Mennonite Church USA v. DHS

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued February 5, 2026 Decided October 20, 2026 No. 25-5209 MENNONITE CHURCH USA, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL., APPELLEES Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:25-cv-00403) Kelsi Brown Corkran argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Shelby B. Calambokidis, Julia Gegenheimer, Alexandra Lichtenstein, and Kate Talmor. Tobin Raju and David A. Schulz were on the brief for amici curiae Quaker Practices and Beliefs in support of appellants. Hyland Hunt and Dana Kaersvang were on the brief for amici curiae Fair and Just Prosecution and the Law Enforcement Action Partnership in support of appellants.  2 Stephen W. Miller was on the brief for amicus curiae the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in support of appellants. Golnaz Fakhimi, Lynn Damiano Pearson, and Hilda Bonilla were on the brief for amici curiae 20 Faith-Based, Immigrant Justice, and/or Civil Rights Organizations in support of appellants. Michael E. Talent, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, and August E. Flentje, Attorney. Michael S. Raab, Sarah N. Smith, and Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr., Attorneys, entered appearances. Christopher J. Hajec and Matt A. Crapo were on the brief for amicus curiae Federation for American Immigration Reform in support of appellees. Before: WILKINS, RAO, and PAN, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PAN. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge RAO. PAN, Circuit Judge: For more than thirty years, the U.S. government largely refrained from conducting immigration- enforcement operations at “sensitive locations,” including houses of worship. But on January 20, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) changed course: DHS announced that immigration officers may use “discretion” and “common sense” to apprehend undocumented immigrants at locations that the government had previously shielded, such as churches, mosques, and synagogues. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) subsequently implemented that directive with a policy of its own: Supervisory agents may now  3 approve enforcement operations “at or near” protected places, on a “case by case” basis, with no “bright line rules” to cabin their discretion. A group of twenty-seven Judeo-Christian organizations sued the government, seeking to protect houses of worship from invasive immigration-enforcement activities. They brought claims under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The organizations moved for a preliminary injunction that would require the government to revert to its prior, more protective policy, and that would bar immigration agents from conducting enforcement operations at houses of worship in the absence of exigent circumstances or a judicial warrant. The district court denied the motion. It held that plaintiffs likely lacked Article III standing to pursue their claims because some of their asserted injuries were likely not sufficiently imminent, while others were likely not traceable to the government’s change in policy or redressable by a reversion to the prior policy. We reverse. I. A. Congress has tasked DHS with the administration and enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). The agency enjoys broad enforcement powers, including the authority to investigate suspected violations of immigration laws, to arrest suspected offenders, and to deport certain undocumented immigrants. Id. §§ 1225, 1226, 1357. DHS acts through numerous subcomponents, including ICE and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), which are both empowered to “enforce and administer all immigration laws.” 6 U.S.C. § 211(c)(8).  4 In 1993, the government adopted a “Sensitive Locations Policy,” under which it directed immigration authorities to “attempt to avoid apprehension of persons and to tightly control investigative operations on the premises of schools, places of worship, funerals and other religious ceremonies.” J.A. 146. That policy remained in place, with relatively minor alterations, for over thirty years. The most recent version of the Sensitive Locations Policy was adopted in 2021, when then-Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas sent a memorandum to the acting heads of ICE and CBP entitled “Guidelines for Enforcement Actions in or Near Protected Areas.” J.A. 130. The Mayorkas Memo instructed that, “[t]o the fullest extent possible, we should not take an enforcement action in or near a [sensitive] location,” such as a “place of worship or religious study, whether in a structure dedicated to activities of faith (such as a church or religious school) or a temporary facility or location where such activities are taking place.” J.A. 131. It provided that “before taking an enforcement action in or near a protected area,” officers “must seek prior approval from their Agency’s headquarters, or as [headquarters] otherwise delegate[s].” J.A. 133. Enforcement actions covered by the Memo “include[d], but [were] not limited to, . . . arrests, civil apprehensions, searches, inspections, seizures, service of charging documents or subpoenas, interviews, and immigration enforcement surveillance.” Id. The Mayorkas Memo included an “exigent circumstances” exception, which allowed emergency