Nelson Armando Landaverde Erazo v. Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security; David J. Venturella, Acting Director of Immigration

1 LAW OFFICES OF ALEX GALVEZ Alex Galvez, Esq. SBN263824 2 1151 West 6th Street Los Angeles, CA 90017 3 Tel.: (213) 623-2358 Fax.: (213) 623-2445 4 5 Attorneys for Petitioner, NELSON ARMANDO LANDAVERDE ERAZO 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NELSON ARMANDO Case No. 5:26-cv-6016 LANDAVERDE ERAZO, 12 Related Cases: 5:26-cv-05117-MCS- 13 Petitioner, JDE 14 VS. EMERGENCY VERIFIED 15 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS United States Department of Homeland 16 Security; DAVID J. VENTURELLA, CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. Acting Director of IMMIGRATION § 2241; REQUEST FOR 17 AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; IMMEDIATE RELEASE; REQUEST 18 THOMAS GILES in his official FOR EMERGENCY 19 c fo a r p a L c o i s ty A a n s g A el c e t s in , g U F .S ie . l I d m O m f i f g ic ra e t i D o i n r e a c n t d o r ADJUDICATION 20 Customs Enforcement; EDDY WANG, Special Agent in Charge for Los 21 Angeles, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and 22 Customs Enforcement; TODD 23 BLANCHE, Attorney General for the United States; FERETI SEMAIA, 24 WARDEN OF ADELANTO ICE PROCESSING CENTER, in his/her 25 capacity as warden of the ADELANTO 26 ICE PROCESSING CENTER, and DOES 1 to 10, INCLUSIVE. 27 28 Respondents. 1 2 INTRODUCTION 3 4 1. COMES NOW Petitioner Nelson Armando Landaverde Erazo (“Petitioner” 5 or “Mr. Landaverde Erazo”), by and through counsel, and petitions this 6 Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 7 8 appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the statutory and 9 constitutional legality of his continuing civil immigration detention at the 10 11 Adelanto ICE Processing Center. 12 2. This case concerns the constitutional sufficiency of an individualized 13 immigration custody determination that denied Petitioner release on the 14 15 ground that he presents a flight risk. Petitioner is a native and citizen of El 16 Salvador who entered the United States in approximately 2021, has no 17 18 reported criminal history, and was apprehended by immigration enforcement 19 officers on August 14, 2026, while traveling to work. According to 20 21 Petitioner, the officers were conducting an operation directed at his uncle 22 rather than at Petitioner himself. 23 3. Petitioner does not contend that the Government lacks authority to institute 24 25 removal proceedings or that his limited period of residence confers an 26 unconditional entitlement to release. Rather, the question presented is 27 28 whether Respondents may continue physically confining him under 8 U.S.C. 1 § 1226(a) based upon a flight-risk determination that must be supported by a 2 lawful application of individualized custody standards and constitutionally 3 4 adequate procedures. 5 4. On September 3, 2026, an Immigration Judge conducted a bond hearing and 6 denied release based upon flight risk. Petitioner challenges the legal and 7 8 constitutional adequacy of that determination, including whether the 9 adjudicator actually connected the available evidence to a present likelihood 10 11 of nonappearance and evaluated the significance of Petitioner's lack of 12 reported criminal history, circumstances of apprehension, employment, 13 available residence, and any concrete conditions capable of ensuring his 14 15 appearance. 16 5. Petitioner recognizes that favorable personal circumstances do not 17 18 automatically compel release. Under Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 19 (BIA 2006), an Immigration Judge retains substantial discretion to evaluate 20 21 the factors relevant to custody. That discretion, however, does not authorize 22 reliance upon legally irrelevant considerations, unsupported assumptions, or 23 a mistaken application of the governing detention framework. 24 25 6. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) restricts judicial 26 reconsideration of discretionary immigration bond determinations while 27 28 preserving federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims and legal error. 1 Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 781–85 (9th Cir. 2024). Accordingly, 2 Petitioner does not ask this Court merely to assign a different weight to the 3 4 evidence or independently select a bond amount. He seeks judicial review of 5 whether continued confinement is being sustained through a legally adequate 6 individualized determination. 7 8 7. The procedural history requires particular attention. Petitioner previously 9 sought habeas relief in Landaverde Erazo v. Pinheiro, No. 5:26-cv-05117- 10 11 MCS-JDE (C.D. Cal.). At the time that action was commenced, Petitioner 12 had not yet received the September 3 bond hearing that subsequently became 13 the subject of the present controversy. 14 15 8. On September 14, 2026, Magistrate Judge John D. Early issued a Report and 16 Recommendation concluding that the original claims had become moot and 17 18 that the challenge to the September 3 custody determination, first raised in 19 reply, had not been administratively exhausted. 20 21 9. On September 17, 2026, District Judge Mark C. Scarsi accepted that 22 recommendation and dismissed the action without prejudice. Landaverde 23 Erazo v. Pinheiro, No. 5:26-cv-05117-MCS-JDE, Dkts. 13–14 (C.D. Cal. 24 25 Sept. 17, 2026). 