Full Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 1 of 63 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 23-1897 JAIME DANIEL NAVARRO CERRITOS, Petitioner, v. TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. --------------------------------------- NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LITIGATION ALLIANCE Amicus Supporting Petitioner. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Argued: May 6, 2026 Decided: August 11, 2026 Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Petition for review granted, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge King joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a dissenting opinion. ARGUED: McKenzie Stoker, Andrew Porter, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Christopher Ian Pryby, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Jayesh Maneklal Rathod, Immigrant Justice Center, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony C. Payne, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 2 of 63 GREGORY, Circuit Judge: Jaime Daniel Navarro Cerritos (“Navarro”) first entered the United States in 2013, fleeing the brutality of the MS-13 gang in El Salvador. After he was deported back to El Salvador, where he faced continued threats of violence and death, he again escaped to the United States for refuge. In April 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) reinstated Navarro’s initial removal order from 2016. Navarro conceded removability but sought withholding and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ denied his requests, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissed his appeal. Thirty days after the Board issued its decision, Navarro petitioned this Court for review of the Board’s decision. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025), the Government contends that we lack jurisdiction to review Navarro’s petition, or, in the alternative, that Navarro’s petition was untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) because it was filed more than thirty days after DHS issued the “final order of removal” in his case. The Government also argues that Navarro’s claims fail on the merits, requiring affirmance of the Board’s decision. We hold that we have jurisdiction to review Navarro’s untimely petition, and we equitably toll 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)’s 30-day deadline as applied to Navarro’s case. We therefore deny the Government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We also agree with Navarro’s arguments on the merits, so we grant Navarro’s petition, vacate the Board’s ruling, and remand for further proceedings. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 3 of 63 I. Navarro was born in El Salvador, in a town with a ubiquitous MS-13 presence. He grew up next to the leader of the town’s MS-13 clique, so gang members were present throughout his childhood. For example, when Navarro was nine, he saw Lolo, a member of the gang, “hacking and slicing” a man with a machete. J.A. 843. Navarro and his aunt fled, but Lolo—covered in blood—found them and “stared at [them] for a moment and then silently shushed [them].” J.A. 843. Another individual was arrested, tried, and convicted for the murder Navarro witnessed; Navarro and his aunt never spoke up. That was not the only crime Navarro witnessed. The next year, when Navarro was going to his grandmother’s house, he saw MS-13 members raping two girls. J.A. 844–45. They asked Navarro if he saw anything, and he stated that he did not. The men beat him anyway to make sure he did not talk. One man punched him in the face, another punched him in the abdomen, and another pushed him into the creek. Navarro was afraid to tell his aunt what happened, but he eventually told her about the incident. Against Navarro’s wishes, his aunt told him she was going to report the attack and threats to the police. But, although she did report the incident to the police, and the police said they would come take a full incident report, they never came. Instead, they notified MS-13 that Navarro’s aunt had made the report. Navarro was frequently harassed for refusing to join MS-13. When Navarro was ten years old, he was walking home when a group of gang members approached him and tried to persuade him to join MS-13. He refused. They continued to harass him, then foreshadowed their next tactic: “since you think you’re too good to join us let’s see if this 3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 4 of 63 changes your mind.” J.A. 844. Then, they punched him, kicked him, and dislocated his wrist. Navarro did not tell anyone that he was attacked by the gang. When asked about his cuts and injured wrist, he stated that he had gotten into a fight at school. In another instance, Navarro was walking through a desolate area on the way to his grandfather’s house when he encountered Calavera, the leader of the