Martinez-Andino v. Mullin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JOSE ELIEZER MARTINEZ-ANDINO, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 26-1208 (BAH) v. Judge Beryl A. Howell U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff, Jose Martinez-Andino, a 21-year-old citizen of Honduras, who is authorized to work in the United States, due to his approved Special Immigrant Juvenile (“SIJ”) status, and is employed as a mechanic to support his minor U.S. citizen child, was subject to a civil immigration arrest and detention on March 18, 2026. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 19, 24, ECF No. 19; Pl.’s Aff. (Apr. 13, 2026) at 1, ECF No. 13-1; Pl.’s Mot. for Preliminary Injunction (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 37, Attach., Letter from Pl. (July 10, 2026) (trans.) at 1, ECF No. 37-2. He attests that, less than 48 hours later, while detained, he was coerced to sign two forms agreeing to voluntary departure, without knowingly and voluntarily agreeing to the terms, that he repeatedly requested to revoke his agreement as permitted by federal law, including after speaking with his counsel, but was ignored, and that he was then deprived of access to his retained counsel for ten days, hindering his ability to enforce his procedural rights prior to his deportation. Pl.’s Aff. (Apr. 13, 2026) at 1. Nonetheless, he was flown to Honduras by the U.S. government on April 10, 2026, barely three weeks after his civil arrest, based solely on his having signed the forms. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-41; Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ MTD”) at 5-6, ECF No. 21. Plaintiff claims that these circumstances, created by the actions of government defendants—the Department of Homeland 1 Security (“DHS”) and its department head, and the heads of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), and CBP’s Border Patrol Division—violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and procedural rights guaranteed to him by law and defendants’ own policies, and directly resulted in him being flown, without his consent, to Honduras. See Pl.’s Mot at 1-2. 1 After obtaining a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) directing defendants to facilitate plaintiff’s return to this country so that he may be afforded the process due to him prior to deportation, that TRO lapsed without plaintiff moving for a preliminary injunction. See Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), ECF No. 26; Martinez-Andino v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 26-cv- 1208 (BAH), 2026 WL 1801137 (D.D.C. June 23, 2026), docketed at ECF No. 27; Minute Order (July 8, 2026) (declining to extend TRO for a second time given the three-month lapse since plaintiff filed TRO motions and his failure to move for a preliminary injunction in that time). Plaintiff now seeks a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to continue steps to facilitate his return to this country. Pl.’s Mot. For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED, and defendants are DIRECTED to continue, in a prompt and expeditious manner, efforts to facilitate his return to this country. I. BACKGROUND The factual background, already detailed in deciding plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, and as supplemented with an additional statement from plaintiff, is set out below, 1 Plaintiff names the following defendants: the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the DHS Secretary, in his official capacity, and the Acting Director of ICE, the Acting Executive Associate Director of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations, the Commissioner of CBP, and the Chief of CBP’s Border Patrol, also in their official capacities. See Am. Compl. at 1. The Acting Attorney General was dismissed as a defendant upon defendants’ motion. See Martinez-Andino v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 26-cv-1208 (BAH), 2026 WL 1801137, at *8 (D.D.C. June 23, 2026), docketed at ECF No. 27. 