Christian v. Mullin
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2026-1428
JudgeJudge Randolph D. Moss
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARK CHRISTIAN,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 26-1428 (RDM)
MARKWAYNE MULLIN., et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), a citizen of the United States “may
file a petition,” referred to as a “Form I-130 petition,” with the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Service (“USCIS”) requesting recognition of a foreign national family member,
including a spouse, as an “immediate relative.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1). If “the facts stated in the
petition are true,” the immediate relative is “eligible for preference” in obtaining a visa to
immigrate to the United States. Id. § 1154(b). The Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”), however,
imposes a limit on this path to lawful permanent resident status: the USCIS must deny a family-
based petition brought by a U.S. citizen who has been convicted of a sex offense against a minor,
unless the USCIS, in its “sole and unreviewable discretion, determines that the citizen poses no
risk to” the beneficiary relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I).
Plaintiff Mark Christian, proceeding pro se, brings this suit against the USCIS, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and the Attorney General, challenging the USCIS’s
denial of two Form I-130 petitions—one in February 2023 and the other in February 2026—
requesting recognition of his wife as an “immediate relative.” The USCIS denied both petitions
on the ground that Christian had been convicted of a sex offense specified in the AWA and had
failed to prove “beyond any reasonable doubt” that he posed no risk to his wife.
Christian contends that the USCIS’s application of the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt
standard to its no-risk determination violated binding agency precedent in Matter of Chawathe,
which directs the USCIS in adjudicating immigration petitions and visa applications to apply a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, except where “a different standard is specified by law.”
25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). Because the AWA specifies no evidentiary standard for
such determinations, Christian contends, Matter of Chawathe controls and the USCIS’s
application of a heightened standard of proof violated the Accardi doctrine, under which an
agency must follow its own binding precedents. See United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954). Christian seeks vacatur of the USCIS’s denial of his
petition and a remand for the agency to re-adjudicate it under the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard. Dkt. 11 at 4 (Am. Compl. Prayer for Relief).
In an earlier decision, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to expedite, denied
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. See
Christian v. Mullin, No. 26-cv-1428, 2026 WL 2453585 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2026) (“Christian I”).
Now before the Court are Defendants’ motion for relief from the requirement under Local Civil
Rule 7(n)(1) to file a certified list of the contents of the administrative record, Dkt. 18,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 29, and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary
judgment, Dkt. 31. The central question posed by the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment is whether Matter of Chawathe’s direction regarding use of the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard in adjudicating immigration petitions applies to AWA no-risk determinations.
2
For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has the better argument and
that Chawathe is binding in the present context.
The Court, accordingly, will DENY Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and will
GRANT in part and DENY in part Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The Court
will DENY as moot Defendants’ request for relief from Local Rule 7(n)(1).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
Under the INA, a United States citizen may file a Form I-130 petition with the USCIS, a
component of the DHS, requesting that the USCIS classify his or her spouse or child as an
immediate relative. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(l)(A)(i); 6 U.S.C. § 271(b) (transferring authority to
adjudicate immigrant visa petitions and all other adjudications previously performed by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to the USCIS); 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.l(a)(1), 204.2(a)(1). If
the facts contained in the Form I-130 petition are true, the USCIS “shall . . . approve” the
petition, and the beneficiary relative may then immigrate to the United States and obtain lawful
permanent resident status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); Castaneira v. Noem 138 F.4th 540, 542 (D.C.
Cir. 2025). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing eligibility and entitlement to the
status claimed. 8 U.S.C. § 1361.
The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120
Stat. 587, imposes limits on this process. Enacted “to protect the public from sex offenders and
offenders against children,” id. § 102, 120 Stat. at 590, the AWA, as relevant here, amended the
INA with respect to U.S. citizens who have been convicted of a “specified offense against a
minor.” The AWA defines a “specified offense against a minor” to include, among other
offenses, “[c]riminal sexual conduct involving a minor, or the use of the Internet to facilitate or
attempt such conduct” and “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.” Id.