local MS-13 group, and other MS-13 members. They called him a “rat,” told him he “hadn’t learned [his] lesson,” and said “they would make sure [he] stayed quiet this time.” J.A. 846. Navarro believes the gang members were referencing the police report his aunt made. They took off his shorts and boxers and punched, kicked, and raped him. J.A. 847. During the attack, Navarro passed out. When he awoke, his shoulder was in pain from being held down so long, and he could not move his arm. But he eventually got up, put his shorts on, and went home. He told his family members not to contact the police. A month later, Navarro left El Salvador; his family realized that he needed to leave in order to survive. He fled to the United States and lived a normal life with his family in Virginia. He applied for asylum soon after arriving, but his application was denied and he was given a voluntary departure order. He then applied for DACA relief, which was approved in 2013 and 2014, but not in 2016. In April 2016, after Navarro was pulled over for a traffic citation, ICE became aware of his unlawful presence and deported him. Once deported, Navarro again began to fear he would be killed. His neighbor’s son was murdered soon after he arrived, so Navarro tried not to leave his house. J.A. 849–50. He later bumped into Calavera, who asked Navarro to take him out to drinks. This 4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 5 of 63 happened often; Navarro repeatedly refused. A month later, after one such refusal, he received another brutal beating from the gang members. Despite this torment, Navarro, his brother Narciso, and his cousin Maritza, founded a committee to create alternatives for young people who may feel compelled to join MS-13. He took the children night fishing, helped them find part-time employment, played soccer with them, tutored them, and drove them to school. Soon after he started this organization, MS-13 members approached Navarro with a gun. They told him to join the gang to avoid any harassment. But when he refused, they threw Navarro on the ground and spat on him. J.A. 850–51. MS-13 members also began referring to Navarro as a “shepherd,” used derogatorily to reference Navarro’s anti-gang activities. J.A. 850; J.A. 555. Navarro’s involvement as Vice President of the youth committee amplified his status as an MS-13 target. When Jose Vallecillos, a wealthy landowner with ties to MS-13, reneged on his promise to donate land to the committee, it was Navarro who confronted him, argued with him, and then publicly repudiated his actions. In retaliation, Vallecillos asked MS-13 to threaten Navarro, and they told Navarro that he “had not learned his lesson” before. J.A. 856. Calavera confronted Navarro, telling him that he would “end up under one of the dirt piles” if he continued in his attempts to retrieve the land. J.A. 855. Calavera threatened, “[d]idn’t you learn your lesson the first time? You know what happens when you don’t comply, but this time we’ll make sure you don’t come back.” J.A. 855. Fearing reprisal, Navarro’s anti-gang committee disbanded soon after, and Navarro relocated to Chalatenango to “avoid being killed by Calavera.” J.A. 855. Chalatenango had a strong government and military presence, so Navarro believed he would be safer there. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 6 of 63 Navarro returned to San Nicolas around Christmas to visit his grandmother. On Christmas Eve of 2016, Calavera was killed. Navarro returned to Chalatenango two days later. Sensing an opportunity to scapegoat a community annoyance, the new MS-13 leader started a rumor that Navarro had killed Calavera. Navarro learned of the rumor from his brother, who warned Navarro to stay away because MS-13 was looking for him and watching his grandmother’s house. But it was not long before MS-13 located Navarro and began asking Navarro’s coworkers about him. Navarro moved to a new city, Jucuapa, but the MS-13 presence there was even worse. Navarro made a third attempt to relocate to Jocurro, a city an hour from Jucuapa. Yet, inquisitive gang members appeared wherever he went: his hosts in Jocurro said they were threatened by gang members because Navarro was staying with them. Because the MS-13 members were aware of his presence in Jocurro, he was worried that the MS-13 clique in San Nicolas would soon learn where he was hiding. He finally decided to leave El Salvador, believing that if he stayed, he would be killed. He returned to the United States in July or August of 2017, but he was soon placed in ICE custody again. J.A. 858. Navarro’s brother conveyed a message from MS-13; the gang was aware that he would be deported to El Salvador shortly and stated that Navarro’s return “would not be tolerated” because of the problems Navarro had caused. J.A. 858. II. Navarro was apprehended by DHS in Virginia, and his prior removal order was reinstated on April 2, 2021. On July 27, 2021, an IJ, overturning an asylum officer’s determination, placed Navarro in withholding-only proceedings. J.A. 137. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 7 of 63 After a hearing, the IJ denied Navarro’s application for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) and CAT protection. Navarro timely appealed the IJ’s determination to the Board, which dismissed his appeal in part and remanded to the IJ in part. The IJ issued a second decision in February 2023, again denying Navarro withholding and CAT relief. The IJ found Navarro credible and determined that he provided sufficient corroboration for his factual allegations, including that Navarro founded a youth committee and was blamed for Calavera’s death. But the IJ nonetheless determined that Navarro failed to demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal because his proposed particularized social group (“PSG”), “Individuals in El Salvador Who Witness and Report Crimes by MS-13 to the Police,” was not cognizable. The IJ held that even if Navarro was an imputed member of his proposed PSG, the group was not sufficiently particular because the term “witness” is not particular. And it found that the articulated group was likewise not socially distinct, because society as a whole, rather than Navarro’s perpetrators, must perceive a group as distinct. 1 Next, the IJ found that Navarro failed to demonstrate that he suffered harm due to his actual or imputed anti-gang political opinion. The IJ determined that Navarro’s work with children would not be perceived by MS-13 as evincing an actual or imputed anti-gang political opinion. It also found that Navarro’s altercation with Vallecillos was “a central reason” for the threats he suffered. J.A. 145–46. In addition, the IJ credited Navarro’s recounting of the rumor that he killed Calavera and found the rumor corroborated by The IJ found that Navarro was not a member of his proposed PSG but assumed 1 arguendo that Navarro was an imputed member of his proposed PSG. J.A. 163. 7 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 8 of 63 Navarro’s brother’s affidavit. But the IJ nonetheless found it unlikely that MS-13 imputed an anti-gang political opinion on Navarro based on that rumor because Navarro’s family has reportedly remained unharmed. J.A. 146. Finally, the IJ determined that Navarro failed to demonstrate his eligibility for protection under CAT. It determined that Navarro does not face a particularized risk of torture by Vallecillos or MS-13 if removed to El Salvador. The IJ found Navarro’s claim that he will be tortured or killed upon arrival to be “speculative” because Navarro’s family did not describe communications they received from MS-13 after Navarro’s departure. J.A. 167. The IJ likewise determined that Navarro did not prove relocation in El Salvador was untenable. And it concluded that even if Navarro had demonstrated a particularized risk of torture upon his return to El Salvador, the record did not show that the government would acquiesce to such torture. So, the IJ denied relief on all grounds. Navarro timely appealed the IJ’s determination to the Board. On July 28, 2023, in a single-member opinion, the Board affirmed the IJ’s decision in full. The Board agreed that Navarro’s proposed PSG was not cognizable because it lacked particularity and social distinction. With respect to Navarro’s political opinion claim, the Board found that Navarro failed to establish that he “held or expressed any anti-gang political opinion, that the gang targeted him because it perceived him as a political threat, or that it would target him for such belief imputed to him.” J.A. 6. It therefore affirmed the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal relief. The Board also affirmed the IJ’s denial of protection under CAT, agreeing that the risk of Vallecillos continuing to pursue Navarro was “low,” and the risk of MS-13 seeking 8 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 9 of 63 to torture or kill Navarro was “speculative.” J.A. 8. In addition, the Board did not disturb the IJ’s determination that Navarro failed to demonstrate he was unable to safely relocate elsewhere in El Salvador. Navarro was removed to El Salvador in August 2023. He petitioned this Court for review on August 28, 2023. III. Before addressing the timeliness of Navarro’s petition, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider his petition at all. “A federal court must always satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction.” Riley, 606 U.S. at 273. “Thus, even if the parties fail to spot a jurisdictional issue or agree that the court has jurisdiction, the court cannot proceed unless it makes an independent determination that it has jurisdiction.” Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) allows noncitizens to petition for judicial review of a “final order of removal.” “[I]n the deportation context, a ‘final order of removal’ is a final order ‘concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 579 (2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A)). Finding a noncitizen is entitled to CAT relief or statutory withholding “means only that, notwithstanding the order of removal, the noncitizen may not be removed to the designated country of removal, at least until conditions change in that country.” Id. at 582. In other words, because statutory withholding and CAT relief do not address the question of removability, a denial of either form of relief does not constitute a final order of removal. See Riley, 606 U.S. at 263 (holding that a Board order in a withholding-only proceeding is not a final order of removal). 9 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 10 of 63 We may still review CAT and withholding claims, but only if these claims accompany a final order of removal. The “zipper clause,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), provides that judicial review of any “questions of law and fact” that arise in removal proceedings may occur “only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” And 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) states that a petition for review filed with a court of appeals “shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review” of a CAT claim. Riley made clear that any challenge to the Board’s denial of withholding and CAT relief must be tethered to a challenge to a final order of removal, because “review of removability and withholding of removal should occur in a single appellate proceeding.” Riley, 606 U.S. at 271. After conceding removability, Navarro petitioned to our court for review of the Board’s determination as to statutory withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) and CAT protection under 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e). The question before us is whether Navarro’s petition challenges a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), even though he does not challenge removability on the merits. If it does, we have jurisdiction to review his petition. A. First, what order constitutes the “final order of removal” in the case before us? Our precedents suggest that reinstatement orders constitute orders of removal under § 1252(a)(1), though we have never definitively answered that question. See Rivas de Nolasco v. Bondi, 150 F.4th 350, 355 (4th Cir. 2025) (treating reinstatement order as final order of removal). 10 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 11 of 63 Though the Government contends in its response brief that the reinstatement order in Navarro’s case is not a final order of removal, the Government previously conceded that it was. See Gov’t Mot. to Dismiss at 8–9 (“Here, though, Navaro Cerritos has not petitioned for review of a final order of removal – that is, he has not sought review of DHS’s April 2, 2021 reinstatement order.”). And the Government likewise acknowledged in its response brief that courts of appeals have “unanimously” reviewed petitions for review of reinstatement orders. Resp. Br. at 20. We see no reason to depart from the weight of authority. We hold that reinstatement orders constitute final orders of removal under § 1252(a)(1). In Riley, the Supreme Court recognized that the order concluding Riley was deportable and “commanding his deportation” was the Final Administrative Removal Order (“FARO”) issued by DHS. 606 U.S. at 267. 2 The Court recognized that, per statute, an order of removal becomes final after either “(1) ‘a determination by the [Board] affirming such order,’ or (2) ‘the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to’ petition the Board for review of the order.” Id. (citing § 1101(a)(47)(B)). Because Riley could not appeal the FARO before an IJ or the Board, “the period to seek review expires as soon as the FARO is issued—meaning that the order becomes final immediately upon issuance.” Id. (citation modified). Thus, the FARO issued in Riley’s case constituted the final order of removal in that case. 2 The term “FARO” comes from 8 C.F.R. § 238.1, which governs expedited removal of noncitizens facing deportation from the United States due to aggravated felony convictions. A FARO is distinct from a “final order of removal” as specified in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 11 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 12 of 63 For similar reasons, the April 2, 2021 reinstatement of Navarro’s prior removal order is the relevant final order of removal in this case. See J.A. 1484 (reinstating the May 6, 2016 order of removal). Like a FARO, the regulations governing reinstatement orders prescribe no process by which the reinstatement of a prior removal order may be appealed. It becomes final upon its issuance. In so holding, we join our sister circuits, which have unanimously exercised