Degueros-Mota v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-2769
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NOV 20 2026
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANGEL DIDIER DEGUEROS-MOTA, No. 25-2769
Petitioner, Agency No.
A098-571-475
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Department of Homeland Security
Submitted November 17, 2026**
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Angel Didier Degueros-Mota petitions for review of a Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) order reinstating his prior removal order under 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). Because the parties are familiar with the facts and history of
this case, we need not recount them here. We deny the petition for review.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We have jurisdiction to review reinstatement orders under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1). Ixcot v. Holder, 646 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011). In a petition
for review of a reinstatement order, we review legal questions de novo and any
factual findings for substantial evidence. Tomczyk v. Garland, 25 F.4th 638, 643
(9th Cir. 2022) (en banc). Under the substantial evidence standard, “we must
uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary
conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). “Our
consideration of the petition is limited to the administrative record and ‘confirming
the agency’s compliance with the reinstatement regulations.’” Tomczyk, 25 F.4th at
643 (quoting Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1137
(9th Cir. 2008)).
I
DHS did not fail to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a)(1), as Degueros-Mota
contends. Under § 241.8(a)(1), the immigration officer only needed to make a
“narrow and mechanical determination[]” that Degueros-Mota was an alien who
was subject to a prior order. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 496
(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The record of Degueros-Mota’s proceedings shows that
DHS had his prior removal order on file. After DHS apprehended Degueros-Mota,
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an immigration officer conducted a search of the agency’s records. The search
revealed that Degueros-Mota was subject to a previous removal order from January
19, 2005 and that he was removed on January 20, 2005. Thus, substantial evidence
supports DHS’s finding that Degueros-Mota has been subject to a prior order of
removal in accordance with § 241.8(a)(1).
II
DHS did not unreasonably determine that Degueros-Mota had unlawfully
reentered the United States within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a)(3).
Degueros-Mota argues that DHS did not specify the “manner” of his reentry. But
§ 241.8(a)(3) requires only a “narrow and mechanical determination[]” by the
immigration officer as to whether the previously deported individual unlawfully
reentered the United States. Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 496. Accordingly,
Degueros-Mota’s contention that DHS did not identify the manner of his reentry is
unavailing. Degueros-Mota does not claim that he had valid authorization at the
time of his reentry. The record does not contain any indication that Degueros-Mota
“applied for, let alone received, a waiver of inadmissibility” between his
deportation in January 2005 and his reentry later that year. Tomczyk, 25 F.4th at
644–45. Despite being given the opportunity, Degueros-Mota did not make any
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statements or provide any evidence to DHS supporting lawful reentry. Thus, DHS
did not err in reinstating his removal order on this basis.
III
Our precedent forecloses Degueros-Mota’s contention that he did not
unlawfully reenter because he was “waved through” by a border agent. Tomczyk,
25 F.4th at 641–42. DHS did not err in finding that Degueros-Mota unlawfully
reentered the United States after being removed.
IV
Degueros-Mota also raises “procedural defects in [his] particular case[].”
Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 496. In support of his due process claim, Degueros-
Mota argues that he could not effectively challenge the factual predicates of his
reinstatement because he was criminally charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (illegal
reentry) at the time, that DHS failed to consider the subsequent dismissal of this
charge, and that the government improperly removed him to Mexico after he filed a
petition for review with this Court.
As a predicate to obtaining relief for “a violation of procedural due process
rights in immigration proceedings,” the noncitizen “must show that the violation
prejudiced him.” Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 495 (quoting Padilla v. Ashcroft,
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334 F.3d 921, 924–25 (9th Cir. 2003)). To show prejudice, the noncitizen must
present “plausible scenarios in which the outcome of the proceedings would have
been different” had there been a more “elaborate” process. Id. (quoting Walters v.
Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Degueros-Mota fails to establish prejudice. He does not explain how the
outcome of his reinstatement proceedings was affected by the agency’s purported
errors. For instance, he does not identify how his status as a defendant in the
criminal illegal reentry case or his premature removal to Mexico affected his
reinstatement proceedings. Id. Nor does he identify any evidence he would have
presented to support the argument that his reentry was lawful, had DHS waited for
his criminal proceedings to conclude. See Padilla, 334 F.3d at 924–25 (observing
that an alien must demonstrate a plausible ground for relief to establish prejudice).
In sum, Degueros-Mota “makes no allegation” that he could have credibly
challenged the factual predicates for his reinstatement (i.e., he is an alien, who was
subject to a prior removal order, who unlawfully reentered the country) absent the
agency’s purported procedural errors. Tamayo-Tamayo v. Holder, 725 F.3d 950,
954 (9th Cir. 2013); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a). Consequently, Degueros-Mota has not
demonstrated any prejudice. As such, his due process claim fails.
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PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.1
1
Degueros-Mota’s motion to stay removal, Dkt No. 2, is denied. Degueros-
Mota’s motions for injunctive relief, Dkt. No. 6, and to supplement the record, Dkt.
No. 35, are denied as moot.
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