2 followed by the procedural history of the case. A. Factual Background Martinez-Andino is a Honduran citizen who entered the United States on or around September 12, 2020, when he was fourteen years old, by crossing the United States/Mexico border in Texas. Am. Compl. ¶ 19. Deemed “to be an unaccompanied minor child,” he was “placed in immigration removal proceedings” immediately thereafter. Id. ¶¶ 19-20; Compl., ECF No. 1, Ex. D, Notice to Appear (Sept. 11, 2020), ECF No. 1-2 at 11. In July 2023, an immigration court “granted dismissal of removal proceedings upon joint motion by [plaintiff] and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,” noting that plaintiff had “an approved I-360 Application for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and intends to file . . . [an application] to become a lawful permanent resident.” Am. Compl. ¶ 21. “Special Immigrant Juvenile” is a statutorily defined category encompassing certain individuals under 21 years old who are present in the United States and whom a state court has found cannot be returned to their parents or home country due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); see also U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs. (“USCIS”), Special Immigrant Juveniles, https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-US/eb4/SIJ [https://perma.cc/P5EM-FBD5]. Individuals with SIJ status may apply for lawful permanent residency, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h), though this process may take several years, since applications for lawful permanent residency are reviewed on a rolling basis based on the date when the SIJ status was approved, Am. Compl. ¶ 21 & n.1. Since 2022, the government has offered deferred action (i.e., withholding of removal) to individuals with SIJ status, along with employment authorization. See USCIS, Special Immigrant Juveniles. 2 2 On June 6, 2025, USCIS rescinded the deferred action policy for those with SIJ status, though the change left in place deferred action for those individuals, like plaintiff, already holding that status. See USCIS, Special Immigrant Juveniles. 3  Under the work authorization he enjoyed due to his SIJ status, plaintiff lives in North Carolina and works as a mechanic in the United States. Letter from Pl. (July 10, 2026); Pl.’s Reply, Att., Form I-213, provided on July 16, 2026, in Resp. to Pl.’s Record Request, under Freedom of Information Act (“Form I-213”), ECF No. 39-1. His life in the United States was upended in March 2026, when plaintiff was driving through Montana. See Form I-213 at 3 (showing plaintiff was stopped by Montana Highway Patrol on March 18, 2026, and then transferred to custody of CBP agent the same or next day); cf. Compl., Ex. A, Decl. of Alison T. Chan, Pl.’s Counsel (“Chan Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 1-2 at 1 (stating plaintiff was arrested “while driving through the state of Minnesota”). On March 18, 2026, plaintiff was arrested by immigration officials “and detained at the Cascade County Jail in Montana.” Am. Compl. ¶ 24. That same day, plaintiff’s relatives contacted his current counsel, but when counsel promptly checked the online ICE Detainee Locator, no information about plaintiff was provided. Chan Decl. ¶ 2. Five days later, on March 23, 2026, while still in a county jail, plaintiff called attorney Alison Chan. Id. ¶ 3; Am. Compl. ¶ 25. In that call, plaintiff communicated that he had “sign[ed] documents he did not fully understand,” which he characterized as “removal paperwork,” although he was “unable to articulate to [Chan] what documents he signed.” Am. Compl. ¶ 25. On March 31, plaintiff’s counsel was retained by plaintiff’s family and entered a notice of appearance with ICE, since “CBP . . . informed Counsel that the Plaintiff [was] transferred to ICE custody on or about March 31, 2026.” Id. ¶¶ 27-28; cf. Chan Decl. ¶ 9 (“On March 31, 2026, Cascade County Jail confirmed to me by phone that Mr. Martinez Andino was transferred to ICE custody on March 28, 2026.”). Between March 31 and April 10, however, plaintiff’s counsel was never able to speak to plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 31. Indeed, despite contacting both ICE and CBP multiple times to obtain information as to plaintiff’s location and which agency had custody of 4 plaintiff, this critical information was not forthcoming. Id. ¶ 29; Chan Decl. ¶ 10. In response to plaintiff’s counsel’s repeated queries, both ICE and CBP denied having custody of plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 30. CBP asserted that ICE had taken custody of him on March 30 or 31, whereas ICE denied having ever taken custody of him. Id. During this ten-day period, neither ICE nor CBP would confirm plaintiff’s physical whereabouts or put counsel in touch with him directly. Id. ¶ 36. Not even plaintiff’s family heard from plaintiff after “the weekend of March 28.” Id. ¶ 37. B. Procedural History Two TRO motions brought by plaintiff and one motion to dismiss filed by defendants have already been resolved in the three-and-a-half months since this case was filed. 