Mbueno-Vita v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledAugust 28, 2026
Docket24-5472
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOAO MBUENO-VITA; MENGUI No. 24-5472
ANIANCE; A.K.V.; C.M.V.,
Agency Nos.
A241-711-547
Petitioners,
A241-711-548
A241-711-549
v.
A241-711-550
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney
General, OPINION
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 21, 2025
Seattle, Washington
Filed August 28, 2026
Before: William A. Fletcher, Richard A. Paez, and Roopali
H. Desai, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Paez
2 MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE
SUMMARY*
Immigration
Granting Joao Mbueno-Vita’s petition for review of a
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals that dismissed
his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), the panel held that the
agency’s adverse credibility determination was not
supported by substantial evidence and that the agency
committed reversible legal error in denying CAT relief.
Mbueno-Vita recounted that he was a member of
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(“UNITA”), a national political party that opposes the
current ruling party in Angola. He alleged that, on multiple
occasions, the Angolan police and military harmed him
because of his political activism.
The panel concluded that none of the four adverse
credibility grounds relied upon by the agency was supported
by substantial evidence. Rather, the agency improperly
relied on trivial perceived inconsistencies regarding an
instance when Mbueno-Vita was injured by police during a
protest and when he was detained by the Angolan military
and tortured for two days. The credibility determination was
further undermined by the frequent translation difficulties
and disjointed English interpretation evident in the hearing
transcripts. The panel concluded that Mbueno-Vita’s
apparent unresponsiveness could not support an adverse
*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE 3
credibility determination where Mbueno-Vita plainly did not
understand the questions to which he was meant to respond.
As to the denial of CAT relief, the panel also concluded
that the agency committed legal errors regarding Mbueno-
Vita’s particularized risk of torture and ability to internally
relocate.
The panel therefore granted Mbueno-Vita’s petition and
remanded for further proceedings, accepting Mbueno-Vita’s
testimony as credible, to determine his eligibility for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief.
COUNSEL
Corrine Cole (argued), Law Offices of Corrine Cole PLLC,
Seattle, Washington, for Petitioners.
Raya Jarawan (argued), Trial Attorney; Anthony C. Payne
and Jeffery R. Leist, Senior Litigation Counsel; Office of
Immigration Litigation, Civil Division; Yaakov M. Roth,
Acting Assistant Attorney General; United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
4 MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE
OPINION
PAEZ, Circuit Judge:
Joao Mbueno-Vita, his wife Mengui Aniance, and their
two minor children, natives and citizens of Angola, entered
the United States without inspection in September 2022.
Mbueno-Vita applied for asylum in March 2023, citing
persecution on account of his political opinion and his
membership in the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (“UNITA”). The Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) found Mbueno-Vita not credible and denied his
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed and dismissed the
appeal.
We hold that the agency’s adverse credibility
determination is not supported by substantial evidence
because the agency improperly relied on trivial
inconsistencies and disregarded significant translation
difficulties during the merits hearing. We also hold that the
agency committed reversible legal error in denying CAT.
We therefore grant Mbueno-Vita’s petition for review,
reverse the agency’s adverse credibility finding, and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1
1
In his opening brief, Mbueno-Vita argues that the IJ violated his due
process rights by failing to “fully develop the record” on behalf of a pro
se petitioner. See Zamorano v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1213 (9th Cir. 2021).
Even assuming the IJ erred by failing to call Aniance as a witness to
clarify a purported inconsistency, Mbueno-Vita was not prejudiced by
the error. The inconsistency between Mbueno-Vita’s testimony
regarding the 2019 protest and Aniance’s description in her Form I-589
was only one of numerous factors the IJ weighed in finding Mbueno-
MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE 5
I. Background
In his proceeding before the agency, Mbueno-Vita
recounted the following. He was a member of UNITA, a
national political party that opposes the current ruling party
in Angola, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (“MPLA”). On multiple occasions, the Angolan
police and military harmed him because of his political
activism.