26 10. The September 17 judgment did not determine that Petitioner was properly 27 28 classified as a flight risk. It did not adjudicate whether the Immigration 1 Judge applied the correct legal standard, whether the record sufficiently 2 supported the detention rationale, or whether continued confinement was 3 4 constitutionally justified. The dismissal was expressly without prejudice, and 5 the challenge to the September 3 hearing was dismissed for non-exhaustion. 6 11. Petitioner has now retained counsel for the specific purpose of pursuing an 7 8 administrative bond appeal and federal habeas relief. Counsel has filed an 9 appeal from the adverse bond determination with the Board of Immigration 10 11 Appeals. 12 12. Petitioner candidly acknowledges that the filing of a Board appeal does not 13 automatically constitute completed exhaustion. Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 14 15 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, the present circumstances 16 materially differ from those existing when the first habeas action was 17 18 dismissed. Petitioner has invoked the available administrative process and 19 seeks excusal of prudential exhaustion because the constitutional challenge 20 21 concerns an ongoing deprivation of physical liberty for which prolonged 22 administrative review may provide an inadequate or untimely remedy. 23 13. This distinction is significant under Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997– 24 25 1000 (9th Cir. 2004), and Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815–16 (9th Cir. 26 2007). The purposes of exhaustion must be examined in relation to the 27 28 claims asserted, the availability of administrative correction, the risk of 1 encouraging deliberate circumvention, and the prejudice imposed by 2 continued confinement. 3 4 14. Recent Central District decisions provide persuasive guidance concerning 5 the distinction between impermissible federal re-weighing and reviewable 6 legal deficiencies in immigration custody determinations. In David Moreno 7 8 Flores v. Santacruz, No. 5:26-cv-03393-SP, Dkt. 14 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 9 2026), the court reviewed the actual bond-hearing record, determined that 10 11 the Immigration Judge had impermissibly relied upon inadequate and 12 speculative reasons to support an un-mitigable flight-risk finding, and 13 ordered immediate release. 14 15 15. The Moreno Flores decision is instructive because it recognizes that the 16 existence of a bond hearing does not foreclose habeas relief where the 17 18 reasoning actually employed fails to satisfy the governing legal standard. 19 Petitioner does not claim that his own hearing involved identical reasoning 20 21 without examination of the September 3 recording and decision. Instead, he 22 relies upon the decision as persuasive authority requiring that custody 23 determinations be assessed for legal sufficiency rather than accepted 24 25 categorically by virtue of their discretionary character. 26 16. Petitioner primarily requests immediate release if the Court determines that 27 28 the September 3 proceeding failed to establish a lawful basis for continued 1 detention. Alternatively, he seeks a prompt, constitutionally adequate 2 custody redetermination with meaningful consideration of individualized 3 4 evidence, enforceable release conditions, and sufficient findings to permit 5 judicial review. 6 JURISDICTION AND VENUE 7 8 17. This Court possesses habeas jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) 9 and (c)(3), which authorizes relief where an individual remains in custody in 10 11 violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. Petitioner is 12 presently confined in federal civil immigration detention and challenges the 13 legal sufficiency of the procedures and determinations sustaining that 14 15 custody. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001); Demore v. Kim, 16 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003). 17 18 18. Petitioner's claims concern physical confinement rather than the merits of his 19 removal proceedings. He does not request adjudication of his removability, 20 21 asylum eligibility, withholding eligibility, or any other substantive 22 application for immigration relief. 23 19. Under Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89 (2018), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 24 25 generally governs detention pending a removal determination. To the extent 26 Respondents rely upon § 1225(b)(2)(A) merely because Petitioner entered 27 28 without admission and was later encountered within the interior of the 1 United States, that position is inconsistent with Rodriguez Vazquez v. 2 Bostock, 183 F.4th 1160, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2026). 3 4 20. Petitioner's prior bond hearing is consistent with treatment of his custody as 5 subject to administrative redetermination under § 1226(a). Nevertheless, 6 Respondents should be required to identify the actual statutory detention 7 8 authority and any mandatory-detention predicate upon which they rely. 9 21. Section 1226(e) does not bar this action insofar as Petitioner raises 10 11 constitutional questions or reviewable legal error. Martinez, 124 F.4th at 12 781–85. Petitioner recognizes that a district court may not substitute its 13 preferred weighing of ordinary custody evidence for the discretionary 14 15 judgment of immigration authorities. He instead challenges whether the 16 agency employed the correct legal standard and whether its rationale 17 18 lawfully supports continued physical custody. 