Jaciel Rojas v. Samuel Olson

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-3127 JACIEL CIRRUS ROJAS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SAMUEL OLSON, Field Office Director, Chicago Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and SCOTT SMITH, Jail Administrator, Dodge County Jail, Respondents-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 2:25-cv-01437 — Brett H. Ludwig, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED JUNE 15, 2026 — DECIDED JULY 30, 2026 ____________________ Before SYKES, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges. KOLAR, Circuit Judge. This case is about a change in the fed- eral government’s longstanding interpretation of its immigra- tion-detention laws. After living in this country since 2018, Jaciel Cirrus Rojas was caught in the throes of that change last year. When the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 2 No. 25-3127 arrested him for unlawfully entering the country without in- spection, it cited Title 8 U.S.C. § 1226. An immigration judge found him neither a danger to the community nor a risk of flight and ordered him released on bond pending his re- moval, also using Section 1226. It is no surprise this case started with Section 1226, the provision that the government has long used to detain “aliens” (the statutory term for any noncitizen) present in the country’s interior without inspec- tion. But despite DHS’s initial use of Section 1226 and the im- migration judge’s order, the agency reversed course. It re- fused to release Cirrus Rojas based on a neighboring provi- sion, Section 1225(b)(2)(A), which was previously used to de- tain aliens without a bond determination only when they were apprehended at the nation’s borders. DHS now con- tends that for decades everyone has read the relevant statu- tory provisions incorrectly and that Section 1225, not 1226, controls, requiring Cirrus Rojas’s detention without so much as a hearing on bond. In response to this change in interpre- tation, Cirrus Rojas filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to secure his release from detention. This sets the stage for the question presented in this ap- peal: whether Section 1226 or Section 1225 governs Cirrus Ro- jas’s detention. That narrow question determines whether millions of aliens living in the United States are subject to mandatory detention, or are eligible for bond hearings before an immigration judge. The issue has split the circuits, though No. 25-3127 3 a consensus is emerging. 1 We have yet to definitively rule upon the issue, leaving our district courts without binding au- thority to help resolve the many similar habeas petitions flooding their dockets. We add but a few more drops of ink to the gallons already spilled, seeking to avoid simple repetition while answering the question before us. DHS rests its new interpretation on changes Congress made to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) almost thirty years ago. Before those changes, aliens who unlawfully entered the country were given greater procedural rights than those who presented for inspection at the border. Congress ended that disparity by creating a legal fiction in removal pro- ceedings that “deemed” all aliens not properly admitted “ap- plicants for admission” to the United States, as if they had never crossed the border. But before last year, no administra- tion had ever suggested this legal fiction extended beyond the INA’s removal procedures to its provisions governing deten- tion pending removal. 1 Compare Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026) (reject- ing DHS’s interpretation), petition for cert. filed, No. 26-104 (U.S. July 24, 2026), Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Federal Detention Center Miami, 175 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2026) (same), Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026) (same), petition for cert. filed, No. 25-1415 (U.S. June 22, 2026), and Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226 (10th Cir. 2026) (same), with Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026) (adopting DHS’s interpretation), petition for cert. filed, No. 26-43 (U.S. July 14, 2026), and Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026) (same); see also Sosnava Rodriguez v. Ortega, 180 F.4th 702 (5th Cir. 2026) (acknowledging Buenrostro-Mendez’s statutory holding but requiring bond hearings on constitutional grounds), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 2014647 (5th Cir. July 10, 2026). 4 No. 25-3127 The crux of the parties’ disagreement is how far the legal fiction of “deeming” Cirrus Rojas an “applicant for admis- sion” stretches. As we detail below, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) im- poses mandatory detention on certain “applicants for admis- sion,” but only those who are also “seeking admission.” And Cirrus Rojas is not seeking admission: the relief he now seeks, asylum and withholding of removal, is not admission as the statute and Supreme Court case law use that term. Cirrus Ro- jas has never applied for anything that counts as “admission” to the United States. Nor can he successfully “seek” admis- sion, as his unlawful entry renders him inadmissible. The government simply argues that because Cirrus Rojas is “deemed” an “applicant for admission,” he must be “seeking admission.” We hold that Cirrus Rojas is not “seeking admission”— and thus not covered by Section 1225(b)(2)(A)—because