enforcement actions in protected areas in situations involving “national security threat[s]”; “imminent risk of death, violence, or physical harm”; the destruction of criminal evidence; or “hot pursuit of an individual who poses a public safety threat”; as well as when “[a] safe alternative location [did] not exist.” J.A. 133. The  5 Memo instructed agents to “exercise [their] judgment” when deciding whether specific circumstances qualified as exigent. Id. Where exigent circumstances precluded prior approval, the Mayorkas Memo instructed that agents promptly report the action to headquarters. In all circumstances, “[t]o the fullest extent possible,” any enforcement action at or near a sensitive location had to “be taken in a non-public area, outside of public view, and be otherwise conducted to eliminate or at least minimize the chance that the enforcement action will restrain people from accessing” the sensitive location. Id. On January 20, 2025, Acting DHS Secretary Benjamine Huffman issued a memorandum superseding and rescinding the Mayorkas Memo. The Rescission Memo removes the former limits on enforcement activities at sensitive locations. It instead instructs immigration officers to “use [their] discretion along with a healthy dose of common sense” when conducting operations at houses of worship. J.A. 128. The Rescission Memo notes that “[t]he Director of ICE and the Commissioner of CBP may wish to issue further guidance to assist officers in exercising appropriate enforcement discretion.” Id. Eleven days later, then-Acting ICE Director Caleb Vitello issued a more detailed policy memo to implement the rescission of the Sensitive Locations Policy. The Vitello Memo disavows “bright line rules” and instructs certain office- level supervisory personnel to make “case-by-case determinations regarding whether, where, and when to conduct an immigration enforcement action in or near a protected area.” J.A. 512–13. Under the Vitello Memo, ICE supervisors can “provide authorization for [sensitive-locations] actions either verbally or in writing.” J.A. 513.  6 The rescission of the Mayorkas Memo was part of the Administration’s “broader initiative to accelerate immigration enforcement.” Mennonite Church USA v. DHS, 778 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2025). In a press release issued on the day after the Rescission Memo was circulated, DHS announced that “criminal aliens” would no longer be able “to hide in America’s schools and churches to avoid arrest.” J.A. 31 (quoting Press Release, DHS, Statement from a DHS Spokesperson on Directives Expanding Law Enforcement and Ending the Abuse of Humanitarian Parole (Jan. 21, 2025), https://perma.cc/ZM97-MY89). In a subsequent press release about the rescission of the Sensitive Locations Policy, DHS noted that ICE agents “believe that rescinding the Mayorkas [Memo] is going to free them up to go after more illegal immigrants.” J.A. 110–11 (quoting Press Release, DHS, Promises Made, Promises Kept: President Trump Is Already Securing Our Border and Deporting Criminal Aliens (Jan. 26, 2025), https://perma.cc/9YZA-G9PZ). B. In response to the government’s change in enforcement policy, a coalition of twenty-seven Judeo-Christian organizations sued DHS, CBP, ICE, and the leaders of those three agencies (collectively, the government) in February 2025. Plaintiffs fall into two categories: Sixteen plaintiffs are national or regional denominational bodies, and the remaining eleven plaintiffs are denominational or interdenominational associations. The first category comprises entities like the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., and the Union for Reform Judaism — large organizations that serve as centralized hubs for hundreds of congregations with shared faiths, such as Presbyterianism and Reform Judaism. The second category comprises a range of associations, like the Latino Christian National Network and the Rabbinical  7 Assembly, which provide support for and represent the interests of their member congregations, clergy, and congregants. Plaintiffs collectively represent the interests of millions of worshippers, including Baptists, Brethren, Catholics, Conservative Jews, Episcopalians, Evangelicals, Mennonites, Quakers, Pentecostals, Presbyterians, Reconstructionist Jews, Reform Jews, Unitarian Universalists, United Methodists, and Zion Methodists. They and their members sponsor a wide variety of religious and social activities and resources, such as worship services, food and clothing pantries, and legal, language, and job-training assistance. In their complaint, every plaintiff alleges that at least one of its member congregations provides support to undocumented immigrants — some of whom are members of the congregations, and others of whom benefit from their charitable work. Plaintiffs brought three claims before the district court. First, they alleged that the Rescission Memo violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which bars the federal government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion” unless the burden “is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b); J.A. 92–95. Second, they asserted that the Memo violates the First Amendment by impinging on their freedom of expressive association. