Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DANIEL AVILA-MEDINA, No. 24-520 Agency No. Petitioner, A206-453-654 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 16, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: FRIEDLAND, BENNETT, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. Petitioner, Daniel Avila-Medina, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings and of the underlying denial of cancellation of removal. Both were denied on the ground that Petitioner failed to show that his “removal would * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his four U.S.-citizen children. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review final orders, including denials of cancellation of removal and motions to reopen. See Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 217 (2024); Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 250 (2010). Petitioner only timely petitioned for review of the BIA’s 2024 denial of the motion to reopen. But Petitioner does not provide us with any arguments challenging the BIA’s decision regarding the motion to reopen. “Issues . . . not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.” Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Singh v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1152, 1157 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004). Turning to the underlying 2021 denial of cancellation of removal, a timely petition for review of a motion to reopen does not permit us to review the underlying decision. See Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 428–29 (2023); Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1995), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 276 (2025). Petitioner failed to provide us with any arguments in his opening brief as to why we could review the 2021 decision. The government then responded with a motion for summary disposition, asserting, in part, that the petition was untimely and thus not properly before us. Only then did Petitioner, in response, make any arguments as to the basis for our review of the 2021 decision. 2 24-520 Although we have “discretion to review an issue not raised by appellant . . . when it is raised in the appellee’s brief,” Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation modified), Petitioner has not provided us with any arguments for why such discretion is warranted here. Petitioner confines his arguments to explaining why the appeal was timely in the first instance but offers no justification for his failure to raise those arguments in the opening brief or any basis for excusing his forfeiture. Furthermore, although we have recognized an exception to the ordinary forfeiture rule when an intervening change in the law excuses a party’s failure to raise an argument, Armstrong v. Brown, 768 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 667 F.3d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 2012)), the circumstances here do not warrant application of that exception. When Petitioner filed his opening brief in August 2024, the Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. Garland already held that the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard is a mixed question of law and fact over which we have jurisdiction. 601 U.S. at 212. Separately, we held that § 1252(b)(1)’s filing deadline is non-jurisdictional and expressly left open the possibility that equitable tolling could apply. See Alonso-Juarez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1039, 1047 n.3 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Though the parties dispute whether § 1252(b)(1) is subject to equitable tolling if it is a non-jurisdictional rule, we need not and do not decide that dispute today because 3 24-520 Alonso’s petition was timely absent any tolling.”), abrogated on other grounds by Riley, 606 U.S. 259. So at the time of Petitioner’s opening brief, whether we could excuse Petitioner’s untimeliness in seeking review of the 2021 decision due to an intervening change in law was an open question that Petitioner was free to argue. Accordingly, Petitioner’s failure to raise that argument at that time forfeited it.1 See Singh, 361 F.3d at 1157 n.3. PETITION DENIED. 1 We also note that even if we could review the underlying decision that removal would not result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to Petitioner’s four U.S.-citizen children, substantial evidence supports that determination. See Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025). Because the BIA summarily affirmed the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), we would look through to the IJ’s decision. Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the IJ cumulatively weighed all relevant evidence including the children’s medical histories and ages, their relationships with the Petitioner, the financial circumstances of the households, and the assistance potentially available to Petitioner’s children after his removal. 4 24-520