1. First TRO Motion and Hearing On Friday, April 10, 2026, after at least 10 days of not hearing from plaintiff and being denied information by defendants as to plaintiff’s whereabouts or custodial status, plaintiff’s counsel initiated this action, filing the complaint and an accompanying motion for temporary restraining order at approximately 11:30 AM on Friday, April 10, 2026. See Compl.; Pl.’s First Mot. for TRO, ECF No. 2. As relief, plaintiff sought an order directing defendants to (1) disclose plaintiff’s “current physical location”; (2) “identify the agency currently exercising custody” over plaintiff; and (3) “provide Plaintiff with immediate access to counsel.” Pl.’s First TRO Proposed Order at 1-2, ECF No. 2-1. The original complaint also contained a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Compl. ¶¶ 53-55. The case was randomly assigned to the undersigned an hour later that same day, and a teleconference TRO hearing was scheduled for 4:00 PM that afternoon. See Minute Order (Apr. 10, 2026, at 3:13 PM). Due to technical difficulties on defendants’ counsel’s part, the hearing began at 4:07 PM. See Hr’g Tr. at 1. At the outset, defendants’ counsel stated that plaintiff “flew to Honduras this morning, and the flight that he was on . . . landed in Honduras at 10:50 Honduras 5 time [12:50 EST],” and that plaintiff was “no longer . . . in the custody of any government agency.” Id. at 5:1-5. Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that, prior to that afternoon, they “had no idea that he was going to be deported” and expressed that they “don’t believe that he could have knowingly and voluntarily signed something if he was being deprived of advice of counsel for over a week.” Id. at 10:9, 11:23-25. Plaintiff’s motion for TRO was granted to the extent that motion sought information about plaintiff’s custody and location, since this information had been provided at the hearing, and directed that, if still in government custody, plaintiff be provided with access to counsel. Hr’g Tr. at 12:19-24, 14:18-22; Minute Order (Apr. 10, 2026, at 5:04 PM). This motion was denied “insofar as plaintiff is no longer in the custody of any agency of the U.S. Government,” since the request that he be allowed to contact counsel was predicated on his continued detention in U.S. custody. Minute Order (Apr. 10, 2026, at 5:04 PM); see also Hr’g Tr. at 13:2-7. 2. Second TRO Motion and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss At approximately 6:00 PM the same Friday, April 10, 2026, plaintiff filed a second motion for a TRO, this time seeking an order directing defendants to (1) disclose whether plaintiff was still in U.S. custody at the time of the hearing and which agency last had custody or plaintiff; (2) provide plaintiff access to counsel, if plaintiff was still in U.S. custody; (3) “[n]ot . . . release the Plaintiff to the Honduran government or to his liberty in Honduras; (4) “[p]arole Plaintiff back into the United States under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d)(5) to rectify his wrongful removal”; and (5) “facilitate his return to the custody of the United States for him to be paroled back to the United States,” if plaintiff was no longer in U.S. custody. Pl.’s Second Emergency Mot. for TRO at 3, ECF No. 8. Defendants were directed to file, by Monday, April 13, 2026, at 2:00 PM, responses to the factual disclosures sought by plaintiff, with plaintiff’s response due the following day. Minute Order (Apr. 10, 2026, at 6:42 PM). 6  Defendants’ response was timely filed on April 13, 2026, accompanied by a declaration from Christopher George, the Deputy Assistant Director of the International Operations Division within ICE’s Removal Division of Enforcement and Removal Operations. See Defs.’ Resp. to Order of the Ct., ECF No. 10; Decl. of ICE Deputy Ass’t Dir. Christopher George (“First ICE Decl.”), ECF No. 12. This ICE declaration stated that “at approximately 8:00 AM EST, Martinez- Andino departed the United States via Mesa, Arizona, on a chartered removal flight to Honduras,” at which time he was in ICE custody. First ICE Decl. ¶ 5. According to ICE, plaintiff landed at “approximately 12:50 PM EST,” and “no later than 2:00 PM EST . . . was transferred from ICE custody to the custody of the Government of Honduras[],” id. ¶ 6, purportedly clarifying that plaintiff was no longer in U.S. government custody at the time of the TRO hearing on April 10, 2026. Later that same day, plaintiff, whom counsel had been able to contact in Honduras, filed an affidavit, stating that “[t]he paperwork [he] signed when [he] was detained was not explained to [him],” and he was “told the only option [he] had in detention was to sign for the paperwork.” Pl.’s Aff. (Apr. 13, 2026) at 1. After signing the paperwork, he “asked . . . to rescind [his] signature” and “told immigration officials that [he] was afraid to return to Honduras and . . . wanted an interview or a hearing with the Judge,” which requests were “ignored or denied.” Id. Moreover, he “asked to speak with [his] attorneys for 9 days between March 31 and April 9,” which “requests were