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). And third, they claimed that in promulgating the Rescission Memo, DHS violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it did not “reasonably consider[] the relevant issues and reasonably explain[] the decision.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021); J.A. 97–99.  8 Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to shield their member congregations from enforcement actions during the pendency of the litigation. They asked the district court: (1) to resurrect the Mayorkas Memo’s Sensitive Locations Policy (by staying the Rescission Memo and enjoining the government from effectuating the Rescission Memo), and (2) to bar the government “from carrying out immigration enforcement activities at [p]laintiffs’ places of worship or during religious ceremonies, absent exigent circumstances or the existence and planned execution of a judicial warrant.” J.A. 106. Plaintiffs supported their motion with sixty-six exhibits, including at least two declarations per plaintiff. The declarants — leaders and congregants of plaintiffs and their member congregations — established that each plaintiff had “strong reason to believe” that at least one of its member congregations was “at imminent risk of immigration enforcement actions.” E.g., J.A. 151. And they attested that members of all but one plaintiff had “experienced declines in attendance at worship services and social service events due to” congregants’ fear of increased ICE and CBP enforcement in the wake of the Rescission Memo. Gov’t Br. 15. Many of the declarants also cited financial and conscience concerns flowing from the imminent risk of immigration enforcement at their houses of worship. Plaintiffs and their declarants asserted — and the district court acknowledged — that after the Rescission Memo issued, several specific enforcement actions occurred at or near houses of worship, including (1) a raid at a plaintiff-affiliated church,1 1 Mennonite Church, 778 F. Supp. 3d at 6 & n.1; J.A. 507 (North Georgia Conference of the United Methodist Church) (“ICE agents came into the [church] daycare office looking for a staff member who they believed to be undocumented.”).  9 (2) a raid next door to a plaintiff-affiliated church,2 (3) a raid at a nonplaintiff church,3 and (4) surveillance at or near three plaintiff-affiliated churches.4 Plaintiffs’ briefs on appeal cite at least six more examples of immigration-enforcement actions at or near houses of worship, but those allegations were not presented to the district court. Before the district court, plaintiffs articulated four theories of constitutional standing, with each theory relying on a different injury to plaintiffs and their member congregations. First, plaintiffs alleged that they and their affiliated congregations were injured by an imminent threat of immigration enforcement at or near their houses of worship. 2 Mennonite Church, 778 F. Supp. 3d at 6 & n.2; J.A. 507 (North Georgia Conference of the United Methodist Church) (“[ICE] conducted another raid next door to another of our churches.”). 3 Mennonite Church, 778 F. Supp. 3d at 6 & n.2; J.A. 28 (“[A]n usher standing in the church entrance saw a group of ICE agents outside and locked the door. The agents said that they were there to arrest Wilson Velásquez . . . .”). The media reported on the incident. See, e.g., J.A. 28 n.11 (citing Andy Olsen, When ICE Comes to Church, Christianity Today (Jan. 31, 2025), https://perma.cc/FPG3- 5YNZ). 4 J.A. 231 (Episcopal Church) (“ICE recently showed up at a food pantry hosted by a congregation in California to take photographs of people lined up to receive food.”); J.A. 253 (Episcopal Church) (“We have seen an ICE presence outside some of our churches, and in early February, ICE agents showed up outside the Food Pantry at one of our congregations and took pictures of people who were in line to receive food.”); J.A. 336 (Massachusetts Council of Churches) (“Congregants have reported . . . [ICE] surveillance targeting direct service programs such as legal counsel, education, youth ministry, after school care, and food provision.”); J.A. 496 (WISDOM) (“[W]e have recently noticed an unknown vehicle repeatedly idling on the edges of our property for 15 to 30 minutes at a time over the course of several days. We suspect ICE is surveilling us again.”).  10 Second, they asserted an injury based on attendance declines at member congregations — i.e., direct harm from having fewer worshippers and social-services recipients. Third, they claimed a conscience injury, asserting that the imminent threat of enforcement created a moral quandary in which they must either encourage congregants to attend services and thus risk deportation, or encourage congregants to skip services and thus contravene their religious beliefs. And fourth, they asserted that they and their affiliated congregations suffered a financial injury from the costs of better security and other measures necessary to respond to the imminent threat of enforcement at their houses of worship. The district court held that plaintiffs were unlikely to establish standing under any of the four theories and therefore denied their request for a preliminary injunction. Mennonite Church, 778 F. Supp. 3d at 13. First, the district court held that alleged harm from the threat of enforcement at plaintiff- affiliated houses of worship likely was not sufficiently imminent. Id. at 8–9. Second, it held that even if plaintiffs alleged cognizable attendance declines, those declines likely were neither traceable to the Rescission Memo nor redressable by a return to the Mayorkas Memo’s Sensitive Locations Policy. Id. at 10–12. And third, it held that because plaintiffs likely did not demonstrate the imminence of harm from enforcement, their conscience and financial claims likely failed. Id. at 13. Plaintiffs challenge all three holdings on appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).5 5 While this case was under consideration, parallel litigation was ongoing in the Fourth Circuit. Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends v. DHS, No. 25-1512, 2026 WL 2409055 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2026). The Fourth Circuit decided that case in August,  11 II. “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). We “review the district court’s decision to [deny] the Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, its legal conclusions de novo, and its findings of fact for clear error.” Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, 27 F.4th 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Because the district court denied the preliminary injunction based solely on its analysis of plaintiffs’ standing, we accept, for present purposes, the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations and plausible legal theories. See Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). To establish a likelihood of success on the merits, a plaintiff must show a “substantial likelihood” of constitutional standing. Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The constitutional-standing requirement stems from Article III, which limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to actual “Cases” and “Controversies.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To demonstrate Article III standing, a plaintiff must show that it has suffered an “injury in fact,” that is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,” and that is “likely” to “be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 560–61 (cleaned up). Although the district court analyzed and rejected four theories of standing, we only need to determine that one affirming a preliminary injunction requiring DHS to revert to the Mayorkas Memo for enforcement actions at those plaintiffs’ houses of worship.  12 plaintiff likely has standing based on one of those theories for the case to proceed. See Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006). That is “because the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Id.; see also Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 402 n.22 (1982) (explaining that if one plaintiff has standing, the court “possess[es] Art. III jurisdiction to entertain those common issues presented by all plaintiffs”). That said, “standing is not dispensed in gross” — rather, at least one “plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each . . . form of relief that is sought.” Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017) (citations omitted); cf. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025) (“The Government’s applications to partially stay the preliminary injunctions are granted, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.”). III. We focus on plaintiffs’ allegations of harm to their members from the imminence of increased enforcement actions, and we hold that all plaintiffs likely have associational standing under that theory to pursue both forms of relief that they seek — i.e., a reversion to the Mayorkas Memo’s Sensitive Locations Policy and an order prohibiting the government from conducting enforcement operations at houses of worship in the absence of a judicial warrant or exigent circumstances. We therefore decline to reach plaintiffs’ other theories of standing. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 295 F.3d 1326, 1331 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In so doing, we do not suggest that plaintiffs do not face harm from their asserted increased financial burdens, decreased attendance, and crises of conscience, or that those other theories of injury are  13 insufficient. Cf. Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends, 2026 WL 2409055, at *5–6 (holding that plaintiffs had standing based on a theory of injury derived from the decline in attendance at their houses of worship). Nor do we suggest that plaintiffs lack organizational standing to sue in their own right, or associational standing to sue on behalf of their undocumented-immigrant members. Rather, we limit our analysis to one theory of standing out of respect for “the cardinal principle of judicial restraint,” which counsels that “if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” Alon Refin. Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA, 172 F.4th 12, 19 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (cleaned up). A. The doctrine of associational standing empowers organizations to sue on behalf of their members. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). To secure associational standing, an organization must show that “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Id. Here, plaintiffs assert associational standing on behalf of their member congregations that minister to undocumented immigrants. Plaintiffs seek to protect their members’ religious exercise and expressive association under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the First Amendment, as well as their procedural rights under the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs clearly satisfy the second requirement of associational standing: The interests they seek to protect are germane to their shared purpose of “welcom[ing], protect[ing], and car[ing] for . . . exiles and refugees,” and “provid[ing]  14 support and shelter to . . . immigrants regardless of legal status.” Opening Br. 5. The government does not argue to the contrary. Plaintiffs also satisfy the third requirement of associational standing: “[T]he nature of [plaintiffs’] claim[s]” and the nature “of the relief sought” do not “make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). This requirement stems from prudential concerns about “administrative convenience and efficiency,” not from “elements of a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution.” United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996). Here, “the nature of [plaintiffs’] claim[s]” — arising under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act — does not make “indispensable” the type of individual evidentiary showings that would require the participation of plaintiffs’ members. Warth, 422 U.S. at 511. Rather, all plaintiffs are similarly situated religious organizations with identical claims of preenforcement injury, and they raise purely “legal questions” on behalf of their member congregations, which a court can resolve without delving into “the individual circumstances of any aggrieved member[s].” Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC, 983 F.3d 498, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Similarly, “the nature of . . . the relief sought” — enjoining a government policy — does not require the members’ individual participation. Warth, 422 U.S. at 511. Where, as here, “an association seeks prospective or injunctive relief for its members,” “individual participation is not normally necessary.” United Food, 517 U.S. at 546 (cleaned up). Thus, our analysis of associational standing turns on whether plaintiffs’ congregational members likely “would  15 otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. Specifically, “[t]he association[s] must allege that [their] members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 511. B. Plaintiffs make a preenforcement claim of injury — i.e., they assert that the imminent threat of immigration enforcement at houses of worship injures their member congregations. Plaintiffs contend that increased enforcement activity “shatter[s] consecrated sanctuary space, thwart[s] communal worship, and undermine[s] the social service ministry work that is central to [their members’] religious expression and practices.” Opening Br. 46. They further assert that the expected surge in enforcement operations at houses of worship is traceable to the government’s change in policy, and that the resulting injury will be redressed by an injunction that (1) revives the Mayorkas Memo’s Sensitive Locations Policy during the pendency of litigation, and (2) bars enforcement at member congregations absent a judicial warrant or exigent circumstances. 1. Injury in Fact The district court rejected plaintiffs’ claim of preenforcement injury because, it believed, the alleged threat of enforcement was not sufficiently imminent. Relying on a series of decisions involving restrictions on the manufacture and possession of firearms, the district court explained that “[t]o demonstrate imminence, a plaintiff must show that enforcement ‘results from a special law enforcement priority,’ namely that the plaintiff has been ‘singled out or uniquely targeted by the government for enforcement.’” Mennonite  16 Church, 778 F. Supp. 3d at 8 (cleaned up) (quoting Ord v. District of Columbia, 587 F.3d 1136, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2009)); see also id. at 8–9 (citing Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Applying that standard, the district court rejected plaintiffs’ theory of injury because plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that they or their members were being “targeted” or “singled out” for immigration enforcement. Mennonite Church, 778 F. Supp. 3d at 9. The legal standard applied by the district court is inapposite. It is associated with firearms cases and addresses only “preenforcement challenges to a criminal statute not burdening expressive rights and not in the form of appeal from an agency decision.” Seegars v. Gonzales, 396 F.3d 1248, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Russell v. District of Columbia, 804 F. Supp. 3d 192, 200–01 (D.D.C. 2025) (assessing this court’s “idiosyncratic” approach to evaluating imminent harm in firearms cases). This case fits none of the criteria for using that “idiosyncratic” test — it does not involve firearms, and it raises a challenge to an agency decision that allegedly burdens religious expression. We look instead to the Supreme Court’s discussion of imminent injury in Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union: “When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest,” but restricted by a government policy, a “credible threat” of enforcement under that policy suffices to demonstrate imminent harm. 