Al Saidi v. Blanche

21-6589 Al Saidi v. Blanche In the United States Court of Appeals FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT AUGUST TERM 2025 No. 21-6589 YAHYA AMEEN MUSLEH AL SAIDI, Petitioner, v. TODD BLANCHE, ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. ARGUED: OCTOBER 27, 2025 DECIDED: AUGUST 3, 2026 Before: CABRANES, PARK, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges. Yahya Al Saidi was ordered removed from the country because of a conviction for first-degree assault. He challenges the denial of his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. He argues that the immigration judge erred in dismissing his application for lack of corroboration. The Board of Immigration Appeals decided that Al Saidi forfeited his challenge to the dismissal for lack of corroboration because he challenged only a purported adverse credibility finding. We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by deciding that the argument was forfeited. We hold that an immigration judge does not need to make an adverse credibility finding before requiring corroboration. The immigration judge may require corroboration whenever it would be reasonably expected to be available and would be helpful to his consideration of the case. Accordingly, the lack of corroboration was an independent basis for denying the relief of deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. We further conclude that the decision of the agency was supported by substantial evidence. We deny the petition for review. STEVEN HASKOS (Craig Relles, on the brief), Relles Law, PLLC, White Plains, NY, for Petitioner. JOHN F. STANTON, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation (Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Jessica E. Burns, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, on the brief), United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. MENASHI, Circuit Judge: Yahya Ameen Musleh Al Saidi petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that affirmed the decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) to deny his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re Al Saidi, No. A-055-782-570 (BIA Oct. 15, 2021), aff’g No. A- 2 055-782-570 (Immigr. Ct. Fishkill Apr. 20, 2021). He argues that (1) the IJ erred by relying on “trivial” inconsistencies in his testimony to make an adverse credibility finding and (2) the erroneous adverse credibility finding led the IJ to deny his claim for lack of corroboration. The BIA decided that Al Saidi failed to challenge the IJ’s decision to require corroboration in his administrative appeal. According to the BIA, the IJ required corroboration based on the quality of Al Saidi’s testimony without making an adverse credibility finding. Because Al Saidi offered no argument that the IJ improperly required corroboration, the BIA considered that issue forfeited. 1 We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by deciding that the argument was forfeited. An immigration judge does not need to make an adverse credibility finding before requiring corroboration. The immigration judge may require corroboration whenever it would be reasonably expected to be available and would be helpful to his consideration of the case. Accordingly, the lack of corroboration was an independent basis for denying the relief of deferral of removal under the CAT. We further conclude that the decision of the agency was supported by substantial evidence. We deny the petition for review. 1 The BIA described the forfeiture as a “waiver,” but while those terms “are often used interchangeably,” the term “[w]aiver is best reserved for a litigant’s intentional relinquishment of a known right, whereas forfeiture is more appropriate when a litigant’s action or inaction is deemed to incur the consequence of loss of a right, or a defense.” Kaplan v. Bank Saderat PLC, 77 F.4th 110, 117 n.10 (2d Cir. 2023) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 3  BACKGROUND During Yahya Al Saidi’s childhood, his family began to feud with the rival Balwi family that had sought to control his home city of Ibb, Yemen. See Cert. Admin. R. 237-38, 261. His life changed in two ways around 2010. First, he married his wife Diana, who gave birth to a daughter. Second, the conflict with the Balwis took on a new dimension. According to Al Saidi, one of the elder Balwi sons, Alaw Balwi, sought to align his family with the Houthis, a political-military movement that planned a takeover of Yemen. Al Saidi objected to Alaw Balwi’s “criminal behavior around our childrens and our women,” explaining that “we don’t like … the ideas of … robbing people and killing people and terrorizing people” and that the Balwis should “take it outside the neighborhood.” Id. at 137. Following this objection, according to Al Saidi, Alaw Balwi started a campaign of persecution against him. Al Saidi hid in his house for months and when he exited he disguised himself in women’s clothing. See id. at 187. No member of the Al Saidi family suffered harm from the Balwis during this time. See id. at 166-67. Eventually, Al Saidi left Yemen for the United States, which he could do because Diana is an American citizen. See id. at 508 (noting his IR-1 visa). In November 2012, he arrived in New York, where he was joined by Diana, their children, and his adoptive parents, the Al Zandanis. But the family rivalry followed him. In June 2014, Al