On June 14, 2019, Mbueno-Vita attended a rally that
called for the recognition and legalization of the Angolan
Renaissance Party (“PRA-JA”) as a national political party.
After the rally ended, Mbueno-Vita boarded a bus with other
rally attendees to return to their respective homes. En route
home, the bus was stopped by Angolan police. The police
began firing their weapons at the rally attendees, killing at
least two people. As Mbueno-Vita attempted to exit the bus,
a police officer hit him in the back of his right leg with a
rifle. Mbueno-Vita sought medical attention for his injury.
Following this incident, Mbueno-Vita continued to engage
in political activity and attended two additional rallies in
support of PRA-JA and the broader coalition of opposition
parties.
On May 8, 2021, Mbueno-Vita participated in his fourth
rally opposing the Angolan government, where he was tear-
Vita not credible. Mbueno-Vita thus fails to establish that the “outcome
of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Zia
v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation modified).
We decline to address Mbueno-Vita’s remaining due process
arguments—they are either unexhausted because he failed to raise them
before the BIA, see Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2020), or
forfeited because he fails to raise them in his opening brief, see Castro-
Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).
6 MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE
gassed and arrested by the Angolan military along with
approximately twenty other people. Mbueno-Vita was then
loaded onto a truck and transported to an unofficial police
compound. At this “black site,” Mbueno-Vita was tortured
for two days. Officers beat him and walked and stomped on
him until he had difficulty breathing. One of the detainees
died during this time and others were badly injured. Before
the police released Mbueno-Vita, they warned him and the
other detainees that if they told anyone about the death of the
man in detention, they would also be killed.
Despite this threat, Mbueno-Vita publicly denounced the
death of the man at the “black site” shortly after his release.
In October 2021, Angolan military personnel came to
Mbueno-Vita’s home but left when they saw his neighbors
outside. Later that night, the military personnel went to
another man’s home in the neighborhood who they believed
had also revealed details of the imprisonment and death. The
military personnel killed that man and raped his wife.
When Mbueno-Vita learned of the other man’s murder,
he went into hiding. He lived in a church, which he would
leave only occasionally to see his family. After over five
months in hiding, Mbueno-Vita and his family fled to
Kanfufu in the Luanda Norte province of Angola. He
remained in hiding in Kanfufu with his family for another
four months until they were able to leave Angola in June
2022. They entered the United States in September 2022.
With the assistance of pro bono counsel, Mbueno-Vita
and his family timely filed their application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Mbueno-Vita
appeared pro se at both of his merits hearings. Mbueno-Vita
was the only person to testify during the proceeding,
MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE 7
although his wife Aniance was present in the courtroom for
both hearings.
The IJ denied Mbueno-Vita’s application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The IJ made
an initial adverse credibility determination based on four
distinct grounds, and found that Mbueno-Vita’s
corroborating evidence did not rehabilitate his incredible
testimony. The IJ denied CAT protection because Mbueno-
Vita’s claim was “primarily based upon testimony” that he
found not credible and because the record did not contain
sufficient evidence to establish a particularized risk of
torture independent of his incredible testimony. The IJ also
determined that Mbueno-Vita could internally relocate to
avoid any future harm.
Citing the same rationales as the IJ, the BIA dismissed
Mbueno-Vita’s appeal. The BIA affirmed that Mbueno-Vita
did not provide credible testimony and concluded that the
IJ’s findings were “based on specific and cogent reasons
supported by the record.” The BIA also concluded that,
notwithstanding the adverse credibility determination, the
record lacked sufficient evidence that Mbueno-Vita faced a
particularized risk of torture and indicated that internal
relocation was possible. Mbueno-Vita timely appealed.2
II. Standard of Review
“Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision and
also contributes its own reasoning to the analysis, we review
both decisions.” Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th
Cir. 2014). We review factual determinations, including
adverse credibility decisions, under the deferential
substantial evidence standard. Id. We review de novo
2
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
8 MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE
questions of law. Id. Our review is limited to those grounds
“explicitly relied upon” by the agency. Budiono v. Lynch,
837 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2016). If we conclude that the
agency’s decision “cannot be sustained upon its reasoning,”
we must remand. Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142
(9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
III. Discussion
A. Adverse Credibility
In assessing credibility, the agency must look to the
“totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors.” Alam
v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc)
(discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The totality of
the circumstances approach to adverse credibility
determinations “imposes the requirement that an IJ not
cherry pick solely facts favoring an adverse credibility
determination while ignoring facts that undermine that
result.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.