3
§ 111(7), 120 Stat. at 592 (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)). A U.S. citizen who has been
convicted of a sex offense against a minor may not petition for immediate relative status for their
spouse or child, “unless the Secretary of Homeland Security, in the Secretary’s sole and
unreviewable discretion, determines that the citizen poses no risk to” the beneficiary relative. Id.
§ 402(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 622 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I)). The Secretary of
Homeland Security has delegated to the USCIS the authority, in adjudicating family-based
petitions, to determine whether a citizen “poses no risk” to the beneficiary relative. See 6 U.S.C.
§ 271(b)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 2.1; Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Delegation No. 0150.l(II)(H) (June 5,
2003), https://perma.cc/7ZKV-4EG5.
The AWA neither includes an express evidentiary standard applicable to such
determinations nor requires the agency to follow any specific procedures in determining whether
a Form I-130 petitioner “poses no risk” to the beneficiary relative. In February 2007, however,
the USCIS’s Associate Director issued an interoffice memorandum to the agency’s field offices
containing guidance on applying the AWA. See Interoffice Memorandum from Michael Aytes,
Associate Director, to Regional Directors, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Guidance for Adjudication of Family-Based Petitions and I-129F Petition for
Alien Fiancé(e) under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Feb. 8, 2007)
(“Aytes Memorandum”), https://perma.cc/5YXA-NYQR. The memorandum explains that the
USCIS interprets the “poses no risk” provision of the AWA “to mean that the petitioner must
pose no risk to the safety or well-being of the beneficiary, which includes the principal
beneficiary and any alien derivative beneficiary.” Id. at 5. As relevant here, the memorandum
further provides that, to avoid denial of a Form I-130 petition, a petitioner who has been
convicted of a specified offense against a minor “must submit evidence of rehabilitation and any
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other relevant evidence that clearly demonstrates, beyond any reasonable doubt, that he or she
poses no risk to the safety and well-being of his or her intended beneficiary(ies).” 1 Id.
This agency guidance arguably conflicts with binding agency precedent requiring
application of a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in administrative immigration
adjudications like those involving Form I-130 petitions. In Matter of Chawathe, a case involving
the evidentiary standard an applicant must satisfy to show that his or her employer is an
“American firm or corporation” for purposes of a Form N-470 application, the USCIS’s
Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”) established that “a petitioner or applicant in
administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or
she is eligible for the benefit sought,” except in cases in which “a different standard is specified
by law.” 25 I&N Dec. at 375. Matter of Chawathe was issued by the AAO in January 2006 and
“adopted” by the USCIS as nonbinding guidance to USCIS field officers. Id. at 369 n.1. In
October 2010, the USCIS, with the approval of the Attorney General, designated Chawathe as
precedential pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(i). Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 369 n.1. Decisions
designated by the agency as precedential are published and “serve as precedents in all
1
In 2008, the USCIS issued another memorandum to its field office leadership about
adjudicating AWA cases, which reiterated the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard. See
Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director, to Field Leadership, U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Transmittal of SOP for Adjudication of Family-Based Petitions Under the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Sept. 24, 2008) (“Neufeld Memorandum”),
https://perma.cc/32UF-XP6A. Because neither party meaningfully discusses the Neufeld
Memorandum nor contends that it bears in any way on the proper disposition of the parties’
motions, the Court will not separately address the Neufeld Memorandum. The Court notes,
however, that the Neufeld Memorandum was, like the Aytes Memorandum, a guidance
document issued internally from USCIS leadership to USCIS field offices. Because, as the Court
explains below, both memoranda constitute nonbinding interpretive guidance and the Neufeld
Memorandum is identical in relevant part to the Aytes Memorandum, the Court agrees with the
parties that the Neufeld Memorandum does not affect the Court’s resolution of this case.
5
proceedings involving the same issue(s).” 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c); see also id. §§ 1003.1(g)(2), (i).