Saidi and his adoptive brother Bassam Al Zandani were confronted by the father and brother of Alaw Balwi while “walking home at night” in Yonkers. Id. at 139. In the ensuing altercation, Al Saidi stabbed the two Balwis with a box cutter. See id. at 138-39, 176. He was convicted of 4 first-degree assault, second-degree assault, and first-degree gang assault and is serving a fifteen-year sentence. I Following Al Saidi’s conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. If an alien is convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” he is ineligible for asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), statutory withholding of removal, id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), and withholding of removal under the CAT, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2)(i). Al Saidi does not dispute that he was convicted of an “aggravated felony crime of violence” and therefore of a particularly serious crime. Cert. Admin. R. 47; see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 1158(b)(2)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Yet an alien who has committed a particularly serious crime may still seek deferral of removal under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a). “[U]nder regulations implementing the CAT,” removal will be “deferred if the applicant establishes that ‘it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 115 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). In support of his application for that relief, Al Saidi alleged that he would likely be tortured if he were returned to Yemen. He claimed that the Balwi family is determined to exact revenge on him for opposing Alaw Balwi’s alliance with the Houthis and for the 2014 assault. Although the Balwis do not govern Ibb, Al Saidi explained that the Houthis rule 80 percent of the population of Yemen and have established checkpoints throughout the country. Al Saidi argued that the Houthis would locate him and turn him over to the Balwis. The Balwis would then subject him to torture without hope of protection from the government. 5  The testimony at the hearing reflected this theory but was often vague and inconsistent. Al Saidi testified, for example, that Yemeni custom allows a family to pay off a revenge-seeker to avoid harm. The IJ asked whether anyone tried to settle his dispute with the Balwis. Al Saidi named a family member, Abdullah, and then added that some other neighbors also tried to settle the dispute. The IJ asked: “why don’t you just tell me everybody who tried to settle the dispute. Abdullah, who else?” Cert. Admin. R. 169. Al Saidi responded that Hamud Balwi also tried, but no one else had. Yet Al Saidi had submitted an affidavit stating that his friend Nageeb Ghaleb had recently tried to settle the dispute. At the hearing, Al Saidi attempted to explain the inconsistency by stating that although Ghaleb is “a close friend to us,” Al Saidi had not asked him to settle the dispute. Id. at 190. Other witness testimony reflected inconsistencies. One relative of Al Saidi said in a sworn statement that she had “heard from the females of the Balwi family that they were upset and affected” by the rivalry. Id. at 406. But she later testified that she had never met any Balwi women, and she explained that her statement was based on secondhand hearsay. See id. at 210-12. Another relative wrote that he “heard on the street that Balwi’s family … wanted Yahya to shed blood in revenge for what happened in the United States,” id. at 403, but he later testified that he heard the threat directly from Alaw Balwi at a wedding, see id. at 228-29. And Al Saidi’s adoptive brother Bassam Al Zandani wrote that there was a warrant for Al Saidi’s arrest in Yemen, but he later testified that he had no firsthand knowledge of a warrant and did not know the original source of that information. See id. at 263-64, 378. At the hearing, the IJ asked Al Saidi why his other family members did not testify or submit affidavits. His wife, sister, and 6 adoptive father live in the United States, and the IJ heard that Al Saidi had communicated with his wife the previous night and had spoken with his sister within the preceding few months. Al Saidi responded that while his wife would know about the threats from the Balwis in Yemen and about the assault in 2014, she did not testify because she could not speak English and his lawyer said she would “come back to her if she need[ed] anything from her.” Id. at 191. Al Saidi did not explain the absence of his sister and adoptive father, nor did he request time to obtain a statement from his wife or permission for her to attend the hearing virtually. The government observed in summation that “there’s no testimony or affidavits from key witnesses, such as the respondent’s wife, who lived with him in Yemen in 2011 to 2012, and who he said knew about the problems there,” and such as “the respondent’s stepfather, as we’re referring to the person who raised him, who should also have a great deal of knowledge about both the scope of the feud between the families and the scope of the efforts to resolve this feud between the families without any blood being shed.” Id. at 270-71. II The IJ denied Al Saidi’s application for relief on two independent grounds. First, the IJ noted his “concerns as to the quality of the testimony provided and the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. at 