jurisdiction over reinstatement orders. See Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003); Laureano v. Att’y Gen., 177 F.4th 453, 457 (3d Cir. 2026); Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 885, 890 (5th Cir. 2014); Moreno-Martinez v. Barr, 932 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 2019); E.E.V. v. Blanche, 180 F.4th 954, 967 (7th Cir. 2026); Lara-Nieto v. Barr, 945 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2019); Ruiz v. Bondi, 172 F.4th 673, 676 (9th Cir. 2026); Arostegui- Maldonado v. Garland, 75 F.4th 1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 2023), abrogated on other grounds by Riley, 606 U.S. at 259; Avila v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 560 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009). B. Next, what constitutes a “challenge” to a final order of removal? Specifically, must a petitioner challenge removability in order to challenge a final order of removal? Riley did not address this question. Before the Supreme Court decided Riley, the Second Circuit stated that courts can only review CAT claims when they accompany a “judicially reviewable final order of removal.” See Bhaktibhai-Patel v. Garland, 32 F.4th 180, 190 n.13 (2d Cir. 2022), abrogated on other grounds by Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025). And since Riley, the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have weighed in, though they have reached diverging conclusions. See Laureano, 177 F.4th at 453 (finding 12 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 13 of 63 jurisdiction to review a CAT claim where petition did not expressly challenge removability); E.E.V., 180 F.4th at 970–72 (in dicta, noting that “Riley clearly requires a would-be petitioner to file a petition for review of a final order of removal, not from the denial of withholding-only relief,” but holding that judicial review does not require a “substantive challenge” to removability); Navarrete v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 2026) (no jurisdiction to review CAT claim because petition did not expressly challenge removability); Hayles v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 179 F.4th 872, 875 (11th Cir. 2026) (same). We join the Third Circuit today in holding that we have jurisdiction to review a petition for review that does not expressly challenge removability. As the Third Circuit recognized in Laureano, Riley itself directs us to assert jurisdiction over Navarro’s petition. See Laureano, 177 F.4th at 457–59. Riley, like Navarro, conceded removability but sought to challenge the Board’s denial of his CAT and withholding of removal claims. The Supreme Court was obligated to dismiss Riley’s petition if it found it lacked jurisdiction. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011) (recognizing that courts must address all jurisdictional bars before remanding a case to lower courts); Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C., 595 U.S. 267, 274 (2022) (stating that the Supreme Court must “assure” itself that all “jurisdictional requirements” are “met” in the cases that come before it). As the Riley majority noted, “a litigant’s failure to comply with a jurisdictional bar deprives a court of all authority to hear a case, regardless of waiver or equitable considerations.” Riley, 606 U.S. at 273 (citing 33 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8316 (2018)). And, because of Justice Thomas’s concurrence, the Court was aware of a potential jurisdictional defect. See id. at 278 (Thomas, J., concurring). 13 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 14 of 63 Although the Court did not provide a full analysis of the jurisdictional issue, it noted that petitioners like Riley, who have conceded removability but have yet to receive a withholding-only relief decision, need not fear being deprived of judicial review so long as timeliness poses no barrier to their petition. Id. at 272. If Riley were deprived of jurisdiction because he failed to expressly challenge his underlying petition for removal, such an outcome would surely conflict with the Supreme Court’s assurance that he would “not be hurt” and unable to have his petition reviewed. Id. Like the Third Circuit, we find this discussion further bodes in favor of our jurisdiction. See Laureano, 177 F.4th at 458 (“[T]he Supreme Court had no doubt that courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review withholding- only rulings independent of any substantive review of final orders of removal.”). Moreover, when a petition for review fails to specify the order being challenged, precedent counsels a functional approach. In his petition for review to this Court, filed August 28, 2023, Navarro stated that he was appealing the Board’s July 28, 2023 decision because it was the “final order of removal” in his case. Pet. at 1. Navarro’s petition references