that is his real-world status. We join the majority of the circuits that have confronted this question in rejecting the govern- ment’s newfound statutory requirement for mandatory de- tention, which rests upon the illogical use of both legal fiction and ordinary meaning for the same term. Congress may use legal fictions to place statutory terms in their desired context. But legal fictions are just that—fictions. One mixes fiction with fact at their peril. And the facts in this case are clear: Cirrus Rojas is not seeking admission to the United States. If Congress had meant to define individuals like Cirrus Rojas as “seeking admission,” it could have done so. But that is not what our elected representatives decided to do, and we must apply the statute as it is written. Our holding is limited. We deal only with whether all al- iens present without admission in the interior and facing No. 25-3127 5 removal proceedings are subject to mandatory detention. Un- der the INA’s plain text, context, and history, the answer is no. Aliens present in the country without admission and not “seeking admission” fall under Section 1226, not Sec- tion 1225(b)(2)(A), and are eligible for bond hearings subject to the INA’s other requirements. Because the government provides no reason other than its statutory analysis to deny Cirrus Rojas’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we reverse the district court’s denial and remand. I. Background Jaciel Cirrus Rojas, a Mexican national, has lived in the United States since 2018 when he entered without inspection. As discussed, DHS arrested him in June 2025 on a warrant that cited 8 U.S.C. § 1226 as the legal basis for his detention. He was placed in removal proceedings and sought release on bond pending his removal. An immigration judge found him neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and or- dered him released on bond. DHS appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). It argued—based on new agency guidance issued days before the immigration judge’s decision—that Cirrus Rojas did not fall under Section 1226 after all. Rather, DHS argued that Cirrus Rojas was covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), subjecting him to mandatory detention with- out bond. DHS also unilaterally stayed the immigration judge’s bond order pending appeal, so Cirrus Rojas remained in custody. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2). Cirrus Rojas petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in fed- eral district court. And, back in his removal proceedings, he requested asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 6 No. 25-3127 under the Convention Against Torture. While his habeas pe- tition was pending, the BIA reversed the immigration judge’s bond order. It did so based on its new precedent adopting DHS’s interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025). The district court agreed with DHS, too. It concluded that Cirrus Rojas must be detained pending his removal proceedings and de- nied his petition. Cirrus Rojas filed this appeal. While Cirrus Rojas’s appeal was pending, a California dis- trict court vacated the BIA’s decision adopting the govern- ment’s new interpretation of Section 1225 in a nationwide class action. Bautista v. Santacruz, 820 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 2026). Cirrus Rojas sought another bond hearing in the wake of this class action, and a different immigration judge again ordered him released. This time DHS did not im- mediately appeal and automatically stay the bond order, and Cirrus Rojas was released from custody. A few weeks later, the Ninth Circuit stayed the California district court’s order pending appeal, and DHS promptly issued a notice purport- ing to cancel Cirrus Rojas’s bond. DHS also appealed to the BIA. Before oral argument, we ordered the parties to brief whether Cirrus Rojas’s habeas petition is now moot. And we ordered DHS to state if it intends to re-detain Cirrus Rojas. The government stated it would re-detain him “if, while this [appeal] is pending, the [BIA] reverses his grant of release on bond.” And after we held oral argument, the BIA did just that and reversed and vacated the second bond order. No. 25-3127 7 II. Discussion We begin with whether Cirrus Rojas’s release from cus- tody has mooted his habeas petition and conclude it does not. We then turn to the statutory question and conclude that Cir- rus Rojas is eligible for a hearing on bond under Section 1226. A. Mootness We have jurisdiction over “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “That constitutional requirement en- sures that the parties before us retain a ‘personal stake’ in the litigation.” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 14 (2023) (citation omit- ted). The mootness doctrine “addresses whether an interven- ing circumstance has deprived the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,” stripping a federal court’s sub- ject-matter jurisdiction. Id. (citation omitted). A party loses a personal stake in an appeal when we can no longer grant “any effectual relief.” Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (citation omitted). This standard is “de- manding.” Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. 