2010). An IJ may base credibility determinations on factors
that do not “go[] to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). An IJ cannot, however, base
an adverse credibility determination on an “utterly trivial
inconsistency” that no reasonable person would understand
as undermining an applicant’s veracity. See Shrestha, 590
F.3d at 1043–44.
In this case, the IJ provided four grounds for his adverse
credibility determination: (1) Mbueno-Vita testified
inconsistently about the location of the injury he sustained
during the June 2019 protest; (2) Mbueno-Vita’s asylum
application omitted that it was the Angolan police who hit
him after the June 2019 protest; (3) Mbueno-Vita testified
inconsistently about the harm he suffered during the May
2021 detention; and (4) Mbueno-Vita demonstrated “a
MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE 9
pattern of nonresponsive testimony.” The IJ also found that
Mbueno-Vita did not adequately explain his inconsistencies
and omissions. Because none of the bases upon which the IJ
relied are supported by substantial evidence, we reverse the
agency’s adverse credibility determination. We address
each basis in turn.
1. Inconsistencies Regarding Injury During June 2019
Protest
The IJ first identified inconsistencies in Mbueno-Vita’s
testimony and asylum application regarding where on his
right leg the police hit him during the June 2019 protest. At
the initial merits hearing, Mbueno-Vita testified that a police
officer hit him on the right leg, including his right ankle, with
the back of a weapon during the 2019 protest. On cross-
examination, counsel for the government asked why
Mbueno-Vita’s Form I-589 (the asylum application) stated
that he sustained a “foot injury” at the protest. Mbueno-Vita
replied that the police hit him with the back of a rifle, causing
injury to his leg. Later, Mbueno-Vita also stated that the
officer hit his knee, causing a “[strong] shock.”
Based on this testimony, the IJ concluded that
“[Mbueno-Vita] gave multiple accounts of where he was hit,
identifying his [right] leg, ankle, knee, and foot.” The IJ
reasoned that these “accounts” “cannot all be true[,]” as “the
knee and ankle/foot are distinct areas that are not easily
mistaken.” The IJ additionally found that Mbueno-Vita was
“nonresponsive” and did not adequately explain these
discrepancies, which “cast[] serious doubt on his overall
credibility.”
10 MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE
a. Approximation of Injury Location
As a threshold matter, it is not clear that these statements
are inconsistent. Indeed, a reasonable person could easily
conclude that allegations of an injured right ankle, knee, and
foot are consistent with an injured right leg.
Even assuming these distinctions could reasonably be
construed as inconsistencies, we hold that they are trivial and
have no bearing on Mbueno-Vita’s veracity, and thus cannot
support an adverse credibility determination. Id. at 1044.
An applicant’s testimony describing where he was injured,
particularly when recounting a traumatic event, is often
approximate rather than anatomically exact. See Morgan v.
Mukasey, 529 F.3d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that
trauma can prevent survivors from recalling peripheral
details about the harms they suffered). Such approximations
do not constitute material inconsistencies. And we have long
cautioned that the agency should “avoid premising an
adverse credibility finding on an applicant’s failure to
remember non-material, trivial details that were only
incidentally related to [his] claim of persecution.” Kaur v.
Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005); see, e.g.,
Osorio v. INS, 99 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]rivial
errors by an asylum applicant do not constitute a valid
ground upon which to base a finding that an asylum
applicant is not credible.”) (quotations omitted); Vilorio-
Lopez v. INS, 852 F.2d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 1988)
(observing that “[m]inor inconsistencies” that “reveal
nothing about an asylum applicant’s fear for his safety are
not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding”).