ignored or denied.” Id. During his U.S. detention, he “felt terribly mistreated,” due to poor food and no access to showers. Id. Plaintiff also recounted a timeline on the day of deportation quite different from that offered by defendants, either through defendants’ counsel at the TRO hearing held the afternoon of Friday, April 10, or in the ICE Declaration filed on Monday, April 13. According to plaintiff, he landed in Honduras “around 2:00 p.m. (Honduras time)” (4:00 PM EST) on April 10, after which he “spent 7 about 2 hours on the plane.” Id. “It was about 4:00 p.m. (Honduras time) [6:00 PM EST] when [they] first started to go through immigration in Honduras,” and plaintiff “remember[s] the time because [they] asked what time it was when [they] landed, and then [they] asked what time it was when [they] got off the plane.” Id. Plaintiff believes “it took about 1.5 hours to go be processed by Honduran officials,” placing the time of processing at around 7:30 PM EST. Id. Plaintiff stated he was “afraid to be . . . in Honduras” because he “suffered a lot of physical abuse by [his] father when [he] was a child” and “still ha[s] scars on [his] body from what [his] father did to [him].” Id. at 2. Given the apparent factual conflicts and concomitant legal issues as to the legal viability of plaintiff’s claims and relief sought, the parties were directed to propose a briefing schedule, Minute Order (Apr. 14, 2026), which proposal was adopted, Minute Order (Apr. 15, 2026); see also Jt. Status Report, ECF No. 16 (proposing schedule for plaintiff’s filing of any amended complaint or amended TRO or preliminary injunction motion, for defendants’ filing of a motion to dismiss, and for briefing to be completed by June 17, 2026, on both motions). Plaintiff subsequently filed the operative Amended Complaint, see Am. Compl., without any amended motion for a new TRO or preliminary injunction motion. The Amended Complaint drops the habeas claim set out in the original complaint, since plaintiff is no longer in U.S. government custody, and asserts five claims for relief: (1) pursuant to the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, due to defendant’s breach of “duty to maintain accurate custody information and permit attorney access,” id. ¶¶ 64-69 (Count I, Mandamus); (2) for violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), since defendants “unlawfully withheld agency action by failing to disclose Plaintiff’s location and permit access to counsel while he was under the custody of the agency,” id. ¶¶ 70-72 (Count II, APA); (3) for violation of the Fifth Amendment, due to defendants’ interference with plaintiff’s “access to counsel,” id. ¶¶ 73-76 (Count III, Fifth Amendment); (4) 8 for violation of the Accardi doctrine, which requires agencies to comply with their own regulations, id. ¶¶ 77-81 (Count IV, Accardi doctrine); and (5) pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, in the form of “[a]n order compelling the facilitation of Plaintiff’s return . . . to restore the Court’s jurisdiction,” id. ¶¶ 82-87 (Count V, All Writs Act). As relief, plaintiff seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s access to counsel, obtaining plaintiff’s agreement to removal “through coercive tactics,” and removing plaintiff from the United States “violated the Fifth Amendment, the APA, and the Accardi doctrine,” (2) a writ of mandamus directing defendants to “facilitate” plaintiff’s return to the United States, “issu[e] humanitarian parole travel documents under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 to allow for admission into the United States,” and “provid[e] for the cost of Plaintiff’s return flight to the United States,” (3) vacatur of plaintiff’s removal and restoration of his deferred action status; (4) a permanent injunction prohibiting interference by defendants with plaintiff’s right to counsel or right to seek adjustment of status; and (5) attorneys’ fees. Id. at 18-19 (Prayer for Relief). Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). See Defs.’ MTD. Submitted with that motion is a second declaration by the same ICE official correcting his prior declaration. Second Decl. of Christopher George (“Second ICE Decl.”) ¶¶ 5-7, ECF No. 23-3. Specifically, the Second ICE declaration states that the declarant “discovered that the times as reported in the records [he] used to prepare for [his first] declaration were reported in local time in Honduras, not Eastern Standard Time as [he] originally believed,” and, with the correct time zones, that plaintiff “departed the United States” “in ICE custody” on April 10, 2026, at “approximately 10:00 AM EST,” landed in Honduras at “approximately 2:50 PM EST,” and “all aliens on the removal flight were confirmed as handed over to the custody of the Government of Honduras[] . . . by 4:10 PM EST”—which is ten minutes into the scheduled 9 hearing time on April 10 and approximately three minutes after the April 10 hearing actually began. 