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979). The Supreme Court has elaborated on Babbitt’s “credible threat” standard on several occasions. In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, it suggested that an injury is “imminent” only when it is “certainly impending.” 568 U.S. 398, 412, 414 (2013). But the following year, in Susan B. Anthony List v.  17 Driehaus (SBA List), the Court reaffirmed Babbitt’s “credible threat” articulation and clarified that under Clapper, imminence exists when “the threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.” 573 U.S. 149, 158–59 (2014) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). It further explained “that the pre-enforcement nature” of review is “not troubling” when plaintiffs “allege[] an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against them.” Id. at 160 (cleaned up). After Clapper and SBA List, we held that “[s]tanding to challenge laws burdening expressive rights requires only a credible statement by the plaintiff of intent to” exercise such expressive rights, “and a conventional background expectation that the government will enforce the law.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 739 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up); accord Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 589 F.3d 433, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2009). That more permissive standard reflects our “special solicitude” for preenforcement First Amendment claims. N.Y. Republican State Comm. v. SEC, 799 F.3d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2015). And the “principle applies with particular force” where, as here, a plaintiff challenges an agency action, rather than a statute. U.S. Telecom, 825 F.3d at 739. Finally, we note that it is easier for a plaintiff to establish the imminence of enforcement where the government “has not disavowed any intention of” conducting enforcement actions under the challenged provision. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302. Under Babbitt and its progeny, plaintiffs likely have demonstrated imminent injury to their member congregations. Plaintiffs’ affiliated congregations intend to engage in conduct — ministering to undocumented immigrants — that is “affected with” a First Amendment “interest.” Babbitt, 442  18 U.S. at 298. And they have demonstrated that under the Rescission Memo, their members face a “credible threat” of enforcement that will likely cause imminent, if not immediate, injury. Id. Indeed, plaintiffs rely on far more than the “conventional background expectation that the government will enforce the law,” which is all that is required. U.S. Telecom, 825 F.3d at 739 (citation omitted). Above and beyond that, plaintiffs have direct evidence that the government intends to increase immigration enforcement at sensitive locations — that is the whole point of the Rescission Memo. See DHS, Promises Made, supra (“[ICE agents] believe that rescinding the Mayorkas [Memo] is going to free them up to go after more illegal immigrants.” (citation omitted)). The government has done the opposite of “disavow[ing] any intention of” taking enforcement action at or near plaintiffs’ members’ houses of worship. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302. Instead, it announced a plan to ramp up enforcement, and that initiative has already begun: Plaintiffs point to several specific examples of the government engaging in enforcement activity at or near their members’ houses of worship. See supra nn.1–4 & accompanying text; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (“Past wrongs [are] evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” (cleaned up)). Plaintiffs plainly present “good evidence that the threat of enforcement is not chimerical.” SBA List, 573 U.S. at 164 (cleaned up). This case does not resemble Clapper because the challenged policy here directly targets houses of worship for increased enforcement, including those operated by plaintiffs’ members. Clapper involved a five-step chain of events, where a general law targeting third parties only incidentally impacted the plaintiffs. See 568 U.S. at 410. Here, by contrast, enforcement operations have already begun at or near the premises of plaintiff-affiliated congregations, as a direct result  19 of a new policy that facilitates the apprehension of undocumented immigrants at houses of worship. Although plaintiffs and their member congregations have not violated any immigration laws themselves, the congregations are nevertheless targeted by the enforcement policy at issue, which addresses where the government will enforce such laws. The policy expressly targets houses of worship for enforcement activity, by removing constraints that previously protected those places. The effect on plaintiffs’ members therefore is direct and completely different from the situation in Clapper. Given the “credible threat” of impending enforcement activity at or near plaintiffs’ members’ premises, plaintiffs “should not be required to await and undergo [further enforcement] as the sole means of seeking relief.” Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 (cleaned up). Because plaintiffs assert injury from agency action that “burden[s] expressive rights,” U.S. Telecom, 825 F.3d at 739 (citations omitted), and they are directly injured by the government’s already-implemented policy of enforcing immigration laws at houses of worship, they likely have met the standard for showing “imminent” harm, as articulated by the Supreme Court and our court. 