Here, one can easily imagine that, while trying to escape
a bus that has been ambushed by police who are shooting at
passengers, and after being hit by an officer on the back of
MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE 11
one’s leg with a large weapon, causing a “shock” and
excruciating pain, a person might have difficulty pinpointing
where an injury was inflicted along his right leg with
complete precision, particularly where the pain was far-
reaching. Given these traumatic circumstances, no
reasonable person could conclude that Mbueno-Vita’s minor
purported discrepancies in recalling the precise location of
his injury say anything about his propensity to tell the truth.
And Mbueno-Vita’s testimony about the 2019 protest was
otherwise “overwhelmingly consistent with . . . his prior
statements,” bolstering his overall credibility. Ren v.
Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1089 (9th Cir. 2011).
Because any inconsistency in describing the exact
anatomical location of his injury was manifestly trivial and
“says nothing about his truthfulness or the overall reliability
of his account, nor was it an attempt to enhance his claims,”
we hold that it does not provide a basis for an adverse
credibility determination. Id. at 1086.
b. Translation Deficiencies
The IJ’s analysis regarding this particular discrepancy is
further undermined by the frequent translation difficulties
and disjointed English interpretation evident in the merits
hearing transcripts. See He v. Aschroft, 328 F.3d 593, 598
(9th Cir. 2003) (“[F]aulty or unreliable translations can
undermine the evidence on which an adverse credibility
determination is based.”).
For example, during government counsel’s cross-
examination of Mbueno-Vita regarding his alleged injury in
2019, Mbueno-Vita expressed persistent confusion as to
what was asked of him, or otherwise answered the questions
12 MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE
in a way that suggests a flawed interpretation of the actual
question posed:
DHS: How many times were you hit on the
leg?
Mbueno-Vita: Well it was a metal. The back
of the weapon was a metal. When it hit on my
leg, that’s why it quickly injured my leg.
DHS: How many times were you hit on the
leg?
Mbueno-Vita: It was once, but it was a very
strong hit.
DHS: What was this weapon?
Mbueno-Vita: I didn’t understand the
question. Is that the name or what kind of
weapon it is?
DHS: Well you said the back of the weapon
had metal on it. What was the weapon?
Mbueno-Vita: I didn’t understand the
question. Is what was the weapon? I’m not
understanding what you mean by what was
the weapon?
DHS: What were you hit on the leg with?
Mbueno-Vita: It was the kind of weapon
when you’re trying to fire it, you have to open
it, and it has an extension. And then it is a
weapon that the soldiers carry, but you have
to have a kind of jacket or something to hold
it, and you trying to fire it. But he opened a
weapon, and as he opened the weapon the
extension of the weapon, the back of it, that’s
what he used to hit on the knee.
DHS: Are you talking about a bow and
arrow?
MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE 13
Mbueno-Vita: I don’t understand. I don’t
know what the name of bow and arrow
means.
Such explicit translation difficulties support the
likelihood that Mbueno-Vita’s discrepancies regarding the
exact location of his injury were semantic rather than
substantive—and thus all the more trivial to assessing his
overall credibility under the totality of the circumstances.
And on this record, the perceived inconsistencies in
testimony that possibly resulted from mistranslation or
miscommunication do not provide a sufficient basis for an
adverse credibility finding. See Akinmade v. INS, 196 F.3d
951, 956–57 (9th Cir. 1999).
2. Omission of Details Regarding Injury During 2019
Protest
The IJ also concluded that Mbueno-Vita omitted from
his Form I-589 the fact that it was the Angolan police who
hit him with a weapon after the June 2019 protest, and that
this purported omission was “material” and “call[ed]
[Mbueno-Vita’s] credibility further into doubt.” This
ground is not supported by substantial evidence.
As a preliminary matter, “omissions are less probative of
credibility than inconsistencies created by direct
contradictions in evidence and testimony.” Iman v. Barr,
972 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “It is
well established that the mere omission of details is
insufficient to uphold an adverse credibility finding.” Lai v.
Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation
modified). Here, Mbueno-Vita did not, in fact, omit any
material detail regarding the injury he sustained in 2019
from his Form I-589. To the extent that Mbueno-Vita’s
14 MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE
attribution of his injury to the Angolan police was at all
unclear in his written application, he clarified this detail with
consistent testimony at his merits hearing. See Iman, 972
F.3d at 1068 (emphasizing that “the omitted information was
not inconsistent with the statements in [Petitioner’s] asylum
application, his direct testimony, or any other evidence in the
record” and “[t]he additional information supplemented
rather than contradicted [Petitioner’s] account”).
The exact statement at issue in Mbueno-Vita’s Form I-
589 is: “the police killed two people from our group and I
managed to escape with a foot injury.” This statement
contains a direct reference to police action regarding the
killing of two other protesters, followed by “and,” which
would commonly be understood to connect the police action
with Mbueno-Vita’s foot injury. Another way to phrase this
sentence could have been “the police murdered two of my
fellow protesters and injured my foot.” Although one
statement is clearer to an English speaker, they communicate
the same action by police. This reading of the I-589 is
particularly compelling because it is entirely consistent with
Mbueno-Vita’s live testimony during his merits hearings
that he was ambushed and injured by the Angolan police
while returning home from the 2019 protest. See Lai, 773
F.3d at 974 (rejecting the BIA’s reliance on omissions
because “the information did not conflict with the rest of [the
petitioner’s] application or cast doubt upon the accuracy of
it”). We thus hold that there was no material omission of the
police’s role in causing Mbueno-Vita’s injury in the first
place. And to the extent that further clarification regarding
the police’s responsibility for Mbueno-Vita’s 2019 injury
was absent from his I-589, it does not constitute a specific or
cogent basis for an adverse credibility finding.
MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE 15
3. Inconsistencies Regarding Harm Suffered During
2021 Detention
The IJ also took issue with inconsistencies in Mbueno-
Vita’s testimony about the harm he suffered during his May
2021 detention. Namely, Mbueno-Vita initially testified
that, upon arriving at a police compound, military officials
told him and other detainees to lie on their backs, face up,
and then walked on their bodies. Mbueno-Vita subsequently
testified that the officials walked on his back, starting from
his head and going down the back of his legs. The IJ
concluded that “this testimony was inconsistent, as
[Mbueno-Vita] could not have been simultaneously on his
back and on his stomach.” The IJ also found that Mbueno-
Vita did not acknowledge that this testimony conflicted or
sufficiently explain why it conflicted. Consequently, the IJ
concluded that the inconsistency “further undermine[d]
[Mbueno-Vita’s] credibility.”
Here again, this inconsistency does not support an
adverse credibility determination both because the detail is
nonmaterial and because the IJ failed to consider Mbueno-
Vita’s plausible explanation for the inconsistency: that he
did not understand the IJ’s questioning. See Shrestha, 590
F.3d at 1040, 1044.
Notably, when the IJ asked how the officers walked on
Mbueno-Vita’s back if he was lying face up, Mbueno-Vita
replied, “I slept on my stomach, and the back was facing up.”
Rather than purposeful evasiveness, Mbueno-Vita’s
response indicates a lack of comprehension of the IJ’s
question altogether. Indeed, throughout the transcript, the
difficulties that the IJ and Mbueno-Vita experience in
understanding one another suggest flawed interpretation
rather than an intentional effort by Mbueno-Vita to be
16 MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE
unresponsive. We have long recognized that trauma
survivors may have difficulty recounting traumatic events
with detail and clarity. See Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d
1081, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). And here, potentially faulty
translations further “undermine the evidence on which [the]
adverse credibility determination is based.” He, 328 F.3d at
598.
Instead of immediately and repeatedly presuming that
Mbueno-Vita was deliberately nonresponsive in his
testimony, the IJ was required to consider the entirely
plausible explanation that Mbueno-Vita did not comprehend
the questions posed in the first place, and thus could not
effectively explain the discrepancies identified. Because the
IJ failed to consider Mbueno-Vita’s explanation, the alleged
inconsistencies regarding the harm Mbueno-Vita suffered in
detention do not support an adverse credibility finding. See
Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009);
Lai, 773 F.3d at 970.