3 Also attached to defendants’ motion to dismiss are two forms, DHS Form I-826 and Form I-210, which reflect plaintiff’s signature on the day of and the morning after his initial arrest and detention in a Montana jail, and on which defendants base their assertion that plaintiff was voluntarily deported. The single-page DHS Form I-826, titled “Notice of Rights and Request for Disposition,” is in Spanish and shows plaintiff’s signature next to the typewritten date “03/18/2026”—the same date as his arrest and detention—with the redacted name of an “Immigration Officer,” next to a different typed date “March 19, 2026 10:08 AM.” Defs.’ MTD, Ex. A, Form I-826, ECF No. 21-1. The text on this DHS Form I-826 states, inter alia, that the signor has “the right to contact an immigration attorney or other legal representative,” and outlines three options for disposition of an immigration case: (1) “I request a hearing before the Immigration Court to determine whether or not I may remain in the United States”; (2) “I believe I face harm if I return to my country. My case will be referred to the Immigration Court for a hearing”; and (3) “I admit that I am in the United States illegally, and I believe I do not face harm if I return to my country. I give up my right to a hearing before the Immigration Court. I wish to return to my country as soon as arrangements can be made to effect my departure. I understand that I may be held in detention until my departure.” Id. Notably, the form states, “If you choose to return to your country, you may change your mind and request a hearing before an immigration judge at any time before your departure from the United States. You must immediately notify an immigration officer if you change your mind.” Id. The copy of the form provided by defendants 3 Obviously, the parties’ timeline for the day of plaintiff’s deportation still conflicts, but resolving the precise time plaintiff was transferred out of U.S. custody is not necessary to resolve the pending motion for preliminary injunctive relief. 10 shows plaintiff’s initials next to the third option (“I wish to return to my country . . .”), and his signature, with the typewritten date, “03/18/2026.” The bottom of the form has checked boxes indicating the Notice was “read by subject” and “read to subject by [redacted name] in the Spanish language,” followed by the redacted name in a digital signature of an “Immigration Officer” affixed at “2026.03.19 10:10:41” with the letters “CBP,” and the typewritten date “March 19, 2026 10:08 AM.” Id. The second form submitted by defendants, a four-page DHS Form I-210, confirms receipt by DHS of plaintiff’s agreement to removal (i.e., the Form I-826), and affirms that DHS has “granted voluntary departure,” requiring plaintiff to depart “on or before [March 23, 2026].” Defs.’ MTD, Ex. B, Form I-210, ECF No. 21-2. Plaintiff’s handwritten signature appears next to the handwritten date, “3/19/2026,” and the redacted name of an “Authorized DHS Official” digitally signed on “2026.03.19 10:36:37”—indicating this form was signed the morning immediately after plaintiff’s arrest and detention. Id. The addendum to this form also bears plaintiff’s handwritten signature, next to the handwritten date, “3/19/2026,” under the text, stating, in part, “I hereby knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive my opportunity to file any and all applications for relief or protection from removal, deportation, or exclusion under the immigration laws. I acknowledge that I do not have a fear of return to my country.” Id. The Form I-210 and addendum are both in English, with the addendum stating that “[t]he alien was provided an oral interpretation/written translation of this Declaration in the alien’s preferred language,” above the digital signature of a redacted name, digitally signed “2026.03.19 10:40:28,” by a “Supervisory Border Patrol Agent.” Id. In sum, these two forms indicate that between about 10:08 AM and 10:40 AM on March 19, 2026, the morning after plaintiff was picked up and detained in a local county jail, and before finding, consulting with, and retaining counsel, plaintiff had executed DHS forms volunteering to 11 leave the United States. Further, the forms make explicit that plaintiff could change his mind at any point prior to departure by notifying an immigration officer that he no longer wished to voluntarily depart. Briefing on plaintiff’s second TRO motion and defendants’ motion to dismiss became ripe for resolution on June 17, 2026, in accordance with the schedule proposed by parties