“Except as these decisions may be modified or overruled by later precedent decisions, they are
binding on all [USCIS] employees” in adjudicating immigration petitions. Id. § 103.3(c).
B. Procedural History
Christian is a U.S. citizen and disabled veteran who lives in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
Christian suffers from a variety of grave medical conditions, including congestive heart failure,
kidney failure, type 2 diabetes, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Dkt. 15 at 3; Dkt. 11-1 at 1.
Christian’s wife is a foreign national, and, over the course of fifteen years, Christian has filed
four separate Form I-130 petitions on her behalf. Dkt. 11-1 at 1. The USCIS has denied each
application on the grounds that Christian has been convicted of a specified offense against a
minor under the Adam Walsh Act. 2
This case involves the USCIS’s two most recent denials of Christian’s Form I-130
petitions, which were issued on February 7, 2023, and February 25, 2026. See Dkt. 11-1 at 2;
Dkt. 11-3 (February 7, 2023 decision); Dkt. 1-1 (February 25, 2026 decision). In both decisions,
the USCIS explained that, given Christian’s conviction of a specified offense against a minor,
avoiding denial of his petition required him to submit evidence that demonstrates, “beyond any
reasonable doubt,” that he “poses no risk” to the beneficiary. Dkt. 11-3 at 3; Dkt. 1-1 at 5.
Evaluating the evidence Christian submitted under this standard, the USCIS concluded that
Christian had failed to demonstrate that he posed no risk to his wife and, accordingly, denied his
petition. Dkt. 11-3 at 6; Dkt. 1-1 at 7. In neither decision did the USCIS consider whether a
2
Christian does not dispute that he has been convicted of one of the sex offenses specified by the
Act.
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different standard of proof applied nor whether Christian might have succeeded in demonstrating
that he posed no risk to his wife under a different standard.
Christian initiated this action on April 24, 2026, Dkt. 1, and sought expedited
consideration of his case given his ongoing health crisis and his concern that his wife, who is his
sole caregiver, might face imminent removal from the United States, Dkt. 3. At the same time
that he filed his complaint, Christian moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 4. On June 8, 2026,
Christian filed an amended complaint, asserting claims under the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq., and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, alleging that the
USCIS applied the incorrect evidentiary standard to its no-risk determination in adjudicating his
petition. Dkt. 11 at 4. Christian contends that the USCIS’s application of the “beyond any
reasonable doubt standard” violates binding USCIS precedent in Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N
Dec. 369 (AAO 2010), and D.C. Circuit precedent in Castaneira v. Noem, 138 F.4th 540 (D.C.
Cir. 2025).
After filing his amended complaint, Plaintiff filed a renewed motion for expedited
consideration given his “profound, active, and life-threatening” condition. Dkt. 15 at 2. In
response, Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s claim because the INA strips federal courts of jurisdiction “to
review . . . any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland
Security the authority for which is specified . . . to be in the[ir] [respective] discretion,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). See Dkt. 17 at 11.
The Court granted Christian’s motion to expedite as unopposed and denied Defendants’
motion to dismiss as foreclosed by binding D.C. Circuit precedent in Castaneira. See Christian I
2026 WL 2453585, at *2–3. The Court also denied Christian’s motion for summary judgment
7
without prejudice to permit him to re-brief the dispositive issues in light of the Court’s decision,
and the Court set an expedited briefing schedule for doing so. Id. at *4. The Court directed
Plaintiff to address in his summary judgment briefing, among other things, whether Matter of
Chawathe constitutes controlling precedent in the present circumstances. Id.
Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on September 8, 2026, Dkt. 29, and
Plaintiff opposed that motion and cross-moved for summary judgment three days later, Dkt. 30;
Dkt. 31. The Court then issued a Neal Order advising Plaintiff of the standards governing the
Court’s consideration of Defendants’ summary judgment motion and permitting Plaintiff to file a
supplemental memorandum in opposition based on the Court’s instructions. Dkt. 32. Plaintiff
did so on September 21, 2026, Dkt. 33, and Defendants filed their reply and opposition to
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on October 13, Dkt. 34; Dkt. 35. Plaintiff filed his
final reply on October 19, 2026. Dkt. 36. Both motions are ripe for the Court’s review. Pending
before the Court is also Defendants’ motion for relief from the requirement under Local Civil
Rule 7(n)(1) to file a certified list of the contents of the administrative record. Dkt. 18. On
September 8, 2026, Defendants filed with the Court the certified list of the contents of the
administrative record. Dkt. 28.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In general, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 authorizes a federal district court to enter
summary judgment when the pleadings and the evidence demonstrate that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In a case involving review of a final agency action under the [APA], however,
the standard set forth in Rule 56(a) does not apply because of the limited role of a court in
reviewing the administrative record.” Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2012). In
8
the unique context of a case brought under the APA, the district court “sits as an appellate
tribunal,” Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1993), to
decide “whether as a matter of law the agency action is supported by the administrative record
and is otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review,” Coal. for Common Sense in Gov’t
Procurement v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 2d 275, 280 (D.D.C. 2011).
III. ANALYSIS
The crux of the present dispute is whether Matter of Chawathe applies in this context and
thus binds USCIS to apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence, rather than beyond-any-reasonable-
doubt, standard in assessing whether a Form I-130 petitioner who has been convicted of a
“specified offense against a minor” under the AWA “poses no risk” to the beneficiary of the
petition.
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
At the outset, Defendants re-raise their earlier contention that the Court lacks jurisdiction
to review whether the USCIS’s application of a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard complied
with Chawathe. As the Court has already explained, see Christian I, 2026 WL 2453585, at *2–
3, D.C. Circuit precedent establishes that the Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the
USCIS has followed binding agency precedent in rendering its otherwise discretionary decision
on Christian’s Form I-130 petition, see Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 548. Although Defendants
argue that recent decisions from the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit “undermine the D.C.
Circuit’s holding,” Dkt. 29 at 27, neither decision overrules nor abrogates the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Castaneira.
With respect to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mullin v. Doe, 609 U.S. 324 (2026),
Defendants concede that the decision concerns a different statutory provision with different
jurisdiction-stripping language. See Dkt. 29 at 27–28; Mullin, 609 U.S. at 338–39 (interpreting
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the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A), which precludes judicial review of “any
determination of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] with respect to the designation, or
termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state” under the Temporary Protected
Status Program). In Castaneira, the D.C. Circuit considered, and rejected, the government’s
contention that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of the Secretary’s alleged disregard
of “applicable agency precedent” by applying the beyond-any-reasonable doubt standard to the
plaintiff’s Form I-130 petition. 138 F.4th at 549. In Mullin, in contrast, the Supreme Court did
not interpret nor apply § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), nor did it consider whether federal district courts have
jurisdiction to consider claims challenging otherwise unreviewable discretionary determinations
on the ground that the agency contravened its own binding precedent. But even if Castaneira
were in some tension with Mullin, the Court would remain bound to follow on-point D.C. Circuit
precedent unless and until the Supreme Court or the en banc D.C. Circuit overrules it or
“effectively overrule[s]” it by thoroughly “eviscerat[ing]” its reasoning. Brookens v. Acosta, 297
F. Supp. 3d 40, 47 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Perry v. MSPB, 829 F.3d 760, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2016),
rev’d on other grounds, 582 U.S. 420 (2017)), aff’d sub nom. Brookens v. Dep’t of Lab., No. 18-
5129, 2018 WL 5118489 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 19, 2018); see City of Saint Paul, Minnesota v. Wright,
816 F. Supp. 3d 65, 71–72 (D.D.C. 2026). Mullin does neither, so Castaneira remains binding
law. See Castaneira v. Mullin, No. 22-cv-1485, 2026 WL 3438451, at *9–10 (D.D.C. Nov. 12,
2026) (reaching the same conclusion).
