Full Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MARK CHRISTIAN, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 26-1428 (RDM) MARKWAYNE MULLIN., et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), a citizen of the United States “may file a petition,” referred to as a “Form I-130 petition,” with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) requesting recognition of a foreign national family member, including a spouse, as an “immediate relative.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1). If “the facts stated in the petition are true,” the immediate relative is “eligible for preference” in obtaining a visa to immigrate to the United States. Id. § 1154(b). The Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”), however, imposes a limit on this path to lawful permanent resident status: the USCIS must deny a family- based petition brought by a U.S. citizen who has been convicted of a sex offense against a minor, unless the USCIS, in its “sole and unreviewable discretion, determines that the citizen poses no risk to” the beneficiary relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I). Plaintiff Mark Christian, proceeding pro se, brings this suit against the USCIS, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and the Attorney General, challenging the USCIS’s denial of two Form I-130 petitions—one in February 2023 and the other in February 2026— requesting recognition of his wife as an “immediate relative.” The USCIS denied both petitions on the ground that Christian had been convicted of a sex offense specified in the AWA and had failed to prove “beyond any reasonable doubt” that he posed no risk to his wife. Christian contends that the USCIS’s application of the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard to its no-risk determination violated binding agency precedent in Matter of Chawathe, which directs the USCIS in adjudicating immigration petitions and visa applications to apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, except where “a different standard is specified by law.” 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). Because the AWA specifies no evidentiary standard for such determinations, Christian contends, Matter of Chawathe controls and the USCIS’s application of a heightened standard of proof violated the Accardi doctrine, under which an agency must follow its own binding precedents. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954). Christian seeks vacatur of the USCIS’s denial of his petition and a remand for the agency to re-adjudicate it under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Dkt. 11 at 4 (Am. Compl. Prayer for Relief). In an earlier decision, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to expedite, denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. See Christian v. Mullin, No. 26-cv-1428, 2026 WL 2453585 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2026) (“Christian I”). Now before the Court are Defendants’ motion for relief from the requirement under Local Civil Rule 7(n)(1) to file a certified list of the contents of the administrative record, Dkt. 18, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 29, and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 31. The central question posed by the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment is whether Matter of Chawathe’s direction regarding use of the preponderance-of-the- evidence standard in adjudicating immigration petitions applies to AWA no-risk determinations. 2 For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has the better argument and that Chawathe is binding in the present context. The Court, accordingly, will DENY Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and will GRANT in part and DENY in part Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The Court will DENY as moot Defendants’ request for relief from Local Rule 7(n)(1). I. BACKGROUND A. Statutory and Regulatory Background Under the INA, a United States citizen may file a Form I-130 petition with the USCIS, a component of the DHS, requesting that the USCIS classify his or her spouse or child as an immediate relative. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(l)(A)(i); 6 U.S.C. § 271(b) (transferring authority to adjudicate immigrant visa petitions and all other adjudications previously performed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to the USCIS); 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.l(a)(1), 204.2(a)(1). If the facts contained in the Form I-130 petition are true, the USCIS “shall . . . approve” the petition, and the beneficiary relative may then immigrate to the United States and obtain lawful permanent resident status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); Castaneira v. Noem 138 F.4th 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2025). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing eligibility and entitlement to the status claimed. 