Castaneira v. Noem

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RYAN CASTANEIRA, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 1:22-CV-1485-RCL MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION This case is before the Court on remand from the D.C. Circuit. In 2023, the Court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff Ryan Castaneira’s claim that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“the Agency”) had applied the incorrect evidentiary standard when rejecting his Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative. The D.C. Circuit held that the Court would possess subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs challenge if the evidentiary standard applied by the agency conflicted with binding agency precedent. The Circuit remanded for the Court to address that issue, which arrives in the form of cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, the Court holds that the Agency had adopted a binding evidentiary standard for the adjudication of Form I-130 applications and that its failure to apply that standard to Plaintiff’s adjudication ran afoul of the Accardi doctrine. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s alternative challenge to the Agency’s adoption of the evidentiary burden under the APA because it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review the Agency’s decision. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment will each accordingly be granted in part and denied in part. I. BACKGROUND A. Statutory & Regulatory Background “Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, including spouses and children, receive certain preferential treatment under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).” Castaneira v Mayorkas, 682 F. Supp. 3d 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2023) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)@)). To request that a foreign national be recognized as an “immediate relative,” a United States citizen may file a “Form I-130” petition with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“the Agency”). See Castaneira v. Noem, 138 F.4th 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)q); 8 CER. § 204.1(a)(1)). If the Attorney General “determines that the facts stated in the petition are true and that the alien in behalf of whom the petition is made is an immediate relative,” the statute directs them to “approve the petition....” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); see also Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 542. The citizen’s relative may then “immigrate to the United States and obtain lawful permanent resident status.” Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 542 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b)). The petitioner has the burden of “proving the beneficiary’s eligibility.” Jd. at 543 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1361). But the Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”) restricts this process. See id. Congress enacted the AWA to address sexual exploitation, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 587 (2006), and amended the INA to exclude from the I-130 process any “citizen of the United States who has been convicted of a specified offense against a minor...,” id., 120 Stat. at 623 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(D); see also Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 543, The AWA specified that nine categories of offenses qualify as “offens[es] against a minor,” including “kidnapping,” “false imprisonment,” “[s]olicitation to engage in sexual conduct,” “[u]se in a sexual performance,” “[s]olicitation to practice prostitution,” “[v]ideo voyeurism,” child pornography offenses, “[c]riminal sexual conduct involving a minor,” and “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(II) (incorporating offenses defined at 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)); see also Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 543-44. A petitioner found to have been convicted of one of those offenses may still pursue immigration benefits if “the Secretary of Homeland Security, in the Secretary’s sole and unreviewable discretion, determines that the citizen poses no risk to the alien with respect to whom a petition described in clause (i) is filed.” Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. at 623 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(D); see also Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 543. USCIS now performs that “no-risk” determination. See Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 544 (citing 6 U.S.C. § 271(b)(1); 8 C-F.R. §2.1). But the AWA does not lay out precisely how to conduct a no-risk determination. See Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 544. For example, it “does not specify... the applicable evidentiary standard pursuant to which the petitioner must demonstrate that he poses no such risk.” Id. Without that textual guidance, the Agency was left to interpret the statue. It addressed the applicable evidentiary standard in the February 2007 Aytes Memorandum, which instructed “field officers in an internal interoffice memorandum that, to ‘avoid denial’ of an I-130 petition . . . , the petitioner must ‘submit evidence of rehabilitation... that clearly demonstrates, beyond any 2 reasonable doubt, that he or she poses no risk to the safety and well-being’ of the beneficiary ....” Id. (quoting Michael Aytes, Interoffice Memorandum at 5, ECF No. 55 at 60).! This case is about that evidentiary burden. Understanding the tension requires turning back the clock. Before the Agency had adopted the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard for AWA determinations (and, in fact, before the AWA became law), the Agency’s Administrative Appeals Office had held that “[e]xcept where a different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought.” Matter of Chawathe, 25 I. & N. Dec. 369, 375 (A.A.O. 2010); see also Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 544. That decision became precedential in 2010, after the Aytes Memorandum had instructed Agency personnel to apply the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard to no-risk determinations under the AWA. Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 544. The tension between Chawathe’s elevation to precedent after the adoption of the Aytes Memorandum and the Agency’s application of the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard to Plaintiff’s adjudication is the crux of this dispute. B. Factual Background Plaintiff filed a Form I-130 application in 2019, seeking recognition of his spouse, a Mexican national, as an immediate relative. Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 544, The Agency responded by sending Plaintiff a “Notice of Intent to Deny because he had been convicted of crimes in Georgia that appeared to qualify as ‘specified offenses against a minor’ under the Adam Walsh Act.” Id. at 542. ! The Court uses ECF-provided page numbers where available, otherwise citing to the page numbers provided by the parties. Specifically, Plaintiff had been convicted of “criminal attempt to commit child molestation, criminal attempt to entice a child for indecent purposes, computer pornography and child exploitation, and obscene Internet contact.” Jd. at 544-45 (citing Castaneira v. State, 740 S.E.2d 400, 408 (2013); Georgia Computer or Electronic Pornography and Child Exploitation Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1), (e)(1) (West 2024)). He committed those crimes when “he engaged in online conversation on an adult-only website with an individual whom he believed to be 15 years old, but who was in fact an adult undercover police officer.” Id. at 545 (citing Castaneira, 740 S.E.3d at 402-03). Based on those convictions, the Agency informed Plaintiff that there were two ways in which his Form I-130 could be approved. First, he could “demonstrate[] by a preponderance of the evidence that he had not been convicted of a ‘specified offense against a minor.” Jd. (citing 8 USS.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(D); see also Compl. Ex. A at 2 (“Notice of Intent to Deny”). If he could not do so, he would have to prove “beyond any reasonable doubt” that he posed no risk to his spouse. Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 545; see also Notice of Intent to Deny at 3. The Agency informed Plaintiff that he could do so by providing, for example, “[c]ertified records indicating successful completion of counseling or rehabilitation programs;” “evaluations by qualified psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, or clinical social workers” attesting to his rehabilitation; evidence of “intervening good and exemplary service to the community or in the uniformed services;” etc. Notice of Intent to Deny at 4-5. B. Procedural History In 2022, while the Agency’s decision was still pending and before providing any of the requested evidence, Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 545, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in this Court “seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, challenging the agency’s use of the beyond-any- reasonable-doubt standard..., and requesting a judgment declaring the Adam Walsh Act inapplicable to his convictions,” id. at 542; Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff claimed that the Agency could not deny his petition on the stated grounds because “his prior convictions involved an undercover officer, not a minor, and thus could not have constituted an offense ‘against a minor’ under the statute.” Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 542. Plaintiff then submitted evidence of rehabilitation, but the Agency determined that it was insufficient to “clear the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt bar.” Jd. at 545; see also Am. Compl., ECF No.15 Ex. F at 2—5 (“Denial Notice”). After receiving that final decision, Plaintiff amended his complaint. Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 545. The Amended Complaint alleged that the Agency failed to follow its own binding precedent in applying a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard, that his prior convictions did not qualify as offenses against a minor under the AWA, and that the Agency “violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in arbitrarily and capriciously refusing to adhere to its own precedent.” Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 542-43. The Agency moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18. 1. District Court Proceedings This Court rejected each of Plaintiff's arguments. Castaneira, 682 F. Supp. 3d at 25, 28; see also Castaneira, 682 F. Supp. 3d at 25-28, 29-31. First, the Court determined that Plaintiff’s convictions were qualifying offenses under the AWA even though the “would-be victim was not in fact a minor.” Castaneira, 682 F. Supp. 3d at 30 (“The question, therefore, is whether the particular conduct underlying Castaneira’s offenses ‘by its nature is a sex offense against a minor,’ even though his would-be victim was not in fact a 999 minor, but an adult undercover police officer. The answer to that question is ‘yes. (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)())); see also Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 545. Accordingly, the Court dismissed that claim pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). Jd. at 31. Second, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Agency’s “no-risk” determination based upon the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions. Under the INA, a court may not review “any [] decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under [8 U.S.C., ch. 12, subch. 2] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” Castaneira, 682 F. Supp. 3d at 25 (alterations in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)). Because of 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)()’s expansive vesting of discretion with the Secretary to conduct “no-risk” determinations, the Court held that those determinations were unreviewable under the INA. Id. at 26. Though Plaintiff acknowledged that the ultimate determination was unreviewable, he argued that courts may “review the evidentiary standard used in making that determination.” Id. The Court disagreed, relying upon substantial authority which indicated that the Agency’s selection of the evidentiary standard was encompassed by the agency’s unreviewable discretion. Id. (collecting cases). Because the Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to afford Plaintiff relief, it did not reach the question of whether the Agency had departed from “Chawathe (or any other agency precedent) in applying the stringent beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard of proof.” Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 548; see also Castaneira, 682 F. Supp. 3d at 27. 2. Appeal Plaintiff, still proceeding pro se, appealed this Court’s dismissal to the D.C. Circuit. See Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 35; Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 546. The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Court’s determination that Plaintiff’s prior convictions qualified as sex offenses against a minor under the AWA and therefore affirmed the Court’s “dismissal of [Plaintiff’s] claim that the AWA does not encompass his past state convictions.” Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 548. With respect to Plaintiff’s argument about the evidentiary standard applicable to the “no- tisk” determination, the Circuit held that the fact that the Secretary’s ultimate determination is immune from judicial review does not foreclose an inquiry of whether she “properly disregarded applicable agency precedent and spurned the preponderance standard when she denied [Plaintiff’s] Form I-130 petition.” Jd. at 549 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(D).. The Circuit held that if the standard announced in Chawathe is binding, “the agency has cabined its own discretion through its own precedent, and it must exercise its discretion in the manner it itself sets out.” Id. at 551 (citing Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). The Circuit therefore remanded the case so that the Court may consider whether the Agency has adopted binding precedent. Jd. If it has, the Court “must exercise its judicial review over [Plaintiff’s] challenge to the standard of review.” Id. C. Present Motions Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint in March 2026. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 43 (“SAC”). Counts I and II of the Second Amended Complaint allege that the Agency violated the Accardi doctrine by failing to adhere to the Agency’s binding precedent regarding the applicable evidentiary standard. SAC {J 57-66.2 As Count IV, Plaintiff invokes the Declaratory Judgment Act to allege that the Agency’s interpretation of the term “no risk” is unclear, meaning that he is “unsure what evidence he must adduce” to rebut the Agency’s decision. Jd. 72. Finally, Count V realleges that the Agency ran afoul of Accardi by applying a beyond-any-reasonable- doubt standard and contends that Plaintiff has provided evidence sufficient to meet the preponderance standard, which he claims the Agency should have applied. Id. {| 74-81. The Agency filed an Answer in April 2026, Defs.’ Answer, ECF No. 45, and served the administrative record in May 2026, ECF No. 46. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 47 (“PI1.’s Mot.”). The Agency cross-moved for summary judgment. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. & Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 49 (Defs.’ Mot.”). Those motions are now ripe for the Court’s review. See P1.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 51 (“P1.’s Resp.”); Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 52; Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 53. Il. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1868)). “Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007). 2 Plaintiff is not pursuing Count III. SAC { 68. B. Summary Judgment The Court must grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson y. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, courts consider each motion individually, view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and determine whether the Rule 56 standard is met.” Am. Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Dep t of Labor, 836 F. Supp. 3d 137, 153 (D.D.C. 2026) (citing Am. Ctr. for Int’l Lab. Solidarity v. Chavez-DeRemer, 789 F. Supp. 3d 66, 80 (D.D.C. 2025). In an APA case like this one, the “district judge sits as an appellate tribunal” and the whole case “is a question of law.” Am. Biosci., Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001). So, “[a]s a practical matter, the merits of § 706 claims are almost always resolved by granting summary judgment for one party or the other” because “APA claims present a singular question— whether, as a matter of law, the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to act as it did.” Am. Fed’n of Labor, 836 F. Supp. 3d at 154 (citing Drs. for Am. v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 793 F. Supp. 3d 112, 131 (D.D.C. 2025)). II. ANALYSIS Plaintiff’s arguments can be crystalized into two claims. First, he argues that the Agency violated the Accardi doctrine by failing to adhere to its binding precedent. See PI.’s Mot. at 18, 24. Second, he argues that even if the evidentiary standard in Chawathe was not binding, the adoption of the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard was arbitrary and capricious under the 10 APA. Jd. at 25. The Court addresses each claim in tum. Plaintiff succeeds under Accardi, but his alternative APA claim fails. A. Accardi Claim Plaintiff seeks “a declaration that Chawathe supplies the controlling standard of proof for the AWA ‘no risk’ determination.” P1.’s Mot. at 10. The Court understands this relief to correspond to Counts I & II of the Second Amended Complaint which allege that the Agency ran afoul of Accardi by failing to adhere to binding precedent. See SAC §{] 57-66. But to reach that analysis, the Court must first determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. After navigating a largely uncharted legal landscape, the Court concludes that it does have jurisdiction and that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. 