Hernandez-Rodriguez v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket24-3704
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE DAVID HERNANDEZ No. 24-3704
RODRIGUEZ; et al., Agency Nos.
A220-554-403
Petitioners, A220-554-404
A220-554-405
v.
A220-554-406
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 18, 2026**
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Jose David Hernandez Rodriguez (“Hernandez”), Eva Sarai Galo Robles,
K.N.H.G., and L.C.H.G. (collectively, “petitioners”), natives and citizens of
Honduras, petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissing their appeal of an immigration judge’s (IJ) order denying their
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT). “When, as here, the BIA conducts an independent review
of the IJ’s findings, this court reviews the BIA’s decision and not that of the IJ.”
Valadez-Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1307–08 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Poblete
Mendoza v. Holder, 606 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010)). We review the denial of
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief for substantial evidence. Duran-
Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). “Under this standard, we
must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary
conclusion.” Id. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the
petition.
1. Petitioners claim that the agency’s failure to consider the individual
applications of Robles, K.N.H.G., and L.C.H.G. violated their due process rights.
However, petitioners never raised this alleged due process violation before the BIA.
As a result, their claim is unexhausted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Because
exhaustion is a claims-processing rule that must be enforced if the government
properly raises it, we could not grant relief on this issue. See Umana-Escobar v.
Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). Regardless, petitioners’ due process
claim would fail. Robles, K.N.H.G., and L.C.H.G. raised no independent grounds
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for relief and based their applications on the facts and claims asserted by Hernandez.1
2. Substantial evidence supports the denial of asylum and withholding of
removal. To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner “has the burden to demonstrate a
likelihood of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’”
Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, Hernandez
must “prove that it is more likely than not” that he will be persecuted in Honduras
“because of” membership in a particular social group or another protected ground.
Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357, 360 (9th Cir. 2017); see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A). “One way to satisfy this burden is by showing past persecution,
which gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution.” Sharma, 9 F.4th
at 1060. “Proving past persecution requires the petitioner to show, among other
elements, that ‘his treatment rises to the level of persecution.’” Id. (quoting Hussain
v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 645 (9th Cir. 2021)).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Hernandez’s
past harm did not rise to the level of persecution. “Persecution . . . is an extreme
concept that means something considerably more than discrimination or
harassment.” Id. (quoting Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.
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For this reason, we will generally refer to Hernandez in this decision.
3
2009)). Hernandez did not suffer significant physical injuries in his altercation with
Officer Herrera, and Herrera’s single death threat did not lead to physical harm. See
id. at 1061 (“We have repeatedly denied petitions for review when, among other
factors, the record did not demonstrate significant physical harm.”); id. at 1062
(noting that “[w]e have been most likely to find persecution where threats are
repeated, specific and combined with confrontation or other mistreatment” (quoting
Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028)); Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028
(explaining that although “credible death threats alone can constitute persecution,”
they do so “in only a small category of cases, and only when the threats are so
menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm” (citation modified)).
Further, substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that petitioners
did not establish that the police were responsible for burglarizing Hernandez’s home
and vandalizing his car. And the record confirms that the agency considered
petitioners’ past harm on a cumulative basis. In short, although petitioners’
experience in Honduras was unfortunate, the record does not compel the conclusion
that it rises to the level of persecution.
Because Hernandez failed to establish past persecution, petitioners were not
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1060. Here, the agency did not err in concluding that petitioners
failed to establish “an objectively reasonable possibility of persecution upon return
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to the country in question.” Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029 (citation modified).
The agency could conclude that police patrols near the residence of Hernandez’s
father do not demonstrate that police are looking for petitioners. Nor have
petitioners provided evidence that police in Honduras are otherwise interested in
them. The country conditions reports submitted by petitioners are not particular to
their situations and do not compel the conclusion that they face a well-founded fear
of future persecution in Honduras. And because petitioners have not established
such a well-founded fear, “it necessarily follows that [they] ha[ve] not established
eligibility for withholding” of removal. Id.
3. Petitioners do not challenge the agency’s determination that they are
ineligible for CAT protection. Accordingly, they have forfeited any challenge to the
denial of CAT relief. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir.
2022) (arguments not raised in opening brief are forfeited).
PETITION DENIED.2
2
Petitioners’ motion to stay removal, Dkt. 2, is denied.
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