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, imposes limits on this process. Enacted “to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children,” id. § 102, 120 Stat. at 590, the AWA, as relevant here, amended the INA with respect to U.S. citizens who have been convicted of a “specified offense against a minor.” The AWA defines a “specified offense against a minor” to include, among other offenses, “[c]riminal sexual conduct involving a minor, or the use of the Internet to facilitate or attempt such conduct” and “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.” Id. 3 § 111(7), 120 Stat. at 592 (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)). A U.S. citizen who has been convicted of a sex offense against a minor may not petition for immediate relative status for their spouse or child, “unless the Secretary of Homeland Security, in the Secretary’s sole and unreviewable discretion, determines that the citizen poses no risk to” the beneficiary relative. Id. § 402(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 622 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I)). The Secretary of Homeland Security has delegated to the USCIS the authority, in adjudicating family-based petitions, to determine whether a citizen “poses no risk” to the beneficiary relative. See 6 U.S.C. § 271(b)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 2.1; Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Delegation No. 0150.l(II)(H) (June 5, 2003), https://perma.cc/7ZKV-4EG5. The AWA neither includes an express evidentiary standard applicable to such determinations nor requires the agency to follow any specific procedures in determining whether a Form I-130 petitioner “poses no risk” to the beneficiary relative. In February 2007, however, the USCIS’s Associate Director issued an interoffice memorandum to the agency’s field offices containing guidance on applying the AWA. See Interoffice Memorandum from Michael Aytes, Associate Director, to Regional Directors, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Guidance for Adjudication of Family-Based Petitions and I-129F Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Feb. 8, 2007) (“Aytes Memorandum”), https://perma.cc/5YXA-NYQR. The memorandum explains that the USCIS interprets the “poses no risk” provision of the AWA “to mean that the petitioner must pose no risk to the safety or well-being of the beneficiary, which includes the principal beneficiary and any alien derivative beneficiary.” Id. at 5. As relevant here, the memorandum further provides that, to avoid denial of a Form I-130 petition, a petitioner who has been convicted of a specified offense against a minor “must submit evidence of rehabilitation and any 4 other relevant evidence that clearly demonstrates, beyond any reasonable doubt, that he or she poses no risk to the safety and well-being of his or her intended beneficiary(ies).” 1 Id. This agency guidance arguably conflicts with binding agency precedent requiring application of a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in administrative immigration adjudications like those involving Form I-130 petitions. In Matter of Chawathe, a case involving the evidentiary standard an applicant must satisfy to show that his or her employer is an “American firm or corporation” for purposes of a Form N-470 application, the USCIS’s Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”) established that “a petitioner or applicant in administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought,” except in cases in which “a different standard is specified by law.” 25 I&N Dec. at 375. Matter of Chawathe was issued by the AAO in January 2006 and “adopted” by the USCIS as nonbinding guidance to USCIS field officers. Id. at 369 n.1. In October 2010, the USCIS, with the approval of the Attorney General, designated Chawathe as precedential pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(i). Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 369 n.1. Decisions designated by the agency as precedential are published and “serve as precedents in all 1 In 2008, the USCIS issued another memorandum to its field office leadership about adjudicating AWA cases, which reiterated the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard. See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director, to Field Leadership, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Transmittal of SOP for Adjudication of Family-Based Petitions Under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Sept. 24, 2008) (“Neufeld Memorandum”), https://perma.cc/32UF-XP6A. Because neither party meaningfully discusses the Neufeld Memorandum nor contends that it bears in any way on the proper disposition of the parties’ motions, the Court will not separately address the Neufeld Memorandum. The Court notes, however, that the Neufeld Memorandum was, like the Aytes Memorandum, a guidance document issued internally from USCIS leadership to USCIS field offices. Because, as the Court explains below, both memoranda constitute nonbinding interpretive guidance and the Neufeld Memorandum is identical in relevant part to the Aytes Memorandum, the Court agrees with the parties that the Neufeld Memorandum does not affect the Court’s resolution of this case. 5 proceedings involving the same issue(s).” 