4. Pattern of “Nonresponsive” Testimony
Finally, the IJ determined that Mbueno-Vita
demonstrated a “pattern of unresponsiveness which strongly
supports a finding that [his] testimony [was] not credible.”
The IJ proceeded to identify at least five separate examples
of Mbueno-Vita’s purported unresponsiveness.
Rather than an “unwillingness” to provide responsive
answers, what is crystal clear from the transcript is that
Mbueno-Vita had difficulty both in understanding the IJ and
making himself understood. Indeed, some portions of the
transcript, including the purported examples of
unresponsiveness the IJ identified in his decision, “read like
‘Who’s on First.’” He, 328 F.3d at 597. These instances
occurred during questioning by both the IJ and the
MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE 17
government’s counsel. And on multiple occasions, the
translation difficulty appears to be compounded by the IJ’s
impatience and hostility.
Consider the first example the IJ cites for
unresponsiveness. The exchange excerpted reads as follows:
IJ: Does your wife have any family
remaining in Angola?
Mbueno-Vita: My wife as well.
IJ: Who?
Mbueno-Vita: She has her family. They
were born in her own family.
IJ: Mother, father, siblings?
Mbueno-Vita: Yes, she’s an Angolan citizen
from the father’s side and the mother’s side
and all her immediate siblings.
IJ: I just want to know who in her immediate
family still live in Angola.
Mbueno-Vita: Her dad passed away. Her
mom is alive. All her siblings are still alive.
The IJ found that this example demonstrated “reticence”
on the part of Mbueno-Vita to answer simple factual
questions. However, the disjointed and nonsensical nature
of Mbueno-Vita’s answers in this example and the other
examples cited by the IJ instead illustrate that Mbueno-Vita
did not understand the questions posed in the first place. See,
e.g., Zahedi v. INS, 222 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he confusion seems to have stemmed, at least in part,
from language problems.”); Abovian v. INS, 219 F.3d 972,
979 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended by 228 F.3d 1127 and 234
F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that translation difficulties
may have contributed to the purported disjointedness and
18 MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE
incoherence in testimony). Here, Mbueno-Vita’s apparent
unresponsiveness cannot support an adverse credibility
determination where he plainly did not understand the
questions to which he was meant to respond.
* * *
When reviewing adverse credibility determinations, this
court has “declined to draw a bright line or engage in a
number-counting analysis, instead noting that no specific
number of inconsistencies requires sustaining or rejecting an
adverse credibility determination.” Kumar v. Garland, 18
F.4th 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2021); Alam, 11 F.4th at 1137.
Instead, the court may affirm credibility findings “only when
they are supported by the totality of [the] circumstances.”
Kumar, 18 F.4th at 1151 (internal citations omitted). Here,
none of the reasons cited by the IJ are valid grounds upon
which to base a finding that a petitioner is not credible. See
Singh, 403 F.3d at 1092–93. Where none of the bases for
the IJ’s credibility determination are sound, the adverse
credibility determination is clearly not supported by
substantial evidence. We therefore reverse the agency’s
determination and find Mbueno-Vita credible. See, e.g., id.;
He, 328 F.3d at 603–04.
B. CAT Claim
That the CAT denial rests in large part on an unsound
adverse credibility determination is cause alone to remand
the CAT claim for further consideration. However, in this
case, the agency also committed legal errors in analyzing
Mbueno-Vita’s particularized risk of torture and ability to
internally relocate. These errors independently require
remand.
MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE 19
1. Particularized Risk of Torture
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding that Mbueno-Vita
lacked “sufficient record evidence that [he] faces a
particularized risk of torture should he return to Angola.”
Even setting aside Mbueno-Vita’s testimonial evidence of
past torture he experienced at the hands of the Angolan
government, which the IJ and BIA improperly found
incredible, this finding mischaracterizes the record.