49. He identified inconsistencies in the testimony and explained that, apart from the inconsistencies, the testimony was vague and based on layers of hearsay. See id. at 49-56. The IJ did not make an adverse credibility finding but said that he “finds it necessary for [Al Saidi] to corroborate his application with all reasonably available information.” Id. at 56-57. He said that “there was reasonably available evidence to [Al Saidi] that was not provided to the Court.” Id. at 57. Al Saidi’s wife, sister, and adoptive father were 7 in the United States and could have testified “about what happened to [Al Saidi] in Yemen” and “the threats that the Balwi family purportedly is making to [Al Saidi] from Yemen.” Id. Because Al Saidi “failed to provide sufficiently persuasive testimony and failed to sufficiently corroborate his application,” the IJ denied his application. Id. at 58. Second, the IJ denied the application on the merits. He determined that Al Saidi had “not established that each [step] in his hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not to occur.” Id. at 63; see Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 917-18 (AG 2006) (denying an application for CAT relief because “[t]he evidence does not establish that any step in this hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not to happen, let alone that the entire chain will come together to result in the probability of torture of respondent”). The IJ reasoned that any threat from the Balwis might no longer be serious, given the vague testimony about the threat; that even if it were serious, it might be resolved monetarily; that even if the Balwis or the Houthis looked for him, he might not be located; and that even if the Houthis intercepted him, Al Saidi had “not established that all of the 200,000 to 300,000 Houthi members or that a majority of them have knowledge of the promise between the Balwi family and [Al Saidi].” Cert. Admin. R. 63. So “even if the Court were to accept as true that the Houthis control ports in Yemen and that they have established checkpoints in Yemen, [Al Saidi] has not demonstrated it is more likely than not that should [Al Saidi] find himself at a Houthi checkpoint that the Houthi member at that checkpoint will have sufficient knowledge of the dispute between [Al Saidi] and the Balwi family, which would result in that Houthi member turning [Al Saidi] over to the custody of the Balwi family.” Id. Indeed, Al Saidi “testified 8 he has not received any direct threats from the Balwi family or from the Houthis since leaving Yemen in 2012.” Id. at 62. The IJ separately determined that Al Saidi had “not satisfactorily demonstrated that internal relocation is impossible,” meaning that Al Saidi could live in a part of Yemen that the Houthis do not control, as one in five Yemenis does. Id. An alien’s “ability to relocate internally means that he cannot establish a likelihood of torture.” Singh, 11 F.4th at 118; see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) (providing that when “assessing whether it is more likely than not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of removal,” the agency considers “[e]vidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured”). III Al Saidi raised two arguments on appeal to the BIA. First, he argued that the IJ erred “because the adverse credibility determination is based principally on perceived rather than actual discrepancies.” Cert. Admin. R. 17 (capitalization omitted). He said that the inconsistencies on which the IJ relied were “trivial” and “improperly perceived,” id. at 17-21, and that there was “nothing inherently implausible” about the testimony, id. at 21. Al Saidi told the BIA that “[r]emand is therefore necessary” for the IJ to “render a new credibility decision, and to independently assess the credibility of the supporting witnesses, and whether corroborating evidence is needed in light of the Respondent’s credible testimony.” Id. at 22. Second, Al Saidi argued that he met his burden to establish eligibility for relief under the CAT because “the uncontroverted evidence reveals that the Houthi-affiliated Balwi family intends to kill Respondent if he is returned to Yemen.” Id. at 23. 9  The BIA agreed with the IJ’s reasoning and decided to “adopt and affirm his decision.” Id. at 4 (citing Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994)). The BIA recounted that the IJ “highlighted significant concerns regarding the credibility of the testimony of the respondent and his witnesses based on internal inconsistencies and omissions.” Id. It explained that “[i]n light of these inconsistencies, the Immigration Judge found that it was necessary for the respondent to provide reasonably available corroboration in support of his claim,” including “testimony from his wife, sister, and stepfather, each of whom were in the United States at the time of the hearing and had knowledge of the respondent’s fear of returning to Yemen.” Id. The BIA observed that the Immigration and Nationality Act “permits an Immigration Judge to require an applicant to provide evidence to corroborate otherwise credible testimony, unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B)). In his appeal to the BIA, however, Al Saidi offered “no argument regarding the need for corroboration or the availability of additional evidence,” so the BIA concluded that “he has waived any challenge” to the “determination” of