and adopted by the Court. See Minute Order (Apr. 15, 2026). On June 23, 2026, defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, and plaintiff’s second motion for a TRO was also granted in part and denied in part. See Martinez-Andino, 2026 WL 1801137, at *21. All claims against the Acting Attorney General were dismissed, as were plaintiff’s claim of unreasonable delay of agency action, under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), and plaintiff’s Accardi claim to the extent that claim relied upon 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b). See id. at *15. At the same time, plaintiff’s alleged facts were found to be sufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction and state plausible claims for mandamus, violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, and an Accardi claim relying upon ICE’s own guidance set out in the agency’s Performance-Based National Detention Standards (“PBNDS”). Id. Turning next to plaintiff’s second TRO motion, the Court found that plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of his Fifth Amendment claim. Id. at *17. Plaintiff had credibly alleged that he did not understand the voluntary deportation forms he signed or know that he had a choice not to sign them. Id. at *16-17. Of equal significance, the forms signed stated that the signor could “change [his] mind” and decide not to voluntarily depart at any time prior to departure by “notify[ing] an immigration officer if [he] change[d] [his] mind,” Pl.’s Form I-826, and plaintiff stated that he had repeatedly requested such rescission, but these requests were “ignored or denied,” Martinez-Andino, 2026 WL 1801137, at *17. Furthermore, plaintiff stated that he had repeatedly requested to speak with his attorney, who on March 31, 2026, had entered an appearance on plaintiff’s behalf with ICE. Pl.’s Aff. (Apr. 13, 2026) at 1; Am. Compl. ¶ 28. Plaintiff’s counsel 12 confirmed that she repeatedly requested, from various ICE and CBP offices, plaintiff’s location, and that ICE and CBP did not provide her with any information about where he was for the ten days immediately preceding his departure. Martinez-Andino, 2026 WL 1801137, at *16; see also Chan Decl. ¶ 10. In response to these attestations, defendants merely pointed to plaintiff’s signed voluntary departure forms, without providing any explanation for or rebuttal to plaintiff’s allegations that his repeated requests to rescind his voluntary departure and to speak with his attorney were ignored and denied. Martinez-Andino, 2026 WL 1801137, at *17 (citing Def.’s Reply in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 6, ECF No. 25). In the face of plaintiff’s uncontroverted assertions that the form was not initially signed voluntarily and intelligently, that plaintiff had attempted to assert his entitlement to change his mind, and that plaintiff was deprived of access to retained counsel prior to his deportation, the Court concluded that plaintiff had shown these forms likely did not provide an adequate basis for putting plaintiff on a plane to and leaving him in Honduras on April 10, 2026. Id. Since defendants asserted no other basis for removing plaintiff from this country, plaintiff was found likely to succeed in showing that his transportation to Honduras was improper based, at a minimum, on his claim that defendants had hindered his ability to avoid being sent to Honduras by violating his Fifth Amendment rights before sending him to Honduras. Id. Turning to the remedy, the Court concluded that directing defendants to facilitate plaintiff’s return to this country was appropriate and within the judicial power to require, but ordering that plaintiff be paroled into the United States was not. Id. at *18-19. The Supreme Court recently affirmed that when persons are “improperly sent” to another country, the appropriate remedy is to order that the government facilitate their return so that their case may be processed as it would have been absent the improper removal. Id. at *17 (quoting Noem v. Abrego Garcia, 145 S. Ct. 1017, 1018 (2025)). Since plaintiff had shown he was likely improperly sent to Honduras, this 13 was the appropriate remedy here, so that plaintiff’s case could be “handled as it would have been had he not been improperly sent” to Honduras. Id. (quoting Abrego Garcia, 145 S. Ct. at 1018). The Court emphasized that “the relief issued is narrow, with no decision made as to whether defendants might have some legitimate basis for removal of plaintiff other than his ‘voluntary’ waiver of removal proceedings.” Id. at *20. On the other hand, ordering that defendants parole plaintiff into the country (i.e., allow him to be in the United States not in physical detention), pursuant