Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0442n.06 No. 25-3999 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 03, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) CARLOS GALAN-SANDOVAL, ) Petitioner, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW ) FROM THE BOARD OF v. ) IMMIGRATION APPEALS ) TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, ) OPINION Respondent. ) ) ) Before: KETHLEDGE, Chief Judge; CLAY and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges. CLAY, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Carlos Galan-Sandoval challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal of the denial of his application for cancellation of removal under § 240A(b)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l). Petitioner challenges the BIA’s order on various grounds. For the reasons set forth herein, we AFFIRM the BIA’s dismissal of Petitioner’s appeal. I. BACKGROUND Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States without inspection in or around December 1992. In November 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) that charged Petitioner with removability based on his entrance into the United States without having been admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. The NTA did not contain the time and date of the hearing, which were provided in a Notice of Hearing about two weeks after. In January 2011, DHS added a second No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche charge of removability relating to a conviction for a controlled substance offense. A month later Petitioner appeared for a master calendar hearing, where the immigration judge (“IJ”) found him ineligible for voluntary departure and ordered him removed to Mexico. However, shortly thereafter Petitioner successfully challenged his substance abuse conviction, and moved to reopen the immigration proceeding and stay removal. The IJ granted Petitioner’s motion, and Petitioner filed an application for cancellation of removal and claimed his three daughters, then ages five, thirteen, and sixteen, as qualifying relatives. At a merits hearing held in August 2011, Petitioner and his expert Kristen Lowe Browning, a licensed social worker, offered testimony on his daughters’ mental states and living conditions. The expert testified that Petitioner’s daughters struggled with their mental health during the period when Petitioner was detained pending resolution of his immigration proceedings. She noted that Petitioner’s children lived with their maternal grandparents and an aunt during Petitioner’s detention, and that those relatives exposed his children to potential mental, physical, and emotional abuse. If the daughters were reunited with their father, the expert opined, their mental health would improve. DHS did not complete its cross examination of Petitioner at the first merits hearing, and the IJ scheduled a second merits hearing for December 23, 2011. However, the IJ rescheduled that hearing to December 24, 2012, and then to November 21, 2016, and a third time to January 24, 2019, and still a fourth time to April 7, 2021. The IJ was not done; on or around July 15, 2020, Petitioner received a fifth notice rescheduling the hearing. But this time, the IJ moved the hearing back in time, to August 19, 2020. The deadlines in the scheduling order required Petitioner to submit any new evidence to the IJ within five days. 2 No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche Petitioner’s counsel moved for a 60-day continuance. Counsel argued that additional time was needed to get mental health evaluations for Petitioner’s daughters and to obtain sworn statements from potential witnesses, and that the distance between herself and Petitioner’s potential witnesses, as well as restrictions and limitations imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, would make it difficult to comply with the new deadlines. Counsel also noted that she often began collecting new evidence six to eight months before a hearing, given that immigration hearings are often rescheduled. The IJ denied Petitioner’s request, noting that Petitioner had already presented hours of fact and expert testimony to the immigration court. The IJ added further that Petitioner could update the court on his daughters’ mental health through contemporaneously kept medical records, and believed Petitioner had already had sufficient time to gather new evidence for the second merits hearing. Petitioner again took the stand at the second merits hearing. During the hearing, the IJ asked Petitioner a series of questions to clarify the record after DHS finished its cross-examination of Petitioner. These questions concerned two driving under the influence charges Petitioner received towards the end of 2010, his relationship with his daughters and their current mental states, his broader family and their relationships with his daughters, and what his plans for his family would be should the IJ order him removed from the country. In particular, the IJ inquired about the registration of Petitioner’s car at the time of his 2010 arrests. The IJ also asked Petitioner about white pills police found in the back of his car during one of his arrests. For Petitioner’s part, he informed the IJ that his eldest daughter had moved out of his house four years prior to the second merits hearing, and that his two younger daughters’ mental health had been much improved since his release