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c); see also id. §§ 1003.1(g)(2), (i). “Except as these decisions may be modified or overruled by later precedent decisions, they are binding on all [USCIS] employees” in adjudicating immigration petitions. Id. § 103.3(c). B. Procedural History Christian is a U.S. citizen and disabled veteran who lives in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Christian suffers from a variety of grave medical conditions, including congestive heart failure, kidney failure, type 2 diabetes, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Dkt. 15 at 3; Dkt. 11-1 at 1. Christian’s wife is a foreign national, and, over the course of fifteen years, Christian has filed four separate Form I-130 petitions on her behalf. Dkt. 11-1 at 1. The USCIS has denied each application on the grounds that Christian has been convicted of a specified offense against a minor under the Adam Walsh Act. 2 This case involves the USCIS’s two most recent denials of Christian’s Form I-130 petitions, which were issued on February 7, 2023, and February 25, 2026. See Dkt. 11-1 at 2; Dkt. 11-3 (February 7, 2023 decision); Dkt. 1-1 (February 25, 2026 decision). In both decisions, the USCIS explained that, given Christian’s conviction of a specified offense against a minor, avoiding denial of his petition required him to submit evidence that demonstrates, “beyond any reasonable doubt,” that he “poses no risk” to the beneficiary. Dkt. 11-3 at 3; Dkt. 1-1 at 5. Evaluating the evidence Christian submitted under this standard, the USCIS concluded that Christian had failed to demonstrate that he posed no risk to his wife and, accordingly, denied his petition. Dkt. 11-3 at 6; Dkt. 1-1 at 7. In neither decision did the USCIS consider whether a 2 Christian does not dispute that he has been convicted of one of the sex offenses specified by the Act. 6 different standard of proof applied nor whether Christian might have succeeded in demonstrating that he posed no risk to his wife under a different standard. Christian initiated this action on April 24, 2026, Dkt. 1, and sought expedited consideration of his case given his ongoing health crisis and his concern that his wife, who is his sole caregiver, might face imminent removal from the United States, Dkt. 3. At the same time that he filed his complaint, Christian moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 4. On June 8, 2026, Christian filed an amended complaint, asserting claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq., and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, alleging that the USCIS applied the incorrect evidentiary standard to its no-risk determination in adjudicating his petition. Dkt. 11 at 4. Christian contends that the USCIS’s application of the “beyond any reasonable doubt standard” violates binding USCIS precedent in Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369 (AAO 2010), and D.C. Circuit precedent in Castaneira v. Noem, 138 F.4th 540 (D.C. Cir. 2025). After filing his amended complaint, Plaintiff filed a renewed motion for expedited consideration given his “profound, active, and life-threatening” condition. Dkt. 15 at 2. In response, Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim because the INA strips federal courts of jurisdiction “to review . . . any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified . . . to be in the[ir] [respective] discretion,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). See Dkt. 17 at 11. The Court granted Christian’s motion to expedite as unopposed and denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss as foreclosed by binding D.C. Circuit precedent in Castaneira. See Christian I 2026 WL 2453585, at *2–3. The Court also denied Christian’s motion for summary judgment 7 without prejudice to permit him to re-brief the dispositive issues in light of the Court’s decision, and the Court set an expedited briefing schedule for doing so. Id. at *4. The Court directed Plaintiff to address in his summary judgment briefing, among other things, whether Matter of Chawathe constitutes controlling precedent in the present circumstances. Id. Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on September 8, 2026, Dkt. 29, and Plaintiff opposed that motion and cross-moved for summary judgment three days later, Dkt. 30; Dkt. 31. The Court then issued a Neal Order advising Plaintiff of the standards governing the Court’s consideration of Defendants’ summary judgment motion and permitting Plaintiff to file a supplemental memorandum in opposition based on the Court’s instructions. Dkt. 32. Plaintiff did so on September 21, 2026, Dkt. 33, and Defendants filed their reply and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on October 13, Dkt. 34; Dkt. 35. Plaintiff filed his final reply on October 19, 2026. Dkt. 36. Both motions are ripe for the Court’s review. Pending before the Court is also Defendants’ motion for relief from the requirement under Local Civil Rule 7(n)(1) to file a certified list of the contents of the administrative record. Dkt. 18. On September 8, 2026, Defendants filed with the Court the certified list of the contents of the administrative record. Dkt. 28. II. LEGAL STANDARD In general, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 authorizes a federal district court to enter summary judgment when the pleadings and the evidence demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In a case involving review of a final agency action under the [APA], however, the standard set forth in Rule 56(a) does not apply because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record.” Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2012). In 8 the unique context of a case brought under the APA, the district court “sits as an appellate tribunal,” Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1993), to decide “whether as a matter of law the agency action is supported by the administrative record and is otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review,” Coal. for Common Sense in Gov’t Procurement v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 2d 275, 280 (D.D.C. 2011). III. ANALYSIS The crux of the present dispute is whether Matter of Chawathe applies in this context and thus binds USCIS to apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence, rather than beyond-any-reasonable- doubt, standard in assessing whether a Form I-130 petitioner who has been convicted of a “specified offense against a minor” under the AWA “poses no risk” to the beneficiary of the petition. A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction At the outset, Defendants re-raise their earlier contention that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review whether the USCIS’s application of a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard complied with Chawathe. As the Court has already explained, see Christian I, 2026 WL 2453585, at *2– 3, D.C. Circuit precedent establishes that the Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the USCIS has followed binding agency precedent in rendering its otherwise discretionary decision on Christian’s Form I-130 petition, see Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 548. Although Defendants argue that recent decisions from the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit “undermine the D.C. Circuit’s holding,” Dkt. 29 at 27, neither decision overrules nor abrogates the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Castaneira. With respect to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mullin v. Doe, 609 U.S. 324 (2026), Defendants concede that the decision concerns a different statutory provision with different jurisdiction-stripping language. See Dkt. 29 at 27–28; Mullin, 609 U.S. at 338–39 (interpreting 9 the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A), which precludes judicial review of “any determination of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state” under the Temporary Protected Status Program). In Castaneira, the D.C. Circuit considered, and rejected, the government’s contention that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of the Secretary’s alleged disregard of “applicable agency precedent” by applying the beyond-any-reasonable doubt standard to the plaintiff’s Form I-130 petition. 138 F.4th at 549. In Mullin, in contrast, the Supreme Court did not interpret nor apply § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), nor did it consider whether federal district courts have jurisdiction to consider claims challenging otherwise unreviewable discretionary determinations on the ground that the agency contravened its own binding precedent. But even if Castaneira were in some tension with Mullin, the Court would remain bound to follow on-point D.C. Circuit precedent unless and until the Supreme Court or the en banc D.C. Circuit overrules it or “effectively overrule[s]” it by thoroughly “eviscerat[ing]” its reasoning. Brookens v. Acosta, 297 F. Supp. 3d 40, 47 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Perry v. MSPB, 829 F.3d 760, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 582 U.S. 420 (2017)), aff’d sub nom. Brookens v. Dep’t of Lab., No. 18- 5129, 2018 WL 5118489 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 19, 2018); see City of Saint Paul, Minnesota v. Wright, 816 F. Supp. 3d 65, 71–72 (D.D.C. 2026). Mullin does neither, so Castaneira remains binding law. See Castaneira v. Mullin, No. 22-cv-1485, 2026 WL 3438451, at *9–10 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2026) (reaching the same conclusion). Nor, contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, does the Seventh Circuit’s disagreement with Castaneira bear on this Court’s decision. See Dkt. 29 at 28 (arguing that the Seventh Circuit in Nobles v. Mullin, 177 F.4th 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2026), “outright rejected the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Castaneira”). “Binding precedent for the district courts within a circuit is set only by 10 the court of appeals for that circuit.” Cannon v. Watermark Ret. Communities, Inc., 45 F.4th 137, 149 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (citation modified). It is not uncommon for the circuits to disagree on significant questions of law, but only the decision of the D.C. Circuit binds this Court, and this Court must abide by that decision. Notably, Defendants have not even attempted to distinguish this case from Castaneira, nor could they. In Castaneira, the D.C. Circuit addressed whether the district court had jurisdiction to decide whether the USCIS failed to abide by Matter of Chawathe when it required the Form I-130 petitioner in that case to prove beyond any reasonable doubt that he posed no risk to the beneficiary relative. The circuit held that this Court had jurisdiction to consider whether Matter of Chawathe binds the agency in this context and that, if so, “it must exercise its judicial review over [the plaintiff’s] challenge to the standard of proof.” 138 F.4th at 551. That conclusion applies here with equal force. This Court, accordingly, has jurisdiction to review Christian’s claim that the USCIS departed from binding agency precedent by applying the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard in adjudicating his Form I-130 petition. B. Merits The Court next turns to the merits of Plaintiff’s APA claim challenging the denial of his petition as contrary to binding agency precedent. 