Alfredo Blanco Gainza v. Warden, in his official capacity as Warden of Torrance County Detention Center; Markwayne Mullin, in his official capacity as Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; David J. Venturella, in his official capacity as Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Mary De Anda-Ybarra, in her official capacity as Field Office Director, El Paso Field Office, Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Todd Blanche, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Mexico
Date FiledOctober 8, 2026
Docket1:26-cv-03177
StatusUnknown
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Full Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
ALFREDO BLANCO GAINZA,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, in his official capacity as Warden
of Torrance County Detention Center;
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official Case No. 1:26-cv-03177-MIS-SCY
capacity as Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; DAVID J.
VENTURELLA, in his official capacity as
Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; MARY DE ANDA-
YBARRA, in her official capacity as Field
Office Director, El Paso Field Office,
Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and
TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. § 2241
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Alfredo Blanco Gainza’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), ECF No. 1, filed September 24, 2026.
The Petitioner is a nearly 61-year-old citizen of Cuba, who has resided in the United States for
many years. Pet. at 6, 21. On October 31, 2011, an Immigration Judge ordered him removed and
he did not appeal. Id. at 6; EOIR. Since his removal order became administratively final, Petitioner
has been detained, and apparently released, by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) several times. Pet. at 6. Petitioner has complied with reporting requirements upon being
released and has no criminal history. Id. In addition, Petitioner has serious medical conditions. Id.
at 6, 20-150.
Nevertheless, sometime in 20261, Petitioner was detained again by ICE. Id. at 6. During
the periods of detention, Respondents did not make any preparations to remove the Petitioner. Id.;
see also ECF No. 7. Petitioner alleges his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future is unlikely,
in large part because Cuba refuses repatriation of its citizens. Pet. at 11. Petitioner’s cumulative
detention has now exceeded 180 days, id. at 13, and he is currently detained at the Torrance County
Detention Center in Estancia, New Mexico. Pet. at 1.
On September 24, 2026, the Court issued an Order to Answer and Enjoining Transfer,
instructing Respondents to show cause why the Court should not grant Petitioner habeas relief.
ECF No. 5. The Court specifically ordered Respondents to “specify whether the Court has already
ruled on the legal issue(s) in this case and whether the holding in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001) requires relief. In addition, if the USAO opposes the Petition, its answer shall set forth all
dates during which Petitioner has been detained after his removal order became administratively
final.” Id.
On October 7, 2026, the federal Respondents filed an “Amended Response [to the]
Petition.” ECF No. 7.2 Therein, they state:
For purposes of this specific case, Respondent is not submitting a brief in
opposition to the Petition detailing the facts and circumstances of this case. This
writer, and his legal assistant, have requested information and supporting
documentation from ICE, detailing Petitioner’s detention, at least twice over the
1 Petitioner does not allege the date his current detention began, and the Respondents have been unwilling to
provide the U.S. Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) such information despite two requests from the USAO, see generally
ECF No. 7, and the Court’s Order to Show Cause in this case. ECF No. 5.
2 The Clerk’s Office served all Respondents with the Petition pursuant to this District’s Standing Order
Regarding Service of Process in Immigration Habeas Petitions filed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Case 1:26 mc-
00004, ECF No. 3 (D.N.M. Jan. 28, 2026). ECF No. 4. However, as has become customary in these cases, the Warden
did not respond to the Petition.
preceding two weeks, and have not received any information. This writer cannot
tell the Court whether or not Petitioner’s claim has been previously litigated,
although he lacks any information that it has. Respondent recognizes that the Court
may decide to grant the Petition and award appropriate relief. Respondent submits
that if the Court does grant the Petition, the appropriate relief would be an Order
directing that Respondent, within seven days of this Court’s Order, provide
Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), or else release Petitioner.
Id. at 1 (citing Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1251 n.13 (10th Cir. 2026)).3
“Where, as here, ‘a party files a response to a motion but does not address all arguments
which the motion raises, the party has effectively conceded the arguments which it does not
address.’” Alfaro Herrera v. Baltazar, Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-04014-CNS, 2026 WL 91470, at
*5 (D. Colo. Jan. 13, 2026) (quoting Series 17-03-615 v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 3d
904, 935 (D. Kan. 2025)); see also C1.G on behalf of C.G. v. Siegfried, 38 F.4th 1270, 1282 (10th
Cir. 2022) (holding that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s facial challenge as
“abandoned” where plaintiff failed to include that challenge in his response to arguments raised in
defendant’s motion to dismiss). Accordingly, the Court finds that Respondents’ non-opposition to
the Petition, indeed, their failure to provide any relevant facts or cite the correct law under which
the Court should review the Petition, constitutes a concession to Petitioner’s allegations that he
has been detained in excess of six months since his removal order became administratively final,
that the Respondents have made no preparations to effectuate his removal, and that his removal to
Cuba or another country is not reasonably foreseeable and thus that he is being detained in violation
of his Fifth Amendment right to due process.
3 The Respondents citation to Santillan Quiroz is misplaced as Petitioner’s detention is not governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a), as relevant in that case, but by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) because his removal order is administratively
final. Respondents’ failure to provide information in their possession relevant to the disposition of this case and to
properly address the Court’s Order to Show Cause, directing them to address whether Zadvydas v. Davis, not Santillan
Quiroz, required relief, is troubling.
Generally, “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien
from the United States within a period of 90 days[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6), the Attorney General may detain certain noncitizens beyond the ninety-day “removal
period” following entry of a final order of removal. However, the statute implicitly “limits an
alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s
removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
689. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court established a presumptively reasonable six-month period of
detention. Id. at 701. After that period, if the petitioner “provides good reason to believe that there
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must
respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.; see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S.
371, 377-78 (2005). Although the government’s authority to detain noncitizens serves important
immigration enforcement purposes, that authority “is subject to important constitutional
limitations” and may not continue “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable.” Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 695, 699.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the presumptively reasonable six-month-period of
confinement has expired, Petitioner has provided good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and the Government has failed to
present sufficient evidence to rebut that showing. See generally ECF No. 6. As such, the Court
further finds that Petitioner’s continued, indefinite detention violates the Immigration and
Nationality Act, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699, and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
Mardanpour v. Warden, Case No. 2:26-cv-00550-MIS-LF, 2026 WL 963164, at *3-8 (D.N.M. Apr.
9, 2026). Therefore, he is entitled to immediate release subject to appropriate conditions of
supervision under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3), as he had been for the most part of the past 15 years.
Therefore, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1, is GRANTED;
2. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner Alfredo Blanco
Gainza from custody/detention, subject to reasonable conditions of supervision
under 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(3);
3. Respondents shall return all of Petitioner’s seized property to Petitioner;
4. Respondents SHALL NOT re-detain Petitioner absent (1) evidence that Petitioner
has committed a crime or absconded, or (2) concrete travel plans to remove
Petitioner from the United States; and
5. The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order.
Maroed Shviddnud
MARGARET STRICKLAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE