Full Opinion

Filed 11/6/26 P. v. Flores CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ord ered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E087290 v. (Super.Ct.No. FVA017693) RICARDO FLORES, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Riley E. Todd, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Reversed. Law Offices of Randy Alexander and Randy Alexander for Defendant and Appellant. 1 Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Adrian R. Contreras and Liz Olukoya, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant and appellant Ricardo Flores appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea and vacate his prior conviction pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1473.7. The trial court stated that it was denying the motion because defendant had not met his burden to show that his misunderstanding of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea was prejudicial, and because defendant had not shown that he was facing “adverse immigration consequences such as removal [or] deportation.” Because the court erred in requiring a showing of “removal [or] deportation,” we reverse the trial court’s denial order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant is a citizen of El Salvador who has lived in the United States after entering illegally in 1990 when he was seven years old. In 2002, defendant pled guilty to felony unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years younger than him (§ 261.5, subd. (c)) (the 2002 conviction). Defendant, who was then 19 years old, admitted to the police upon his arrest to having sex on multiple occasions with his 14- year-old niece and having a “dating relationship” with her. Both the victim and defendant claimed that their sexual encounters were consensual, although defendant acknowledged that he knew it was a crime to have sex with a minor. 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 As part of defendant’s guilty plea he executed a form declaration, which included in relevant part his initials next to the following sentence: “I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States, deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization may result from a conviction of the offense(s) to which I plead guilty/nolo contendere (no contest).” In addition to defendant’s signature, the form included a signature from an interpreter attesting that the entire contents of the form had been interpreted to Spanish for defendant, and a signature from defendant’s attorney attesting that she read and explained the contents of the form to defendant. In 2008, the court reduced defendant’s conviction to a misdemeanor (§ 17, subd. (b)), then set aside the conviction, entered defendant’s not guilty plea, and dismissed the case pursuant to section 1203.4.2 In 2017, as part of an application for a U visa,3 which appears to be based on a 2004 incident where defendant was shot and was helpful to law enforcement during the investigation, defendant filed with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) the Form I-192, Application for Advance Permission to Enter as Nonimmigrant. The application was denied by USCIS in a letter dated December 10, 2024 (USCIS Letter), 2 The expungement of the conviction pursuant to section 1203.4 does not alleviate defendant of the immigration consequences of the guilty plea, but an order vacating a conviction based on procedural or substantive infirmities would invalidate it for immigration purposes. (People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1004-1005.) 3 Under federal immigration law, a U visa is “for victims of certain crimes who have suffered mental or physical abuse and are helpful to law enforcement or government officials in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity.” (Chairez v. Mayorkas (9th Cir. 2026) 168 F.4th 1227, 1229.) 3 with heavy emphasis placed by USCIS on the 2002 conviction as the reason for the denial. On January 6, 2025,4 defendant filed a motion to vacate the 2002 conviction pursuant to sections 1016.5 and 1473.7. Defendant appears to have abandoned the section 1016.5 claim at both the trial court level and on appeal. On October 21, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the motion, which it described as “the first step in the process, which requires that the Defendant state a prima facie case, in order to achieve the privilege of having an evidentiary hearing.” The trial court denied defendant’s motion without prejudice, finding that defendant failed to meet his burden as “the evidence given to the Court with the Court file and the filings” were insufficient. The court also found that defendant did not show that he was facing “adverse immigration consequences such as removal, deportation, et cetera.” Defendant timely filed this appeal. DISCUSSION Section 1473.7 “allows noncitizens who have served their sentences to vacate a conviction.” (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 316.) Among the enumerated bases for vacating a conviction under the statute is that “[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to 4 The filing stamp reflects a date of January 2024; however, based on the December 2024 date of the USCIS Letter, which was attached to the motion, this appears to have been a misdated stamp. 4 meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) Our Supreme Court has enumerated a two-prong analysis for assessing a defendant’s motion for relief pursuant to section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1): “[T]he defendant must first show that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea. Next, the defendant must show that his misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error.” (People v. Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) When reviewing the trial court’s orders pursuant to section 1473.7, we exercise independent review, “a standard that heavily weighs trial court factual findings based on the court’s own observations, but not trial court findings arising only from a cold record.” (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 534.) “[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634.) The trial court here erred in requiring that defendant make a “showing of actual, identifiable adverse immigration consequences.” The trial court repeatedly referenced “removal or deportation” as the type of immigration consequence that defendant needed to be facing in order to qualify for relief. The trial court further erred in finding that the USCIS denial of defendant’s Form I-192 did not qualify as an “adverse immigration consequence.” The People acknowledge that defendant is “likely correct” that the trial court committed these two errors. What the trial court presumably intended to reference is the requirement set forth in section 1473.7, subdivision (f)(1), that a party seeking relief pursuant to paragraph 5 (1) of subdivision (a) “shall also establish that the conviction or sentence being challenged is currently causing or has the potential to cause removal or the denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.” This language is expressly broader than the “removal or deportation” referenced by the trial court, as it includes (as relevant here) “the denial of an application for an immigration benefit [or] lawful status.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (f)(1).) The Supreme Court recently defined “immigration benefits” as “any sort of legal authorization that allows a noncitizen to lawfully enter the United States or remain here to live, work, study, or travel, either temporarily or permanently. Such benefits include immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, various forms of humanitarian relief, adjustment of status to permanent residency, relief from removal, employment authorization, family reunification, and naturalization.” (People v. Hernandez (August 13, 2026, S282186) 2026 WL 2343195, at *6.) Further, the trial court erroneously focused much of its analysis on whether the USCIS denial was an act of discretion. Many immigration decisions involve the broad discretion of the federal immigration officials, including whether to subject an undocumented immigrant to removal or deny a request for adjustment of status. (In re Garcia (2014) 58 Cal.4th 440, 460-461.) Whether an immigration decision involves an exercise of discretion by USCIS, or not, has nothing to do with whether it satisfies section 1473.7, subdivision (f)(1), by the plain language of the statute. The only question put forth by the subdivision is whether the defendant’s conviction is causing “removal or the denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (f)(1).) 6 We also note the inaccurate statements by both the People and the trial court that defendant was denied a U visa. The USCIS Letter was not a denial of defendant’s U visa; it was a denial of his request to waive his grounds of inadmissibility, which grounds include the 2002 conviction. An inadmissible nonimmigrant may apply for a waiver of inadmissibility via Form I-192 as part of a U visa application, as defendant did, but it is not itself a U visa application. (Chairez, supra, 168 F.4th at 1229-1230.) The People argue that despite the errors by the trial court, we may nevertheless affirm the order because we review the trial court’s “ruling, not its reasoning” based on our independent review of the record. However, affirmance would require us to effectively take over the trial court’s role by ruling on the substance of the motion before the trial court itself has had an opportunity to make a ruling on the motion while utilizing the correct standard regarding section 1473.7, subdivision (f)(1). We decline to do so as we “are mindful that we may not substitute our conclusions for those of the trial court.” (People v. McGlothin (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 468, 477.) Moreover, there is an indication that the trial court may have ruled differently but for its misunderstanding of the showing required by section 1473.7, subdivision (f)(1), as it stated that “if there does come a point where [defendant] is facing those actual immigration consequences then, of course, we may have a different dialog at that point.” (See People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 818-820 [remand on the trial court’s denial of motion for new trial is appropriate where the appellate record does not permit the reviewing court to determine if the motion lacked merit or that the trial court would have properly exercised its discretion to deny the motion].) We leave it to the trial court 7 on remand to have that “different dialog” and properly exercise its discretion to determine if defendant qualifies for section 1473.7 relief now that we have clarified that defendant met his burden with respect to subdivision (f)(1).5 DISPOSITION The trial court’s denial of the 1473.7 motion is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. MILLER Acting P. J. We concur: CODRINGTON J. RAPHAEL J. 5 Because the trial court stated that it was holding a prima facie hearing before entitling defendant to an evidentiary hearing, and both parties referenced prima facie hearings in their briefing, we are compelled to note for the purposes of remand that there is no reference in section 1473.7 to a prima facie hearing being held before a movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Although it is true that certain motions under the Penal Code specify this type of two-step process (e.g., § 1172.6 petitions), there is no such requirement set forth in section 1473.7. Instead, section 1473.7, subdivision (d), provides simply that “All motions shall be entitled to a hearing.” On remand, there should accordingly be a hearing where defendant’s motion is ruled upon based on the evidence presented, rather than a prima facie hearing. 8