the 2021 reinstatement of his prior removal order. Id. His petition does not, however, expressly challenge the reinstatement order constituting the final order of removal in his case. But Navarro’s “inexact specification” that the order to be reviewed is the 2023 denial of withholding-only relief, rather than the 2021 reinstatement order, does not foreclose us from reviewing his petition. Am. Rivers v. FERC, 895 F.3d 32, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B) imposes requirements on litigants petitioning to a court of appeals: the notice must “designate the judgment–or the appealable order–from which the appeal is taken.” The Supreme Court has instructed that “‘functional’ 14 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 15 of 63 rather than formalistic compliance” with Rule 3 “is all that is required.” Clark v. Cartledge, 829 F.3d 303, 305 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992)). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a)(2)(C) similarly requires that a petition for review “specify the order to be reviewed.” We, in accord with our sister circuits, have construed Rule 15(a)(2)(C) with the same liberal approach the Supreme Court has mandated be applied to Rule 3(c)(1)(B). See Gottesman v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 33 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e do not disturb the well-established principle that ‘the requirements of the rules of procedure should be liberally construed and that mere technicalities should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its merits.’”) (quoting Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988)) (citation modified); Castillo- Rodriguez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 929 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1991); Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 157–58 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Village of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., 892 F.3d 252, 266 (7th Cir. 2018); Kazarian v. Bondi, 159 F.4th 690, 692–93 (9th Cir. 2025). Such requirements “derive from the need to provide ‘fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Perez-Perez v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007)). For that reason, in the context of Rule 15(a)(2)(C), our sister circuits have repeatedly noted that “a mistaken or inexact specification of the order to be reviewed is not fatal, as long as the ‘intent to seek review of a specific order . . . can be fairly inferred from the petition for review . . .’ [and] the respondent is not misled by the mistake.” Am. Rivers, 895 15 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 16 of 63 F.3d at 44 (citing Entravision Holdings, LLC v. FCC, 202 F.3d 311, 312 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); see Le v. Astrue, 558 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). In one such case, Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc., 284 F.3d at 156–158, a petition for review only expressly challenged an unreviewable reconsideration order, rather than an earlier order the petitioner intended to challenge. But the D.C. Circuit nonetheless determined it had jurisdiction to review the petition for review because the petitioner’s docketing statement “gave notice to a reasonably intelligent person that [petitioner] intended to make a substantive challenge to the underlying Local Ownership Order and not only to the Reconsideration Order.” Id. at 158. The court “fairly read” a challenge stating that the FCC “acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and otherwise contrary to law in imposing the new local television ownership regulations on broadcasters” to refer to the underlying order the petitioner failed to name in its petition for review. Id. And the D.C. Circuit has exercised jurisdiction in several similar cases where the underlying order petitioner sought to appeal was not named at all. See Martin v. FERC, 199 F.3d 1370, 1372–73 (D.C. Cir. 2000); City of Oconto Falls v. FERC, 204 F.3d 1154, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In City of Oconto Falls, the court found it persuasive that the petitioner’s briefs “addressed” the underlying order not named in its petition. 