19 22. The Court also possesses federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 20 21 § 1331 insofar as Petitioner seeks declaratory and injunctive relief arising 22 under federal law. Declaratory relief is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201– 23 2202, and appropriate prospective relief may issue pursuant to the Court's 24 25 equitable authority, subject to applicable statutory limitations. 26 23. Venue is proper in the Central District of California because Petitioner is 27 28 confined at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in San Bernardino County, 1 within the Eastern Division of this District. His immediate physical 2 custodian is subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Rumsfeld v. 3 4 Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–35, 443 (2004). 5 24. The prior habeas action's dismissal without prejudice does not constitute an 6 adjudication on the merits of the September 3 bond-hearing challenge. 7 8 Petitioner discloses that proceeding to permit consideration of any applicable 9 related-case rules and acknowledges that the previous exhaustion ruling 10 11 must be addressed rather than disregarded. 12 PARTIES 13 25. Petitioner NELSON ARMANDO LANDAVERDE ERAZO, is a native and 14 15 citizen of El Salvador who first entered the United States in or about 2021. 16 On August 14, 2026, officers of United States Immigration and Customs 17 18 Enforcement (“ICE”) apprehended Petitioner while he was traveling to 19 work. He is presently confined in federal civil immigration custody at the 20 21 Adelanto ICE Processing Center in Adelanto, California, within the 22 territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 23 26. Petitioner reports that he has no criminal history and has no United States 24 25 citizen immediate family members. On September 3, 2026, an Immigration 26 Judge denied his request for release on bond based upon flight risk. 27 28 Petitioner challenges the statutory and constitutional sufficiency of that 1 custody determination and his resulting continued physical confinement. His 2 representation in this action is limited to immigration detention and related 3 4 habeas proceedings and does not extend to the merits of his underlying 5 removal proceedings. 6 27. Respondent FERETI SEMAIA is the Warden of the Adelanto ICE 7 8 Processing Center and is sued in his official capacity as Petitioner's 9 immediate physical custodian. As Warden, Respondent Semaia is 10 11 responsible for the facility in which Petitioner is confined and for 12 implementing any lawful judicial order directing Petitioner's production or 13 release. He is therefore the ordinarily proper respondent to a core habeas 14 15 petition challenging present physical custody. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 16 426, 434–35, 443 (2004). 17 18 28. Respondent THOMAS GILES is the Acting Field Office Director for the 19 Los Angeles Field Office of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations 20 21 (“ERO”) and is sued in his official capacity. In that capacity, Respondent 22 Giles exercises supervisory authority over immigration enforcement and 23 custody operations within the Los Angeles Area of Responsibility, including 24 25 matters concerning continued detention, release, supervision, and 26 implementation of applicable custody determinations affecting Petitioner. 27 28 Petitioner names Respondent Giles insofar as his official responsibilities 1 encompass the challenged detention and any prospective relief necessary to 2 effectuate this Court's judgment. 3 4 29. Respondent DAVID J. VENTURELLA is the Acting Director of United 5 States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and is sued in his official 6 capacity. As Acting Director, Respondent Venturella exercises agency-level 7 8 supervisory responsibility for ICE's administration 9 30. Respondent TODD BLANCHE is the Attorney General of the United States 10 11 and is sued solely in his official capacity. The Attorney General exercises 12 supervisory authority over EOIR, including the Board of Immigration 13 Appeals, before which Petitioner's merits appeal presently remains pending. 14 15 EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 16 A. The Prior Dismissal Requires a Specific and Candid Showing of 17 Excusal 18 31. The Ninth Circuit ordinarily requires an individual challenging an adverse 19 20 Immigration Judge bond determination to pursue the available BIA appeal 21 before obtaining federal habeas review. Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 22 23 1157, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2011). 24 32. That rule is directly implicated here. Judge Scarsi previously dismissed 25 Petitioner's challenge to the September 3 bond hearing without prejudice 26 27 because the issue had been raised before exhaustion of administrative 28 remedies. 1 33. Petitioner does not contend that the dismissal was erroneous merely because 2 it was unfavorable. Nor does he contend that the filing of the subsequently 3