from detention nine years prior. Petitioner also reported that he had taken his 3 No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche daughters for a mental health evaluation the week before the second merits hearing and reported to the IJ that the counselor told him his daughters were doing fine and did not require therapy. Shortly after the second merits hearing, the IJ filed a written decision denying Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal. The IJ found that Petitioner lacked good moral character due to his two driving-related offenses, taking particular note that Petitioner offered a different name to the police during one of the arrests, and found that he had done little to address his issues with alcohol. The IJ similarly found that Petitioner had failed to prove that his daughters would experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he were removed, pointing to Petitioner’s testimony regarding his daughters’ improvement since his release from detention. Two weeks later, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal before the BIA. In his brief before the BIA, Petitioner challenged the denial of his motion for a continuance and argued that the IJ relied on testimony she coerced out of Petitioner to find that he lacked good moral character. He argued further that there was a legal error in the IJ’s good moral character analysis and claimed her questioning of him violated his due process rights. Finally, Petitioner claimed for the first time that the NTA he received was defective because it lacked a date and time for his removal proceedings. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The BIA first denied Petitioner’s notice argument, holding that an IJ still has jurisdiction to hear a proceeding where an NTA is missing the time and date. The BIA also affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s motion for a continuance, holding that Petitioner had presented a considerable amount of evidence at the first merits hearing and that, rescheduling notwithstanding, Petitioner had a significant amount of time to prepare for the second merits hearing. The BIA next rejected Petitioner’s due process arguments, finding that the IJ asked permissible questions about issues in the record and did not demonstrate bias against Petitioner. 4 No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche Lastly, the BIA found that Petitioner had failed to raise any meaningful challenge to the IJ’s hardship determination, thus waiving that issue, and declined to reach his good cause arguments given that the IJ’s hardship determination was dispositive of the cancellation of removal analysis. Petitioner appealed the BIA’s decision to this Court. II. DISCUSSION Before this Court, Petitioner identifies the following errors in the BIA’s order. Petitioner first argues that the BIA erred in finding that he waived any challenge to the IJ’s determination that his daughters would not face exceptional and extremely unusual hardship from his removal, and, additionally, should have addressed his arguments addressing the IJ’s good moral character analysis. Petitioner next argues that the BIA erred again in upholding the denial of his motion for a continuance, which denied him a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his behalf. Petitioner identifies a third error in the BIA’s failure to find the IJ abused her discretion and violated his due process rights through excessive cross-examination and bullying. Fourth and finally, Petitioner argues the BIA erred by refusing to terminate the proceedings before the IJ because of the defect in the NTA. We address each argument in order. A. Petitioner’s Hardship and Good Moral Character Challenges Petitioner contends that the BIA erred by finding he failed to meaningfully challenge the IJ’s hardship determination. He argues that contrary to the BIA’s opinion, his “appellate brief set out detailed factual arguments directly tied to the statutory standard.” (Pet’r’s Br. at 25.) Petitioner also challenges the BIA’s decision to forgo reviewing the IJ’s good moral character analysis. This Court agrees with the BIA’s determination that Petitioner failed to raise any meaningful arguments directed to the IJ’s hardship determination and thus waived his hardship argument on appeal. And 5 No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche as explained below, neither the BIA nor this Court need reach the IJ’s good moral character analysis. This Court may review a final order of removal “only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). “Accordingly, this Court may review only those claims ‘properly presented to the BIA and considered on their merits.’” Tomaszczuk v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 159, 167 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir. 2004)). A petitioner presents a proper challenge to the BIA where any “legal or factual issue that the party seeks to raise with the Board” is contained in the petitioner’s notice of appeal. Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1155 (6th Cir. 2021). To the extent a petitioner files a brief with their appeal, the issue “must be reasonably developed in the petitioner’s brief to the BIA.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2009). A thorough reading of Petitioner’s brief before the BIA reveals that he did not challenge the IJ’s hardship determination. Petitioner did not raise the IJ’s hardship determination in his notice of appeal. The notice references the hardship determination once, and only to characterize the IJ’s hardship ruling as a consequence of her allegedly improper denial of Petitioner’s motion to continue. Similarly, Petitioner did not discuss the hardship determination in the argument section of his brief before the BIA, nor is the hardship determination listed in the brief as an issue presented for review. Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary are not convincing. Petitioner first notes that his briefing before the BIA included extensive factual descriptions of the risks and harms his daughters would face upon his removal, but listing facts in a brief does not amount to raising an argument before the BIA. He next argues that he raised “factual errors, omissions, and mischaracterizations in [the IJ’s] reasoning” in his brief. (Pet’r’s Br. at 26.) Yet Petitioner offers only one example of 6 No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche a purported error: that the IJ’s decision “omit[ed] material segments of [the expert]’s testimony” regarding his daughters’ living conditions when he was in detention nine years prior. (A.R. 20.) Petitioner’s attempt to defend his briefing fails because his claim that the IJ omitted material facts from her decision fails to identify an error in the IJ’s analysis, such as a mistaken application of law or finding of fact. Noticeably missing from Petitioner’s brief was anything in the vein of explaining why those facts should have been included, what legal error was committed by their exclusion, or how their exclusion affected the IJ’s determination that his daughters would not face exceptional and extremely unusual hardship from his removal. Without more, we cannot say that this issue was “reasonably developed in the petitioner’s brief to the BIA.” Khalili, 557 F.3d at 433. Given the above, the Court concludes that the BIA correctly determined that Petitioner failed to meaningfully challenge the IJ’s hardship determination. As a result, this Court may not hear Petitioner’s arguments on the issue. The Court also notes that even if it entertained Petitioner’s argument, his hardship challenge would still fail. “[E]ven when the agency’s reasoning was inadequate, its decision may be upheld on the basis of harmless error if the petitioner’s prospects are otherwise so weak that there is no reason to believe that remand might lead to a different result.” Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 696, 701 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). Were this Court to remand Petitioner’s purported challenge to the IJ’s hardship determination to the BIA, the BIA would review Petitioner’s concern that material facts were omitted from the IJ’s decision. However, IJs are not obligated to list every fact on the record in their decision, material or otherwise. See Torres v. I.N.S., No. 93-3617, 28 F.3d 1214, 1994 WL 284540, at *4 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion) (noting an IJ “need not specifically address each claim or each piece of evidence”). Additionally, the “material” facts Petitioner points to were 7 No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche not material. In his brief before the BIA, Petitioner raises facts from the expert’s testimony concerning the time where his daughters lived with relatives during his detention in 2011. The expert testified that those living conditions exposed Petitioner’s daughters to potential emotional, physical, and sexual abuse while under the care of their maternal grandparents and aunt. However, Petitioner’s daughters resumed living with him after his release from detention, and nothing in his testimony implied that his daughters would have to return to living with the potentially dangerous relatives if he were removed. Remanding this matter to the BIA to reconsider Petitioner’s hardship “arguments” as raised before that body would be unlikely to alter the resolution of this issue. Because the Court upholds the BIA’s determination regarding Petitioner’s hardship argument, we need not reach his good moral character argument. To establish eligibility for cancellation of removal, a party must demonstrate both exceptional and extremely unusual hardship and good moral character; failure to demonstrate either signals an end to the analysis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b; see also Galindo-Munoz v. Barr, 799 F. App’x 905, 911 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Finally, the [BIA]’s failure to address additional good-moral-character evidence was unnecessary because [the petitioner]’s failure to establish the requisite hardship was dispositive of his eligibility for cancellation of removal.”). B. Motion for a Continuance Petitioner challenges the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of his motion to continue. He argues that the IJ’s advancement of the hearing and denial of his motion prevented him from obtaining updated witness statements and new mental health evaluations for his daughters, without which he lacked an opportunity to present evidence before the immigration court. “We review the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of petitioner’s motion for continuance under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Ilic-Lee v. Mukasey, 507 F.3d 1044, 1047 (6th Cir. 2007). 