Hernandez in this decision. 3 2009)). Hernandez did not suffer significant physical injuries in his altercation with Officer Herrera, and Herrera’s single death threat did not lead to physical harm. See id. at 1061 (“We have repeatedly denied petitions for review when, among other factors, the record did not demonstrate significant physical harm.”); id. at 1062 (noting that “[w]e have been most likely to find persecution where threats are repeated, specific and combined with confrontation or other mistreatment” (quoting Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028)); Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028 (explaining that although “credible death threats alone can constitute persecution,” they do so “in only a small category of cases, and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm” (citation modified)). Further, substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that petitioners did not establish that the police were responsible for burglarizing Hernandez’s home and vandalizing his car. And the record confirms that the agency considered petitioners’ past harm on a cumulative basis. In short, although petitioners’ experience in Honduras was unfortunate, the record does not compel the conclusion that it rises to the level of persecution. Because Hernandez failed to establish past persecution, petitioners were not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1060. Here, the agency did not err in concluding that petitioners failed to establish “an objectively reasonable possibility of persecution upon return 4 to the country in question.” Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029 (citation modified). The agency could conclude that police patrols near the residence of Hernandez’s father do not demonstrate that police are looking for petitioners. Nor have petitioners provided evidence that police in Honduras are otherwise interested in them. The country conditions reports submitted by petitioners are not particular to their situations and do not compel the conclusion that they face a well-founded fear of future persecution in Honduras. And because petitioners have not established such a well-founded fear, “it necessarily follows that [they] ha[ve] not established eligibility for withholding” of removal. Id. 3. Petitioners do not challenge the agency’s determination that they are ineligible for CAT protection. Accordingly, they have forfeited any challenge to the denial of CAT relief. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022) (arguments not raised in opening brief are forfeited). PETITION DENIED.2 2 Petitioners’ motion to stay removal, Dkt. 2, is denied. 5