Angelica S. v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ANGELICA S., et al., Plaintiffs, v. No. 25-cv-1405 (DLF) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION The Immigrant Defenders Law Center, along with five minor plaintiffs proceeding pseudonymously, bring this case challenging an Interim Final Rule and changes to procedures promulgated by the Office of Refugee Resettlement within the Department of Health and Human Services. Before the Court is the plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, Dkt. 9, and both parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Dkts. 58, 71. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part and deny in part both Motions for Summary Judgment and defer any determination as to the class. I. BACKGROUND A. Legal Background When unaccompanied minors arrive or are found in the United States without immigration papers, they are placed in the care of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, a component of the Department of Health and Human Services. See 45 C.F.R. § 410.1101(a). ORR is responsible for their care and placement. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(C). In carrying out that responsibility, ORR must protect children from “smugglers, traffickers, or others who might seek to victimize or otherwise engage them in criminal, harmful, or exploitive activity.” Id. § 279(b)(2)(A)(ii). At the same time, ORR generally must place each child “in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child,” which often involves placing children with adult sponsors. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A). Two statutes principally govern ORR’s care and placement of unaccompanied children. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred responsibility for unaccompanied children from the former Immigration and Naturalization Service to ORR. 6 U.S.C. § 279(a), (b)(1)(A), (g)(2). The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 further requires HHS to “establish policies and programs to ensure that unaccompanied alien children in the United States are protected from traffickers and other persons seeking to victimize or otherwise engage such children in criminal, harmful, or exploitative activity.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(1). Federal regulations, in turn, govern ORR’s placement of children with potential sponsors. As part of the sponsor-vetting process, ORR may require documentation establishing a sponsor’s identity and relationship to the child, interviews with household members, and a home visit or home study. See 45 C.F.R. § 410.1202(a)–(c). Potential sponsors and adult members of their households may also be required to submit fingerprints for background checks. See id. § 410.1292(c). ORR also maintains a publicly available Policy Guide governing the sponsor-vetting and release process. Biswas Decl. ¶¶ 2 & n.1, 4, Dkt. 21-1; Off. of Refugee Resettlement, Unaccompanied Alien Children Bureau Policy Guide (2025) [hereinafter Guide]. The Guide divides potential sponsors into four categories. Category 1 includes parents and legal guardians; Categories 2A and 2B include immediate relatives, depending on whether the relative previously served as the child’s primary caregiver; and Category 3 includes all other potential sponsors. 2 Guide § 2.2.1. Sponsors must submit an application identifying the members of their household and an alternative adult caregiver, documenting their identity and relationship to the child, and demonstrating their ability to support that child. Id. § 2.2.3–4. In the years preceding the challenged changes, several reports raised concerns about this sponsor-vetting process. A 2022 Senate committee report found that ORR was completing fewer background checks even as the number of unaccompanied children entering the United States increased. Minority Staff of S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs., 117th Cong., Federal Care of Unaccompanied Children: Minors Remain Vulnerable to Tracking and Abuse 34 (2022). The following year, ORR established an Integrity & Accountability Team to detect fraud in sponsor applications. Biswas Decl. ¶¶ 6–7. The Team identified several instances of fraud, including ten occasions in one month in which children were released to sponsors who used falsified documents. Id. ¶ 6. And in 2024, the HHS Office of the Inspector General identified deficiencies in ORR’s sponsor-screening practices and recommended additional safeguards. Id. ¶ 9; Christi A. Grimm, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. Off. Of Inspector Gen., OEI-07-21-00250, Gaps in Sponsor Screening and Follow-up Raise Safety Concerns for Unaccompanied Children 22 (2024), Dkt. 21-2. Soon after taking office in January 2025, President Trump directed HHS to take “all appropriate action to stop the trafficking and smuggling of alien children into the United States.” Exec. Order No. 14,159, 90 Fed. Reg. 8443, 8447 (Jan. 20, 2025). ORR responded the following month with a memorandum proposing several changes to its sponsor-vetting process. Biswas Decl. ¶ 11; see generally Harper Memo., Dkt. 21-3. Two changes are relevant here. First, in March 2025, ORR removed several forms of identification—including