Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 26-9526 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 17, 2026 _______________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court BANJOKO OLAKITAN ADETAYO, Petitioner, v. No. 26-9526 (Petition for Review) TODD BLANCHE, United States Attorney General Respondent. _______________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _______________________________________ Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _______________________________________ This petition for review stems from an immigration case and raises issues of mootness and administrative exhaustion: 1. Mootness: Did the challenge to detention become moot once the petitioner was removed? We answer yes. * The parties don’t request oral argument, and it would not help us decide the petition for review. So we are deciding the petition based on the record and the briefing. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 26-9526 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 2 2. Administrative exhaustion: Did the petitioner fail to properly pursue administrative remedies before challenging the removal? We answer yes. 1. The petitioner overstays his visa, is granted voluntary departure, and appeals the immigration judge’s decision. The petitioner, Dr. Banjoko Olakitan Adetayo, 1 is a citizen of Nigeria who was lawfully admitted to the United States through the issuance of a visa. R. at 63, 89. After expiration of his visa, Dr. Adetayo was detained and served with notice of removal proceedings for overstaying his visa. Id. at 227. In the removal proceedings, the immigration judge told Dr. Adetayo that • he could voluntarily depart and • the failure to voluntarily leave the country by the specified date would result in removal to Nigeria. Id. at 149−72. Dr. Adetayo accepted a grant of voluntary departure. Rather than voluntarily depart, Dr. Adetayo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, challenging his detention and alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 48−49. But he appealed too late, and the Board of Immigration Appeals summarily dismissed the appeal. Id. at 2. 1 Because Dr. Adetayo is pro se, we liberally construe his briefs but don’t “assume the role of advocate.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 2 Appellate Case: 26-9526 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 3 This petition for review followed. While the petition was pending, Dr Adetayo was removed to Nigeria based on his failure to voluntarily depart. Doc. 42 at 1. Despite his removal, he challenges • the legality of his detention, which he characterizes as “unlawful” and “indefinite,” and • the legality of his removal based on a denial of due process. In response, the government argues that • the Board of Immigration Appeals did not err in summarily dismissing Dr. Adetayo’s appeal and • his other claims are unexhausted. 2. Dr. Adetayo’s challenges to his detention became moot by his removal to Nigeria. Dr. Adetayo challenges his detention, but he’s no longer detained because the government removed him to Nigeria. Id. Upon his removal, the challenge to detention became moot. See Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1257−58 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that the appellants’ release from immigration custody mooted their challenges to the legality of detention). 2 2 Dr. Adetayo was removed after the completion of briefing, so the parties haven’t addressed the impact of removal. But mootness is jurisdictional, and we must consider the issue sua sponte. Moongate Water Co. v. Dona Ana Mut. Domestic Water Consumers Ass'n, 420 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2005). 3 Appellate Case: 26-9526 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 4 3. Dr. Adetayo’s challenges to his removal are unexhausted. Dr. Adetayo also challenges the order of removal, 3 claiming a denial of due process based on • factual inaccuracies in his original notice to appear and the immigration judge’s subsequent reliance on that notice, • the immigration judge’s failure to consider certain documents relating to Dr. Adetayo’s immigration status, • the immigration judge’s failure to provide advice about the effect of voluntary departure, • the immigration judge’s decision to “invoke deportation” and grant voluntary departure, and • the immigration judge’s failure to grant an interview for asylum. This claim requires exhaustion of administrative remedies. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). And exhaustion ordinarily requires a timely appeal to 3 When a noncitizen has been removed, we retain jurisdiction in a later petition for review if the removal results in “collateral consequences.” Tapia Garcia v. I.N.S., 237 F.3d 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001). One such collateral consequence is the loss of eligibility for adjustment of status. See Monsalvo v. Bondi, 604 U.S. 712, 716 (2025) (finding that a failure to voluntarily depart results in “ineligibility for most forms of immigration relief for a period of 10 years”); see also Ahmed v. Holder, 381 F. App’x 786, 787 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (noting that inability to reenter the United States for a specified period is a collateral consequence that prevents mootness). Dr. Adetayo’s removal for failing to voluntarily depart thus results in collateral consequences. So we retain jurisdiction over his challenge to the removal itself. 4 Appellate Case: 26-9526 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 5 the Board of Immigration Appeals. Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1308−09 (10th Cir. 2004). An exception exists for constitutional questions. Vicente-Elias v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1086, 1095 (10th Cir. 2008). 4 But this exception is narrow; it doesn’t apply to “administratively correctable procedural errors, even when [those] errors are failures to follow due process.” Akinwunmi v. I.N.S., 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1995)). The challenges here aren’t “substantive constitutional claim[s] for relief independent of the statutory provisions the [Board of Immigration Appeals] is authorized to enforce.” Vicente-Elias, 532 F.3d at 1095. Rather, these claims involve correctable procedural errors that could have been presented to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See, e.g., Miguel- Pena v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145, 1155−59 (10th Cir. 2024) (noting that arguments regarding deficiencies in notices to appear are subject to the 4 Dr. Adetayo also argues that exhaustion isn’t required when it would be futile. We may assume, for the sake of argument, that he’s right. See Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder, 625 F.3d 1233, 1240 n.** (10th Cir. 2010) (Gorsuch, J.) (“assuming without deciding” that exhaustion is unnecessary when it would be futile). Even with that assumption, however, Dr. Adetayo couldn’t “bypass the [Board of Immigration Appeals] simply because he [thought] it [would] be unsympathetic to his claim.” Sundar v. I.N.S., 328 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003). 5 Appellate Case: 26-9526 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 6 exhaustion requirement). So Dr. Adetayo’s challenges to the order of removal are unexhausted. *** We thus • dismiss the challenge to detention based on mootness and • deny the petition for review involving the order of removal. 5 Entered for the Court Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge 5 We grant Dr. Adetayo’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 6