8 No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche An abuse of discretion occurs if “the denial was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination.” Badwan v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation modified). “Because the BIA did not summarily affirm or adopt the IJ’s reasoning and provided an explanation for its decision, we review the BIA’s decision as the final agency determination.” Ilic- Lee, 507 F.3d at 1047. The BIA upheld the IJ’s denial of the continuance motion on two grounds. First, the BIA pointed to Petitioner’s opportunity to present evidence and testify at the first merits hearing as a sufficient opportunity to present evidence to the immigration court. Second, the BIA concluded that because Petitioner and his counsel knew about the second merits hearing since October 24, 2018, there had been “sufficient time to prepare for the hearing and [Petitioner and his counsel] should have already been doing so at the time” the hearing was advanced. (A.R. 4–5.) The BIA’s first ground for denying the continuance falls short of the necessary showing. The BIA, to demonstrate that Petitioner had already had ample time to present evidence to the immigration court, pointed to the three hours of testimony and extensive evidence and medical records that Petitioner was allowed to present during the first merits hearing. However, nearly a decade passed between the two hearings. Petitioner reasonably wanted to update the evidence before the IJ. Newer evidence would offer greater probative value as to what his daughters’ likely response to his deportation would be, given that his daughters grew from ages 5 and 8 to 13 and 16 in the intervening time. The IJ clearly agreed, because she welcomed new testimony on Petitioner’s daughters’ mental state and wellbeing at the second merits hearing, including taking interest in a recent mental health evaluation. It was therefore irrational to affirm the rejection of 9 No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche Petitioner’s request for a continuance based on the fact that he previously presented evidence on the same topic nine years prior. The BIA fares better on its second ground for denying the continuance. It is true that the advancement of the second merits hearing from April 7, 2021, to August 19, 2020, left Petitioner with little time to have his daughters examined by a mental health professional. However, Petitioner and his counsel had had notice of the second merits hearing, and therefore awareness that he needed to take his daughters to see a mental health professional, since October 24, 2018. Petitioner could have taken his daughters for mental health examinations at any time during that window. Because Petitioner had ample time to prepare for the hearing, this Court concludes that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance. C. Due Process Claim Petitioner claims that the IJ engaged in bullying and excessive cross-examination during his testimony at the second merits hearing. According to Petitioner, the IJ abandoned her role as a neutral arbiter and became an adversarial participant three times during the second merits hearing. We reject Petitioner’s arguments for all three instances of allegedly improper conduct. “Fifth Amendment guarantees of due process extend to aliens in deportation proceedings, entitling them to a full and fair hearing.” Huicochea-Gomez v. I.N.S., 237 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2001). “We review de novo alleged due process violations in removal hearings.” Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 287, 296 (6th Cir. 2016). A due process violation has occurred when “there was a defect in the removal proceeding and . . . the alien was prejudiced because of it.” Id. (citation omitted). If the petitioner cannot establish proof of prejudice, this Court need not address the merits of that claim. Graham v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 546, 549 (6th Cir. 2008). “To establish the requisite prejudice, the petitioner must show that the due process violations led to a substantially 10 No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche different outcome from that which would have occurred in the absence of those violations.” Bi Qing Zheng, 819 F.3d at 297 (citation modified). Petitioners before the immigration court “are entitled to an unbiased arbiter who has not prejudged their claims.” Ahmed v. Gonzales, 398 F.3d 722, 725 (6th Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, IJs are not spectators; they are statutorily empowered to “administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1). This “broad discretion to control the manner of interrogation in order to ascertain the truth” is exceeded when an IJ acts as an advocate. Vasha v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 863, 872 (6th Cir. 2005). For example, an IJ “is free to and should interrupt witnesses on occasions when necessary to [clarify] testimony. But he must be impartial and must not attempt to establish proof to support the position of any party.” Matter of Lam, 14 I. & N. Dec. 168, 170 (B.I.A. 1972). As we have previously explained: An IJ must be impartial and must not attempt to establish proof to support the position of any party to the controversy; once he does so he becomes an advocate or a participant, thus ceasing to function as an impartial trier of fact, and a hearing so conducted is lacking in the fundamental fairness required by due process. Bi Qing Zheng, 