1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction The Circuit has held that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to review agency action for consistency with its binding procedures, even where the agency has broad discretion in reaching the result of those procedures. Jd. at 551 (“Even where Congress has accorded an agency broad discretion, if the agency itself chooses to bind itself to published procedures, this choice means that it must then ‘exercise its own discretion’ in accordance with its own ‘existing valid regulations’ and binding precedents.” (quoting United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954))). a. Chawathe Applies to AWA No-Risk Determinations The question is whether Chawathe binds the Agency in its AWA determinations. The Circuit noted that “[i]t is possible that Chawathe does not apply in the AWA context and that, in making its preponderance-of-the-evidence standard precedential, the Department did not mean to 11 disturb the beyond-any-reasonable doubt standard that may have already been in place for no-risk determinations under the AWA.” Jd. at 551. The Circuit’s statement can be broken down into two inquiries. First, was the “beyond-any-reasonable-doubt” standard already in place for no-risk determinations under the AWA? Second, did the Agency intend to disturb that practice? With respect to the first inquiry, there is little doubt that the “beyond-any-reasonable- doubt” standard was already in place for AWA determinations. The Agency’s arguments all seek to justify its applicability, see Defs.’ Mot. at 17—20, and Plaintiff does not dispute the issue, SAC { 10 (“Defendants routinely require Adam Walsh Act Form 1-130 petitioners, such as Plaintiff, to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they pose no risk to intended beneficiaries . . . 3 This dispute is really about the second question. But at the outset, the Court notes that there is scant legal authority for determining whether the “Department . . . mean[t] to disturb” its practice. Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 551. Because “[t]he D.C. Circuit stands alone” in allowing judicial review of the consistency of the Agency’s evidentiary burden with its precedent, Nobles v. Mullin, 177 F.4th 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2026), courts in other circuits have not determined whether Chawathe is binding on AWA determinations, see id.; Bourdon v. U.S. Dept of Homeland Sec., 940 F.3d 537, 542 (11th Cir. 2019); Bremer v. Johnson, 834 F.3d 925, 931 (8th Cir. 2016). The Court must therefore make its own way in addressing what appears to be a matter of first impression. There is no doubt that Chawathe is a precedential decision binding on the Agency. See Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 549 (“Chawathe constitutes binding agency precedent pursuant to the agency’s own regulations.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(i); Fogo De Chao (Holdings) Inc. v. U.S. Dept of 3 As discussed below, however, there is some indication that the agency has applied a preponderance standard in AWA determinations. 12 Homeland Sec., 769 F.3d 1127, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Wang v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 375 F. Supp. 3d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2019). And parties do not dispute that Chawathe was properly designated as precedential on October 20, 2010. See Pl.’s Mot. at 16; Def.’s Mot. at 20; see also Chawathe, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 369 n.1 (“This matter was initially decided on January 11, 2006, and designated as an ‘adopted decision’ of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), guiding USCIS officers in their administration of the immigration laws. It was not designated as precedent under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(i) (2010) until October 20, 2010.”). The Agency nonetheless argues that Chawathe does not apply to AWA determinations. The Court begins with the case itself. In Chawathe, the Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”) considered whether an immigration beneficiary had adequately demonstrated continuous residence under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(b). 25 L & N. Dec. at 369. Doing so required the AAO to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that a company was an American firm. Jd. at 374-75. The AAO held that the applicant had met the preponderance of the evidence standard, which it applied because the statute was silent on the matter. Id. Specifically, the AAO wrote that “[e]xcept where a different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought.” Chawathe, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 375. By its text, Chawathe applies to AWA no-risk determinations because the AWA does not specify an evidentiary standard. The AWA provides that a petitioner must demonstrate to the Secretary’s satisfaction “that the [petitioner] poses no risk to the alien with respect to whom a petition described in clause (i) is filed.” Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. at 623 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(T)). The Circuit has already opined that the language does not contain an 13 evidentiary standard. See Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 551 (“Nothing in the Act required the agency to adopt any particular standard.”). The Agency appears to resist that conclusion. It argues that the text of the AWA is incompatible with a preponderance standard because the AWA intended to place “an extremely arduous burden on certain sex offenders’ ability to file family-based immigration petitions,” and that the term “no risk” is “irreconcilable” with such a standard because it would allow a petitioner to succeed even if they presented some risk to the beneficiary. Defs.’ Mot. at 10, 8, 18.4 But the Agency is missing the point. Evidentiary burdens deal with the degree of certainty with which a proposition can be sustained, not with the content of the underlying proposition. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (“The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”” (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970))). It is therefore as logical to say something like: “I am 51% certain that there will be no rain during the marathon,” contrary to the Agency’s logic. See Defs.’ Mot. at 9. And even if the Agency were correct about the meaning of “no risk,” its argument goes too far. Applying a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard still entails some risk of harm, albeit a very low risk. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 27 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part) (describing a sufficient beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction to convey “that the prosecution must prove its case by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence, yet not necessarily to an absolute certainty”); United States v. Lyle, No. 23-cr-20098, 2026 WL 1507696, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 4 The Agency notes that the term “no risk” is “singular in the field of immigration law,” Defs.’ Mot. at 11, but it provides no authority at all for that proposition. 14 May 29, 2026) (“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, while a high standard, does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt.”). The Agency’s arguments about the restrictive intent of the AWA are also unpersuasive. Even accepting that Congress wished to prevent abuse by barring certain petitions, Defs.’ Mot. at 11., that objective is not at all relevant to the procedures, including evidentiary burdens, by which they would achieve those goals. 5 And if Congress wished to set an evidentiary burden, it knew how to do so. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(2)(A)Gi) (specifying a clear and convincing evidence standard). Even setting all that aside, the D.C. Circuit already interpreted the AWA to lack a particular evidentiary standard, see Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 551, and the Court is bound by the law of the case, see Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. Cit. 1995) (‘[A] court involved in later phases of a lawsuit should not re-open questions decided (i.e., established as the law of the case) by that court or a higher one in earlier phases.”). The Agency also attempts to mobilize chronology to explain why Chawathe nonetheless does not disturb no-risk determinations under the AWA. It points out that Chawathe was decided before the AWA became law and that draft memoranda demonstrate that the Agency explicitly rejected the preponderance standard for AWA cases. Defs.’ Mot. at 13. The Agency also notes that by the time that Chawathe was designated as binding precedent, the Agency had been operating under its “beyond-any-reasonable-doubt” standard for over three years. Id. at 16. 5 The Agency’s arguments about the terms “prevent” and “barring” in section titles are therefore non sequiturs. See Defs.’ Mot. at 10. 15 Therefore, they argue, adopting Chawathe “left the beyond any reasonable doubt standard undisturbed.” Jd. That argument is unpersuasive. As a matter of logic, the fact that the Agency designated Chawathe as binding precedent after the Agency had an established practice of applying a beyond- any-reasonable-doubt standard is consistent with the conclusion that the Agency decided to reverse its previous determination and adopt a new, binding evidentiary standard. And if the beyond-any- reasonable-doubt standard had been so “firmly ensconced,” id. at 16, at the time that Chawathe was elevated to binding precedent, it would be odd not to exclude AWA determinations from the standard that Chawathe announced if the Agency truly intended to maintain to its previous practices. The Agency’s decisions after elevating Chawathe to binding precedent also indicate that it applied to AWA determinations. In three cases from 2012, the AAO applied a preponderance of the evidence standard to no-risk determinations under the AWA. See In re. Petitioner, 2012 WL 9160988, at *4 (Nov. 5, 2012) (“Overall, a preponderance of the relevant evidence establishes that the petitioner poses no risk to the beneficiary with whom he has been in a relationship for approximately four years.”); In re. Petitioner, 2012 WL 8593908, at *2 (May 24, 2012) (“In proceedings for an alien fiance(e) petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Here, that burden has not been met because the petitioner has failed to establish that he poses no risk to the beneficiary.” (citation omitted) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 375)); In re. Petitioner, 2012 WL 9161910, at *3 (Sept. 24, 2012).