Unlike the petitioners in Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, who
submitted only “generalized evidence of violence and
crime” in their home country, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.
2010), Mbueno-Vita does not rely on generalized country
conditions evidence and a random risk of violence to support
his CAT claim. Instead, Mbueno-Vita argues that he
personally is likely to be tortured by the Angolan
government because of his involvement in organizing and
activism on behalf of UNITA.
When country conditions evidence shows that a discrete
class of persons is likely to face specific dangers, and the
petitioner belongs to that class of persons, the country
conditions evidence supports a particularized risk of torture.
Here, Mbueno-Vita’s evidence—namely, the United States
Department of State’s Angola 2022 Human Rights Report—
confirms that the Angolan government has targeted and
arbitrarily arrested, detained, tortured, and killed members
of the opposing political parties. Because Mbueno-Vita is a
member of UNITA, a political party oppositional to the
Angolan government, the country report constitutes
evidence of a particularized risk of torture. Where the
agency does not properly construe evidence as probative of
a particularized risk of torture and give reasoned
consideration to that evidence, we must remand. See Cole v.
20 MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE
Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 2011); see also
Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. Internal Relocation
The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s finding that “the
possibility of internal relocation weighs against a grant of
relief” on the ground that “[Mbueno-Vita] and his family
previously relocated within Angola and were not subject to
harm or contacted by authorities while living in a different
province.” Substantial evidence does not support this
conclusion.
The CAT regulation “does not bar relief if an applicant
could relocate, but it nevertheless provides that assessing the
likelihood of future torture requires considering ‘[e]vidence
that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of
removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured.’”
Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2020)
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(ii)). The agency must
consider all relevant evidence and no one factor is
determinative. Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1164
(9th Cir. 2015).
In noting that Mbueno-Vita and his family “safely lived
in Lunda Norte for a significant period before coming to the
United States,” both the IJ and BIA neglected to consider
that Mbueno-Vita and his family were living in hiding for
the duration of the four months they spent in Lunda Norte
before escaping Angola. Under our precedent, a person
cannot safely relocate if they are forced to live in hiding or
as a fugitive in their home country. Akosung, 970 F.3d at
1101–02. The fact that Mbueno-Vita and his family
managed to live in hiding for four months without incident
“does little to establish that [he] is able to ‘avoid future
persecution’ or ‘is not likely to be tortured.’” Id. at 1102
MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE 21
(citation omitted). On the contrary, “a person who lives in
hiding does so precisely because [he] continues to be in
danger of being captured and returned to face persecution or
torture.” Id. Therefore, counter to the IJ and BIA’s analysis,
the time Mbueno-Vita and his family spent in Lunda Norte
prior to leaving Angola weighs against the possibility of
relocation.
The IJ further opined that a recent national election
resulted in UNITA members gaining seats in three provinces
and that this constituted evidence that Mbueno-Vita could
safely relocate elsewhere in Angola. However, the agency
committed legal error by failing to consider other “highly
probative” evidence to its relocation determination. Cole,
659 F.3d at 772. Specifically, the agency failed to consider
that the MPLA continues to control the other fifteen
provinces, as well as the central government, which
maintains power over all the provinces. And where the
persecutor is the government, “[i]t has never been thought
that there are safe places within a nation” for the petitioner
to return. Singh v. Moschorak, 53 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir.
1995).
For the above reasons, we remand Mbueno-Vita’s CAT
claim to the agency to address these legal errors.
IV. Conclusion
None of the four adverse credibility grounds relied upon
by the IJ is supported by substantial evidence. And the IJ
did not determine whether Mbueno-Vita’s testimony, if
credible, established past persecution or a well-founded fear
of future persecution. The agency also erred in its analysis
of Mbueno-Vita’s particularized risk of torture and ability to
internally relocate. We therefore grant Mbueno-Vita’s
petition and remand for further proceedings, accepting his
22 MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE
testimony as credible, to determine his eligibility for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief.
PETITION GRANTED and REMANDED.