370, 377 (2019). So long as a court can provide even a “partial remedy,” an appeal is not moot. Calderon, 518 U.S. at 150 (citation omitted). Cirrus Rojas seeks relief through a writ of habeas corpus. Habeas petitioners typically seek a reduction in, or release from, custody. See DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 119 (2020) (habeas is “at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991) (habeas may be used to obtain “a quantum change in the level of custody”). Ordering Cirrus Rojas re- leased from physical custody now might not seem to provide 8 No. 25-3127 meaningful relief because the record suggests the government has not yet re-detained him. Nonetheless, we conclude on these unique facts that Cir- rus Rojas’s appeal is not moot. Nothing stops DHS from re- detaining him now, and that is precisely what it has vowed to do. Cirrus Rojas was only released on bond because of a class- action order that is no longer in place. DHS purported to can- cel the bond on which he was released. Then it promised to re-detain him, even while this appeal remains pending, once the BIA reversed the immigration judge’s bond order. And now that the BIA has reversed, nothing, absent our interven- tion, stops the government from making good on its promise. Cirrus Rojas’s “release” is at most a temporary “reprieve from detention” that appears likely to end “at any time.” Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2003). This burden is “an actual injury traceable to” the government that is “likely to be redressed by a favorable” habeas judg- ment. Id.; see Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 294 (2023) (“It is a federal court’s judgment, not its opinion, that remedies an injury; thus it is the judgment, not the opinion, that demon- strates redressability.”). We therefore hold that this appeal is not moot.2 B. Interpretation of the INA’s Detention Provisions With our jurisdiction secure, we turn to the merits. In re- viewing the district court’s statutory interpretation de novo, we consider the INA’s “text, structure, and history.” See United States v. Liestman, 97 F.4th 1054, 1060 (7th Cir. 2024) (en 2 Article III mootness aside, Cirrus Rojas has satisfied the habeas stat- ute’s “in custody” requirement because he was in custody when he filed his petition. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). No. 25-3127 9 banc). Starting with the text and structure, we conclude that Cirrus Rojas has the better reading. Then, widening our lens, we look to the INA’s amendments and historical interpreta- tions to confirm its plain meaning. Finally, we consider in the alternative whether DHS’s interpretation invites constitu- tional concerns. Two INA provisions are at issue. We take them in the or- der that the government used them in detaining Cirrus Rojas. Recall that DHS initially detained Cirrus Rojas pursuant to a warrant issued under Section 1226 (“Apprehension and de- tention of aliens”). We focus on Section 1226(a): On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney General-- (1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and (2) may release the alien on-- (A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or (B) conditional parole[.] (Emphasis added). Though Section 1226(a) permits bond, bond is by no means guaranteed. An immigration officer makes the first de- tention decision. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). This officer must pre- sume that detention is required, see id., and has “extremely 10 No. 25-3127 broad discretion in deciding” whether to grant bond, In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 39 (B.I.A. 2006). If the officer denies bond, an alien may petition for a bond hearing before an im- migration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1). But the judge must also presume detention is necessary. See Matter of Siniauskas, 27 I. & N. Dec. 207, 207 (B.I.A. 2018). And the burden to prove otherwise rests with the alien: the government need not pre- sent any evidence justifying detention. See id. at 207–08; Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 39–40. If the judge orders bond, the government may appeal to the BIA—where the same burden applies in its favor—and may unilaterally stay the judge’s bond order pending appeal. Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 39–40 (burden on appeal rests on alien); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) (uni- lateral stay). The government has since decided, though, that Cirrus Rojas is not even entitled to these procedures. Instead it ar- gues his detention is mandatory under Section 1225 (“Inspec- tion by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissi- ble arriving aliens; referral for hearing”). Here, we focus on Section 1225(b)(2)(A): [I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration of- ficer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be ad- mitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceed- ing under Section 1229a of this title. (Emphasis added). Congress added Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and Section 1226(a) in their current forms to the INA in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), No. 25-3127 11 Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 302, 303, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-582, -585. For the nearly thirty years since IIRIRA, five presidential administrations—including the first administration of Presi- dent Donald J. Trump—have applied Section 1225(b)(2)(A) to aliens “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry” and Sec- tion 1226(a) to aliens “inside the United States.