birth certificates, foreign passports, and foreign national identification 3 cards—from its list of documents generally acceptable to establish a sponsor’s identity. Compl. ¶¶ 48, 50. ORR explained that foreign documents were difficult to authenticate quickly and had been used in fraudulent sponsor applications. See Biswas Decl. ¶¶ 14–15; Biswas Memo. at 3, Dkt. 21-4. Foreign and U.S. birth certificates were removed as permissible forms of identification because they lack photographs. Id. The revised policy permits case-by-case exceptions for Category 1 sponsors, or parents and legal guardians. Guide § 2.2.4. Second, in April 2025, ORR imposed new proof-of-income requirements. Compl. ¶ 53. Potential sponsors previously could establish their financial ability to support a child through a narrative answer about their income without specific supporting documentation. See Pls.’ Separate Stmt. Of Undisp. Mat'l Facts ¶ 60, Dkt. 58-1. Under the revised policy, they instead have to provide one of three forms of documentation: the previous year’s tax return, paystubs from the preceding 60 days, or a letter from an employer verifying employment and salary. Id. (citing Guide § 2.2.4). Usually, agencies must obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before collecting new information from the public. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3502(3)(A), 3507(a). Yet ORR did not get OMB approval for its revised Sponsor Application Packet before imposing the new requirements. See Pls.’ Suppl. Separate Stmt. of Undisp. Mat’l Facts ¶¶ 375–76. OMB approved a revised packet about a year later, in February 2026. Id. ¶ 376. Despite this approval, ORR continues to use the prior, unapproved version. Id. ¶¶ 376–78. As it introduced the new requirements, HHS issued an immediately effective Interim Final Rule (IFR) rescinding an ORR regulation that prohibited it from disqualifying potential sponsors based solely on their immigration status, collecting their immigration-status information for law- enforcement purposes, or sharing that information with immigration-enforcement authorities. See 4 Unaccompanied Children Program Foundational Rule; Update to Accord with Statutory Requirements, 90 Fed. Reg. 13554, 13554–56 (Mar. 25, 2025) [hereinafter Unaccompanied Children Program Foundational Rule]; 45 C.F.R. § 410.1201(b) (2024). HHS explained that the information-sharing part of the regulation conflicted with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which prohibits federal officials from restricting the exchange of information concerning an individual’s citizenship or immigration status with government entities or officials. See Unaccompanied Children Program Foundational Rule, 90 Fed. Reg. at 13555; see 8 U.S.C. § 1373. Because HHS concluded that it had lacked statutory authority to promulgate the provision in the first place, it found good cause to rescind it via IFR without advance notice and comment. See 90 Fed. Reg. at 13555. B. Factual Background The plaintiffs include several unaccompanied alien children who were held in ORR custody after the new sponsor requirements were implemented. In May 2025, those plaintiffs filed for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that those changes affected the sponsor applications of the individual plaintiffs. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 54. When this action began, each was an unaccompanied minor in ORR custody with a proposed sponsor whose application had been complete or pending before the new requirements took effect. See Angelica S. Decl. ¶ 6, Dkt. 9-7; Eduardo M. Decl. ¶ 6, Dkt. 9-8; Liam W. Decl. ¶ 4, Dkt. 9-9; Leo B. Decl. ¶ 8, Dkt. 9-10; Xavier L. Decl. ¶ 4, Dkt. 9- 11. After the requirements changed, their sponsor applications were delayed or terminated because the proposed sponsors lacked newly compliant identification or proof-of-income documentation. See Deisy S. Decl. ¶¶ 22–25, Dkt. 9-12; Angelica S. Decl. ¶¶ 6–7; Eduardo M. Decl. ¶ 6; Sofia W. Decl. ¶ 7, Dkt. 9-14; Liam W. Decl. ¶ 7; Leo B. Decl. ¶¶ 8–9; Ximena L. Decl. ¶¶ 7–8, 10, Dkt. 9- 15; Xavier L. Decl. ¶ 5. 5  The original set of plaintiffs also moved to certify a provisional class of “all unaccompanied children who are or will be in the custody of [ORR] and who (a) have or had a potential sponsor who has been identified; ” and whose “sponsor’s family reunification application has been denied, closed, withdrawn, delayed, or cannot be completed because the sponsor is missing” the newly-required documents. See Mem. Op. on Prelim. Inj. (PI Opinion) at 19, Dkt. 35. At the time, that class included all children who acted in reliance on the documentation policies that existed before March 7, 2025, when the sponsor requirements changed—in other words, those children who were in or transferred into ORR custody on or before April 22, 2025. Id. at 15, 22; Mem. Op. Prelim. Inj. at 1, Dkt. 34 [hereinafter PI Opinion]. The Court certified that provisional class for the purposes of the preliminary injunction, which it granted. See generally id.; PI Opinion at 19–22. The injunction was a narrow one: It prevented the agency “from creating a new blanket policy that departs from its previous one without explaining how it weighed the