2. Traceability To establish standing, plaintiffs must show that their members’ injury is “fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged behavior.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 733 (2008). The traceability requirement bars standing primarily where an alleged injury “depends on the independent action of third parties.” Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 767 (2019). That is not the case here. Plaintiffs’ theory of traceability is straightforward: They argue that the Rescission Memo directly causes immigration authorities to increase enforcement at plaintiff-affiliated houses of worship, and that  20 enforcement will harm plaintiffs’ members. See Mennonite Church, 778 F. Supp. 3d at 6. The government does not contest the traceability of plaintiffs’ members’ preenforcement injury. Thus, “because Article III requires no more than de facto causality, traceability is satisfied here.” Dep’t of Com., 588 U.S. at 768 (cleaned up). 3. Redressability “To determine whether an injury is redressable, a court will consider the relationship between the judicial relief requested and the injury suffered.” California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 671 (2021) (cleaned up). Here, plaintiffs seek two forms of equitable relief: (1) a return to the Mayorkas Memo’s Sensitive Locations Policy during the pendency of litigation, and (2) an order requiring the government to obtain a “judicial warrant” before undertaking enforcement at a house of worship, absent exigent circumstances. J.A. 106. We separately assess whether “each form of relief” would redress plaintiffs’ asserted injury. Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 61 (2024) (citation omitted). We hold that they both likely would. a. Stay of Rescission Memo Plaintiffs challenge the legality of the government’s new enforcement policy, and they seek a stay of that policy during the pendency of this litigation. Naturally, “[i]f a defendant’s action causes an injury, enjoining the action . . . will typically redress that injury.” FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024) (cleaned up). And where, as here, plaintiffs’ members have been subject to “the [enforcement] action[s] . . . at issue, then there is ordinarily little question . . . that a judgment preventing . . . the action[s] will redress” the harm. Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U.S. 100, 112 (2025) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs need not show that a stay of the Rescission Memo will restore the status quo ante; they need  21 only show that such equitable relief will cure “at least some of” their asserted injury. Id. at 114. Plaintiffs have likely made that showing. The Rescission Memo announces a new policy that removed previous limitations on enforcement actions at houses of worship. The Memo thus “free[s] [ICE] up to go after more illegal immigrants” at or near plaintiff-affiliated houses of worship. DHS, Promises Made, supra. Staying the implementation of the Rescission Memo would reinstate, for now, the prior policy delineated in the Mayorkas Memo. That prior policy prohibited immigration authorities from undertaking enforcement actions “in or near a protected area,” absent exigent circumstances or “prior approval” from agency headquarters. J.A. 133. The Mayorkas Memo also declared that, “[t]o the fullest extent possible,” immigration authorities “should not take an enforcement action in or near a [sensitive] location.” J.A. 131. Thus, reinstating the Mayorkas Memo would mean that ICE no longer would be “free[d] . . . up” to “go after more illegal immigrants” at houses of worship. That would likely redress “at least some of” plaintiffs’ asserted injury from increased enforcement. Diamond Alt., 606 U.S. at 114. To be sure, the Mayorkas Memo gave the government leeway to increase enforcement activity at houses of worship, above and beyond the historical norm. For example, under the Mayorkas Memo, ICE and CBP leadership were free to “delegate” their approval authority to subordinates and thus could have created a dispersed approval authority akin to that imposed by the Vitello Memo. J.A. 133. And as the district court pointed out, the Mayorkas Memo left immigration officers with significant discretion, failed to define certain key terms, and did not confer “legally enforceable rights.” Mennonite Church, 778 F. Supp. 3d at 12. But even so, the  22 Mayorkas Memo required agents to avoid sensitive-locations enforcement “to the fullest extent possible.” J.A. 132. It also narrowly defined the exception for “exigent circumstances,” and it included additional guidelines to mitigate the adverse consequences of covered actions. J.A. 133. Thus, even if a reversion to the Mayorkas Memo would not restore the status quo ante, it likely would alleviate “at least some of” plaintiffs’ asserted injury, Diamond Alt., 606 U.S. at 114, by discouraging at least some immigration-enforcement activities at or near their members’ houses of worship. b. Judicial-Warrant Requirement Plaintiffs also ask the district court to bar enforcement operations at their members’ houses of worship “absent exigent circumstances or the existence and planned execution of a