Full Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SERGEY OLEGOVICH VYAZHEVICH Case No. 1:26-cv-6089-TLN-JDP (A-Number: 070-323-485), 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 15 SECURITY IMMIGRATION, 16 Respondent. 17 18 Petitioner Sergey Olegovich Vyazhevich was ordered removed from the United States in 19 2014, subsequently released on an order of supervision that same year, and re-detained by ICE in 20 2025. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 21 claiming that his re-detention violates the Fifth Amendment. For the following reasons, I 22 recommend that the petition be granted and that petitioner be immediately released. 23 Background 24 Petitioner entered the United States as a refugee from the U.S.S.R. in 1989 and 25 subsequently became a legal permanent resident. ECF No. 6-2 at 3. Petitioner has an extensive 26 criminal history, including multiple convictions in 2006 and 2010 for felony grand theft and 27 obtaining property in return for worthless checks. ECF No. 6-3 at 5-66. In February 2014, 28 petitioner was ordered removed to Russia; his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, 1 and deferral of removal were denied. ECF No. 6-8. 2 Petitioner alleges that Russia declined to issue him a travel document in March 2014. 3 ECF No. 11 at 3. To corroborate that allegation, petitioner has submitted what he represents is a 4 page from a filing made by the government in another habeas action involving him; this 5 document states that “[o]n March 18, 2014, the Consulate of Russia denied travel documents for 6 Petitioner.” See id. at 18. I allowed the government to address this allegation and evidence in a 7 supplemental brief. In that brief, the government has not contested either assertion and, instead, 8 has argued only that “that historical episode does not control now.” See ECF No. 14 at 2. 9 Because petitioner’s allegation is uncontested, I find that, in March 2014, Russia declined to issue 10 a travel document to petitioner. 11 Petitioner was released in March 2014 on an order of supervision. ECF No. 6-9 at 1. 12 While on supervised release, petitioner continued to come into contact with law enforcement. In 13 2017, he was convicted of felony uttering a forged check and grand theft; in 2018, he was 14 convicted of resisting an officer; in 2023, he was convicted of grand theft; in 2024, he was 15 convicted of driving under the influence and other traffic violations; and in 2025, he was 16 convicted of a probation violation. ECF No. 6-3 at 6-7, 55-66. 17 On October 21, 2025, petitioner was re-detained by ICE. ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 6 at 5. 18 The government represents that although it “has acted with diligence in attempting to obtain a 19 travel document to effectuate [petitioner’s] removal to Russia, . . . petitioner has failed to comply 20 with repeated requests for assistance in completing travel document request paperwork.” Id. 21 Specifically, petitioner refused to comply with completing and/or signing paperwork on four 22 occasions between March 2026 and July 2026. Id. at 6. Consequently, on July 8, 2026, petitioner 23 was issued a notice of failure to comply that stated that he would not be released from ICE 24 custody because he had not complied with his “obligation to assist in obtaining a travel 25 document.” ECF No. 6-15. Petitioner, for his part, does not contest the government’s 26 representations and, in fact, has stated that he will continue to refuse to comply because he is not 27 a citizen of Russia and fears removal there. ECF No. 11 at 12-13. 28 1 Petitioner, originally re-detained in Florida, initiated two habeas actions in the United 2 States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The first action was filed in January 2026 3 and dismissed without prejudice in February 2026. Vyazhevich v. Warden, No. 3:26-cv-0032- 4 WWB-MCR (M.D. Fla. 2026). The second action was filed in March 2026 and dismissed 5 without prejudice in August 2026. Vyazhevich v. Warden, 3:26-cv-0641-WWB-SJH (M.D. Fla. 6 2026). 7 Procedural History 8 On August 3, 2026, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus. ECF 9 No. 1. On the following day, the court referred the matter to me. ECF No. 4. On August 14, 10 2026, respondent filed a declaration of a deportation officer and, the following day, filed a 11 response to the petition. ECF Nos. 6 & 7. Petitioner filed a traverse on August 27, 2026. ECF 12 No. 11. On September 29, 2026, I allowed respondent to submit a supplemental brief, which 13 respondent filed on October 5, 2026. ECF Nos. 13 & 14. 14 Legal Standard 15 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates 16 federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75 17 (2000). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 18 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 19 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a 20 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 21 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of 22 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have 23 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction 24 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 25 26 27 28 1 Analysis 2 Petitioner claims that his re-detention violates the Fifth Amendment.1 ECF No. 1 at 6-11. 3 Respondent counters that petitioner’s detention remains constitutional under 8 U.S.C. § 1231.2 4 ECF No. 7 at 4. 5 Under section 1231, a noncitizen with a final order of removal is subject to mandatory 6 detention for ninety days. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)(A), (2)(A). This time period is known as the 7 removal period, and it typically begins on the date the order of removal becomes administratively 8 final. Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). The removal period may be extended if a noncitizen “fails or 9 refuses to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary” for 10 removal. Id. § 1231(a)(1)(C). Where a noncitizen is not removed by the expiration of the 11 removal period, they are ordinarily released on an order of supervision. Id. § 1231(a)(3). Some 12 noncitizens, however, “may be detained beyond the removal period.” Id. § 1231(a)(6). 13 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that discretionary detention under section 1231(a)(6) 14 is “presumptively reasonable” for up to six months, at which point the noncitizen may provide 15 “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 16 foreseeable future,” and the government “must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that 17 showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 18 Petitioner, who was re-detained in October 2025, has provided “good reason to believe 19 that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See 20 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Specifically, petitioner alleges that, in 2014, Russia declined to issue 21 him a travel document on the purported basis that he is not a citizen of Russia. ECF No. 1 at 6. 22 23 1 Petitioner’s pro se filing is entitled to liberal construction. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also Charan S. v. Warden of the Cal. City Det. Facility, No. 1:26-cv- 24 3017-TLN-JDP, 2026 WL 1144158, at *1 n. 1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2026) (applying liberal construction to pro se immigration habeas filing). 25 2 As an initial matter, respondent argues that the petition should be dismissed as successive and abusive in light of petitioner’s then-pending action in the United States District 26 Court for the Middle District of Florida. ECF No. 7 at 3. As noted, that action has since been 27 dismissed without prejudice. See Vyazhevich v. Warden, 3:26-cv-0641-WWB-SJH, ECF No. 28 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2026). Consequently, I find that petitioner is not barred from bringing the 28 present claims in the instant action. 1 Petitioner asserts that he is a citizen of the U.S.S.R., he was “brought into the United States as a 2 child at [the] age of 8,” and “both of his parents were from the U.S.S.R. and citizens of the 3 U.S.S.R. and hold United States citizenship today.” ECF No. 11 at 3. Petitioner further argues 4 that the U.S.S.R. and Russia “are complete[ly] different countries and may not be considered the 5 same country by any terms, laws, or its historic events.” Id. As a result, petitioner alleges that he 6 is “stateless.” Id. at 4. Taken together, these uncontested allegations show “good reason to 7 believe that there is no significant likelihood of [petitioner’s] removal [to Russia] in the 8 reasonably foreseeable future.” See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 9 Respondent fails to “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut” petitioner’s showing. See 10 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. In fact, respondent does not contest that there is no significant 11 likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Rather, respondent argues that, 12 because petitioner has refused to cooperate with obtaining a travel document from Russia, his 13 detention is governed by section 1231(a)(1)(C), which, as noted, provides that the removal period 14 may be extended beyond ninety days if a noncitizen “fails or refuses to make timely application 15 in good faith for travel or other documents necessary” for removal. ECF No. 7 at 4. The Court of 16 Appeals has held that, unlike indefinite detention under section 1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas, indefinite 17 detention under 1231(a)(1)(C) is constitutional because a noncitizen “has the keys to his freedom 18 and could likely effectuate his removal by providing the information requested by the 19 [government].” Pelich v. I.N.S., 329 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). 