disrupted reliance interests and other valid considerations,” and blocked enforcement of the new proof-of-identity and proof-of-income requirements against members of that limited, provisionally certified class. PI Opinion at 24. In other words, it extended only to those children who acted on the older sponsor- application process. It remains in effect. Since then, the five original individual plaintiffs have been released from ORR custody. See First Am. Compl., ¶¶ 12–16, Dkt. 48; Pls.’s Separate Stmt. Of Undisp. Mat’l Facts ¶¶ 115 (Angelica S.), 129 (Eduardo M.), 140 (Liam W.), 150 (Leo B.), 163 (Xavier L.), Dkt. 58-2. The plaintiffs first amended their complaint to add new named plaintiffs and putative class representatives in the same factual position as the original named plaintiffs: Their reunification cases were blocked or delayed because their sponsors or sponsors’ household members could not meet the new documentation requirements because of immigration status. First Am. Compl., ¶¶ 6 17–19, 108–27. Later, as those plaintiffs were either released or about to age out, the plaintiffs again amended their complaint to add new named plaintiffs representing children in custody. See Second Am. Compl., ¶¶ 20–22, Dkt. 104; Pls.’ Suppl. Separate Stmt. of Undisp. Mat’l Facts ¶¶ 382–94, 403, 406–07, 416–20, Dkt. 108-1. Immigration Defenders of Law Center (ImmDef), the organizational plaintiff, provides legal services to unaccompanied children in California. Compl. ¶ 100. ImmDef maintains that the revised sponsor requirements have increased the number of children on its “detained docket,” which handles the immigration proceedings of children in ORR custody. Id. ¶ 101. According to ImmDef, the uptick in detained clients has required it to devote additional resources to those clients and to revise educational materials for unrepresented children. Id. ¶ 102. Its injury has remained the same since the onset of this litigation. Before the Court are the plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Class Certification, Dkts. 9, 105, and the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Dkts. 58, 71. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant bot Motions for Summary Judgment in part and deny both in part, and defer any determination as to the Motion for Class Certification. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A court will grant summary judgment if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A “material” fact is one with potential to change the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). And a dispute is “genuine” if a reasonable jury could determine that the evidence warrants a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. 7  In cases arising under the Administrative Procedure Act, summary judgment “serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.” Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2006). Accordingly, the Court will “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right,” id. § 706(2)(C), or “unsupported by substantial evidence,” id. § 706(2)(E). Before reviewing an agency action, however, this Court must first determine whether the party challenging that action has Article III standing. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). III. ANALYSIS A. Standing Article III of the Constitution limits the “judicial Power” of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies,” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, and “there is no justiciable case or controversy unless the plaintiff has standing,” West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2017). To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must also establish that there is “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” and that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. Each of these elements “must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.” Id. at 561. As such, at the summary judgment stage, “the plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but must 8 set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 1. ImmDef’s Standing The Court begins with ImmDef’s standing. An organization, like any other plaintiff, must establish a concrete injury to itself; it cannot “spend its way into standing” by devoting resources to opposing a government policy with which it disagrees. FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 394–95 (2024). Thus, an organization does not suffer an Article III injury merely because a challenged policy inspires it to devote additional resources to advocacy or litigation. Id. Still, an organization can establish standing if it adequately alleges that a defendant’s conduct “perceptibly impaired” the organization’s existing activities and thereby caused a “concrete and demonstrable injury” to those activities. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982); see All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395–96 (describing Havens as an “unusual case” in which the challenged conduct “directly affected and interfered with” the organization’s “core business activities”). The D.C. Circuit recently clarified the types of impairments that satisfy this standard. Where “a government action directly affects and interferes with an organization’s core business activities and the organization diverted its resources to continue pursuing those activities, such concrete harm to the organization’s activities supports standing to sue.” Ctr. for Taxpayer Rts. v. IRS, No. 26-50006, slip op. at 12 (D.C. Cir. Sept 8, 2026); accord Las Ams. Immigrant Advoc. Ctr. v. DHS, 783 F. Supp. 3d 200, 217 (D.D.C. 2025). The distinction, then, is between resources an organization chooses to expend in response to a challenged policy and burdens the policy imposes on activities that the organization already conducts. Expenditures on advocacy, education, or litigation undertaken in response to 9 government action generally do not themselves establish standing. See, e.g., ASPCA v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 24–28 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. FAA, 892 F.3d 1249, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Friends of Animals v. Bernhardt, 961 F.3d 1197, 1207–08 (D.C. Cir. 2020). By contrast, when government action directly impedes an organization’s preexisting activities, the resulting “substantial, tangible costs” may constitute an injury to the organization itself. See, e.g., Nw. Immigrant Rts. Project v. USCIS, 496 F. Supp. 3d 31, 46–48 (D.D.C. 2020) (internal citation omitted); see also Cap. Area Immigrants’ Rts. Coal. v. Trump, 471 F. Supp. 3d 25, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2020). ImmDef asserts two different but related theories of injury. First, it claims that the heightened sponsor requirements disqualify previously-eligible sponsors, thus prolonging time in ORR custody for unaccompanied children who would otherwise be released. As a result, it claims, ImmDef has to take on more detained clients for longer periods of time, which requires more time and resources. Compl. ¶ 100. Second, it claims that the IFR chills potential guardians from coming forward to sponsor children in ORR custody, which likewise contributes to longer periods in ORR custody for more detained children. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 68. i. Sponsor Requirements The uptick in children held in ORR custody for longer periods of time “directly affect[s] and interfere[s] with” ImmDef’s “core business activities”—that is, providing legal representation to unaccompanied alien children. Ctr. for Taxpayer Rts., slip op. at 12; see Compl. ¶ 100. And ImmDef “diverted its resources to continue pursuing those activities.” Id. The policies at issue allegedly prolong children’s time in ORR custody, increasing the proportion of ImmDef’s clients on the more resource-intensive detained docket from 44% to 84%. Id. ¶¶ 101–02; Felix Decl. ¶ 12, Dkt. 10-15; Pls.’ Separate Stmt. of Undisp. Mat’l Facts ¶¶ 218–20, 239. Detained cases require 10 additional attorney time, and the resulting reduction in available sponsors has increased the number of clients pursuing alternatives to release to sponsors that require additional resources, which in turn require additional representation. Pls.’ Separate Stmt. of Undisp. Mat’l Facts ¶¶ 218–34, 239. Those burdens have ultimately forced ImmDef “to close client intake, preventing the organization from representing children it [previously] would have.” Id. ¶ 221. And providing legal services to unaccompanied children is not an activity ImmDef undertook to oppose the challenged policies; it predates them. Compl. ¶ 100. Those injuries thus constitute concrete burdens on the ImmDef’s existing legal-services activities, not expenditures voluntarily undertaken to oppose government policy. See Nw. Immigrant Rts. Project, 496 F. Supp. 3d at 46–48; Las Ams., 783 F. Supp. 3d at 217. Accordingly, the challenged polices have “directly affected and interfered with” the organization’s core activities in a manner sufficient to establish an injury in fact to support ImmDef’s standing. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395. The remaining standing requirements follow readily as to the requirements for sponsors. ImmDef attributes its increased detained caseload and attendant resource burdens to the challenged sponsor requirements and the reduced availability of sponsors they allegedly produce. Compl. ¶ 100; see Ctr. for Taxpayer Rts., slip op. at 10 (“[C]ausation is shown where new activities, not previously part of the organization’s normal annual expenditures, became necessary in response to the injury, causing a drain on the organization’s resources.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). An order setting aside the requirements would alleviate those burdens. The organization therefore has standing to pursue its claims as to the sponsor requirements. 