Nor, contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, does the Seventh Circuit’s disagreement with
Castaneira bear on this Court’s decision. See Dkt. 29 at 28 (arguing that the Seventh Circuit in
Nobles v. Mullin, 177 F.4th 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2026), “outright rejected the D.C. Circuit’s
holding in Castaneira”). “Binding precedent for the district courts within a circuit is set only by
10
the court of appeals for that circuit.” Cannon v. Watermark Ret. Communities, Inc., 45 F.4th
137, 149 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (citation modified). It is not uncommon for the circuits to disagree on
significant questions of law, but only the decision of the D.C. Circuit binds this Court, and this
Court must abide by that decision.
Notably, Defendants have not even attempted to distinguish this case from Castaneira,
nor could they. In Castaneira, the D.C. Circuit addressed whether the district court had
jurisdiction to decide whether the USCIS failed to abide by Matter of Chawathe when it required
the Form I-130 petitioner in that case to prove beyond any reasonable doubt that he posed no risk
to the beneficiary relative. The circuit held that this Court had jurisdiction to consider whether
Matter of Chawathe binds the agency in this context and that, if so, “it must exercise its judicial
review over [the plaintiff’s] challenge to the standard of proof.” 138 F.4th at 551. That
conclusion applies here with equal force.
This Court, accordingly, has jurisdiction to review Christian’s claim that the USCIS
departed from binding agency precedent by applying the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard
in adjudicating his Form I-130 petition.
B. Merits
The Court next turns to the merits of Plaintiff’s APA claim challenging the denial of his
petition as contrary to binding agency precedent. 3 Because the parties agree that the USCIS
3
Plaintiff’s complaint also seeks relief under the Mandamus Act, which empowers courts “to
compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty
owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361; see also Dkt. 11 at 4, 5. Although the Court recognizes
that Plaintiff’s pro se status requires the Court to construe his filings liberally, see Richardson v.
United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the Court notes that Plaintiff’s pending cross-
motion for summary judgment raises arguments under only the APA, see Dkt. 30 at 8, 24. And,
in any event, considering whether mandamus is available in this case is unnecessary because, to
the extent Plaintiff’s claim is successful, the APA provides a remedy. See Liu v. Novak, 509 F.
11
applied a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt, rather than a preponderance-of-the-evidence, standard to
its no-risk determination, the merits of this dispute turn entirely on whether Matter of Chawathe
provides the applicable standard for such determinations. If Chawathe applies to no-risk
determinations that the USCIS makes in adjudicating family-based petitions, the USCIS’s
application of a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard violated binding agency precedent, and
Christian is entitled to summary judgment. See Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 551 (citing Accardi,
347 U.S.at 268). If Chawathe does not apply, the Court may not review the USCIS’s ultimately
discretionary no-risk determination. See id. at 550 (recognizing that “USCIS’s final no-risk
determinations are unreviewable”). The parties agree that Chawathe qualifies as a binding
agency precedent pursuant to 8C.F.R. §§ 103.3(1) and 1003.1(i). 4 See Dkt. 29 at 19; see also
Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 549 (“The Government does not dispute that Chawathe constitutes
binding agency precedent pursuant to the agency’s own regulations.”). The question for the
Court is whether this binding precedent applies to no-risk determinations under the AWA.
Although Matter of Chawathe arose in the context of a noncitizen’s application to
preserve his residence and the subsidiary question whether he was “employed by an American
firm or corporation engaged in whole or in part in the development of foreign trade and
commerce of the United States,” 25 I&N Dec. at 371, Chawathe announced a more expansive
rule: “Except where a different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in
Supp. 2d 1, 8 n.3 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Leavitt, 483 F.3d
852, 858 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). The Court will, accordingly, focus on Plaintiff’s APA claim.
