Full Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 1 of 86 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25-7044 OSCAR ENRIQUE LOPEZ GARCIA, Petitioner – Appellee, v. ROBERT GUADIAN, in his official capacity as Director of the Washington Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Respondents – Appellants, and PAUL PERRY, in his official capacity as Warden of Caroline Detention Facility, Respondent. ------------------------------ IMMIGRATION LAW SCHOLARS; CALIFORNIA; MARYLAND; NEW YORK; ARIZONA; COLORADO; CONNECTICUT; DELAWARE; HAWAII; ILLINOIS; MAINE; MASSACHUSETTS; MICHIGAN; MINNESOTA; NEVADA; NEW JERSEY; OREGON; RHODE ISLAND; VERMONT; VIRGINIA; WASHINGTON; THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL; AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, Amici Supporting Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 2 of 86 No. 25-7050 JUAN JOSE RIVERA, Petitioner – Appellee, v. ROBERT GUADIAN, in his official capacity as Director of the Washington Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; DAVID J. VENTURELLA, in his official capacity as Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Respondents – Appellants, and PAUL PERRY, in his official capacity as Warden of Caroline Detention Facility, Respondent. ------------------------------ IMMIGRATION LAW SCHOLARS; CALIFORNIA; MARYLAND; NEW YORK; ARIZONA; COLORADO; CONNECTICUT; DELAWARE; HAWAII; ILLINOIS; MAINE; MASSACHUSETTS; MICHIGAN; MINNESOTA; NEVADA; NEW JERSEY; OREGON; RHODE ISLAND; VERMONT; VIRGINIA; WASHINGTON; THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL; AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, Amici Supporting Appellee. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Patricia Tolliver Giles, District Judge. (1:25-cv-01764-PTG-WEF; 1:25-cv- 01793-PTG-WBP) 2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 3 of 86 Argued: May 5, 2026 Decided: September 10, 2026 Before RUSHING and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Berner wrote the opinion, in which Senior Judge Keenan concurred. Judge Rushing wrote a dissenting opinion. ARGUED: Benjamin Timothy Hayes, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. My Khanh Ngo, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, San Francisco, California, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Yaakov M. Roth, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Drew C. Ensign, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Keith I. McManus, Kohsei Ugumori, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Judy Rabinovitz, Natalie Behr, New York, New York, Michael K.T. Tan, Oscar Sarabia Roman, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, San Francisco, California; Sarah Beth Pitney, Ava Benach, Bianca Granados, BENACH PITNEY REILLY LLP, Washington, D.C.; Sophia Leticia Gregg, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia; Simon Y. Sandoval-Moshenberg, MURRAY OSORIO PLLC, Falls Church, Virginia; Sarnata Reynolds, CEARTAS SOLUTIONS, Takoma Park, Maryland, for Appellees. Amit Jain, Kathleen Pleiss, RODERICK & SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Amici Immigration Law Scholars. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael L. Newman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Robin L. Goldfaden, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Marissa Malouff, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Julia Heming Segal, Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, San Francisco, California, for Amicus State of California. Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General, Julia Doyle, Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amicus State of Maryland. Letitia James, Attorney General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Philip J. Levitz, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, Gillian Barna, Assistant Solicitor General, Julie Dona, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK, New York, New York, for Amicus State of New York. Kristin K. Mayes, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA, Phoenix, Arizona, for Amicus State of Arizona. Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF COLORADO, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus State of Colorado. William Tong, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CONNECTICUT, Hartford, Connecticut, for Amicus State of Connecticut. Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 4 of 86 DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware, for Amicus State of Delaware. Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Washington, D.C., for Amicus District of Columbia. Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF HAWAI’I, Honolulu, Hawai’i, for Amicus State of Hawai’i. Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS, Chicago, Illinois, for Amicus State of Illinois. Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MAINE, Augusta, Maine, for Amicus State of Maine. Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS, Boston, Massachusetts, for Amicus Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Dana Nessel, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHIGAN, Lansing, Michigan, for Amicus State of Michigan. Keith Ellison, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MINNESOTA, St. Paul, Minnesota, for Amicus State of Minnesota. Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEVADA, Carson City, Nevada, for Amicus State of Nevada. Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, Trenton, New Jersey, for Amicus State of New Jersey. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OREGON, Salem, Oregon, for Amicus State of Oregon. Peter F. Neronha, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RHODE ISLAND, Providence, Rhode Island, for Amicus State of Rhode Island. Charity R. Clark, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VERMONT, Montpelier, Vermont, for Amicus State of Vermont. Jay Jones, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Amicus Commonwealth of Virginia. Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON, Olympia, Washington, for Amicus State of Washington. Emma Winger, Rebecca Cassler, Suchita Mathur, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, Washington, D.C., for Amici American Immigration Council and American Immigration Lawyers. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 5 of 86 BERNER, Circuit Judge: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), enacted by Congress thirty years ago, created the current scheme for detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. One provision of IIRIRA requires that certain noncitizens be detained throughout their removal proceedings. Another provision allows for other noncitizens to be released pending removal after a bond hearing before an immigration judge. The question before us is which part of IIRIRA applies to Petitioners Oscar Enrique Lopez Garcia and Juan Jose Rivera. There is a growing split among federal circuit courts of appeal on this question. Lopez Garcia and Rivera are noncitizens who have lived in the United States for decades after having entered the country without inspection and authorization. Each was taken into immigration detention in October 2025 following encounters with immigration authorities. If either had been detained only four months prior, he would have been provided a bond hearing before an immigration judge and an opportunity to seek release on bond pending the outcome of immigration removal proceedings. That is because before July 2025, noncitizens like Lopez Garcia and Rivera were generally released on bond unless one or more of the following circumstances applied: the noncitizen had committed a certain crime, the noncitizen was considered a flight risk, or the noncitizen posed a danger to his community. The Government does not contend that any of these circumstances applies to Lopez Garcia or Rivera. Yet neither was permitted a bond hearing because, starting in July 2025, the Government began to construe IIRIRA to require all noncitizens who entered the 5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 6 of 86 country without inspection and authorization be detained throughout their immigration removal proceedings. Petitioners Lopez Garcia and Rivera moved for habeas corpus relief in federal district court. They argued that the Government’s new construction of IIRIRA is wrong and that they were being detained in violation of their rights to due process. The district court agreed and granted their petitions. The Government sought expedited appeal, which this court granted. Today we join the overwhelming majority of circuit courts of appeal that have considered this question in holding that IIRIRA and its implementing regulations, properly construed, require noncitizens like Lopez Garcia and Rivera be provided a bond hearing and be eligible for release pending removal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grants of habeas relief. I. Background Petitioner Oscar Enrique Lopez Garcia came to the United States from Guatemala as a child in 1996. He entered without inspection and authorization from immigration authorities. He has lived and worked in Washington, D.C. for more than thirty years. Lopez Garcia is married and is the father of two United States citizen children. On October 9, 2025, Lopez Garcia was on his way to work when he was detained by agents of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and taken into custody. Petitioner Juan Jose Rivera left his birthplace of El Salvador and came to the United States in 2005 at the age of twenty-six. He too entered the country without inspection and authorization. Rivera has lived and worked in the United States for the past twenty years. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 7 of 86 He has never been arrested or charged with any crime. On October 2, 2025, ICE detained him near his home in Washington, D.C., and took him into custody. Following their detention, ICE initiated removal proceedings against Lopez Garcia and Rivera on the ground that they entered the country without inspection and authorization. During this time, the men were held at an ICE detention facility in Virginia without a bond hearing. A bond hearing is a court proceeding where an immigration judge determines whether a noncitizen 1 should be detained or released while his immigration proceedings advance. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d), 1003.19, 1236.1(d). If the noncitizen establishes that he is not a danger to the community or a flight risk, the immigration judge can order his release. Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 346 (4th Cir. 2022). The immigration judge may set a bond or place certain conditions on the noncitizen’s release. Id. Not all noncitizens are eligible for bond during their removal proceedings, however. Noncitizens who are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are eligible for bond, while noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) are not. Had they encountered immigration authorities prior to July 2025, the Government would have detained Lopez Garcia and Rivera pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and provided them with a bond hearing. In July 2025, however, the Department of Justice announced that, going forward, a new construction of the existing immigration laws would be applied 1 The INA defines the term “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). We use the term “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory term “alien.” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020). We use the term “alien” only when quoting the statute directly. 7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 8 of 86 to noncitizens who entered the country without authorization or inspection. See U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission (July 8, 2025). Under this new construction, the Government would detain such noncitizens under Section 1225(b)(2)(A), not under Section 1226(a). Thus, Lopez Garcia and Rivera were subjected to mandatory detention without a bond hearing. Id. 2 Lopez Garcia and Rivera petitioned for habeas corpus relief from a federal district court, alleging that their detention without a bond hearing was unlawful. They contended that they should be detained under Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), and provided with a bond hearing. They also claimed that the Government’s failure to provide a bond hearing violated their rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court granted both Lopez Garcia’s and Rivera’s petitions for relief. The district court concluded in each case that Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applied to the Petitioners and therefore they were entitled to bond hearings. See Order at 3, Lopez Garcia v. Perry, No. 1:25-CV-1764, ECF No. 6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2025); Order at 2 Following the Government’s changed position, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision adopting this new construction. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). 8 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 9 of 86 3, Rivera v. Crawford, No. 1:25-CV-1793, ECF No. 8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2025). 3 During the subsequent bond hearings, immigration judges concluded that Lopez Garcia and Rivera posed no danger to the community or a risk of flight. In November 2025, both men were released from detention on bond. The Government timely appealed the decisions granting habeas relief and the cases were consolidated on appeal. We possess jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). II. Statutory Framework The Constitution vests Congress with the power to establish requirements for naturalization. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. Congress, not the Executive Branch, possesses plenary power over the admission and exclusion of noncitizens. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394–96 (2012). As we are called upon to construe a law enacted by Congress pursuant to this power, we begin by laying out the statutory context. A. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952 The first one hundred years after the founding of the United States of America marked a period of relatively open borders without federal restrictions on immigration. 3 The district court granted habeas relief and ordered that the Government provide the Petitioners “with a standard bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” See, e.g., Parties’ Joint Appendix 81. In its decision, however, the district court improperly inverted the burden of proof at bond hearings. To clarify, it is the Petitioner, not the Government, who bears the burden under the processes established by the Attorney General to demonstrate he is not a danger to the community nor a flight risk. Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 356 (4th Cir. 2022). 9 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 10 of 86 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010). It was not until the late 1800s that Congress began to enact laws restricting entry into the United States and providing for the brief detention of those arriving at our borders. Id. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Congress passed a patchwork of immigration laws, including the predecessor statutes to Section 1225 and Section 1226, the statutes at issue in this case. Historically, our immigration laws have always distinguished between immigrants who recently arrive at our borders and those already present in the United States, even those who entered unlawfully. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); accord Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“The distinction between a[ ] [noncitizen] who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law.”). This distinction is rooted in part in the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, which applies to all “persons” within the United States. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The fourteenth amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens” but rather applies “to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality[.]”); accord Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. This distinction has long applied to detention during removal proceedings. The Immigration Act of 1893 first provided for brief mandatory detention for those arriving in the United States who were not “clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission.” Section 5, 27 Stat. 569, 570. The language of this statute echoes in its modern-day equivalent, Section 1225. Starting in 1891 and continuing until June 2025, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and its predecessor statutes have been applied to immigrants at our borders. See Brief for 10 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 11 of 86 Immigration Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae at 7–13. For nearly as long, our immigration laws also permitted noncitizens apprehended within the United States to be released pending removal proceedings, regardless of how they entered our country. See Lindsay Nash, Resurrecting Immigration Releases, 135 Yale L.J. 1533, 1586–1607 (2026). In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to compile the various provisions of immigration law into a single comprehensive federal statutory framework. Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 587 (2011); see also United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 98 F.4th 90, 94 (4th Cir. 2024). Notably, the INA preserved the long-held “distinction between those [noncitizens] who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958). B. The Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 Though Congress has amended this statutory framework multiple times since 1952, the INA has endured and continues to govern our immigration system. Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191, 195 (2020). This appeal calls upon us to interpret certain amendments Congress made to the INA through the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). IIRIRA “overhauled numerous sections” of the INA, including the immigration removal processes. Orquera v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 2003); see also William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 330 (4th Cir. 2007). Prior to 1996, the United States maintained two entirely different processes for removing noncitizens: “deportation 11 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 12 of 86 proceedings” and “exclusionary proceedings.” Noncitizens present in the United States, regardless of whether they entered the country legally, were removed through “deportation proceedings.