20 However, as another court in this District found, section 1231(a)(1)(C) cannot extend a 21 removal period that expired long ago. See V.R. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 1:26-cv- 22 4279-MWJS, 2026 WL 1965908, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2026). In V.R., the removal period 23 ended in 2011. Id. at *7. The court ordered supplemental briefing, and the government 24 “concede[d] that it [was] ‘not aware of any Ninth Circuit decision applying § 1231(a)(1)(C) 25 where the triggering conduct occurred after the statutory removal period had already expired.’” 26 Id. The court found that it was “likewise unaware of ‘any case that applied § 1231(a)(1)(C) to 27 permit re-detention following the expiration of the 90-day removal period established by § 28 1231(a)(2).’” Id. (quoting Larose v. Blanche, No. 26-cv-00423, 2026 WL 1346636, at *4 (D. 1 Nev. May 14, 2026)). Accordingly, the court held that it was improper to “interpret 2 § 1231(a)(1)(C) as allowing the government effectively to revive a removal period that has 3 already expired.” Id. 4 I find V.R. persuasive. It is uncontested that petitioner’s removal period expired in 2014. 5 ECF No. 6-8. Consequently, petitioner’s refusals to complete paperwork in 2026 cannot, as a 6 matter of law, extend the removal period that had expired nearly twelve years prior. See ECF No. 7 6 at 6. I provided the government an opportunity to file a supplemental brief in light of V.R. and 8 petitioner’s removal period having already expired. ECF No. 13. In its supplemental brief, the 9 government stated that it “maintains that extension applies here because Petitioner repeatedly 10 refused to complete or sign travel-document forms.” ECF No. 14 at 1. However, the government 11 does not identify any case law supporting its assertion, and it otherwise does not argue that 12 petitioner is still within the removal period. See id. As with the V.R. and Larose courts, I am 13 unable to locate any case law establishing that the government may extend the removal period on 14 the basis of a triggering event that occurs after the removal period has already expired. For all of 15 these reasons, I find that petitioner’s present detention cannot be authorized under section 16 1231(a)(1)(C) because his removal period expired in 2014.3 17 In its supplemental brief, respondent asserts that detention is proper under section 18 1231(a)(6), but it does not address the Zadvydas framework or otherwise show that there is a 19 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See ECF No. 14 at 2. As 20 such, respondent has failed to rebut petitioner’s showing, and it otherwise has not provided a 21 lawful basis for petitioner’s present detention. 22 Accordingly, petitioner’s “continued detention is no longer authorized by statute,” and 23 petitioner should be released on the conditions under which he was previously released. See 24 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. 25 3 It also bears mention that, in 2014, Russia declined to issue a travel document for petitioner, apparently on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of Russia. See ECF No. 11 at 3. 26 In its supplemental brief, the government argues that “that historical episode does not control 27 now.” ECF No. 14 at 2. However, the government fails to explain Russia’s previous refusal to issue a travel document or give the court any reason to find that, even if petitioner completed the 28 paperwork, Russia would issue a travel document at this time. 1 Conclusion 2 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 3 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be GRANTED. 4 2. Respondent be ordered to immediately release petitioner (A-Number: 070-323-485) from 5 its custody subject to the previously-imposed conditions of release, if any. 6 3. Respondent be ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner unless it 7 obtains a travel document for his removal, if necessary, and follows all procedures set 8 forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(1), 241.13), and any other applicable statutory and regulatory 9 procedures. 10 4. The Clerk of Court be directed to serve Central Valley Annex Detention Facility with a 11 copy of this order. 12 5. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 14 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within three days of 15 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 16 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 17 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 18 | within three days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 19 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 20 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 21 | 1991). IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ October 9, 2026 QH——— 24 JEREMY D. PETERSON 95 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28