the IJ that corroboration was required. Id. (citing Matter of R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 658 n.2 (BIA 2012)). The BIA further agreed with the IJ that the “claim for CAT protection relied on the occurrence of a series of hypothetical events” and concluded that the IJ “did not clearly err in finding that the respondent did not prove that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” Id. (citing Matter of Z-Z-O-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 586, 590 (BIA 2015)). The BIA also said that it was not clearly erroneous for the IJ to conclude that “that Houthis control 80 percent of Yemen” but do not 10 “have count[r]ywide control or operate with absolute impunity.” Id. at 5. Al Saidi timely filed a petition for review in this court. DISCUSSION “When the BIA issues an opinion, the opinion becomes the basis for judicial review of the decision of which the alien is complaining.” Singh v. Bondi, 139 F.4th 189, 196 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Bhagtana v. Garland, 93 F.4th 592, 593 (2d Cir. 2023)). But when, as in this case, “the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ and supplements the IJ’s decision, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA.” Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2006). “Our review of the IJ’s decision includes the portions not explicitly discussed by the BIA, but not those grounds explicitly rejected by the BIA.” Malets v. Garland, 66 F.4th 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2023) (alteration omitted) (quoting Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018)). Congress has specified that “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Accordingly, we review the agency’s decision for “substantial evidence” and “must defer to the factfinder’s findings based on ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “The scope of review ‘under the substantial evidence standard is exceedingly narrow, and we will uphold the BIA’s decision unless the petitioner demonstrates that the record evidence was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find him eligible for relief.’” Singh, 11 F.4th at 113 (quoting Mu Xiang Lin v. DOJ, 432 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2005)). 11  The Supreme Court has clarified that “§ 1252(b)(4)(B) requires courts to review the entirety of the agency’s conclusions—both the underlying factual findings and the application of the INA to those findings—for substantial evidence.” Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 545 (2026). Thus, while we have previously applied a different standard when reviewing the application of law to fact, 2 we now apply the substantial evidence standard not only to “the underlying factual findings” but also to “the agency’s application of the statute to those findings.” Urias-Orellana, 607 U.S. at 544. 2 See, e.g., Sufiyan v. Blanche, 177 F.4th 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2026) (reviewing “the application of law to facts anew, without deferring to the reasoning of the BIA”); Toalombo Yanez v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2025) (holding that “the appropriate standard of review” for a “hardship determination” under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) “is for clear error”); Reid v. Bondi, 132 F.4th 109, 121 (2d Cir. 2024) (stating that we review “the application of law to facts” de novo) (quoting Ojo v. Garland, 25 F.4th 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2022)); Ud Din v. Garland, 72 F.4th 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2023) (stating that “we review de novo … the application of law to facts”) (quoting Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 326 (2d Cir. 2020)); Mendis v. Filip, 554 F.3d 335, 338 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that we “review de novo … the application of law to fact”) (quoting Passi v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2008)); Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e review de novo the IJ’s determination of mixed questions of law and fact, as well as … the IJ’s application of law to facts.”); Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]f the issue on appeal involves the proper application of legal principles to the facts and circumstances of the individual case at hand, our review has been de novo.”); Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen the situation presented is the BIA’s application of legal principles to undisputed facts, rather than its underlying determination of those facts or its interpretation of its governing statutes, ‘our review of the BIA’s asylum and withholding of deportation determinations is de novo.’”) (quoting Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995)). 