to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s parole authority, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(5), was not appropriate, for at least two reasons. Martinez-Andino, 2026 WL 1801137, at *19-20. First, parole is entirely left to the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security by statute. Id. Second, plaintiff had not shown that his detention was the result of any of the deprivations of rights alleged in his complaint, only that his removal flowed from multiple due process violations. Id. at *20. Both of these reasons independently meant that ordering parole was not appropriate. Id. Again, this decision was “narrow,” “with no decision made as to . . . whether plaintiff might have a basis on which to seek release from the custody of immigration authorities, if detained upon his return to the United States.” Id. With these limitations on relief in place, plaintiff had shown a likelihood of irreparable harm, given the risks of physical danger from his abusive father in Honduras that he attested to, and the harm of separation from his three-year-old U.S. citizen child. Id. The “defendants ma[d]e no arguments about the equities or the public interest,” and “[t]hough the public has an interest in conserving government resources by allowing removals to be final, that interest is not well served by allowing the government to make removals without due process, which then necessitate actions such as facilitating a person’s return to this country.” Id. These factors therefore also cut in favor of plaintiff. 14  Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for a TRO was denied in part, as to his request that he be paroled into the United States, but granted in part by directing defendants to facilitate his return to the United States, in order to restore the status quo in place before the likely legal violations occurred. See Martinez-Andino, 2026 WL 1801137, at *18 & n.15 (explaining that “‘[t]he status quo is the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy,’ not the immediately ‘pre-litigation status quo’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, 27 F.4th 718, 733 (D.C. Cir. 2022))). Defendants were also directed to file status reports every 48 hours explaining the steps taken to facilitate plaintiff’s return. TRO at 2. Plaintiff was cautioned that the TRO would last only for 14 days, until July 7, 2026, and the parties were directed to file, by July 3, 2026, a joint status report indicating whether plaintiff would seek a preliminary injunction and proposing a schedule on which to proceed. Martinez-Andino, 2026 WL 1801137, at *19 n.16; TRO at 2. 3. Defendants’ Reports on Efforts to Comply with TRO Defendants filed the court-ordered reports on June 25, June 29, and July 1, summarizing various administrative steps to effectuate plaintiff’s return. See Defs.’ Status Report (June 25, 2026), ECF No. 29; Defs.’ Status Report (June 29, 2026), ECF No. 30; Defs.’ Status Report (July 1, 2026), ECF No. 31. On July 3, 2026, the parties requested an extension of time to confer on how this case would proceed, Jt. Status Report (July 3, 2026), ECF No. 32, which request was granted, along with an extension of the TRO until July 10, 2026, see Minute Order (July 4, 2026). Defendants, meanwhile, continued to file status reports regarding steps taken to facilitate plaintiff’s return. Defs.’ Status Report (July 6, 2026), ECF No. 33. On July 8, 2026, plaintiff indicated he intended to seek a preliminary injunction and sought to extend the TRO until the preliminary injunction was briefed, on an expedited schedule beginning July 10, 2026, and ending July 17, 2026, whereas defendant opposed further extension of the TRO and advocated a slightly more 15 extended, though still expedited, briefing schedule, extending from July 10, 2026, to July 22, 2026. Jt. Status Report (July 8, 2026) at 3, 5, ECF No. 34; Am. Jt. Status Report (July 8, 2026), ECF No. 35. Defendants’ proposal was adopted, Minute Order (July 8, 2026), given that plaintiff’s first and second TRO motions had been filed nearly three months earlier, and plaintiff had agreed to an extended briefing schedule for his second TRO motion, see Jt. Status Report (April 15, 2026) (jointly proposing schedule extending from April 15, 2026, to June 17, 2026), which included an opportunity for him to file a preliminary injunction motion by April 19, 2026, see Minute Order (April 15, 2026) (entering parties’ proposed schedule). Neither by April 19 nor during the approximately 17-day duration of the TRO did plaintiff move for a preliminary injunction, notwithstanding the express caution that the TRO would last only fourteen days unless converted to a preliminary injunction or supplemented by a preliminary injunction. Martinez-Andino, 2026 WL 1801137, at *19 n.16. This left no “good cause” to extend the TRO over defendants’ objection, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2). Minute Order (July 8, 2026). 4. Pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction When the TRO expired on July 10, 2026, defendants’ last status report indicated they had issued a travel letter to plaintiff and “notified DHS personnel in Honduras to coordinate with Plaintiff for the next steps.” Jt. Status Report (July 10, 2026), ECF No. 36. That same day, July 10, 2026, plaintiff filed the pending motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking the same relief granted in the TRO, namely that defendants facilitate plaintiff’s return to the United States and report regularly on their progress in doing so. See Pl.’s Mot.; Pl.’s Mem. in Support of Mot. for Preliminary Injunction (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 37-1; Pl.’s Proposed Preliminary Injunction Order (“Pl.’s Proposed Order”), ECF No. 37-3. Notably, in contrast to the second TRO motion, plaintiff did not request, as preliminary relief, parole into the country, only facilitation of his return. Pl.’s 16 Proposed Order. This motion for preliminary injunction included a letter from plaintiff, detailing that he feels “destroyed because [he] [can]not be there for [his] daughter, Abi,” who is a U.S. citizen, and that he has “talked to her by video each day here in Honduras.” Letter from Pl. (July 10, 2026). Furthermore, he explains that he has “felt afraid for [his] life since [he] arrived” in Honduras, because “gangs target young men like [him].” Id. He makes no mention of his abusive father, which he had initially stated as a primary reason that he feared being in Honduras. Compare id., with Pl.’s Aff. (Apr. 13, 2026) at 1 (“I am afraid to be here in Honduras. I suffered a lot of physical abuse by my father when I was a child.”). With this support, plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is now ripe for resolution. See Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Preliminary Injunction (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 38; Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Preliminary Injunction (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 39. II. LEGAL STANDARD A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction “must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The plaintiff must “establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “The balance of the equities weighs the harm to [plaintiff] if there is no injunction against the harm to [defendants] if there is,” and, when the government opposes the preliminary injunction, “the [government]’s harm and the public interest are one and the same, because the government’s interest is the public interest,” so the third and fourth factors merge. Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v. FEC, 831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 17 (emphasis in original). The party seeking a preliminary injunction “carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (quoting 11A WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (2d ed. 1995)). III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff seeks preliminary injunctive relief on grounds that “[d]efendants violated the core tenets of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act,” resulting in plaintiff being sent to Honduras, Pl.’s Mem. at 6, and that the other requirements for preliminary injunction are met, see id. at 7-11. Defendants adopt their arguments made in opposition to plaintiff’s second TRO motion and advance certain new arguments in opposition. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 1. Plaintiff’s motion is granted for essentially the same reasons that plaintiff’s second TRO motion was granted in part. Each of the preliminary injunction factors are discussed in turn, and defendants’ arguments in opposition are considered and rejected. A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits Likelihood of success on the merits is the “most important” factor, Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and the “plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish” that this factor is met to obtain a preliminary injunction, Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Whether plaintiff is likely to succeed on his Fifth Amendment due process claim, and whether that entitles him to the order he seeks, are discussed next. 1. Defendants Likely Violated Plaintiff’s Due Process Rights, Leading Directly to His Removal Plaintiff alleges that (1) his initial signing of the voluntary departure forms was not knowing and voluntary; (2) he repeatedly attempted to revoke his agreement to voluntary departure, which