° 6 These cases refer to I-129F petitions which are also subject to no-risk determinations under the AWA. See Nobles, 177 F4th at 892 n.3 (citing guidelines for applying the AWA to 1-129F 16 The Government’s argument that “Chawathe is a wholly distinguishable case on the law and the facts,” Defs.’ Mot. at 17, is also unpersuasive because the Agency has drawn on it to justify applying a preponderance standard in adjudications under other statutes. See, e.g., Mo v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 719 F. Supp. 3d 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2024) (applying Chawathe to EB-5 adjudication under 8 U.S.C. §1361); Liv. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 25-00002, 2026 WL 799490, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2026) (same); Chain-Sys Corp. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 2:15-cv-01466, 2016 WL 285037, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016) (same); VVP Advisors, Inc. v. Baran, No. 8:19-cv-00919, 2020 WL 1652556, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2020) (applying Chawathe to an H1-B visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)()(b)); Fontenoy Eng’g, Inc. v. Baran, No. 18-cv-03361, 2020 WL 137155, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020) (same). Finally, the Agency argues that Plaintiff’s reading of Chawathe would “preclude Congress from actually allocating any discretion to USCIS.” Defs.’ Mot. at 17. But that is beside the point. The question here is whether the Agency, in exercising discretion provided by Congress, bound itself to Chawathe. See Castaneira, 138 F.Ath at 549 (“[I]f the Secretary exercised her discretion to bind herself to a preponderance standard in no-risk determinations under this statute, the fact that she has ‘sole and unreviewable’ discretion to make that determination does not preclude judicial review ....”). b. Mullin Does not Overrule the D.C. Circuit As a final Hail Mary, the Agency argues that recent Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent have “undermine[d] the D.C. Circuit’s holding” in this case. Defs.’ Mot. at 27-28. This petitions); Bittinger v. Johnson, No. 1:14-cv-1560, 2015 WL 3842649, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2015). 17 Court is “bound to follow controlling D.C. Circuit precedent unless and until the Circuit overrules that precedent en banc or intervening Supreme Court authority ‘eviscerate[s]’ the law of the Circuit.” Wehr-Darroca v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 24-cv-3504, 2025 WL 2694790, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2025) (alteration in original) (citing LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)). There is no doubt that the D.C. Circuit’s holding controls this case regardless of the Seventh Circuit’s stance on the matter. The relevant question is therefore whether Supreme Court authority has eviscerated the D.C. Circuit’s holding. See Bahlul v. United States, 77 F.4th 918, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“We may depart from the law of the case and from circuit precedent, however, based on an intervening Supreme Court decision.” (citing Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2014))). Defendants rely upon Mullin v. Doe, where the Supreme Court recently interpreted 8U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A), which bars judicial review “of any determination of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] with respect to the designation, or termination, or extension of a designation, of a foreign state under this subsection.” 146 S. Ct. 2121, 2133 (2026) (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A)). There, the Supreme Court noted that it is “common to use the term ‘determination’” in a broad sense, encompassing “the chain of events leading up to a decision.” Id. at 2133. Because the D.C. Circuit’s decision here similarly depends on the word “determines,” Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 550 (stating that McNary’s analysis of the term “determination” applies with equal force to the AWA’s use of the verb “determines”), the Agency argues that the Court should apply the broad definition advanced in Mullin to include steps leading to the ultimate 18 decision, Defs.’ Mot. at 28-29. The Agency also points out that the D.C. Circuit relied on McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr. Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991), for the proposition that “Congress may shield from judicial review an agency’s ultimate determination without precluding courts form reviewing the ‘practice[s] or procedure[s] employed in making’ such individual terminations, Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 549 (quoting McNary, 498 U.S. at 492); Defs.’ Mot. at 28-29. And in Mullin, the Supreme Court read McNary narrowly, holding that it “turned on the specific provision at issue.” Mullin, 146 S. Ct. at 2134.7 The Court is not persuaded. Heeding the Supreme Court’s instruction to privilege statutory text over McNary, the Court proceeds by considering whether the text of the AWA is sufficiently analogous to the statute at issue in Mullin to effectively constitute reversal of the D.C. Circuit. Recall the text of the AWA. The Act affords “the Secretary of Homeland Security ... sole and unreviewable discretion [to] determine[]” whether a Form I-130 petitioner . . . has established that he presents ‘no risk’ to the intended alien beneficiary.” Castaneira, 682 F. Supp. 3d at 26 (alterations in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(D). The Supreme Court’s decision to interpret “determination” broadly in Mullin relied in part on the phrase “with respect to,” which the Court interpreted as having “a broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only its subject but also matters relating to that 7 The statute at issue in McNary “barred ‘review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under’ that program except in removal proceedings.” Mullin, 146 S. Ct. at 2133 (emphasis in original) (quoting § 1160(e)(1)). The Supreme Court therefore held that “[blecause this provision referred to ‘a single act,’ i.e, a ruling on an individual application, ... broad claims about the procedures used in implementing the program could proceed.” Jd. (quoting McNary, 498 U.S. at 492). 