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1995). Noncitizens arriving at the border were subject to “exclusionary proceedings.” See id. U.S.C. § 1225(a)–(b) (1995). Before IIRIRA, the process and rights accorded to noncitizens turned on whether the individual was physically present in the United States. Following IIRIRA, these distinctions turn instead on lawful entry to the United States. IIRIRA uses the terms, “admission” and “admitted,” to describe “the lawful entry of the [noncitizen] into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Today, all noncitizens, regardless of whether they are in the country or arriving at the border, are subject to a single removal process under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. This process is known as “removal proceedings.” A noncitizen is considered “removable” if he 1) was never lawfully admitted to the United States and is charged as “inadmissible” under Section 1182, or 2) was lawfully admitted to the United States but is now charged as “deportable” for some reason, such as committing a crime or overstaying a visa, under Section 1227. Id. § 1229a(e)(2). Those who are “inadmissible” and those who are “deportable” bear different burdens of proof during removal proceedings: Noncitizens who have not been lawfully admitted must establish that they are “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Id. § 1229a(c)(2). In contrast, noncitizens who have been admitted need only show “by clear and convincing evidence” that they are present in the United States lawfully. Id. 12 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 13 of 86 To summarize: Prior to IIRIRA, noncitizens present in the United States without inspection and authorization were subject to deportation proceedings, and subject to the same burden of proof as those lawfully in the country. Following IIRIRA, noncitizens who entered the country without inspection and authorization bear the same burden of proof in removal proceedings as noncitizens arriving at the border. Our focus today is on the detention provisions of IIRIRA during these removal proceedings. Two sections of IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226, govern the detention of noncitizens. Section 1225 requires mandatory detention for certain noncitizens whereas Section 1226 allows for other noncitizens to be released on bond pending the outcome of their removal proceedings. Under Section 1225(b)(2)(A), “an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained” pending removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1226 provides that, in the case of a noncitizen arrested and detained within the United States, “an alien may [be] release[d]” on “bond.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This case calls upon us to determine which statutory section applies to noncitizens like the Petitioners who have 1) not been lawfully admitted to the United States and 2) are arrested and detained within the United States. The Government argues that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies because the Petitioners, having not been lawfully admitted to the country, are applicants for admission seeking to be admitted. The Government further 13 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 14 of 86 points to IIRIRA’s focus on lawful entry, rather than physical presence, as evidence of congressional intent to change the scope of the detention provisions. The Petitioners assert that Section 1226(a) applies because they were arrested and detained within the United States and are not currently seeking admission into the country. They argue that this reading of the statute is consistent with the plain text of the statute and the universal interpretation of the statute over the past thirty years. With this statutory framework in mind, we turn to the question before us on appeal: whether the district court properly granted habeas relief to Lopez Garcia and Rivera when it concluded that Section 1226 governed their detention and that they were, therefore, entitled to a bond hearing. We review a district court’s grant of habeas relief de novo with respect to issues of law and for clear error with respect to findings of fact. Wolfe v. Clarke, 691 F.3d 410, 413, 423 (4th Cir. 2012). III. Analysis For nearly three decades, all three branches of the federal government interpreted Section 1226 to apply to noncitizens—like Petitioners Lopez Garcia and Rivera—present in the United States without inspection and admission, and Section 1225 to apply to noncitizens arriving at our borders. The Petitioners are among thousands of noncitizens in the United States swept up and detained without bond as a result of the Government’s newly adopted construction of Section 1225. “To no one’s surprise and as the [G]overnment has acknowledged, this change in policy has led to a ‘tsunami’ of habeas 14 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 15 of 86 petitions” filed across the country. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 509 n.3 (5th Cir. 2026) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In response to this tsunami, hundreds of federal district courts have considered the question we consider today. The overwhelming majority—over five hundred—rejected the Government’s new construction and sided with the petitioners in over twenty thousand individual cases. 4 The debate has now reached every numbered United States court of appeals and has led to a circuit split. The First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits concluded that Section 1226 applies to noncitizens inside our country, like the Petitioners, and that they must thus be provided a bond hearing. Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 2352042 (1st Cir. Aug. 13, 2026); Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026); Buele Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 2546223 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026); Cirrus Rojas v. Olson, 183 F.4th 909 (7th Cir. 2026); Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 183 F.4th 1160 (9th Cir. 2026); Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226 (10th Cir. 2026); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2026). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits ruled, on the other hand, that Section 1225 applies to all noncitizens who have not been admitted to the United States 4 In the midst of this dramatic increase in workload, district courts across the country have admirably risen to the occasion, issuing carefully researched and meticulously analyzed opinions. Though too numerous to recognize individually, their work on this topic has greatly aided our review. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bostock, 802 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Pablo Sequen v. Albarran, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). 15 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 16 of 86 and therefore they must be detained without bond. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026) (concluding that Section 1225 applies); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). We benefit from the careful consideration and thoughtful analysis of our colleagues. As is readily apparent from the circuit split, the statutory provisions before us lack clarity. When faced with an unclear statute, we must “use every tool at [our] disposal [to] determine the best reading of the statute[.]” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024). These tools are known as the canons of statutory interpretation. Valladares v. Ray, 130 F.4th 74, 80–81 (4th Cir. 2025). Putting all of our tools of statutory construction to work, we hold that Section 1226, not Section 1225, applies to noncitizens who, like the Petitioners, have been present in the United States for years regardless of how they entered our country. Our holding accords with the text, structure, context, and purpose of the INA as well as its universally accepted application for the past three decades. Though the Government’s construction finds some support in the text, it suffers several fatal defects. It renders entire portions of the INA meaningless, calls into question amendments to the statute in the intervening decades, including the recent passage of the Laken Riley Act, and raises significant constitutional concerns. If we were to agree with the Government’s construction, we would need to conclude that, in passing IIRIRA thirty years ago, Congress intended to direct the single largest mass detention of human beings in our nation’s history. Section 1225 simply “cannot bear the weight of the millions of noncitizens it would potentially subject to detention without 16 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 17 of 86 bond.” Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1242; see also Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. 229, 240 (2026). We therefore affirm the district court’s grants of habeas relief. A. Plain Text As with all questions of statutory interpretation, we begin with the text of the statute. Copley v. United States, 959 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 2020). We look to “the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). We first consider whether the plain text of Section 1226(a) applies to noncitizens like the Petitioners. We find that it does. We then consider whether the plain text of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to Petitioners, thereby displacing Section 1226(a) as the controlling detention provision. This requires us to delve into and consider a number of statutory provisions in Section 1225. Because we conclude that the plain text of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is ambiguous, we then turn to principles of statutory construction to determine the best reading of the statute. i. Section 1226 We begin by examining the plain text of Section 1226. Section 1226(a) authorizes that, “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). “Except as provided in subsection” 1226(c), a noncitizen arrested under Section 1226 can be released on bond or conditional parole during removal proceedings. Id. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). 17 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 18 of 86 The word “removed” in Section 1226(a) applies broadly to both inadmissible noncitizens present without authorization and now charged as inadmissible, like Petitioners, and previously admitted noncitizens who are now charged as deportable. This plain reading is supported by the text of other INA sections as well. Where Congress cared to distinguish between inadmissible and deportable noncitizens, it did so. See, e.g., id. § 1229a(c)(2) (distinguishing the burden of proof in removal proceedings for those who are inadmissible and those who are deportable). The plain reading of Section 1226(a)—that it applies to noncitizens present in the United States without inspection and authorization—is further affirmed through the exceptions contained in Section 1226(c), which explicitly call for the mandatory detention of noncitizens present in the country without lawful admission who commit certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). When Congress provides “specific exceptions” to a general rule, it “proves” that the general rule applies in all other circumstances. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010). Otherwise, “the statutory exceptions would be unnecessary.” Id. Section 1226(c) “carves out a statutory category of [noncitizens] who may not be released under § 1226(a).” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). This category includes both noncitizens who are deportable because they committed a crime enumerated in the statute and noncitizens who are inadmissible because they committed these crimes within the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1)(A)–(D). Congress amended Section 1226 with the passage of the Laken Riley Act in 2025. The Laken Riley Act added yet another carve-out to Section 1226(a) for noncitizens who are present in the United States 18 USCA4 Appeal: 25-7050 Doc: 79 Filed: 09/10/2026 Pg: 19 of 86 without being admitted or paroled and have been charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or have admitted committing a set of enumerated crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). Section 1226 unambiguously applies to noncitizens, like the Petitioners, who are present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. The Petitioners were detained inside the United States after living here for decades and they have never committed any of the crimes enumerated in Section 1226(c). By its plain text, therefore, Section 1226(a) applies to the Petitioners. The Government argues however that Section 1226(a) cannot apply to Petitioners because the plain reading of Section 1226 conflicts with the text of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). We now turn to that section. ii. Section 1225 The Government argues that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to the Petitioners. The text of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “an applicant for admission” must be detained during removal proceedings “if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Detention under this subsection is mandatory and therefore such applicants are not given an opportunity for a bond hearing. 5 5 A noncitizen detained under this subsection can be released only through a mechanism known as “parole” for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Parole creates its own legal fiction. If a noncitizen is paroled, he is not considered to have been “admitted” into the