Cruz Aijiaco
CourtBoard of Immigration Appeals
Date FiledNovember 2, 2026
DocketID 4271
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 30 I&N Dec. 218 (BIA 2026) Interim Decision #4271
Matter of Jonnathan CRUZ AIJIACO, Respondent
Decided November 2, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
No amount of bond is sufficient to ensure the respondent’s appearance at future
immigration hearings in light of his multiple violations of motor vehicle laws, failure to
establish a fixed address, and apparent lack of eligibility for relief from removal.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Paulette Tostado, Esquire, Houston, Texas
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Timothy Wakimura, Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: HUNSUCKER and GEMOETS, Appellate Immigration Judges;
WHITE, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appeals from the
Immigration Judge’s bond order dated April 1, 2026. The Immigration Judge
issued a bond memorandum explaining the bond decision on May 5, 2026.
The respondent opposes the appeal. We will sustain DHS’ appeal.
The Immigration Judge found the respondent eligible for bond,
concluding that he was not a danger to the community and a bond in the
amount of $8,000 was sufficient to ensure his appearance at future hearings.
On appeal, DHS argues that the respondent is ineligible for bond because he
is a danger to the community and a flight risk. We assume, without deciding,
that the respondent is not a danger to the community. See Matter of Urenas,
25 I&N Dec. 140, 141 (BIA 2009) (explaining that the Immigration Judge
must first determine if the respondent’s release would pose a danger to
property or persons, and then the Immigration Judge should consider what is
required to ensure the respondent’s appearance at future hearings). However,
upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude that the respondent poses
too high a flight risk to merit release on bond. See Matter of Dobrotvorskii,
29 I&N Dec. 211, 212 (BIA 2025) (“Whether an alien poses a flight risk is a
question of judgment that we review de novo, but the factual findings
underlying the judgment are reviewed for clear error.”).
In June 2017, the respondent was stopped by police officers for making
an improper lane change. The respondent was then arrested when the officers
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determined that the respondent’s driver’s license was suspended and a
warrant was pending for his arrest. In August 2017, the respondent was again
detained by police officers after he was observed driving a vehicle with
inoperative brake lights. The respondent admitted to the officers that he did
not have a valid driver’s license. A records check revealed that the
respondent’s license had been suspended multiple times, and the respondent
was thereafter arrested for knowingly driving without a license.
On appeal, the respondent disputes the accuracy of the violations as
alleged by DHS and claims that he never admitted to intentionally violating
the law but rather misunderstood the “procedural requirements related to
driving privileges.” The respondent provides no evidentiary support for this
claim, and it is undermined by the fact that he has had multiple encounters
with law enforcement over this issue.
The Immigration Judge found that the respondent had been cited for
numerous violations of laws related to the use of a motor vehicle at various
different times, including repeatedly driving without a valid license.
However, the Immigration Judge failed to give these violations sufficient
weight when assessing whether the respondent poses a flight risk.
An alien in custody seeking release on bond must establish that he does
not present a risk of flight and is likely to attend future immigration
proceedings. See Matter of R-A-V-P-, 27 I&N Dec. 803, 805 (BIA 2020)
(outlining the factors an Immigration Judge should consider in making a
flight risk determination). “Inherent in the concept of flight risk is not only
whether the alien will appear at future hearings before the Immigration
Judge, but also whether the alien is likely to comply with future orders of the
Immigration Judge.” Matter of A-L-S-, 29 I&N Dec. 794, 797 (BIA 2026).
The respondent has been repeatedly cited for violations of motor vehicle
laws in the United States, including repeatedly driving without a valid
license. Laws regulating the operation of motor vehicles, including licensing
laws, exist to ensure the safety of everyone in society. See United States v.
Leonard, 439 F.3d 648, 651 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he requirement of having
a license has a serious purpose: to ensure that drivers meet all safety
regulations and qualifications. Persistent violations of this requirement
betoken a conscious disregard for these considerations.”).
The respondent’s violation of motor vehicle laws, including repeatedly
driving without a license, indicates a disregard for existing laws and is
therefore an important factor for consideration regarding risk of flight. The
respondent’s refusal to comply with a statutory legal requirement is
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significant evidence that he would not comply with an order from the
Immigration Judge regarding attendance at a future hearing. See Portillo-
Rendon v. Holder, 662 F.3d 815, 816 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Driving while
intoxicated or without a license reflects both indifference to the welfare of
other drivers and pedestrians and defiance of known legal obligations.”
(emphasis added)).
The respondent has also not clearly established that he has a fixed address
within the United States. See Matter of Z-N-L-, 29 I&N Dec. 511, 512 (BIA
2026) (concluding that inconsistent evidence regarding whether the
respondent has a fixed address in the United States demonstrates the
respondent is a flight risk); Matter of Akhmedov, 29 I&N Dec. 166, 167–68
(BIA 2025) (same). The respondent was most recently detained by DHS in
February 2026, after he was encountered in Cheyenne, Wyoming. When
initially detained, the respondent claimed to be unmarried and to have no
children. On his application for custody redetermination, the respondent lists
a wife and children with an address of only “USA.”
The respondent claimed to the Immigration Judge that if released he
would reside in Ocala, Florida. The respondent presented a letter from a
friend allegedly living in Florida promising to ensure that the respondent
would attend all of his immigration hearings. On appeal, the respondent
argues that, at the time of his apprehension in February 2026, he possessed a
valid Indiana driver’s license and that he currently resides in Westfield,
Indiana. It is unclear from the record whether the respondent resides with
any family members or, indeed, even where the respondent resides. The
respondent’s failure to provide a clear fixed address weighs heavily against
finding he is not a flight risk. See Matter of Z-N-L-, 29 I&N Dec. at 512–13
(finding unmitigable flight risk based on lack of clear fixed address).
The Immigration Judge determined that the respondent’s pending
application for cancellation of removal and his residence with his wife and
children established that he is not a flight risk. The findings underlying this
determination are clearly erroneous. As discussed above, the respondent’s
address and residence with family members are not established by the record
evidence. Furthermore, the respondent has not demonstrated that he is prima
facie eligible for cancellation of removal. See Matter of Andrade, 19 I&N
Dec. 488, 490 (BIA 1987) (observing that an alien with a greater likelihood
of being granted relief has a greater motivation to appear for future hearings);
see also Matter of A-L-S-, 29 I&N Dec. at 797 (“[S]peculative future
eligibility for relief based upon conjecture or hypothetical future events does
not materially diminish flight risk.”). The record indicates that the
respondent entered the United States in August of 2016 and was placed in
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removal proceedings in February 2026. Thus, the record does not reflect the
requisite continuous physical presence for cancellation of removal. See
section 240A(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(A) (requiring 10 years of continuous physical presence).
The burden of proof is on the alien to demonstrate that he is likely to
appear for future immigration proceedings. Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N
Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006). The respondent has shown a disregard for the laws
of the United States, failed to establish a fixed address, and failed to
demonstrate prima facie eligibility for any relief from removal. The
respondent, thus, has not met his burden to prove he is likely to appear at
future immigration proceedings. We conclude that no amount of bond is
sufficient to ensure the respondent’s appearance at future immigration
hearings in light of his multiple violations of motor vehicle laws, failure to
establish a fixed address, and apparent lack of eligibility for relief from
removal. Accordingly, we will sustain DHS’ appeal and order the respondent
detained without bond.
ORDER: The appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge’s April 1,
2026, decision granting bond is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: The respondent shall be detained without bond.
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