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–88 (2018); see Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 91 (2d Cir. 2026), petition for cert. filed, No. 26-104 (U.S. July 24, 2026). Now DHS has changed its view. So we must decide whether Section 1226 or Section 1225 governs Cirrus Rojas’s detention. If Cirrus Rojas reads the statutes correctly, he and others like him are entitled to bond hearings under Sec- tion 1226(a). But if the government’s reading is correct, they must be detained without bond hearings under Sec- tion 1225(b)(2)(A). 1. Statutory Text The government’s recent reinterpretation turns on the statutory term “applicant for admission.” That term is ex- plained in Section 1225(a)(1): An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of ar- rival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an appli- cant for admission. Cirrus Rojas does not meaningfully contest that he is “deemed” an “applicant for admission” under 12 No. 25-3127 Section 1225(a)(1)—that is, he is an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted.” Thus, the govern- ment argues, he falls under Section 1225(b)(2)(A)—which it- self applies to “an alien who is an applicant for admission”— and so he must be detained without bond. Cirrus Rojas disagrees. He argues Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those who are both “applicants for admission” and “seeking admission.” The INA defines “admission” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after in- spection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). It does not define what “seeking” ad- mission means. But Cirrus Rojas observes that the ordinary meaning of “seeking” connotes “an affirmative step of search or pursuit.” 3 Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Federal Detention Center Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1268 (11th Cir. 2026) (citation omitted); see Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary 1311 (3d ed. 1996) (defining “seek” as, inter alia, to “try or want to find or get” or “ask for; request”). He says he is not “seeking” (as ordinarily understood) “admission” (as the INA defines the term). Indeed, his time to do so has passed: he unlawfully en- tered the country eight years ago without inspection. So even though he is “deemed” an “applicant for admission” as a legal fiction under Section 1225(a)(1), he relies on the fact that he is 3 By “ordinary meaning” here, we refer to “the content of what the statutory text would convey to a reasonable English user in the context of everyday communication,” as opposed to “[p]lain meaning,” which “re- fers to a judgment that whatever the statutory text conveys in context is clear from the text.” Marco Basile, Ordinary Meaning and Plain Meaning, 110 Va. L. Rev. 135, 158 (2024). Plain meaning can arise not only from or- dinary meaning, but also a statutorily imposed meaning that diverges from ordinary meaning. No. 25-3127 13 not presently “seeking” “admission” to argue he is not subject to Section 1225(b)(2)(A). The government does not distinguish an “applicant for ad- mission” from one “seeking admission.” It claims all “appli- cant[s] for admission” must be “seeking admission” under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). In its view, these terms are a “doublet— ‘two ways of saying the same thing that reinforce its mean- ing.’” Hernandez Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1295 (Lagoa, J., dissent- ing) (citation omitted); see American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 63 (1980) (defining “apply” as, inter alia, “[t]o request or seek employment, acceptance, or admission”). The government’s argument does not get off the ground without a logical leap we see little reason to make. We agree that the ordinary meaning of “applicant for admission” could perhaps include “seeking admission.” But the government goes a step too far. It argues that because Cirrus Rojas is “deemed” an “applicant for admission,” he is also deemed to be all that flows from that term’s ordinary meaning—includ- ing “seeking admission.” This conclusion does not follow; it mixes an admitted legal fiction with fact. And the fact re- mains: Cirrus Rojas is not presently seeking a form of relief qualifying as admission. When Congress “deems” something, we take it as a depar- ture from the term’s ordinary meaning in favor of a particu- larized one. See Barbosa da Cunha, 175 F.4th at 76 (“Where a statute deems a term to have a particularized meaning, an analogy to its use in everyday conversation is of limited help.”); see also Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U.S. 28, 47 (2019) (the word “deemed” “is used in legal materials to treat something as if it were really something else” (cleaned up)); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 14 No. 25-3127 Legal Texts 225 (2012) (“Drafters often specify the meaning of the terms they use. Individual statutes often contain defini- tion sections giving ordinary words a limited or artificial meaning.”). Section 1225(a)(1) explains “applicant for admission” as a term of art—relevant here, as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted.” This artificial “deeming” mandates that the ordinary meaning of “applicant for admis- sion” must give way to Congress’s chosen definition. See Dig- ital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S. 149, 160 (2018). And Section 1225(a)(1) does not say applicants for admission are necessarily seeking admission. But Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention clause does use the unique phrase “seeking admission,” and we cannot ignore that meaningful variation. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (discussing canon of meaningful variation). The government attempts to read “seeking admission” into Section 1225(a)(1)’s definition of “applicant for admission” with little textual sup- port. 4 Congress could have defined “seeking admission” con- sistent with the government’s reading; it did not do so. We apply the artificial meaning to “applicant for admis- sion” because the statute requires it. But because the term 4 Indeed, IIRIRA struck a provision of the INA that never took legal effect, which would have “deemed” individuals like Cirrus Rojas as “seek- ing entry and admission.” See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 414, 110 Stat. 1214, 1270; IIRIRA § 308(d)(2)(D), 110 Stat. at 3009-617. IIRIRA thus ensured that “seeking ad- mission” remained undefined in Section 1225(b)(2)(A). “When Congress amends legislation, courts must presume it intends the change to have real and substantial effect.” Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374, 393 (2021) (citation omitted). No. 25-3127 15 “seeking admission” is undefined, we must apply its ordinary meaning. Feliciano v. Department of Transportation, 605 U.S. 38, 45 (2025); Scalia & Garner, supra, at 69, 226. While Sec- tion 1225(a)(1)’s “deeming” language may make Cirrus Rojas an applicant for admission “abracadabra-style,” Sturgeon, 587 U.S. at 47, it does not conjure a fictional intent to seek admis- sion. Congress holds the magic wand to “deem” that statutory terms carry a specific meaning in this context; the Executive does not. The dissent thoughtfully recognizes that the labyrinthine nature of the INA complicates the use of dictionary defini- tions and canons of construction, and we share the view that generations of overlapping legislation coupled with defined terms make our task a difficult one. But we trudge on, march- ing next to our dissenting colleague 5 even as we hear the drum beat a bit differently. At least to our ears, solving the riddle before us by mixing a legal fiction with ordinary mean- ing is less faithful to the statutory scheme and the words Con- gress chose. With that in mind, we agree with Cirrus Rojas that he is not “seeking admission” as the term is ordinarily understood. Again, admission means “lawful entry … into the United States after inspection and authorization.” Sanchez v. Mayor- kas, 593 U.S. 409, 411 (2021) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)). Cirrus Rojas entered the United States without admission or parole in 2018, making him “inadmissible” under the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). “[O]nce a noncitizen has entered 5 Judge Kirsch and many colleagues from our sister circuits have like- wise produced well-reasoned explanations supporting a broader reading of Section 1225. See Castañon-Nava v. DHS, 175 F.4th 828, 871–77 (7th Cir. 2026) (Kirsch, J., dissenting); supra note 1. 16 No. 25-3127 unlawfully, no amount of legal maneuvering allows him to go back in time and make his initial entry lawful.” Santillan Qui- roz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1239 (10th Cir. 2026). Rather, those in Cirrus Rojas’s shoes—though deemed “applicants for admission”—can only seek to remain in the United States through other forms of relief that are not admis- sion. Cirrus Rojas’s own case illustrates this point. He has pe- titioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture in his removal pro- ceeding—all legal statuses different from “admission.” 6 Sanchez, 593 U.S. at 415. This highlights a fundamental issue with the govern- ment’s reasoning. To read Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s use of “seeking admission” as merely another way of saying “appli- cant for admission” ignores that while “applicants for admis- sion” may literally “seek admission,” they do not always do so. Indeed, they cannot (at least not successfully) “seek admis- sion” after unlawfully entering. Cirrus Rojas is an “applicant for admission” because he is an alien present in the country and not admitted. But he wisely does not “seek” the “lawful entry” that he could never obtain. Compare that with an “ap- plicant for admission” at the border. That applicant may af- firmatively seek—and subject to the INA’s other require- ments, secure—admission. Both Cirrus Rojas and our exam- ple of an alien at the border are deemed “applicants for ad- mission.” But the applicant at the border actually seeks what Cirrus Rojas has not sought and cannot obtain: admission. 6 For this same reason, the district court’s alternative conclusion that Cirrus Rojas is “seeking admission” by seeking asylum misses the mark. No. 25-3127 17 The dissent correctly notes that we look to real-world facts in attempting to answer a legal question of statutory analysis. But that approach follows from our textual reading of “seek- ing” and “applicant” as meaningfully distinct terms. We do not suggest that Cirrus Rojas could alter the plain meaning of the INA based on his factual circumstances. Nor do we sug- gest that, if that plain meaning did reach Cirrus Rojas’s cir- cumstances—if, for example, he were on a quixotic quest to seek the admission that he cannot obtain—he would escape the grasp of Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention pro- vision. We simply apply the relevant statutory provision to the facts in the record before us based upon Cirrus Rojas’s de- cision to seek forms of relief that do not qualify as admission. As it has in other cases, the government likens Cirrus Ro- jas to a student who is an “applicant for admission” to a col- lege, and who seeks admission to that college even after their initial application. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2026), petition for cert. filed, No. 26-43 (U.S. July 14, 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1134 (8th Cir. 2026). But that only spotlights the error in mixing defined or deemed terms and ordinary meaning. The student is an ap- plicant for admission precisely because they are seeking ad- mission; Cirrus Rojas is an “applicant for admission” only be- cause the statute deems him so. In the college example, Cirrus Rojas is a nonstudent who has never applied to college sitting in on a lecture long after the semester’s registration deadline has passed. The government also contended at oral argument that Sec- tion 1225(a)(1)’s “deeming” clause does not exclusively define the category “applicant for admission” by using the word “means,” but merely “deems” as a legal fiction “present” and 18 No. 25-3127 “arriving” aliens to fall within that undefined category. In the government’s view, the term’s outer boundary is instead set by the ordinary meaning of “applicant for admission.” Our dissenting colleagues in the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have reasoned similarly. See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713, 743 (6th Cir. 2026) (Murphy, J., dissenting), petition for cert. filed, No. 25-1415 (U.S. June 22, 2026); Hernandez Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1288 (Lagoa, J., dissenting). But neither these dissents nor the government cite any au- thority stating that “deemed” as used in Section 1225(a)(1) is not definitional. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit recently collected other examples in the U.S. Code where “deem” functions as “quintessential definitional language.” Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1243 (citation omitted). That is how we see it being used here: the way Section 1225(a)(1) is set up strongly im- plies that it is definitional. “Applicant for admission,” like “al- ien” or “immigrant,” is a discrete label used throughout the INA—unlike, for instance, the “deeming” provision that the Supreme Court considered in Sturgeon, which “deemed” cer- tain lands to fall outside real “geographic boundaries” for le- gal purposes. 587 U.S. at 47. More to the point, whether Section 1225(a)(1)’s deeming clause defines “applicant for admission” exclusively or non- exclusively is irrelevant. A local code could deem bicycles, among other unspecified vehicles, to be “motorized vehicles” for purposes of a ban on such vehicles in public parks. It does not follow that bicycles are deemed to have motors for pur- poses of emissions-testing requirements. The question, in other words, is whether Section 1225(a)(1)’s acknowledged le- gal fiction “behave[s] in the way” DHS posits by imposing the real-world consequences of “applicant” on those who are No. 25-3127 19 “deemed” to fall within that category. Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1243–44. And for the reasons already stated, we do not believe it does. The government next turns to Section 1225’s other provi- sions to justify equating “applicant for admission” and “seek- ing admission.” It points to another subsection in 1225 that says “[a]ll aliens … who are applicants for admission or other- wise seeking admission … shall be inspected by immigration of- ficers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis added). This provi- sion, the government contends, suggests that “applicant for admission” is a subset of those “seeking admission.” We are unpersuaded. True, “or otherwise” can be read “as a catchall: the specific items that precede it are … subsumed by what comes after [it].” Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 914 F.3d 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). But “or otherwise” can also “refer to something that is different from something already mentioned.” Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 727 (quoting Hernandez Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1273–74); Castañon-Nava v. DHS, 175 F.4th 828, 850–51 (7th Cir. 2026) (opinion of Lee, J.). And as we discuss below, a disjunctive reading of Sec- tion 1225(a)(3)—treating “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” as distinct—better fits within Section 1225 and the INA as a whole. In sum, Congress was clear about which terms it wanted to define and those it left to ordinary meaning. “Alien” is de- fined. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). “Admission” is defined. Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A). “Applicant for admission” is defined. Id. § 1225(a)(1). “Seeking admission” is conspicuously not de- fined. The government cannot escape these choices. Just as Cirrus Rojas could not invoke ordinary meaning to argue he is not an “alien” or an “applicant for admission,” the 20 No. 25-3127 government cannot ignore ordinary meaning and “deem” him to be “seeking admission” when that runs contrary to fact. The statute’s plain text therefore shows Cirrus Rojas is not covered by Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 2. Statutory Structure We next consider the government’s argument that Cirrus Rojas’s reading creates structural problems within Section 1225. We reject that argument, then turn to the government’s own structural problems within both Section 1225 and the INA overall. a. Structural Fit of Cirrus Rojas’s Reading The government suggested at oral argument that distin- guishing “seeking admission” from “applicant for admis- sion” creates structural issues within Section 1225. Though not directly presented in the government’s brief, we under- stand the argument like this. In Section 1225(a)(1), Congress deemed individuals “present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted” as applicants for admission. If those indi- viduals are not “seeking admission” or “arriving in the United States,” the government posits that it is not clear what work that category does in the section. They would not be subject to Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention since they are not “seeking admission.” Nor are they subject to ex- pedited removal under Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) because they are not “arriving.” And Section 1225(a)’s provisions for re- quiring “statements” and “withdrawal[s] of application[s],” which apply where aliens are “applying for admission” or have “intentions of … seeking admission,” also seem inappli- cable. See id. § 1225(a)(4), (5). No. 25-3127 21 The government sees this as creating a surplusage prob- lem within the section. As the government argues, Cirrus Ro- jas’s reading would mean that Congress included those pre- sent in the interior without admission within “applicant[s] for admission” but then “excluded” them “from every operative consequence in the section where the phrase appears.” Her- nandez Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1297 (Lagoa, J., dissenting). If Con- gress went out of its way to counterintuitively deem individ- uals like Cirrus Rojas “applicants for admission,” then why (the government asks) does no provision of Section 1225 seem to apply to him? But there are indeed sections of the INA that apply to “ap- plicants for admission” like Cirrus Rojas. True, many in- stances of “applicant for admission” do apply only to those who are “arriving” and “seeking” admission at the border. But others—both within Section 1225 and the INA writ large—also apply to those who are simply “present” without admission in the interior, like Cirrus Rojas. For example, Section 1225(a)(1) “deem[s]” aliens in the in- terior like Cirrus Rojas applicants for admission “for purposes of this chapter,” i.e., the whole INA. And Section 1229a, which governs removal proceedings, specifies that applicants for ad- mission have “the burden of establishing” they are “clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted” with no mention of whether those persons are “seeking admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A). Applicants for admission carry this burden whether they are arriving at the border or present without ad- mission in the interior. Section 1225(a)(1)’s definition of “ap- plicant for admission” is naturally placed at the top of the sec- tion about the initial admission process. But one of its key functions—to hold unadmitted aliens in the interior to the 22 No. 25-3127 same burden in removal as if they had never entered the country—kicks in several sections down. Even within Section 1225 itself, the present-without-ad- mission category of “applicant for admission” still does meaningful work under Cirrus Rojas’s reading. Consider those in the interior “designated” for expedited removal un- der Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). They are applicants for admis- sion. See id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (applying to aliens “who ha[ve] not been admitted or paroled into the United States”); id. § 1225(b) (describing procedures for the “[i]nspection of applicants for admission”). But they are not “arriving.” See id. § 1225(b)(1)(a)(i) (distinguishing “arriving” aliens from those “described in clause (iii)”). Nor does the statute require that they be “seeking admission.” Rather, so long as they have not “been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior” to a determination of inadmissibility, the Attorney General may “designate” them for expedited removal. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). This sec- tion alone solves the government’s purported surplusage puzzle. It applies to present-without-admission “applicants for admission” who are neither “arriving” nor “seeking ad- mission.” Conversely, Cirrus Rojas’s reading avoids the opposite surplusage problem of reading “seeking admission” out of the statute. Section 1225(b)(2)(A)—the provision that the gov- ernment has invoked to detain Cirrus Rojas—is a “catch-all” that applies to “all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant here).” Jen- nings, 583 U.S. at 287. It applies only to those “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission,” a qualifier that does not appear in its neighbor (b)(1)(A)(iii). That variance No. 25-3127 23 suggests Congress meant Section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply to the subcategory of “applicants for admission” who are also "seeking admission." See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 170 (“[A] material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.”). Cirrus Rojas’s reading accounts for that meaningful variation; the government’s reading does not.