11  ii. Interim Final Rule But ImmDef’s challenge to the March 2025 Interim Final Rule, which rescinded 45 C.F.R. § 410.1201(b) is blocked by two related justiciability doctrines. One is standing, as ImmDef’s theory runs into imminence, causation, and redressability problems. The other is ripeness, which “forbids federal courts to adjudicate disputes that are dependent on contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Trump v. California, 609 U.S. ___, slip op. at 3 (2026) (quoting Trump v. New York, 592 U. S. 125, 131 (2020) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). ImmDef cannot fairly trace its increased caseload to the IFR on this record. The IFR lifted three related restrictions on ORR’s consideration and use of a potential sponsor’s immigration status, prohibiting ORR from (1) disqualifying a potential sponsor “solely based on their immigration status”; (2) collecting immigration-status information “for law enforcement or immigration enforcement related purposes”; and (3) sharing such information with “any law enforcement or immigration enforcement related entity at any time.” 45 C.F.R. § 410.1201(b) (2024); 90 Fed. Reg. 13554, 13554–56 (Mar. 25, 2025). ImmDef’s theory of causation appears to be that, by lifting these restrictions, ORR has chilled potential guardians from coming forward to sponsor children in its custody, out of fear that doing so could expose them to immigration enforcement. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 68. But the agency action challenged here—that is, ORR’s decision to remove regulatory restrictions on its treatment of sponsor immigration-status information—excised only statements of policy. Cf. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. E.P.A., 26 F. Supp. 2d 180, 186 (D.D.C. 1998) (concluding that a policy in which an agency does not bind itself or bear on the rights of private parties does not meet the second prong of Bennett). By rescinding policy 12 statements that ORR shall not collect or share immigration-status information, ORR has not committed to doing so. Nor has ImmDef alleged otherwise. Alternatively, ImmDef alleges that, combined with the new sponsor requirements, the IFR effectively disqualifies sponsors based on immigration status because the new requirements are designed to exclude the majority of sponsors, who “lack the requisite immigration status.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 68; see Pls.’ Mem. Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. Summ J. at 27–29. And they contend that this consequence is especially significant because the IFR simultaneously rescinded the regulation prohibiting ORR from disqualifying a sponsor “solely based on their immigration status.” Id.; see 45 C.F.R. 410.1201(b)(2024). But the identification policy does not make lawful immigration status a condition of sponsorship. It identifies documents ORR will accept as proof of identity. Some people without lawful status may nevertheless possess qualifying documents, including an employment- authorization document or, in some states, a driver’s license. 1 See Pls.’ Mem. Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. Summ J. at 39; see, e.g., Pls.’ Stmt. of Undisp. Mat’l Facts ¶¶ 124 (California), 173 (Massachusetts); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (identifying classes of noncitizens who can receive employment authorization without possessing lawful immigration status). And Category 1 sponsors (parents or legal guardians) are eligible for individualized exceptions. See Guide § 2.2.4. That the documentation requirements may make sponsorship more difficult for those without lawful status does not transform the identity-verification requirement into an immigration-status prerequisite. 1 The plaintiff argues that, although some states allow individuals to obtain a driver’s license without proof of lawful status, “they still require lawful presence to obtain a regular state identification card,” see Dkt. 58-1, at 28 n.7, which disqualifies sponsors who cannot drive. But that refrain underscores the point: Those sponsors are not excluded because of their immigration status, but because of their status as non-drivers. 13  Nor does the rescission of § 410.1201(b) change that conclusion. The Interim Final Rule removed a regulatory prohibition on certain uses of immigration-status information; it did not require ORR to disqualify sponsors based on their status. See Unaccompanied Children Program Foundational Rule, 90 Fed. Reg. at 13554–56; Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 30. ImmDef thus asks the Court to infer from the combined effect of two policies an immigration- status criterion that neither policy expressly imposes while alleging no actual instances of a sponsor being declined based on his immigration status. Absent allegations of actual enforcement or disqualification based on status—or even an imminent threat of either—ImmDef’s theory of causation is difficult to credit. The Court would have to “speculate about how the agency would weigh” the nearly 400 comments the IFR received. California, 609 U.S. ___, slip op. at 7. The Court would also have to speculate about whether ORR would issue a final rule, id., what that final rule would say, id. at 8, whether ORR might use that final rule to share immigration information with DHS or to disqualify potential sponsors, and finally, whether the shared information would in fact lead DHS to enforce immigration laws against those sponsors. That speculation necessarily rests on an “attenuated chain of inferences.” Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414–415, n. 5. And such “speculative threat[s]” cannot support standing. California, 609 U.S. ___, slip op. at 9. For many of the same reasons, ImmDef’s theory poses a redressability problem. It is unclear whether ORR’s consideration and use of a potential sponsor’s immigration status has changed since the IFR and, indeed, existing laws and regulations suggest otherwise. “Immigration status is not one of the many enumerated factors that ORR must consider when determining sponsor suitability, either by statute, see 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3)(A), . . . or regulation,” see 45 C.F.R. § 410.1202, and “no provision within the Policy Guide explicitly permits ORR to disqualify 14 potential sponsors solely based on their immigration status.” Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 30, Dkt. 72. Even if HHS wants to share immigration status information to advance immigration enforcement, it cannot: In the same month the IFR was promulgated, Congress conditioned DHS’s appropriations such that none of its funding may be used “to place in detention, remove, refer for a decision whether to initiate removal proceedings, or initiate removal proceedings against a sponsor, potential sponsor, or member of a household of a sponsor or potential sponsor of [UAC] based on information shared by the Secretary of [HHS].” Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-93, div. D, title II, § 216(a), 133 Stat. 2317, 2513 (Dec. 20, 2019); see Full Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, Pub. L. No. 119-4, div. A, title I, § 1101(a)(6), 139 Stat. 9, 10-11 (Mar. 15, 2025) (adopting rider in 2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act); Continuing Appropriations, Agriculture, Legislative Branch, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Extensions Act, 2026, Pub. L. No. 119- 37, div. A, § 101(a) (Nov. 12, 2025) (adopting rider in 2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act by adopting that same rider in the Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025). Accordingly, even assuming that the IFR has the effect that ImmDef claims, it is unclear that setting it aside would change the state of affairs at all. Relatedly, ImmDef’s claim is not ripe. “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998). The “ripeness doctrine” thus prevents courts, “through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements … until … its effects are felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). Courts accordingly consider both the “fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id. at 149. 15  For many of the same reasons already described, ImmDef's challenge is not yet fit for judicial resolution. The present record does not establish whether ORR will start sharing sponsors’ immigration information with DHS, whether it will share information about ImmDef or its clients, or whether any such sharing will result in heightened immigration enforcement against sponsors. Nor does it allege any instances of a sponsor being disqualified because of his immigration status. Each link in that chain thus depends on future events that might not occur. And, because the legality of ORR’s rescission likely turns on those facts, that uncertainty militates against finding the dispute ripe for judicial review. As for hardship, the relevant inquiry focuses on the hardship to the party seeking judicial review. See Abbot Labýs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 149. The unaccompanied children in ORR custody may of course experience hardship from remaining in custody while their sponsors satisfy the heightened sponsorship requirements. And, as discussed, those children's extended periods in custody might continue to sap ImmDef's resources. But “a discretionary agency position is often best postponed to a specific application of the position." See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Especially where, as here, the organizational plaintiff has not established a cognizable injury sufficient for Article III standing, withholding review pending a more concrete application of the challenged requirements imposes comparatively limited hardship on that plaintiff, since it can still seek review should its concerns come to fruition. See Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427–28 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Adjudicating ImmDef's challenge now would require the Court to fill in the blanks and evaluate the consequences of an agency action before those consequences have taken concrete form. The challenge to the IFR is thus not ripe. 16  2. Individual Plaintiffs The individual plaintiffs run into the same barriers. They too claim that the IFR chills available sponsors, thus contributing to prolonged periods in ORR custody. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 68. Although being held in ORR custody for a prolonged period qualifies as an injury in fact, see PI Opinion, on this record, that injury is neither fairly traceable to the IFR, nor is it likely to be redressed by setting the rule aside. Thus, for these same reasons, the individual plaintiffs’ claims also are not ripe. 3. Class Certification If no named plaintiff can establish standing to challenge the IFR, the class cannot either. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). Alternatively, if no member of the class has a ripe claim, class certification cannot cure that defect. See id. Any class would thus lack standing to challenge the IFR. Because the Court concludes that the organizational plaintiff has standing to challenge the sponsor requirements—and thus provides the Court jurisdiction to reach the merits of that challenge—the Court need not address whether the individual plaintiffs, or the putative class, have standing to challenge those requirements. See Nat’l Tr. for Historic Pres. in the U.S. v. Nat’l Park Serv., No. 26-5123, slip op. at 30–31 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 7, 2026); Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) (“[O]ne party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.”). It also need not make a final determination as to whether it should certify an equitable class in order to evaluate the merits. See Cert. Mot. at 25, Dkt. 9-1 (motion for provisional certification); Mem. Op. 19 (“Conscious of its authority to “alter[] or amend[]” the certification before adjudication on the merits, see R.I.L-R., 80 F. Supp. 3d at 179–80, the Court will certify a class.”). “The question of whether to allow a suit to proceed 17 as a class action is one primarily for the determination of the trial judge,” Bermudez v. U.S. Dep't of Agr., 490 F.2d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1973), who has “broad discretion in deciding whether to permit a case to proceed as a class action,” Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1994). “It is not uncommon for courts to deny class certification on the basis that certification is not needed when the particular facts and circumstances of the case warrant doing so.” Gomez v. Trump, 485 F. Supp. 3d 145, 204 (D.D.C.) (internal quotation marks omitted). A common reason for declining to certify a class is where, as here, there is “nothing left to achieve by certifying the class and doing so would only needlessly burden [the] litigation.” Id. Finally, the relief the Court will grant to ImmDef, see infra, necessarily produces the same result that any putative class could achieve. The Court thus denies without prejudice the plaintiffs’ requests for class certification. B. Merits Claims ImmDef also challenges the sponsor requirements in their own right as an agency action subject to APA review. Only final agency actions can be challenged under APA. Although finality is not jurisdictional, “there is no doubt that [plaintiffs] would lack a cause of action under the APA” without it. Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 324 F.3d 726, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003). For an action to be “final” and subject to review under the APA, the action must mark consummation of agency’s decision-making process, rather than merely be tentative or interlocutory in nature, and the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal consequences will flow. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). A court must set aside any final agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Review under that 18 standard is deferential, but an agency must still “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action,” including “a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citation modified). Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,” or supplied an explanation “so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Id. This standard of review does not permit a court to substitute its judgment for the agency’s. FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021). Nor must an agency “consider all policy alternatives in reaching [its] decision,” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51, or explore “every alternative device and thought conceivable by the mind of man,” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,, 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978). But the agency must reasonably consider the relevant issues and explain the path it took. See Prometheus Radio, 592 U.S. at 423. ORR operates under statutory directives that pull in more than one direction. It generally must place an unaccompanied child “in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A). At the same time, Congress has directed HHS to “establish policies and programs to ensure that unaccompanied alien children in the United States are protected from traffickers and other persons seeking to victimize or otherwise engage such children in criminal, harmful, or exploitative activity.” Id. § 1232(c)(1); 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(2)(A)(ii). The challenged policies reflect ORR’s effort to balance those obligations. The Court’s task is not to decide how it would have struck that balance. It asks only whether ORR considered the relevant factors and reasonably explained the choices it made. See Prometheus Radio, 592 U.S. 19 at 423. With those considerations in mind, the Court turns toward ORR’s identification and proof- of-income requirements. 1. Identification and Income Requirements Plaintiffs argue that the identification and income-verification requirements implemented as part of ORR’s Policy Guide violate ORR’s rescinded regulatory obligations and the TVPRA, conflict with ORR’s statutory obligation to place children wit