12  We have not previously identified the standard by which we review the determination of the BIA that a petitioner’s claim has been waived or forfeited. See Steevenez v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 114, 118 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that “this Court has not determined a standard of review of the BIA’s procedural determination that a claim before the BIA has been waived”). Because in this case we must apply a standard of review, we hold that we review a BIA determination of waiver or forfeiture for abuse of discretion. Under the applicable regulations, the BIA “may summarily dismiss any appeal or portion of any appeal in any case in which,” among other circumstances, “[t]he party concerned fails to specify the reasons for the appeal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(A) (emphasis added). To avoid summary dismissal, “[t]he party taking the appeal must identify the reasons for the appeal,” “must specifically identify the findings of fact, the conclusions of law, or both, that are being challenged,” and “must identify the specific factual and legal finding or findings that are being challenged.” Id. § 1003.3(b). The Supreme Court “has repeatedly observed” that “the word ‘may’ clearly connotes discretion.” Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6, 13 (2024) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Our court has also recognized that “may” indicates that the relevant “officials have discretion.” Garcia v. Heath, 74 F.4th 44, 48 (2d Cir. 2023). We therefore agree with the Third Circuit that because the BIA “may determine when to summarily dismiss an appeal for lack of specificity and when the BIA is sufficiently appraised of the appealable issues to entertain the appeal,” the proper standard is to “review such dismissals for abuse of discretion.” Uddin v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 13 omitted). Other circuits have reached similar conclusions. 3 Abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard even when the BIA says that it has dismissed an applicant’s claim because it “found his claim ‘waived,’ and not ‘summarily dismissed.’” Uddin, 870 F.3d at 288. Even if the BIA “may not have used the magic words ‘summarily dismiss,’ it was clearly unable to address [the] claim because it could not discern [the applicant’s] grievance with the IJ’s CAT ruling, and it dismissed the claim on those grounds.” Id. Bearing in mind these standards of review, we proceed to consider the agency’s dismissal of Al Saidi’s application for CAT relief based on (1) the failure to provide corroboration and (2) the failure to establish a likelihood of torture. I The IJ denied Al Saidi’s application for deferral of removal under the CAT for failure to present reasonably available corroborating evidence. The BIA affirmed the decision of the IJ by adopting the determination of the IJ that corroboration was required and by concluding that Al Saidi forfeited any challenge to that determination. Al Saidi argues that the BIA erred in doing so. In his view, the determination that corroboration was required relied on a finding that the hearing testimony was incredible without 3 See Esponda v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 1319, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because the regulation at issue here indicates that the BIA ‘may’ summarily dismiss an appeal, it vests discretion in the BIA. Thus, we review the BIA’s application of the regulation to summarily dismiss the [petitioners’] appeal for abuse of discretion.”) (citation omitted); Singh v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The regulation at issue here states that the BIA ‘may’ summarily dismiss an appeal for failure to state specific reasons or file a promised brief. … Accordingly, we will not reverse a dismissal under [the regulation] unless the Board has abused its discretion.”) (citation omitted). 14 corroboration because of the purported inconsistencies. Because Al Saidi argued to the BIA that the IJ should have found the testimony credible, he claims that he raised a challenge to the determination that corroboration was required. And he argues that the determination itself was erroneous. We disagree. We conclude that the agency did not abuse its discretion by treating a challenge to the corroboration requirement as forfeited. Moreover, even if Al Saidi had not forfeited a challenge to the corroboration requirement, we would conclude that the agency did not abuse its discretion by requiring corroboration. A Before the BIA, Al Saidi argued that the inconsistencies the IJ identified were too “trivial” to justify an adverse credibility finding. Cert. Admin. R. 17. He inferred that the IJ made an adverse credibility finding because, in his view, corroboration may be required only when the testimony is incredible without corroboration. But that premise is incorrect. The IJ neither made nor needed to make an adverse credibility finding before requiring corroboration. Instead, the IJ expressed “concerns as to the quality of the testimony provided and the credibility of the witnesses” before concluding that he “finds it is necessary for [Al Saidi] to corroborate his application with all reasonably available information.” Id. at 49, 56-57. In reaching that conclusion, the IJ relied on precedent of the BIA holding that “regardless of whether an applicant is deemed credible, he still has the burden to corroborate the material elements of his claim where evidence is reasonably available.” Id. at 57 (citing Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516, 518-19 (BIA 2015)). Whether the inconsistencies provided a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility finding is a different question from whether, given 15 the IJ’s concerns about the testimony, he was entitled to require corroboration. “Credibility and corroboration are distinct but related issues discussed in separate provisions of the INA and require separate analysis.” Matter of G-C-I-, 29 I. & N. Dec. 176, 180 (BIA 2025). For that reason, “credibility and corroboration are distinct principles in this Circuit’s immigration jurisprudence.” Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has also recognized that “the INA expressly distinguishes between credibility, persuasiveness, and the burden of proof,” so even when the agency “treats an alien’s evidence as credible, the agency need not find his evidence persuasive or sufficient to meet the burden of proof.” Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 371 (2021). The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that “the immigration judge will determine whether or not the testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant has satisfied the applicant’s burden of proof.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). It addresses credibility by providing that “the immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements,” and other inconsistencies, “inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.” Id. § 1229a(c)(4)(C); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). It addresses corroboration by separately providing that “[w]here the immigration judge determines that the applicant should provide evidence which corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant demonstrates that the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” Id. § 1229a(c)(4)(B). These separate authorities of the IJ—to make an 16 adverse credibility finding and to require corroboration—each aid the IJ in deciding whether the applicant has met his “burden.” Id. § 1229a(c)(4)(B); id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). We have previously recognized that the INA “affords factfinders considerable flexibility in requiring corroborating evidence, even for credible testimony.” Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149 n.11 (2d Cir. 2020). The statute authorizes the IJ to determine that the applicant should provide corroborating evidence. Once the IJ makes that determination, the “evidence must be provided” subject only to a sufficient demonstration by the applicant that “the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B) (emphasis added); id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). The IJ, like any rational factfinder, might require corroborating evidence for reasons aside from incredible testimony. “An IJ who finds an applicant’s testimony credible may still decide that the testimony falls short of satisfying the applicant’s burden of proof, either because it is unpersuasive or because it did not include specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee,” so he might “require evidence to corroborate otherwise credible testimony.” Pinel-Gomez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 523, 529-30 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). The IJ might determine that “it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics of an applicant’s claim,” so “[t]he absence of such [expected] corroborating evidence can lead to a finding that an applicant has failed to meet her burden of proof.” Matter of S- M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 725-26 (BIA 1997). The IJ “may not be able to decide sufficiency of evidence until all the evidence has been presented,” so he might require corroborating evidence. Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 198. The IJ might require corroborating evidence in order 17 to decide whether the testimony is credible: “[T]here must be sufficient information in the record to judge the plausibility and accuracy of the applicant’s claim. Without background information against which to judge the alien’s testimony, it may well be difficult to evaluate the credibility of the testimony.” Matter of Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120, 124 (BIA 1989). As a result, “corroborative background evidence that establishes a plausible context for the persecution claim (or an explanation for the absence of such evidence) may well be essential.” Id. at 125. And, of course, “corroboration may be found to fill an evidentiary gap created when testimony is unspecific or otherwise unpersuasive on its own.” Matter of G-C-I-, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 181. To be sure, we have said that “[a]n applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). But that means that a failure of corroboration may support an adverse credibility finding. It does not mean that the only circumstance in which an IJ may require corroboration is when he has already made an adverse credibility finding. To the contrary, we and other courts have recognized that “an applicant may be generally credible but his testimony may not be sufficient to carry the burden of persuading the fact finder of the accuracy of his claim of crucial facts if he fails to put forth corroboration that should be readily available.” Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 2018). As a result, “the agency is entitled to require reasonably available corroborating evidence even for credible testimony.” Moller v. Garland, No. 21-6564, 2024 WL 2747253, at *2 (2d Cir. May 29, 2024). Thus, “an immigration judge exercises ‘substantial leeway to demand corroboration of an asylum applicant’s allegations whether or not the judge finds the applicant 18 credible.’” Raghunathan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 371, 379 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 618 (7th Cir. 2009)). “Only if such evidence is beyond the reasonable ability of the immigrant to obtain is the judge precluded from demanding corroboration.” Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d at 618. An IJ need not even provide a “continuance for the applicant to obtain that evidence prior to rendering a decision on the application,” Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 29; see also Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 198 n.6, because the corroboration requirement reflects the fact that “the alien bears the ultimate burden of introducing such evidence without prompting from the IJ,” Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 198; see also Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he REAL ID Act clearly states that corroborative evidence may be required, placing immigrants on notice of the consequences for failing to provide corroborative evidence.”). We have not previously needed to decide “whether the IJ’s decision to require corroboration is a legal or discretionary determination.” Pinel-Gomez, 52 F.4th at 530. We conclude here that it is discretionary because the INA authorizes the IJ to determine that the applicant has met his burden of proof without corroboration, but it also authorizes the IJ to “determine[] that the applicant should provide evidence which corroborates otherwise credible testimony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B); id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). The IJ may make such a determination subject to a single statutory limitation: “Only if such evidence is beyond the reasonable ability of the immigrant to obtain is the judge precluded from demanding corroboration.” Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d at 618 (emphasis added). And the INA expressly directs that “[n]o court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of corroborating evidence, as described in section 1158(b)(1)(B), 1229a(c)(4)(B), or 1231(b)(3)(C) of this title, unless the court finds, pursuant to subsection (b)(4)(B), that a 19 reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (emphasis added); see also Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 197-98 (“[W]e review with substantial deference an IJ’s determination that corroborating evidence was reasonably available to the applicant.”). That statutory framework creates a range of circumstances under which the IJ has the discretion to require corroboration. Cf. Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 524 (explaining that § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) “was intended to codify Matter of S-M-J- and not to impose additional rigid requirements for the consideration of corroboration”). 4 An IJ does not abuse his discretion when he requires corroborating evidence in the absence of an adverse credibility 4 We have also recognized that the IJ must explain “why it is reasonable under the BIA’s standards to expect such corroboration.” Manning v. Barr, 954 F.3d 477, 485 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Diallo, 232 F.3d at 290). The obligation to follow the precedents of the BIA reflects the regulatory requirement that the published decisions of the BIA and of the Attorney General “serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(2). “It is a familiar rule of administrative law that an agency must abide by its own regulations.” United States v. Kahn, 5 F.4th 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2021) (Menashi, J., dissenting) (quoting Fort Stewart Schs. v. FLRA, 495 U.S. 641, 654 (1990)). As a result, “the Board’s interpretation of the immigration law, when set forth in a published Board decision, remains an authoritative statement of the law unless modified or overruled by the Attorney General.” Matter of E-L-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 814, 825 (BIA 2005). The BIA may revise its precedents but in doing so it must show “that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (emphasis omitted); see also Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011). That the agency may constrain its own discretion by regulation or precedent, however, does not alter the conclusion that the agency has a range of discretion to require corroboration. 20 finding. Indeed, an adverse credibility finding by itself would be a sufficient ground for denying an application for immigration relief. See, e.g., Xue Hong Yang v. DOJ, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). If corroboration could not be required unless the IJ had already made an adverse credibility finding, then the requirement to provide corroborating evidence would never contribute to the IJ’s determination of “whether the applicant has met [his] burden.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B); id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Corroboration would become relevant only after the IJ had already determined that the applicant failed to satisfy his burden, and its function would be only to rehabilitate an insufficient evidentiary showing. Cf. Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 199 (noting that an alien might provide an “explanation for the failure to provide such corroborating evidence, either in a motion to reopen or on appeal to the BIA”). That approach conflicts with a fair reading of the INA and with