Avila-Medina v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket24-520
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 18 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL AVILA-MEDINA, No. 24-520
Agency No.
Petitioner, A206-453-654
v. MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 16, 2026**
San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND, BENNETT, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner, Daniel Avila-Medina, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review
of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen
removal proceedings and of the underlying denial of cancellation of removal. Both
were denied on the ground that Petitioner failed to show that his “removal would
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his four U.S.-citizen
children. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review final orders, including
denials of cancellation of removal and motions to reopen. See Wilkinson v. Garland,
601 U.S. 209, 217 (2024); Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 250 (2010). Petitioner
only timely petitioned for review of the BIA’s 2024 denial of the motion to reopen.
But Petitioner does not provide us with any arguments challenging the BIA’s
decision regarding the motion to reopen. “Issues . . . not supported by argument are
deemed abandoned.” Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996);
see also Singh v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1152, 1157 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004).
Turning to the underlying 2021 denial of cancellation of removal, a timely
petition for review of a motion to reopen does not permit us to review the underlying
decision. See Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 428–29 (2023); Stone v.
INS, 514 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1995), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by
Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 276 (2025). Petitioner failed to provide us with any
arguments in his opening brief as to why we could review the 2021 decision. The
government then responded with a motion for summary disposition, asserting, in
part, that the petition was untimely and thus not properly before us. Only then did
Petitioner, in response, make any arguments as to the basis for our review of the
2021 decision.
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Although we have “discretion to review an issue not raised by
appellant . . . when it is raised in the appellee’s brief,” Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d
1039, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation modified), Petitioner has not provided us
with any arguments for why such discretion is warranted here. Petitioner confines
his arguments to explaining why the appeal was timely in the first instance but offers
no justification for his failure to raise those arguments in the opening brief or any
basis for excusing his forfeiture.
Furthermore, although we have recognized an exception to the ordinary
forfeiture rule when an intervening change in the law excuses a party’s failure to
raise an argument, Armstrong v. Brown, 768 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing
Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 667 F.3d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 2012)), the
circumstances here do not warrant application of that exception.
When Petitioner filed his opening brief in August 2024, the Supreme Court in
Wilkinson v. Garland already held that the exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship standard is a mixed question of law and fact over which we have
jurisdiction. 601 U.S. at 212. Separately, we held that § 1252(b)(1)’s filing deadline
is non-jurisdictional and expressly left open the possibility that equitable tolling
could apply. See Alonso-Juarez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1039, 1047 n.3 (9th Cir. 2023)
(“Though the parties dispute whether § 1252(b)(1) is subject to equitable tolling if it
is a non-jurisdictional rule, we need not and do not decide that dispute today because
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Alonso’s petition was timely absent any tolling.”), abrogated on other grounds by
Riley, 606 U.S. 259. So at the time of Petitioner’s opening brief, whether we could
excuse Petitioner’s untimeliness in seeking review of the 2021 decision due to an
intervening change in law was an open question that Petitioner was free to argue.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s failure to raise that argument at that time forfeited it.1 See
Singh, 361 F.3d at 1157 n.3.
PETITION DENIED.
1
We also note that even if we could review the underlying decision that
removal would not result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to
Petitioner’s four U.S.-citizen children, substantial evidence supports that
determination. See Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025).
Because the BIA summarily affirmed the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), we would look
through to the IJ’s decision. Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 925 (9th Cir. 2004).
Here, the IJ cumulatively weighed all relevant evidence including the children’s
medical histories and ages, their relationships with the Petitioner, the financial
circumstances of the households, and the assistance potentially available to
Petitioner’s children after his removal.
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