V.A.S.R. v. Kenneth Genalo, in his official capacity as Field Office Director of New York, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Robert Brown, in his official capacity as Acting Warden of the Metropolitan Detention Center; David J. Venturella, in his official capacity as Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Markwayne Mullin, in his official capacity as Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd Blanche, in his official capacity as Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
Date FiledOctober 8, 2026
Docket1:26-cv-06198
StatusUnknown
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
V.A.S.R.,
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
– against – 26-cv-06198 (NCM)
KENNETH GENALO, in his official
capacity as Field Office Director of New
York, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; ROBERT BROWN, in his
official capacity as Acting Warden of the
Metropolitan Detention Center; DAVID J.
VENTURELLA, in his official capacity as
Senior Official Performing the Duties of
the Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in
his official capacity as Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; TODD
BLANCHE, in his official capacity as
Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice,
Respondents.
NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:
On September 9, 2026, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents
arrested and detained petitioner V.A.S.R.1 when he appeared for an immigration check-in
1 Petitioner has moved to proceed under a pseudonym. See Mot. to Proceed under
Pseudonym, ECF No. 2. Upon consideration of the petition and petitioner’s motion and
memorandum of law, the Court finds that petitioner’s interest in anonymity outweighs the
public interest in disclosure and any prejudice to respondents. See Sealed Petitioner v.
Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the motion is
granted.
appointment. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) ¶¶ 2, 6, ECF No. 1.2 Petitioner is
currently being detained by respondents at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in
Brooklyn, New York. Pet. ¶ 6. Petitioner now petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pet. 1. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is allegedly a citizen of Ecuador. Pet. ¶ 8. He entered the United States
without inspection on November 16, 2022, when he was 17 years old. Pet. ¶ 3; Gov’t Letter
dated Oct. 7, 2026 (“Gov’t Letter”) at 1, ECF No. 8. After a short period of detention, he
was released on humanitarian parole on November 17, 2022. Gov’t Letter 1; Pet. ¶ 3. That
parole expired on January 17, 2023, and was not renewed. Gov’t Letter 1–2. Following his
2022 release, petitioner settled with his mother in New York, attending school online and
working in construction. Pet. ¶ 23.
On August 17, 2026, petitioner received a letter from ICE instructing him to attend
a “check in” appointment on September 9, 2026. Pet. ¶ 28; Gov’t Letter 2. When petitioner
arrived for the appointment, he was immediately taken into custody. Pet. ¶ 30; Gov’t Letter
2. Petitioner has been in ICE custody since that arrest. Pet. ¶ 31; Gov’t Letter 2–3. He is
currently being held at MDC. Pet. ¶ 31; Gov’t Letter 3.
Petitioner commenced the instant action on October 1, 2026, by filing a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. See Pet. The next day, the Court issued an order directing
respondents to submit a letter stating: (1) the statutory provision(s) under which
respondents assert the authority to detain petitioner; and (2) whether the Second Circuit’s
2 Throughout this Order, page numbers for docket filings refer to the page numbers
assigned in ECF filing headers.
decision in Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026) controls, or whether
otherwise there is any material basis to distinguish the instant case from this Court’s prior
decisions in Y- C- v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-06558, 2025 WL 3653496 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025),
Crespo Tacuri v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-06896, 2026 WL 35569 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2026),
Terrero v. Tsoukaris, No. 26-cv-00869, 2026 WL 607917 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2026), Meza
v. Francis, No. 26-cv-02722, 2026 WL 1734903 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2026), R.J.S.R v.
Mullin, No. 26-cv-03611, 2026 WL 1803649 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2026), Menjivar v.
Genalo, No. 26-cv-2506, ECF No. 16 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2026), R.M.R. v. Genalo, No. 26-
cv-04358, 2026 WL 2211009 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2026), or any other decision of this Court.
Scheduling Order 2, ECF No. 5.
On October 7, 2026, the government filed a response stating that petitioner is
subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) because he was apprehended shortly
after crossing the border in 2022 and was released on parole under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A). Gov’t Letter 3. The government further argues that da Cunha is
“distinguishable” because it did not address noncitizens who were released into the
country on parole. Gov’t Letter 3. Despite that contention, however, the government
acknowledges that this Court has previously held that noncitizens released on parole that
later lapses cannot be subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) under da
Cunha. Gov’t Letter 4 (citing Mora Alvarez v. Blanche, 2026 WL 2295454, at *2-3
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2026); R.M.R. v. Genalo, 2026 WL 2211009 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2026)).