4
Although Defendants emphasize in their opposition that Matter of Chawathe was a nonbinding
“adopted” decision when it was first issued in 2006, see Dkt. 34 at 6 (referring to Chawathe as a
“non-precedential Adopted Decision”), they concede that Chawathe was a binding precedent at
the time the USCIS adjudicated Christian’s petition and has been since the USCIS and the
Attorney General designated it as such in 2010, see id. at 10–11.
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administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or
she is eligible for the benefit sought.” Id. at 375. On its face, the rule applies broadly to
“petitioner[s] [and] applicant[s] in administrative immigration proceedings,” and the proviso for
cases in which “a different standard is specified by law” plainly contemplates application beyond
the particular question posed in Chawathe. Indeed, from the very beginning—and even before
the decision was given binding precedential effect—the USCIS understood that Chawathe set
forth the “standard of proof applicable in most administrative immigration proceedings,” albeit
not in cases “where a higher standard is specified by law.” Memorandum from Robert C.
Divine, Acting Deputy Director, to Service Center Directors, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Servs., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Matter of Chawathe (Jan. 11, 2006) (“Divine Memorandum”),
https://perma.cc/RD7G-CKQ7.
Defendants contend that, despite Chawathe’s sweeping language, the Court should
conclude that Chawathe is distinguishable from the instant case based on its different factual
backdrop. But Defendants’ attempt to circumscribe Chawathe’s reach is belied by both the
decision’s own language and the agency’s practice in applying it.
As noted above, Matter of Chawathe unmistakably speaks to the evidentiary standard
applicable to USCIS adjudications beyond those involving questions of an employer’s status as
an “American firm or corporation” or subsidy thereof. In establishing that the preponderance-of-
the-evidence constitutes the default standard of proof in immigration adjudications, Chawathe
cites immigration decisions in various contexts, including decisions involving family-based
petitions. See Matter of Martinez, 21 I&N Dec. 1035, 1036 (BIA 1997) (requiring a petitioner
seeking a visa on behalf of his daughter to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the
beneficiary was his child); Matter of Soo Hoo, 11 I&N Dec. 151, 152–53 (BIA 1965) (requiring
13
a petitioner seeking a visa on behalf of her adopted son to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that there was a valid adoption). And following Chawathe’s elevation to binding
precedent, the USCIS has routinely cited Chawathe in its guidance materials, and in its decisions
in myriad factual contexts, for the proposition that the default evidentiary standard in USCIS
adjudications is preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,
AAO Practice Manual, Chapter 3—Appeals (“AAO Practice Manual”) (citing Chawathe, 25
I&N Dec. at 376), https://perma.cc/DFK6-6Z5T; Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884, 889 &
n.8 (2016) (applying Chawathe to a petition for a national interest waiver); Matter of Christos,
Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 539 (AAO 2015) (applying Chawathe to a petition seeking visa
preference classification for immigrants qualified to perform “skilled labor”); Matter of Skirball
Cultural Ctr., 25 I&N Dec. 799, 805 (2012) (applying Chawathe’s preponderance standard to a
visa petition seeking classification of beneficiaries as entertainers in a “culturally unique”
program).
Whether Chawathe binds the agency to apply the preponderance standard to Christian’s
Form I-130 petition—including the no-risk determination required by the AWA—turns on two
questions: first, whether Chawathe sets forth a general default rule applicable to “administrative
immigration proceedings,” and, second, if so, whether this case falls within the exception to the
default rule for adjudications for which “a different standard is specified by law.” 25 I&N Dec.
at 375.
As to the first question, Defendants do not dispute that the USCIS’s adjudication of
Christian’s Form I-130 petition is an “administrative immigration proceeding,” as that phrase is
used in Chawathe. Nor can the Court discern any reason to conclude otherwise. Like the
examples Chawathe cites, Christian’s petition was filed with the USCIS and seeks an
14
immigration benefit (here, classification of his wife as an “immediate relative”) under the chapter
of the U.S. Code dealing with immigration and nationality. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a). The
examples on which Chawathe relies further confirm that the decision contemplates application of
the preponderance standard both when a petitioner seeks a benefit for him or herself and when a
petitioner seeks that benefit on behalf of another. See, e.g., Matter of Martinez, 21 I&N Dec. at
1036.
