Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 5 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DIETZ ANDERSON VEGA-CASTILLO; No. 25-3847 LUCERO ARACELY LOVERA-REYES; Agency Nos. A. M. V.-L.; Y. A. V.-L., A246-285-169 A246-285-164 Petitioners, A246-285-170 A246-285-171 v. TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 29, 2026** Seattle, Washington Before: CHRISTEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and SYKES, District Judge.*** Dietz Anderson Vega-Castillo, Lucero Aracely Lovera-Reyes, A.M.V.-L., and Y.A.V.-L., natives and citizens of Peru, seek review of a decision of the Board * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sunshine Suzanne Sykes, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. Where the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions. Hernandez v. Garland, 38 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022). We review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal questions de novo. Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020). Under the substantial-evidence standard, we may not reverse the Board’s factual determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Singh v. Bondi, 130 F.4th 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2025). 1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Vega-Castillo did not establish a nexus between his fear of persecution and his proposed particular social group (PSG) of “Peruvian citizens who oppose criminal organizations.” Both asylum and withholding of removal require an applicant to show that his past or feared persecution bears a nexus to a protected ground. Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2021). For asylum, a protected ground must be “one central reason,” and for withholding of removal, “a reason,” for the 1 Vega-Castillo, Lovera-Reyes, A.M.V.-L., and Y.A.V.-L. each separately applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. A.M.V-L. and Y.A.V.-L. are listed as derivative beneficiaries to Dietz’s and Lovera-Reyes’s application. 2 25-3847 persecution. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(C)) (emphasis omitted). Vega-Castillo testified that unknown extortionists threatened him and his family for money because he was earning a big salary from his job, and although the threats escalated, the record does not compel a conclusion contrary to the agency’s finding that Vega-Castillo’s persecutors were “motivated solely by financial gain.” Because the absence of a nexus to a protected ground is dispositive of his asylum and withholding of removal claims, we need not reach Vega-Castillo’s remaining arguments. See Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 2020). 2. Lovera-Reyes, A.M.V-L., and Y.A.V-L. did not challenge the IJ’s finding that they failed to establish a nexus between their fear of persecution and their proposed PSGs of “immediate relatives of Dietz Anderson Vega-Castillo” and “Peruvian citizens who oppose criminal organizations.” Because they failed to exhaust any nexus challenge, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), we decline to consider this argument, Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). Accordingly, we need not reach their remaining arguments. See Nguyen, 983 F.3d at 1104. 3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection. To obtain CAT relief, a petitioner must establish that “it is more likely than not that he 3 25-3847 or she would be tortured if removed,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2), and that the torture would be “inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official” or other person acting in an official capacity, id. § 1208.18(a)(1). Even assuming Vega-Castillo will more likely than not be tortured upon return to Peru, the record does not compel the conclusion that public officials would acquiesce in that torture. While the record reflects “some” government complicity in organized crime, it shows that the Peruvian government is taking, if imperfect, affirmative steps to combat such activity. See Del Cid Marroquin v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1035 (9th Cir. 2014). The IJ’s and BIA’s CAT analysis addressed only Vega-Castillo’s application. To the extent Lovera-Reyes’s CAT claim was raised to the BIA, any such arguments were forfeited in this court when not argued in the opening brief. Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (9th Cir. 1996). The motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 2) is denied. PETITION DENIED. 4 25-3847