3 Because the parties agree that the USCIS 3 Plaintiff’s complaint also seeks relief under the Mandamus Act, which empowers courts “to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361; see also Dkt. 11 at 4, 5. Although the Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s pro se status requires the Court to construe his filings liberally, see Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the Court notes that Plaintiff’s pending cross- motion for summary judgment raises arguments under only the APA, see Dkt. 30 at 8, 24. And, in any event, considering whether mandamus is available in this case is unnecessary because, to the extent Plaintiff’s claim is successful, the APA provides a remedy. See Liu v. Novak, 509 F. 11 applied a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt, rather than a preponderance-of-the-evidence, standard to its no-risk determination, the merits of this dispute turn entirely on whether Matter of Chawathe provides the applicable standard for such determinations. If Chawathe applies to no-risk determinations that the USCIS makes in adjudicating family-based petitions, the USCIS’s application of a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard violated binding agency precedent, and Christian is entitled to summary judgment. See Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 551 (citing Accardi, 347 U.S.at 268). If Chawathe does not apply, the Court may not review the USCIS’s ultimately discretionary no-risk determination. See id. at 550 (recognizing that “USCIS’s final no-risk determinations are unreviewable”). The parties agree that Chawathe qualifies as a binding agency precedent pursuant to 8C.F.R. §§ 103.3(1) and 1003.1(i). 4 See Dkt. 29 at 19; see also Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 549 (“The Government does not dispute that Chawathe constitutes binding agency precedent pursuant to the agency’s own regulations.”). The question for the Court is whether this binding precedent applies to no-risk determinations under the AWA. Although Matter of Chawathe arose in the context of a noncitizen’s application to preserve his residence and the subsidiary question whether he was “employed by an American firm or corporation engaged in whole or in part in the development of foreign trade and commerce of the United States,” 25 I&N Dec. at 371, Chawathe announced a more expansive rule: “Except where a different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in Supp. 2d 1, 8 n.3 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Leavitt, 483 F.3d 852, 858 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). The Court will, accordingly, focus on Plaintiff’s APA claim. 4 Although Defendants emphasize in their opposition that Matter of Chawathe was a nonbinding “adopted” decision when it was first issued in 2006, see Dkt. 34 at 6 (referring to Chawathe as a “non-precedential Adopted Decision”), they concede that Chawathe was a binding precedent at the time the USCIS adjudicated Christian’s petition and has been since the USCIS and the Attorney General designated it as such in 2010, see id. at 10–11. 12 administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought.” Id. at 375. On its face, the rule applies broadly to “petitioner[s] [and] applicant[s] in administrative immigration proceedings,” and the proviso for cases in which “a different standard is specified by law” plainly contemplates application beyond the particular question posed in Chawathe. Indeed, from the very beginning—and even before the decision was given binding precedential effect—the USCIS understood that Chawathe set forth the “standard of proof applicable in most administrative immigration proceedings,” albeit not in cases “where a higher standard is specified by law.” Memorandum from Robert C. Divine, Acting Deputy Director, to Service Center Directors, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Matter of Chawathe (Jan. 11, 2006) (“Divine Memorandum”), https://perma.cc/RD7G-CKQ7. Defendants contend that, despite Chawathe’s sweeping language, the Court should conclude that Chawathe is distinguishable from the instant case based on its different factual backdrop. But Defendants’ attempt to circumscribe Chawathe’s reach is belied by both the decision’s own language and the agency’s practice in applying it. As noted above, Matter of Chawathe unmistakably speaks to the evidentiary standard applicable to USCIS adjudications beyond those involving questions of an employer’s status as an “American firm or corporation” or subsidy thereof. In establishing that the preponderance-of- the-evidence constitutes the default standard of proof in immigration adjudications, Chawathe cites immigration decisions in various contexts, including decisions involving family-based petitions. See Matter of Martinez, 21 I&N Dec. 1035, 1036 (BIA 1997) (requiring a petitioner seeking a visa on behalf of his daughter to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the beneficiary was his child); Matter of Soo Hoo, 11 I&N Dec. 151, 152–53 (BIA 1965) (requiring 13 a petitioner seeking a visa on behalf of her adopted son to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a valid adoption). And following Chawathe’s elevation to binding precedent, the USCIS has routinely cited Chawathe in its guidance materials, and in its decisions in myriad factual contexts, for the proposition that the default evidentiary standard in USCIS adjudications is preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., AAO Practice Manual, Chapter 3—Appeals (“AAO Practice Manual”) (citing Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376), https://perma.cc/DFK6-6Z5T; Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884, 889 & n.8 (2016) (applying Chawathe to a petition for a national interest waiver); Matter of Christos, Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 539 (AAO 2015) (applying Chawathe to a petition seeking visa preference classification for immigrants qualified to perform “skilled labor”); Matter of Skirball Cultural Ctr., 25 I&N Dec. 799, 805 (2012) (applying Chawathe’s preponderance standard to a visa petition seeking classification of beneficiaries as entertainers in a “culturally unique” program). Whether Chawathe binds the agency to apply the preponderance standard to Christian’s Form I-130 petition—including the no-risk determination required by the AWA—turns on two questions: first, whether Chawathe sets forth a general default rule applicable to “administrative immigration proceedings,” and, second, if so, whether this case falls within the exception to the default rule for adjudications for which “a different standard is specified by law.” 25 I&N Dec. at 375. As to the first question, Defendants do not dispute that the USCIS’s adjudication of Christian’s Form I-130 petition is an “administrative immigration proceeding,” as that phrase is used in Chawathe. Nor can the Court discern any reason to conclude otherwise. Like the examples Chawathe cites, Christian’s petition was filed with the USCIS and seeks an 14 immigration benefit (here, classification of his wife as an “immediate relative”) under the chapter of the U.S. Code dealing with immigration and nationality. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a). The examples on which Chawathe relies further confirm that the decision contemplates application of the preponderance standard both when a petitioner seeks a benefit for him or herself and when a petitioner seeks that benefit on behalf of another. See, e.g., Matter of Martinez, 21 I&N Dec. at 1036. Defendants, instead, focus much of their argument on the second question, which asks whether, in the circumstances presented here, “a different standard is specified by law,” 25 I&N Dec. at 375. Defendants point to two potential sources of “law” governing family-based petitions in AWA cases. First, they contend that the AWA itself is inconsistent with Chawathe’s preponderance standard and thus compels application of a more onerous evidentiary standard. Second, they invoke the Aytes Memorandum’s interpretive guidance directing USCIS officials adjudicating Form I-130 petitions in AWA cases to apply a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard. Neither argument is persuasive. Defendants raise a variety of arguments in support of their contention that Chawathe’s preponderance standard is inconsistent with the AWA. They point, for example, to the purpose of the AWA to protect beneficiaries by imposing a high bar for those convicted of sex offenses to file family-based immigration petitions. Dkt. 29 at 15–16. And they cite ample legislative history to this effect. See id. Reinforcing this stated purpose, Defendants also invoke what they characterize as textual indicia that AWA “no risk” adjudications demand an onerous burden of proof. These include the titles and subheadings in the AWA, the language of which reflects an intent to “prevent sex offenders from abusing children” and “bar[] convicted sex offenders from having family-based petitions approved.” Id. at 15. Finally, Defendants contend that the AWA’s 15 requirement that the Secretary determine that a petitioner “poses no risk”—that is, “not any” risk—is incompatible with the preponderance standard, under which the USCIS might conclude that there is “a 49 percent chance that the sex offender would pose a risk” to the beneficiary and yet nevertheless approve the petition. Id. at 21. But even if the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard would further Congress’s goals in enacting the AWA, Defendants’ arguments from purpose and legislative history do not answer the question presented here, which is not whether the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard is consistent with the purposes of the AWA, but rather whether it is the only standard the AWA permits; that is, is it the standard “specified” in the AWA? The Court does not doubt that Congress intended to impose a substantial burden on family-based petitioners who have been convicted of sex offenses against minors, but Defendants provide no basis to conclude that the AWA’s history and purpose (or titles and subheadings) establish that Congress implicitly mandated that the USCIS impose a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt burden of proof or that it foreclosed the USCIS’s application in this context of the default preponderance standard. Most notably, Defendants fail to explain why the substantive “no risk” test fails to achieve the statutory purpose or why the statute should be read to impose a second level of assurance. On Defendants’ telling, Congress was not satisfied with its requirement that the USCIS find by a preponderance of the evidence—or some other standard—that the petitioner “poses no risk” to the immediate relative at issue, but instead at least implicitly required that the agency go a step further and find beyond any reasonable doubt that the petitioner poses no risk. That is, in Defendants’ view, the AWA does not permit the USCIS to approve a petition if it concludes that it is more likely than not that a Form I-130 petitioner poses zero risk to the beneficiary; rather, the AWA demands that the agency conclude that there is no reasonable doubt that a petitioner 16 poses zero risk. The first standard is daunting; the second borders on the insurmountable. The question before the Court is not which standard constitutes the better policy, but whether Congress required—as a matter of law—that the USCIS apply the second approach. Defendants have failed to identify any statutory text, context, or legislative history that supports that legal conclusion. As for Defendants’ textual argument that the “poses no risk” requirement “specifie[s]” a standard other than Chawathe’s preponderance standard, the Court is further unpersuaded. The Chawathe proviso applies “where a different standard is specified by law,” 25 I&N Dec. at 375, and not where a different standard is “merely assumed or contemplated,” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 243 n.10 (2010). As the Supreme Court has explained, the word “‘[s]pecified is not synonymous with ‘implied’ or ‘anticipated.’” Id. Rather, it “means ‘to name or state explicitly or in detail.’” Id. (quoting Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 1116 (1974)). Here, the relevant provision of the AWA does not specify the standard of proof the USCIS must apply in making no-risk determinations. Even assuming Defendants are correct that the phrase “poses no risk” requires the USCIS to determine that the petition poses “not any” or “zero” risk to the beneficiary, moreover, that language simply establishes the substantive standard governing the USCIS’s determination, not the evidentiary standard the USCIS is to apply in evaluating whether the petitioner has satisfied the standard. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (“The function of a standard of proof . . . is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”) (citation modified); see also Castaneira, 2026 WL 3438451, at *7 (“Evidentiary burdens deal with the degree of certainty with which a proposition can be sustained, not with the content of 17 the underlying proposition.”). That is, the AWA instructs only that the USCIS must determine that a petitioner “poses no risk” to the beneficiary, not how confident the USCIS must be in making the no-risk determination—i.e., whether the agency must determine that it is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376, that a petitioner poses no risk or that there is no reasonable doubt that the petitioner poses no risk. That the AWA does not “specif[y]” a different evidentiary standard in the manner contemplated by Chawathe is reinforced by the sole example Chawathe itself provides of a context in which a “different standard is specified by law.” 25 I&N Dec. at 375. Chawathe identifies a specific provision of the INA expressly requiring that a petitioner seeking a visa on behalf of a second spouse within five years of a prior spousal preference petition rebut the presumption of fraudulent marriage “by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 376 (citing Matter of Patel, 19 I&N Dec. 774, 782–83 (BIA 1988)). Unlike the AWA provision in question here, that INA provision explicitly indicates that the agency, in determining whether the presumption of fraudulent marriage has been rebutted, must apply a particular evidentiary standard: clear and convincing evidence. The Court’s reading of Matter of Chawathe finds additional support in other provisions of the immigration laws that, unlike the AWA, expressly specify the evidentiary standard applicable in certain immigration adjudications. In addition to Chawathe’s reference to the clear-and-convincing standard in rebutting the presumption of fraudulent marriage, the immigration laws abound with examples. As Plaintiff points out, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) imposes a burden of proof on an applicant for admission in removal proceedings to establish that he or she “is clearly and beyond doubt” admissible or, “by clear or convincing evidence,” that he or she is lawfully present pursuant to a prior admission. The asylum laws also direct that an 18 applicant for asylum must show “by clear and convincing evidence” that the application was filed within a year of his or her arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). These are just a few of the many examples illustrating that, when Congress wants to specify the burden of proof in an immigration proceeding, “it knows exactly how to do so.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 514 (2018). Because Congress chose not to include similar language establishing a standard of proof in the AWA, the AWA does not “specify” an evidentiary standard other than the default preponderance standard Chawathe requires. Finally, the Court notes that Defendants’ contention that the AWA compels application of a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard in making no-risk determinations is in tension with their position that the USCIS has sole and unreviewable discretion over every aspect of its process for determining whether a petitioner poses no risk, including the burden of proof. See Dkt. 29 at 14–15. The D.C. Circuit in Castaneira recognized that, but for the agency’s own potential constraint on its discretion in Chawathe, the AWA grants the USCIS unfettered discretion to establish the governing standard of proof. See Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 551 (“Nothing in the Act required the agency to adopt any particular standard.”). And every other court of appeals to have confronted the issue has concluded that the USCIS has discretion to set the standard of proof in AWA adjudications, albeit in the context of concluding that either § 1154(a) alone, or § 1154(a) in combination with § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), strips federal co