Defendants, instead, focus much of their argument on the second question, which asks
whether, in the circumstances presented here, “a different standard is specified by law,” 25 I&N
Dec. at 375. Defendants point to two potential sources of “law” governing family-based
petitions in AWA cases. First, they contend that the AWA itself is inconsistent with Chawathe’s
preponderance standard and thus compels application of a more onerous evidentiary standard.
Second, they invoke the Aytes Memorandum’s interpretive guidance directing USCIS officials
adjudicating Form I-130 petitions in AWA cases to apply a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt
standard. Neither argument is persuasive.
Defendants raise a variety of arguments in support of their contention that Chawathe’s
preponderance standard is inconsistent with the AWA. They point, for example, to the purpose
of the AWA to protect beneficiaries by imposing a high bar for those convicted of sex offenses
to file family-based immigration petitions. Dkt. 29 at 15–16. And they cite ample legislative
history to this effect. See id. Reinforcing this stated purpose, Defendants also invoke what they
characterize as textual indicia that AWA “no risk” adjudications demand an onerous burden of
proof. These include the titles and subheadings in the AWA, the language of which reflects an
intent to “prevent sex offenders from abusing children” and “bar[] convicted sex offenders from
having family-based petitions approved.” Id. at 15. Finally, Defendants contend that the AWA’s
15
requirement that the Secretary determine that a petitioner “poses no risk”—that is, “not any”
risk—is incompatible with the preponderance standard, under which the USCIS might conclude
that there is “a 49 percent chance that the sex offender would pose a risk” to the beneficiary and
yet nevertheless approve the petition. Id. at 21.
But even if the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard would further Congress’s goals in
enacting the AWA, Defendants’ arguments from purpose and legislative history do not answer
the question presented here, which is not whether the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard is
consistent with the purposes of the AWA, but rather whether it is the only standard the AWA
permits; that is, is it the standard “specified” in the AWA? The Court does not doubt that
Congress intended to impose a substantial burden on family-based petitioners who have been
convicted of sex offenses against minors, but Defendants provide no basis to conclude that the
AWA’s history and purpose (or titles and subheadings) establish that Congress implicitly
mandated that the USCIS impose a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt burden of proof or that it
foreclosed the USCIS’s application in this context of the default preponderance standard. Most
notably, Defendants fail to explain why the substantive “no risk” test fails to achieve the
statutory purpose or why the statute should be read to impose a second level of assurance. On
Defendants’ telling, Congress was not satisfied with its requirement that the USCIS find by a
preponderance of the evidence—or some other standard—that the petitioner “poses no risk” to
the immediate relative at issue, but instead at least implicitly required that the agency go a step
further and find beyond any reasonable doubt that the petitioner poses no risk. That is, in
Defendants’ view, the AWA does not permit the USCIS to approve a petition if it concludes that
it is more likely than not that a Form I-130 petitioner poses zero risk to the beneficiary; rather,
the AWA demands that the agency conclude that there is no reasonable doubt that a petitioner
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poses zero risk. The first standard is daunting; the second borders on the insurmountable. The
question before the Court is not which standard constitutes the better policy, but whether
Congress required—as a matter of law—that the USCIS apply the second approach. Defendants
have failed to identify any statutory text, context, or legislative history that supports that legal
conclusion.