204 F.3d at 1160. So too here: Navarro’s “inexact specification of the order to be removed is not fatal” to our review of his petition. Am. Rivers, 895 F.3d at 44. It can be “fairly inferred” that Navarro’s petition, seeking review of the Board’s denial of withholding-only relief, implicitly sought review of the underlying removability decision. Id. Navarro’s petition referenced the 2021 reinstatement order and sought to challenge the “final order of 16 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 17 of 63 removal” in his case. Pet. at 1. His challenges to the Board’s rulings on his withholding and CAT claims arise from the single proceeding that reinstatement of his prior removal order triggered. See Riley, 606 U.S. at 271 (noting that “review of removability and withholding of removal should occur in a single appellate proceeding”). And the Government has not claimed any prejudice, nor that it is somehow burdened by Navarro’s failure to expressly challenge the reinstatement order. To be sure, in many cases where the court has found an intent to seek review to be “fairly inferred,” the petitioners submitted a statement of issues or reasons expressly listing its challenge to the agency’s underlying order, and Navarro has not. See Am. Rivers, 895 F.3d at 44; Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 158; Damsky v. FCC, 199 F.3d 527, 532–34 (D.C. Cir. 2000). But, given the requirement that petitioners challenge removability “without also briefing meritless arguments against those orders,” a fulsome challenge to the final order of removal in Navarro’s case is particularly unnecessary. Riley v. Blanche, 180 F.4th 187, 195 (4th Cir. 2026) (hereinafter “Riley II”). After all, Navarro does not need any actual challenge to removability to preserve review of his withholding and CAT claims. Riley tells us quite the opposite: the Court envisioned “nominal challenges” to removability to ensure compliance with 1252(b)(1)’s 30-day filing requirement. Id. at 194. Such “placeholder appeal[s]” do not require the noncitizen to mount a merits challenge to removability—we recognized in Riley II that we simply require some indication that the petition challenges the final order of removal in a noncitizen’s case. Id. at 193. For that reason, we granted Riley’s request to amend his petition to include an express challenge to his initial removal order, even though Riley did not actually contest removability. Id. at 17 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 18 of 63 195. We are satisfied that Navarro’s petition challenges the underlying final order of removal, supporting our exercise of jurisdiction. The Government looks to Entravision Holdings, LLC, 202 F.3d at 312, where the D.C. Circuit held that the petitioner’s intent to seek review of an underlying order was not fairly inferable from its filings. There, Entravision’s contemporaneous filings “clearly demonstrate[d]” an intent to put only the unreviewable order before the court. Id. at 314. Entravision’s petition for review mentioned the order it actually intended to challenge in passing, when recounting procedural history. Id. But Entravision is inapposite: Navarro’s contemporaneous filings illustrate his intent to challenge the underlying removal order. As discussed above, when a petitioner has conceded removability, a petition to review the Board’s denial of withholding of removal and CAT relief requires only a nominal challenge to the underlying final order of removal. Thus, Navarro’s discussion of the reinstatement decision in his petition for review, along with his inclusion of both the reinstatement decision and his initial order of removal in his subsequent filings, allow us to “fairly infer” his intent to nominally challenge the underlying removability decision in his case. In sum, we retain jurisdiction over Navarro’s petition because his petition for review challenges the final order of removal in his case. IV. Since we have jurisdiction over Navarro’s petition, we must now determine whether timeliness poses a bar to his petition. 18 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1897 Doc: 105 Filed: 08/11/2026 Pg: 19 of 63 The Supreme Court clarified in Riley v. Bondi that the statutory deadline in § 1252(b)(1) is a “claims-processing rule” and not jurisdictional. 606 U.S. at 275. So Navarro urges us to determine whether § 1252(b)(1)’s 30-day filing rule may be equitably tolled. This is an open question, though the dissenting justices in Riley noted that equitable tolling is “likely available now that the Court has recognized that section 1252(b)(1)’s appeal deadline is not jurisdictional.” 606 U.S. 302–03 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Some post-Riley decisions have described § 1252(b)(1)’s 30-day deadline as a “mandatory” claims-processing rule, and therefore not subject to equitable tolling. See Marroquin-Zanas v. Bondi, No. 22-1122, 2025 WL 2694111, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 2025); Liao v. Bondi, 162 F.4th 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2025); Fuentes Aguilar De Perez v. Bondi, No. 24-4605, 2025 WL 3657596, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2025). 3 The Sixth Circuit was the first of our sister circuits to squarely address whether § 1252(b)(1) is subject to equitable tolling in a published opinion. See Oxlaj-Perez v. Blanche, 174 F.4th 516 (6th Cir. 2026). It determined that the “text, structure, and context” of § 1252(b)(1) did not rebut the presumption that the 30-day deadline is subject to equitable tolling. 174 F.4th