Although petitioner has not yet filed a reply, “[t]he Court issues the instant Order
before [p]etitioner’s deadline to file a reply in light of its obligation to determine the facts,
and dispose of habeas petitions expeditiously, as law and justice require.” Ccorihuaman v.
Genalo, No. 26-cv-00554, 2026 WL 328983, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2026) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2243).3
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 authorizes federal district courts “to grant a writ of habeas corpus
whenever a petitioner is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.’” Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3)). Under Section 2241, “[f]ederal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas
corpus claims by noncitizens challenging the constitutionality of their detention.”
Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, 811 F. Supp. 3d 274, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (citing Velasco
Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020)).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends, among other arguments, that he is being detained in violation
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., Pet. ¶¶ 34–38, 41–47. The government concedes that “this case is
not materially distinguishable” from this Court’s decisions in Mora Alvarez and R.M.R.
Gov’t Letter 4.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated by this Court in Mora Alvarez and R.M.R.,
which the Court incorporates here by reference, the Court concludes that petitioner is
being unlawfully detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and in violation of his rights to due
process under the Fifth Amendment.4 See Mora Alvarez, 2026 WL 2295454, at *2–3;
3 Throughout this Order, the Court omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes, and
citations, and adopts all alterations, unless otherwise indicated.
4 For the avoidance of doubt, the Court does not address any legal or factual
argument that respondents do not raise here or did not raise in their briefing in Mora
R.M.R., 2026 WL 2211009, at *2–5; see also Olivier v. Mullin, 2026 WL 2350274, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2026); Rivera Casallos v. Maldonado, 2026 WL 2267789, at *4–5
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2026); Robles Escalona v. Warden, MDC Brooklyn, 2026 WL 2018505,
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2026).
Moreover, as this Court discussed in R.M.R., respondents’ argument that da Cunha
is distinguishable, Gov’t Letter 3, ignores the reality that petitioner here is not “requesting
lawful entry into the United States—he is, in fact, already in the country, and has been for
multiple years[.]” R.M.R., 2026 WL 2211009, at *3. Like the noncitizen in da Cunha, and
the Court’s prior opinions in R.M.R. and others, petitioner has built a life with his mother
here. In other words, “[h]e is ... no longer seeking admission; he is here.” Robles Escalona,
2026 WL 2018505, at *3. Thus, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) cannot apply to him. da Cunha, 175
F.4th at 74.
“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention” and “[t]he typical
remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 693
(2008). The Court therefore deems petitioner entitled to immediate release.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that petitioner’s detention violates the
INA and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. The petition for a writ
of habeas corpus is therefore GRANTED.
Alvarez and R.M.R. See Catania v. United Fed’n of Tchrs., No. 21-cv-01257, 2023 WL
1962533, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2023) (“Courts generally do not decide issues not raised
by the parties.” (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 482 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring)));
see also Russell v. Bd. of Plumbing Exam’rs, 1 F. App’x 38, 41 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary
order) (“We are, however, troubled by the district court reaching an issue neither pressed
nor briefed before it, and urge against such a practice in the future.”).
Respondents are directed to release petitioner from custody within 24 hours of this
Order and file a letter on the docket no later than 12:00 p.m. on October 9, 2026 certifying
their compliance. The Court further orders that petitioner shall not be re-detained without
notice and an opportunity to be heard at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker, where the government will have the burden of showing that his detention
is authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). For the avoidance of doubt, the Court concludes
that petitioner “is entitled to release from the unlawful restrictions on his liberty—which
means, in the circumstances here, restoration of . . . the status quo ante.” Khabazha v. ICE,
No. 25-cv-05279, 2025 WL 3281514, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025) (ordering
government to release petitioner from “restrictions on his liberty imposed as a result of his
unlawful [detention] . . . including the ankle monitor and reporting requirements”); see
also Ccorihuaman, 2026 WL 328983, at *2. This Order includes “an injunction barring
deprivation of [petitioner’s] rights without the requisite procedural protections.”
Khabazha, 2025 WL 3281514, at *8; see also Ccorihuaman, 2026 WL 328983, at *2.
The government’s October 7, 2026, deadline to file a full response and petitioner’s
October 9, 2026, deadline to file a reply are hereby adjourned sine die.
Should the petitioner seek an award of reasonable fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, he may file a letter application on the docket within thirty days of
this Order. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment consistent with
the Order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Natasha C. Merle
NATASHA C. MERLE
United States District Judge
Dated: October 8, 2026
Brooklyn, New York