As for Defendants’ textual argument that the “poses no risk” requirement “specifie[s]” a
standard other than Chawathe’s preponderance standard, the Court is further unpersuaded. The
Chawathe proviso applies “where a different standard is specified by law,” 25 I&N Dec. at 375,
and not where a different standard is “merely assumed or contemplated,” Kucana v. Holder, 558
U.S. 233, 243 n.10 (2010). As the Supreme Court has explained, the word “‘[s]pecified is not
synonymous with ‘implied’ or ‘anticipated.’” Id. Rather, it “means ‘to name or state explicitly
or in detail.’” Id. (quoting Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 1116 (1974)). Here, the
relevant provision of the AWA does not specify the standard of proof the USCIS must apply in
making no-risk determinations.
Even assuming Defendants are correct that the phrase “poses no risk” requires the USCIS
to determine that the petition poses “not any” or “zero” risk to the beneficiary, moreover, that
language simply establishes the substantive standard governing the USCIS’s determination, not
the evidentiary standard the USCIS is to apply in evaluating whether the petitioner has satisfied
the standard. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (“The function of a standard of
proof . . . is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”)
(citation modified); see also Castaneira, 2026 WL 3438451, at *7 (“Evidentiary burdens deal
with the degree of certainty with which a proposition can be sustained, not with the content of
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the underlying proposition.”). That is, the AWA instructs only that the USCIS must determine
that a petitioner “poses no risk” to the beneficiary, not how confident the USCIS must be in
making the no-risk determination—i.e., whether the agency must determine that it is “probably
true” or “more likely than not,” Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376, that a petitioner poses no risk or
that there is no reasonable doubt that the petitioner poses no risk.
That the AWA does not “specif[y]” a different evidentiary standard in the manner
contemplated by Chawathe is reinforced by the sole example Chawathe itself provides of a
context in which a “different standard is specified by law.” 25 I&N Dec. at 375. Chawathe
identifies a specific provision of the INA expressly requiring that a petitioner seeking a visa on
behalf of a second spouse within five years of a prior spousal preference petition rebut the
presumption of fraudulent marriage “by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 376 (citing
Matter of Patel, 19 I&N Dec. 774, 782–83 (BIA 1988)). Unlike the AWA provision in question
here, that INA provision explicitly indicates that the agency, in determining whether the
presumption of fraudulent marriage has been rebutted, must apply a particular evidentiary
standard: clear and convincing evidence.
The Court’s reading of Matter of Chawathe finds additional support in other provisions
of the immigration laws that, unlike the AWA, expressly specify the evidentiary standard
applicable in certain immigration adjudications. In addition to Chawathe’s reference to the
clear-and-convincing standard in rebutting the presumption of fraudulent marriage, the
immigration laws abound with examples. As Plaintiff points out, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)
imposes a burden of proof on an applicant for admission in removal proceedings to establish that
he or she “is clearly and beyond doubt” admissible or, “by clear or convincing evidence,” that he
or she is lawfully present pursuant to a prior admission. The asylum laws also direct that an
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applicant for asylum must show “by clear and convincing evidence” that the application was
filed within a year of his or her arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). These are
just a few of the many examples illustrating that, when Congress wants to specify the burden of
proof in an immigration proceeding, “it knows exactly how to do so.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
584 U.S. 497, 514 (2018). Because Congress chose not to include similar language establishing
a standard of proof in the AWA, the AWA does not “specify” an evidentiary standard other than
the default preponderance standard Chawathe requires.
Finally, the Court notes that Defendants’ contention that the AWA compels application
of a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard in making no-risk determinations is in tension with
their position that the USCIS has sole and unreviewable discretion over every aspect of its
process for determining whether a petitioner poses no risk, including the burden of proof. See
Dkt. 29 at 14–15. The D.C. Circuit in Castaneira recognized that, but for the agency’s own
potential constraint on its discretion in Chawathe, the AWA grants the USCIS unfettered
discretion to establish the governing standard of proof. See Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 551
(“Nothing in the Act required the agency to adopt any particular standard.”). And every other
court of appeals to have confronted the issue has concluded that the USCIS has discretion to set
the standard of proof in AWA adjudications, albeit in the context of concluding that either
§ 1154(a) alone, or § 1154(a) in combination with § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), strips federal co