819 F.3d at 297 (citation modified). In the instant case, Petitioner offers no evidence that the IJ became an adversarial participant. Petitioner raises three instances during his testimony that he claims demonstrate the IJ “bullying” him and engaging in excessive cross-examination. (Pet’r’s Br. at 12.) First, Petitioner argues that the IJ engaged in cross-examination where she pressured him to concede the use of a false plate on his car at the time of one of his DUIs. Second, he claims that the IJ pressured him to take responsibility for white pills that were found in his car during one of his DUIs. These first two instances Petitioner identifies do not provide a basis for this Court to reverse the BIA’s opinion. Petitioner claims the IJ relied on the testimony elicited from those questions to find that 11 No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche “[he] lacked good moral character,” but the BIA did not need to reach the IJ’s good moral character holding to uphold the IJ’s opinion because of Petitioner’s failure to prove exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. (Pet’r’s Br. at 23.) Petitioner therefore cannot demonstrate this matter would have had a substantially different outcome, i.e., prejudice, were it not for the questioning on the license plate and the white pills.1 See Ferreira v. Lynch, 629 F. App’x 4, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding that the IJ’s alleged failure to allow the petitioner to corroborate his testimony could not have prejudiced his claims where “even if [he] had satisfied the credibility and corroboration requirements, he would still have been denied asylum because he failed to meet his burden of proof to establish either membership in a viable social group or that any persecution he feared was connected to a government action or inaction”). The third instance of allegedly improper conduct involved the IJ allegedly stating that in her experience, “minors in counseling often share information differently and that teenage females are more private about interactions with peers and ‘people of the opposite sex.’” (Pet’r’s Br. at 13 (citing A.R. 443.)) Petitioner argues that the IJ’s comment “reflected subjective personal beliefs rather than judicial fact-finding and further demonstrated [the IJ] was not acting as a neutral adjudicator.” (Pet’r’s Br. at 14.) However, Petitioner’s argument runs into several issues. First, the statement that Petitioner references does not appear in the transcript before the court. And even if it did, the Court does not see how the IJ would have committed any error by making that statement; the IJ’s one-off comment regarding the habits of teenage girls is not an example of an IJ abandoning the role of a neutral arbiter. For comparison, in Reyes-Melendez v. I.N.S. the Ninth 1 Separately, Petitioner argues the immigration judge committed a separate due process violation by concluding that Petitioner’s alcohol rehabilitation efforts were unsuccessful when there was proof on the record to the contrary. Because this argument also concerns Petitioner’s good moral character argument, Petitioner similarly cannot demonstrate that the IJ’s alleged error affected the outcome of this case. 12 No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche Circuit held that an IJ abandoned their role as a neutral arbiter by judging the petitioner’s personal behavior as “morally bankrupt.” 342 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003). The IJ in that case repeatedly commented on the petitioner’s illegitimate child and remarked that she would not “reward” the petitioner for his “illicit relationship” by allowing him to remain in the United States to take care of his children. Id. at 1005. The IJ’s behavior in this case, by comparison, does not suggest her decision making was animated by bias, prejudgment, or the consideration of her personal opinions. The Court concludes that the utterance, assuming it occurred, did not constitute a defect in the proceeding, nor did it prejudice Petitioner’s claims. D. Defective NTA Petitioner concludes his arguments by raising the BIA’s refusal to terminate the proceedings despite the defect in his NTA. Petitioner notes that the NTA did not include the time and place of his hearing. He claims that his objection to the defect was timely because he challenged it in his direct appeal to the BIA after the IJ’s decision. An objection to a defective NTA is timely “if it is raised prior to the closing of pleadings before the [IJ].” Matter of Fernandes, 28 I. & N. Dec. 605, 610–11 (B.I.A. 2022). Untimely objections are waived or forfeited. Id. at 609. Because Petitioner waited until he was before the BIA to raise his objection, he waived any challenge to the NTA. See Bains v. Garland, No. 23- 3208, 2024 WL 3950812, at *5 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2024) (finding the petitioner “forfeited [his challenge to a defective NTA by] raising it for the first time before the BIA on appeal”); see also Lux-Lux v. Bondi, No. 24-4071, 2025 WL 2092498, at *3 (6th Cir. July 25, 2025) (“In the present matter, it was not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to conclude that [the petitioner] forfeited his challenge to the defective NTA by failing to raise it until his motion to reopen.”). 13 No. 25-3999, Galan-Sandoval v. Blanche III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the BIA’s dismissal of Petitioner’s appeal. 14