19 subject.” Mullin, 146 S. Ct. at 2133-34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1622 (2022)). But that phrase is absent in the AWA. A panel of the D.C. Circuit recently made a similar distinction when applying Mullin to the term “determination” in another statute. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Kennedy, 187 F.4th 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2026). In Teva, the Circuit interpreted a statute which provided that “[t]here shall be no administrative or judicial review of...the determination of qualifying single source drugs....” Jd. at 603. The Circuit held that Mullin did not control because the statutory language there “swept broadly,” including the phrase “with respect to.” Jd. In contrast, the statute in Teva Pharmaceuticals merely barred review of “the determination.” Id. The issue is close, but following the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Mullin, the Court concludes that the AWA does not preclude judicial review because it does not contain analogous broadening language to the statute at issue in Mullin. See California v. EPA, No. 26-cv-2185, 2026 WL 2593640, at *19 (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 2026) (holding that Mullin’s broad reading of “determination” did not apply where the statute lacked broadening language). And the D.C. Circuit drew another relevant distinction in Teva. It held that Mullin concerned the adequacy of the Secretary’s consultation with the State Department, which dealt with “the quality of the [agency’s] reasoning rather than the scope ofits authority.” Teva, 187 F.4th at 604-05 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Ardelyx, Inc. v. Kennedy, 179 F.4th 947, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2026)). In contrast, the challenge in Teva targeted “the scope of [the agency’s] statutory authority, not the quality of the reasoning underlying any such determination.” Jd, That reasoning preserves review here as well because Plaintiff is analogously 20 challenging the Agency’s authority to depart from its binding precedent. Castaneira, 187 F.4th at 551. Accordingly, though the Court recognizes that the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in this case is subject to debate considering Mullin, it cannot be said that the Supreme Court has “effectively overrule[d]” the law of the Circuit as applied to this case. Bahlul, 77 F.4th at 926 (quoting United States v. Williams, 194 F.3d 100, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). The Court therefore determines that the Agency did bind itself to a preponderance standard in AWA determinations by adopting Chawathe as binding precedent. It joins one dissent from the Eleventh Circuit in that view. Bourdon, 940 F.3d at 551 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (“Here, as noted, § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) does not specify any evidentiary standard whatsoever. Under Chawathe, then, USCIS was obligated to use the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to determine whether Mr. Bourdon had shown that he posed ‘no risk’ to his wife.”). The Eleventh Circuit itself did not address the issue because the panel concluded that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review “the Secretary’s chosen burden of proof.” Id. at 542. 2. Merits Having determined that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s challenge under controlling D.C. Circuit precedent, it now proceeds to address the merits. Plaintiff alleges that by applying a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard instead of the binding preponderance standard announced in Chawathe, the Agency violated the Accardi doctrine. P1.’s Mot. at 24-25. The Accardi doctrine prohibits agencies from “violat[ing] their own rules and regulations to the prejudice of others.” Battle v. FAA., 393 F.3d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Put another way, “an agency, even one that enjoys broad discretion, must adhere to voluntarily adopted, binding 21 policies that limit its discretion.” Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also IGIv, Mullin, No. 25-cv-03898, 2026 WL 2837310, at *12 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2026) (“[A]n agency pronouncement is subject to Accardi if it imposes ‘rights or obligations on the respective parties,’ places ‘significant restraints on the agency’s discretion,’ or is ‘intended’ to function as a “binding norm.’” (citing Padula, 822 F.2d at 100; Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 336-37 (D.D.C. 2018); Moghaddam v. Pompeo, 424 F. Supp. 3d 104, 120-21 (D.D.C. 2020))). a. Accardi Violation The Accardi doctrine applies to the evidentiary burden adopted in Chawathe. As discussed above, Chawathe is properly adopted, binding agency precedent which restrains the Agency’s discretion. See Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 549 (“Chawathe constitutes binding agency precedent pursuant to the agency’s own regulations.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(). There is no dispute that the Agency did not apply a preponderance standard to the adjudication of Plaintiff’s petition. SAC Ex. F at 3 (“To avoid the denial of a family-based visa petition, a petitioner who has been convicted of a ‘specified offense against a minor’ must submit evidence that demonstrates, beyond any reasonable doubt, that he or she poses no risk to the beneficiary.”); id. at 5 (“The need for continued monitoring, treatment, and your continued probation do not suppo